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 This dissertation seeks to discern the impact of social housing on public health in the 
cities of Glasgow, Scotland and Baltimore, Maryland in the twentieth century. Additionally, 
this dissertation seeks to compare the impact of social housing policy implementation in 
both cities, to determine the efficacy of social housing as a tool of public health betterment. 
This is accomplished through the exposition and evaluation of the housing and health trends 
of both cities over the course of the latter half of the twentieth century. Both the cities of 
Glasgow and Baltimore had long struggled with both overcrowded slum districts and 
relatively unhealthy populations. Early commentators had noticed the connection between 
insanitary housing and poor health, and sought a solution to both of these problems. 
Beginning in the 1940s, housing reform advocates (self-dubbed ‘housers) pressed for the 
development of social housing, or municipally-controlled housing for low-income persons, 
to alleviate the problems of overcrowded slum dwellings in both cities. The impetus for 
social housing was twofold: to provide affordable housing to low-income persons and to 
provide housing that would facilitate healthy lives for tenants. Whether social housing 
achieved these goals is the crux of this dissertation. In the immediate years following the 
Second World War, social housing was built en masse in both cities. Social housing provided 
a reprieve from slum housing for both working-class Glaswegians and Baltimoreans. In 
Baltimore specifically, social housing provided accommodation for the city’s Black residents, 
who found it difficult to occupy housing in White neighbourhoods. As the years progressed, 
social housing developments in both cities faced unexpected problems. In Glasgow, stable 
tenant flight (including both middle class and skilled artisan workers)+ resulted in a 
concentration of poverty in the city’s housing schemes, and in Baltimore, a flight of White 
tenants of all income levels created a new kind of state subsidized segregated housing stock. 
The implementation of high-rise tower blocks in both cities, once heralded as a symbol of 
housing modernity, also faced increased scrutiny in the 1960s and 1970s. During the period 
of 1940-1980, before policy makers in the United States began to eschew social housing for 
subsidized private housing vouchers and community based housing associations had truly 
taken off in Britain, public health professionals conducted academic studies of the impact of 
social housing tenancy on health. Their findings provide the evidence used to assess the 
second objective of social housing provision, as outlined above.  Put simply, while social 
housing units were undoubtedly better equipped than slum dwellings in both cities, the 
public health investigations into the impact of rehousing slum dwellers into social housing 
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 This dissertation has used a variety of primary and secondary sources to bolster its 
arguments, all of which are included in the bibliography. However, it should be noted that 
there is a slight irregularity regarding the referencing of certain primary documents 
gathered from the University of Baltimore Langsdale Library Special Collections. As the 
recipient of a Lord Kelvin Adam Smith doctoral fellowship, I was awarded a generous travel 
fund to conduct archival research in Baltimore, Maryland. When I arrived in Baltimore, I 
found hundreds upon hundreds of useful documents in the Langsdale Library, and 
subsequently created high-resolution scans of all these documents to analyze when I 
returned to Glasgow. Again, all of these documents are located at the University of 
Baltimore’s Langsdale Library. In the bibliography, I have included the author of each 
document, the title of each document, and the collection series of each document cited. In 
many instances, however, I have omitted the box number and folder number for these 
documents. This error was due to both the time restraints of my archival research trips and 
my decision to scan each document that I have referenced.  
 
 While this is slightly irregular, I have no doubt that future researchers will be able to 
find and locate the documents that I have referenced from the Langsdale Library. I have 
included enough information in the bibliography for researchers to locate these documents. 
Additionally, the University of Baltimore lists most of their archival documents on the 
Langsdale Library website. Finally, as I have scanned copies of every primary source 
document I have referenced, any future scholar could contact me for a copy of any 
document referenced in this dissertation. It is my hope that future scholars do consult the 
primary source documents that I have referenced in my dissertation in the pursuit of 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 Perhaps the most interesting types of cities for historians are port cities. Port 
cities develop early in most civilizations, develop organically for commercial 
purposes, and are integral to the growth of nations.1 Given their unique qualities and 
especial importance for economic development, they are integral to any historical 
analysis of a society.2 This historical importance provides the context for a 
comparative study of the port cities of Glasgow and Baltimore. Specifically, this 
dissertation seeks to understand the relationship between social housing tenancy 
and public health in each city. Ultimately, the point of this study is to fill a niche in 
public health historiography, of the historical correlation between housing and 
health has been commented on previously but the subject has not been exhausted. 
The primary focus of this dissertation will be an examination of the development of 
social housing in both cities after WWII and social housings’ impact on the health of 
tenants. This task will be accomplished in the succeeding chapters through the 
examination of a wide variety of documents related to housing and municipal politics 
in addition to an examination of medical literature throughout the years. The 
purpose of this introductory chapter, however, is to delineate the purpose of this 
study, examine the relevant historiography on the subject, and explain 
methodological approaches that will be employed in the dissertation’s narrative.  
 
Admittedly, the two cities of Glasgow and Baltimore seem an odd pair for 
comparison. Yet a good historical comparison must involve subjects that are similar 
enough to justify a comparison, but different enough to make such a comparison 
interesting. The housing narratives of the cities of Glasgow and Baltimore fit this 
criteria, and are thus fit for comparison. The two cities, as will be discussed in this 
                                                 
1 Paul Bairoch, Cities and Economic Development: From the Dawn of History to the Present (University 
of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 213-237 ; David Ormord, The Rise of Commercial Empires: England and the 
Netherlands in the Age of Mercantilism,  1650-1770 (Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 10-17; EA 
Wrigley, ‘The Growth of Population in Eighteenth-Century England: A Conundrum Resolved’, Past and 
Present, No. 98 (Feb., 1983): 121-150. 
2 Peggy Liss and Franklin Knight, ‘Introduction’, Atlantic Port Cities: Economy, Culture, and Society in 
the Atlantic World, 1650-1850 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1991), p. 1; Jacob Price, 
‘Economic Functions and the Growth of American Port Towns in the Eighteenth Century’ Perspectives 
in American History, No.  8 (1974): 121-186. 
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chapter and the next, share very similar characteristics. The major qualitative 
difference between the cities is that Baltimore has always maintained a large Black 
community. As far as public health trends are concerned, both cities have struggled 
(and continue to struggle) with higher than average mortality and morbidity rates; 
relative to their neighbours both Glasgow and Baltimore are unhealthy. The term 
‘Glasgow Effect’ is applied to the Scottish city as a shorthand to describe all the 
public health problems in the city; Glasgow has higher morbidity and mortality rates 
than cities suffering from comparable socioeconomic deprivation, and there is no 
settled consensus to explain the level of excess mortality and morbidity.3 While the 
term ‘Baltimore Effect’ is not used commonly, the city exhibits the same public 
health characteristics as Glasgow, despite several positive influencing factors 
(Baltimore is located in Maryland, one of the United States’ wealthiest states, and is 
close to Washington, DC, a very healthy and wealthy metropolis in its own right). 
Furthermore, both cities have struggled to house their respective populations, and 
consequently both cities turned to social housing in the mid twentieth century to 
relieve their housing pressures. Glasgow and Baltimore, then, are an apt choice of 
case studies for this dissertation. With similar characteristics, and a shared 
enthusiasm for social housing, Glasgow and Baltimore provide the perfect setting to 
discern the impact of social housing on health. This dissertation seeks to shed light 
on the ever-looming question of the relationship between housing and health, with a 
special emphasis on the role of social housing. Hopefully, the dissertation will 
provide enough evidence to support the argument that, at least in the two cities 
studied, rehousing slum tenants into social housing developments had a noticeable 
impact on the public health. 
 
What is the Question, and Why Ask It? 
 
 The question that needs to be addressed is: what exactly is the relationship 
between housing and health? Does housing quality have any kind of an impact on 
persons’ health, or is housing tenancy irrelevant in assessing occupants’ health? 
                                                 
3 L Gray and A H Leyland, ‘A Multilevel Analysis of Diet and Socio-Economic Status in Scotland: 
Investigating the “Glasgow Effect”, Public Health Nutrition, Vol. 12, No. 9 (2009): 1351-1358. 
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More specifically, this dissertation asks: did rehousing slum dwellers in Glasgow and 
Baltimore into social housing have any positive or negative impact on their health? 
While public health professionals have long investigated the connection between 
housing and health, there have been fewer studies focusing specifically on the 
impact of social housing on tenant health. This is an unfortunate gap in historical 
research, as many of the earliest proponents of social housing believed that the 
housing form would improve tenant health.4 Considering this, it is a worthwhile 
endeavour to discern whether social housing had any impact on public health during 
the post-war period. It is the thesis of this dissertation that rehousing slum dwellers 
into social housing in both cities had a beneficial effect on tenant health, and that 
given the public health benefits of social housing tenancy the social housing 
experiment of the latter half of the twentieth century should be viewed as a 
successful public health intervention. The dissertation seeks to prove this by 
completing the following objectives. Firstly, the dissertation will elaborate upon why 
Glasgow and Baltimore are especially suitable for such a comparison, namely by 
highlighting their shared problems with slum housing and poor health relative to 
similar cities. Secondly, the dissertation will review the public health motivations for 
the development of social housing in both cities. Thirdly, the dissertation will detail 
the implementation of social housing policy and trace the municipal and central 
governmental arguments that social housing would improve tenant health. Finally, 
over two chapters, the dissertation will review medical evidence, in the form of 
cross-sectional and longitudinal studies that present data on the health impact of 
rehousing in both cities. To distil this study into a single sentence: the central aim is 
to elucidate social housing tenancy as a key factor of public health in two similar but 
distinct cities. Such a study requires a preliminary definition of what is meant by 
‘health’, however. For conceptions of health have varied widely throughout history 
and what criteria specifically constitute ‘health’ or ‘public health’ remain fluid. In 
order to fulfil this definition, however, an examination of the key models of the 
variety of social determinants of health is needed.  
                                                 
4 Russell Lopez, The Built Environment and Public Health (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2012), pp. 35-
36; Russell Lopez, Building American Public Health: Urban Planning, Architecture, and the Quest for 
Better Health in the United States (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 100-102. 
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Methodology and Analysis? 
 
 Like nearly all dissertations in social and economic history, this study will 
derive conclusions from primary sources. The sources used that relate primarily to 
housing will be somewhat predictable to academic historians. The second chapter on 
housing and health trends in both cities before the twentieth century relies mostly 
on municipal documents and historical written accounts of life in both cities, along 
with citations from established secondary literature. The third chapter on the 
intellectual foundation of social housing relies on the published secondary works of 
noted housing academics and intellectuals, who dubbed themselves ‘housers’. The 
fourth and sixth chapters detail the social and political history of social housing in 
both cities, and again rely mainly on municipal publications along with governmental 
reports, departmental reports, academic studies, and newspapers. The fifth and 
seventh chapters, however, which examine medical literature to determine the 
public health impact of social housing specifically, are what constitute the most 
substantive and concerted content of the dissertation. The most important bodies of 
medical literature examined are the longitudinal and cross-sectional studies. The 
importance of longitudinal studies in social-historical research cannot be 
overestimated. In effect, longitudinal studies are academic investigations that 
involves the repeated observation of the same variables over a period of time to 
record change-over-time. In the discipline of public health research, longitudinal 
studies are often conducted to observe any changes in health in a study group of 
participants that are impacted by some variable versus a control group. Cross-
sectional studies, which are also reviewed in this dissertation, are very similar to 
longitudinal studies – though as cross-sectional studies collect data from a study and 
control group at one specific point in time, the results are more open to criticism due 
to changes in variables. For this reason, longitudinal studies are very useful because 
of their temporal aspect: while cross-sectional studies can point to static health 
differences in different groups, longitudinal studies allow the particular variables 
that determine health differences to be identified and thus elaborated upon further. 
While there are justifiable reasons for reviewing cross-sectional studies as well (if 
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only because sometimes the most pertinent data is contained in imperfect studies), 
longitudinal studies are particularly suitable sources for medical history.  
 
 Yet medical data cannot evaluate itself and strew itself into a compelling 
historical narrative. This is of course the duty of historians, but there are different 
styles of analysis that lend themselves to facilitate different conclusions. Indeed, 
historian Christopher Hamlin has noted that ‘traditional medical historiography 
caricatures events and investigations as wrong and wrongheaded if they seem not to 
belong to the mainline of medical advance’ but that seeing as how medical history is 
in part an assessment of health policies, this is unfair.5 For instance, in writing on the 
historical medical interpretations of air, Hamlin finds that while there was great 
interest on the subject among historians in the mid nineteenth century, current 
historians fail to include their past works in contemporary historiography. According 
to Hamlin, this suggests that: 
 
‘it is not beyond the pale to project the high points of a counternarrative of medical history in which 
environmental determinants of health would not be isolated in latter-day breakthroughs, but would 
belong instead to a trajectory, underrecognized by historians and environmental health researchers 
alike, which is in its own way at least as robust as those that have been recognized as the mainline of 
medical history.’6 
 
Hamlin’s prediction that the importance of the environmental determinants of 
health may be neglected by medical historians is a stark warning to more social 
research oriented historians; it is easy to forget that public health history is still in a 
growing phase, and the direction of public health historiography is still fluid.7 For this 
reason, it is important to understand how medical data derived from primary 
sources will be evaluated and woven into an historical narrative. Contemporary 
public health academics and professionals understand that health is not simply the 
                                                 
5 Christopher Hamlin, ‘Surgeon Reginald Orton and the Pathology of Deadly Air: The Contest for 
Context in Environmental Health’, Toxic Airs: Body, Place, and Planet in Historical Perspective 
(University of Pittsburgh Press, 2014), p. 23 
6 Ibid., p. 36. 
7 Christopher Hamlin, ‘Chapter 23: Public Health’, The Oxford Handbook of the History of Medicine 
(Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 413-424. 
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absence of disease. Experts now agree that there are many factors that influence 
health, both internal and external. While personal decisions and innate/learned 
behaviours contribute to health, cultural and socioeconomic factors outside personal 
control also influence personal health. Not all factors impact health equally, 
however, and certain influences impact health more severely than others. Perhaps 
one of the most simple, distilled model of these factors is the one presented by 
Dahlgren and Whitehead. Dahlgren and Whitehead emphasized the concentric 
nature of health determinants, and presented the variety of factors that influence 




Public Health Skills: A Practical Guide for Nurses and Public Health Practitioners 
(Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), eds Lesley Coles and Elizabeth Porter, p. 11. 
 
While the model may seem overly simplistic, it is useful in assessing the different 
levels of severity that different external factors impact personal health.8 Yet while 
the Dahlgren and Whitehead rainbow model is malleable and adaptable, it was 
preceded by the more concrete and defined health determinant prescriptions of the 
Black Report. First published in 1980, political pressure delayed the release of the 
report as the newly elected Conservative government was afraid of public outcry at 
the severity of social health inequalities.9 The Report, commissioned by the 
                                                 
8 Helen Aveyard, Pam Sharp, and Mary Woolliams, A Beginner’s Guide to Critical Thinking and Writing 
in Health and Social Care (Berkshire: Open University Press, 2011), p. 128. 
9 Amanda Killoran and Michael Kelly, Evidence Based Public Health: Effectiveness and Efficiency 
(Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 456. 
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preceding Labour government led by James Callaghan, focused on data stemming 
from the early 1970s, and essentially highlighted a widening health gap between 
higher and lower income earners. Low income earners experienced much poorer 
health than higher income earners, and the Report blamed this on inherent social 
class inequalities in the social determinants of health.10 Furthermore, the Report 
argued that the British welfare state as was then structured did little to counteract 
these structural inequalities. The Report thus strongly recommended that increases 
be made to child benefits, maternity benefits, and disabled benefit allowances. 
Significantly, the Report also endorsed increases in the provision of sheltered 
housing and home improvement grants, and argued that adequate housing was a 
necessary precondition for good health.11 Due to its wide and sweeping judgements 
and suggestions (notwithstanding clandestine attempts to diminish its impact), the 
Black Report has become heralded as an historic document pointing to the causes of 
poor health and the symptoms of social inequality. While the Black Report was 
published at the end of this dissertation’s focus study period, an understanding of 
the importance of the Black Report is essential to gauge the structural health 
problems that befell British (and indeed American) working populations who, 
according to the Report, were more likely to inhabit inferior housing. Again, although 
the Black Report was published in 1980, it highlighted the severity of external factors 
that are now known to determine health. Nearly 20 years later, the Acheson Report 
examined the claims of the Black Report, and concurred that housing was one of the 
key determinants of health.12 Published in 1998, the Acheson Report recommended 
increasing the availability of social housing for lower income persons, improving the 
quality of social housing units, and improving policy measures aimed at helping 
people on benefits in order to reduce health inequalities by class.13 While the Black 
Report was largely scuttled by the Thatcher government of 1980, the Acheson 
                                                 
10 Shaping Health Policy: Case Study Methods and Analysis (Bristol: The Policy Press, 2012), eds Mark 
Exworthy et al, p. 293. 
 
11 Peter Barritt, Humanity in Healthcare: The Heart and Soul of Medicine (Oxford: Radcliffe Publishing, 
2005), p. 36. 
12 Rob Baggott, Public Health: Policy and Politics (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 2nd ed, p.375. 
13 Sheena Asthana and Joyce Halliday, What Works in Tackling Health Inequalities? Pathways, Policies, 
and Practice through Lifecourse (Bristol: The Policy Press, 2006), p. 71. 
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Report was published under the auspices of the Blair government in 1998 and well 
received. Indeed, even the authors of the Black Report wrote in support of the 
Acheson Report’s objectives.14 Thus, an understanding of models of health such as 
those put forth by Dahlgren and Whitehead, Black, and Acheson are essential for 
drawing the connection between poor housing and poor health. Health, while 
partially dependent on individual lifestyle choices, is significantly determined by 
external social and environmental factors. Likewise, while the more contemporary 
models of health are extremely useful as a concise directive of the factors that affect 
the public health, there is a large and varied corpus of medical and social science 
literature that discusses the relationship between housing and health. Indeed, while 
the contemporary body of literature continues to grow, the historiography of 
housing and health works extends far back before the 1980s. A review of the 
academic opinions on social housing and health, and in particular the relationship 
between social housing and health, will be useful context for this dissertation.   
 
Historiography and the Impact of Residualization  
 
The twentieth-century commentators on housing and health came from a 
variety of backgrounds, but were united by a shared appreciation of the importance 
of housing to health. While the task of elucidating such a relationship might seem 
fluid, determining the relationship between the built environment and public health 
is an essential task for historians and social scientists. While there have been fewer 
attempts to discern the impact of social housing specifically on health, scholars have 
tackled the broader issue of housing’s relationship to health. Indeed, since Nathan 
Straus’s appointment to lead the newly established United States Housing Authority 
in 1937, and Aneurin Bevan’s appointment to head the Ministry of Health (then 
responsible for housing matters) in 1945, both the American and British 
governments have stressed the need for the provision of healthy, state supported 
housing options.15 Since the 1930s, then, a historiography of housing and health has 
                                                 
14 Peter Townsend, ‘Better Benefits for Health’, (Bristol: The Policy Press, 2010), pp. 395-396. 
15 See: Nathan Straus, The Seven Myths of Housing (New York: Knopf, 1945); Nicklaus Thomas-
Symonds, Nye: The Political Life of Aneurin Bevan (London: IB Taurus, 2015), pp. 42-44. 
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arisen, and a small but steady amount of research on the correlation between 
housing and health has been written over the years. Yet regardless of the attention 
the issue has received over the years, the question remains a complex one, and the 
relationship between housing quality and public health remained nebulous. Consider 
the following description of the problems in defining the correlation between 
housing and health by the New York Academy of Medicine:  
 
It is generally believed that housing exerts an important influence on health. True, it has 
never been possible to devise techniques of investigation that would permit demonstration 
of the effect of housing apart from the social conditions with which it is associated. 
Malnutrition, neglect of symptoms, and inability to obtain medical care may go along with 
crowded and insanitary living quarters as underlying reasons for ill health, and they in turn 
may be the result of poverty, lack of education, or low intelligence. But among this complex 
conditions conducive to ill health, housing is acknowledged to be a definite factor.16 
 
The quotation above is quite telling, for although medical professionals were 
convinced that there was a connection between poor housing and poor health, they 
were confounded how to illustrate this connection without succumbing to criticism 
that other external factors influenced poor health. Consequently, at the middle of 
the twentieth century published studies that considered poor housing as a significant 
determinant of health were infrequent. One annotated bibliography on existing 
studies of housing and health noted that ‘although there is an abundance of 
literature on the merits of good housing, there is a rarity of systematic studies 
pertaining to a direct link between housing and health with regard to specific 
disease.’17 Clearly, a demand existed for such studies, as evidenced by the annotated 
bibliographical reference lists published by the United States government. Noted 
housing academic Edith Elmer Wood produced Introduction to Housing: Facts and 
Principles for the nascent United States Housing Authority (USHA) in 1939, which 
covered the economic and social effects of poor housing. The work explained the 
costs of preventable mortality and morbidity, juvenile delinquency, and excessive 
                                                 
16 Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine, ‘Report of the Subcommittee on Housing of the 
Committee of Public Health Relations’ (June, 1954),Vol. 30, No. 6: 494.  
17 United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Housing and Health: Annotated 
References (Washington, DC: GPO, October, 1959), pp. i.  
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property taxes. The monograph argued for social housing as a solution against the 
deleterious effects of slum life, although at this point very little social housing 
existed in the United States.18 Rumney and Shuman’s A Study of the Social Effects of 
Public Housing in Newark, New Jersey examined three housing projects in Newark 
and compared the incidence of disease, juvenile delinquency, and crime with 
adjacent slum tenants. The study found that social housing tenants benefitted from 
rehousing; however their findings did not distinguish greatly between public health 
outcomes and/or increased social mobility.19 The confusion over the exact impact of 
housing on health did not prevent stern warnings about the dangers of slum 
housing, however. At a 1947 meeting of the American Public Health Association, 
former New York City housing official Charles Ascher advised health officers to take a 
greater interest in housing code enforcement; his rationale was: 
  
The germ theory of disease as a basis for public intervention suggests the leading role of the 
health officer in framing these regulations. But structural safety, fire prevention, the 
avoidance of moral hazards, the promotion of recreation, and even aesthetics call for the 
blending of social science and engineering skills. Within the past two years we have had 
numerous instances of the ready cooperation of health officers, housing officers, and 
planning officers in the use of techniques of appraisal developed by our Subcommittee on 
the Hygiene of Housing. It would be a great contribution if health officers in their home 
communities would work quietly for the setting up of a committee within the city 
government on which these officers, the city engineer, and the city attorney were 
represented, to deal with housing regulation.’20 
 
The idea that health was inextricably linked to housing, therefore, became more and 
more mainstream as the years progressed. The task of determining the relationship 
between housing and health became viewed as so important that the United States 
government commissioned several annotated bibliographies of housing and health 
                                                 
18 Edith Wood, Introduction to Housing: Facts and Principles (Washington, DC: GPO, 1939).  
19 J Rumney and Sara Shuman, A Study of the Social Effects of Public Housing in Newark, New Jersey 
(Newark, NJ: Housing Authority of the City of Newark, 1944). The study did compare disease incidence 
of social housing tenants, slum tenants, and reviewed a corollary study on Manchester rehousing 
schemes, See pp. 57-62. 
20 Charles Ascher, ‘Regulation for Housing: Hints for Health Officers’, American Journal of Public 
Health Vol. 37 (May, 1947): 512.  
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studies in the latter half of the twentieth century.21 British and Scottish housing 
intellectuals, of course, composed their own bibliographies of housing and health 
studies.22 Even the World Health Organization (WHO) compiled an annotated 
bibliography on the subject.23 Still, slum housing plagues both developed and 
developing societies, and there is room for more research on the relationship 
between housing and health. Thus, there is intellectual room for further discussions 
of the relationship between housing (and in particular, social housing) and health.  
 
 Regardless, a contemporary historiography of the development of social 
housing in Britain and the United States does exist, and it would be a disservice to 
readers not to include a review of existing literature as a preface before an analysis 
of primary source documents. As noted, there is a dearth of literature that 
specifically tackles the question of whether social housing improved tenant health. 
There is, however, a large of body of literature that details the trends that influenced 
the public health of social housing communities in both countries. In particular, both 
British and American housing historians have stressed the importance of 
residualization in understanding the development of social housing in both societies. 
Broadly, the concept of residualization refers to the transitioning in the purpose and 
function of social housing over time. Put more simply, in both Scotland and the 
United States, social housing developments gradually transitioned (though at 
different speeds and for different reasons) towards accommodating lower-income 
                                                 
21 For an overview of housing and health studies, See: Elizabeth Carey, Bibliography on Public Housing 
and Related Subjects for the Use of Teachers and Students (Washington, DC: GPO, 1949); DHEW, 
Housing and Health: Annotated References (Washington, DC: GPO, October, 1959); Alvin Schorr, 
Slums and Social Insecurity: An Appraisal of the Effectiveness of Housing Policies in Helping Eliminate 
Poverty in the United States (Washington, DC: GPO, 1963); HUD, Information Sources in Housing and 
Community Development (Washington, DC: GPO, 1972); HUD, Housing in the Seventies: Working 
Papers (Washington, DC: GPO, 1976), Vols. 1 & 2; Lawrence Hinkle and William Loring, The Effect of 
the Man-Made Environment on Health and Behavior (Washington, DC: GPO, 1977).  
22 RL Reiss, Municipal and Private Enterprise Housing (London: JM Dent, 1945); John Lambert et al, 
Housing Policy and the State: Allocation, Access, and Control (London: Macmillan, 1978); Alan Murie, 
Housing Inequality and Deprivation (London: Heinemann Educational, 1983); DS Byrne, Housing and 
Health: The Relationship Between Housing Conditions and the Health of Council Tenants (London: 
Gower, 1986); Tony Newson, Housing Policy: An International Bibliography (London: Mansell, 1986);  
Tony Newson, A Housing Bibliography (Birmingham: Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, 1988); 
Health and Social Services: the New Relationship (London: Policy Institutes, 1991), ed. Isobel Allen. 
23 AE Martin et al, Housing, The Housing Environment, and Health: An Annotated Bibliography 
(Geneva: World Health Organization, 1976). 
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tenant groups in successive years. That is, as wealthier social housing tenants move 
to proverbial greener pastures, lower-income tenants take their place, come to 
represent a larger share of the population of a social housing development.24 Thus, 
residualization describes the process of social housing transitioning from subsidized 
housing for a broad spectrum of socioeconomic groups into subsidized housing for 
the very poor exclusively – becoming in effect the ‘housing of last resort’.25 
Furthermore, historians on both sides of the Atlantic have argued that in both 
countries social housing has played the role of a residualized form of tenure, though 
not for identical reasons or at the same time.   
 
In Britain, historians have delineated the residualization process in social 
housing developments. Davies has argued that the process of residualization was 
somewhat politically contrived; the Conservative Party position since the 1920s has 
been that social housing should be designed to be a temporary step onto the private 
property ladder, and measures were adopted to discourage housing complacency.26  
Jones has focused much of his research on residualization in social housing in English 
cities.27 Jones has further argued that haphazard tenant allocation policies and the 
premature sale of social housing units expedited the process of residualization in 
English social housing.28 In Scotland, Robertson and Serpa have contended that 
social housing was more successful due to its ubiquity. They note that, by the mid-
1970s, two thirds of Scottish families lived in social housing, whereas only one third 
of English and Welsh families lived in social housing at that time. Much like Davies 
and Jones, however, Robertson and Serpa maintain that conservative political policy 
helped expedite the process of residualization – contending that the promotion of 
private home ownership (along with the transfer of municipally controlled social 
                                                 
24 Social Housing in Ireland: A Study of Success, Failure, and Lessons Learned (Dublin: Oak Tree Press, 
1999), ed. Tony Fahey, p. 20.  
25 Peter Malpass and Alan Murie, Housing Policy and Practice (London: Macmillan, 1994), pp. 21-22; 
Richard Martin Kirwin, Strategies for Social Housing and Social Integration in Cities (Paris: 
Organisation of Economic Co-Operation and Development, 1996), p. 149.   
26 Kate Davies, Housing Poverty: From Social Breakdown to Social Mobility (London: Centre for Social 
Justice, 2008), p. 7. 
27 Ben Jones, ‘Slum clearance, Privatization, and Residualization: the practices and politics of council 
housing in mid-twentieth century Britain’, 20th Century British History, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Dec., 2010): 510. 
28 Ibid., p.  
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housing to non-profit housing associations) resulted in an exponential decline of 
social housing tenancy in Scotland.29 Issues relating to the extent of the impact of 
specific government policies on the decline of social housing in Britain are not wholly 
settled. However, Malpass has argued that the residualization phenomenon cannot 
be attributed solely to housing policy. According to Malpass, the booming post-war 
economy in Britain produced a much greater desire for home ownership among the 
general public than Westminster could have possibly anticipated.30 In the late 1940s, 
it would have been difficult to imagine the dramatic rise in standard of living that 
would follow in the coming decades and the concomitant demand for 
homeownership. Moreover, Rogaly and Taylor have contended that haphazard slum 
clearance policies by British municipalities had a much greater impact than either 
housing policy or residualization trends.31 Pushing more slum dwellers into social 
housing encouraged many more stable tenants to leave; these tenants were more 
animated by desires for social segregation than home ownership.32  
 
What most historians of British social housing agree on is that residualization 
had a dramatic and negative effect on the sustainability of subsidized communities: 
both council housing schemes and later housing associations. Historians disagree, 
however, over the exact causes of residualization. While some are quick to place 
blame on Conservative government policies (namely the prioritization of quantity 
over quality in the early 1950s and Thatcher’s ‘right-to-buy’ scheme in the 1980s), 
others argue that housing policy had less influence on residualization trends than did 
general decennial increases in standards of living. Indeed, Forrest and Murie, two of 
the first scholars to address the issue of residualization, argued in the early 1980s 
that it was largely unfair to chastise politicians for not enacting policies that would 
have mitigated or slowed the flight of wealthier tenants out of social housing, for 
                                                 
29 Douglas Robertson and Regina Serpa, ‘Social Housing in Scotland’, Social Housing in Europe 
(Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Blackwell, 2014), eds Kathleen Scanlon, Christine Whitehead, and Melissa 
Arrigoitia, p. 47. 
30 Peter Malpass, ‘The Wobbly Pillar? Housing and the British Welfare State’, Journal of Social Policy, 
Vol. 32, No. 4 (Oct., 2003): 603.  
31 Ben Rogaly and Becky Taylor, Moving Histories of Class and Community: Identity, Place and 
Belonging in Contemporary England (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), p. 38-50. 
32 Ibid., p. 513. 
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few predicted the growth of the demand for homeownership in Britain during the 
1960s and 1970s.33 Furthermore, while in hindsight slum clearance programmes 
demolished housing units and severed families’ community ties – they were 
implemented with the best of intentions. In short, even the harshest critics of 
Conservative policy must concede that there were extraneous societal forces that 
helped cause residualization. Regardless, British social housing schemes were not 
viewed as the ‘housing of last resort’ for most of the twentieth century; greenbelt 
policies and slow housing construction limited the amount of private housing 
available and thus made social housing attractive to middle class Britons.34 While 
historians have noted that the character of social housing began to change during 
the 1950s, the most devastating effects of residualization were delayed until the 
1980s.35  Indeed, Pryke notes that in 1980 the average British social housing tenant’s 
income was 73% of the national average but by 1990 that figure had declined to 
45%.36 Yet despite eventual problems, it should be acknowledged that during the 
post-war period housing schemes played a vital role in sheltering Britain’s (and 
particularly Scotland’s) working population, and that while residualization ultimately 
had a deleterious effect on socioeconomic sustainability – these communities have 
been mostly viewed as pillars of the British welfare state.  
 
In contrast, residualization in American social housing developments 
occurred early and fiercely. Because of this, social housing developments in the 
United States declined into a state of decrepitude far earlier than they did in the 
United Kingdom and arguably to a much more severe degree.37 To be clear, while 
social housing in the United States was designed to serve a more concentrated 
                                                 
33 R Forrest and A Murie, ‘Residualization and Council Housing: Aspects of Changing Social Relations of 
Housing and Tenure’, Journal of Social Policy, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Oct., 1983): 453-468.   
34 Phil Jones and James Evans, Urban Regeneration in the UK (Los Angeles: Sage, 2008) p. 141; By 
Nancy Kleniewski and Alexander Thomas, Cities, Change, Conflict: A Political Economy of Urban Life 
(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2011), p. 123. 
35 Peter Sommerville, ‘Homelessness Policy in Britain’, Policy and Politics, Vol. 22, No. 3 (1994): 165. 
36 Michael Pryke, ‘Thinking Social Policy into Social Housing’, Unsettling Welfare: the Reconstruction of 
Social Policy (London: Routledge, 1998), eds Gordon Hughes and Gail Lewis, p. 131. 
37 Michael Harloe, The People’s Home: Social Rented Housing in Europe and America (Hoboken, NJL 
Wiley-Blackwell, 1995); Daniel Jones, Master’s of the Universe: Hayek, Friedman, and the Birth of 
Neoliberal Politics (Princeton University Press, 2012), pp. 326-327; Harjinder Singh, Housing in the 
Third World: Analyses and Solutions (New Delhi: Concept Publishing, 1992), pp. 280-281. 
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demographic (i.e. poor Whites and poor to working-class Blacks) than social housing 
in Britain to start with, residualization to the point of ‘housing of last resort’ 
happened much faster and to a much more severe degree in Baltimore than 
Glasgow. Beginning about a decade after most developments were built, by the 
middle 1950s American tenants were exiting housing projects in droves. Historians 
highlight a number of factors that explain this phenomenon. Firstly, as the industrial 
infrastructure of the United States was not damaged during the Second World War, 
the American economy experienced a long and sustained economic boom 
immediately after 1945. A housing construction boom, coupled with much cheaper 
land prices, facilitated a great exodus of both middle and working class persons to 
suburban developments. Additionally, as will be discussed in later chapters, the 
prospect of racial integration in social housing prompted White tenants to 
voluntarily leave developments for private housing options in neighbourhoods that 
remained segregated. While racial anxiety contributed to residualization in Britain as 
well, the impact of prejudice was more pronounced in social housing in the United 
States.38  
 
Again, the issue of race is central to American historians’ understanding of 
residualization. Sugrue has written extensively on the topic of ‘White flight’, and 
argued that not only was the process fuelled by racial anxiety, but helped exaggerate 
feelings of racial anxiety among urban Whites. Writing on the dramatic impact of 
White flight on Detroit, Sugrue contended that ‘In the postwar city, blackness and 
whiteness assumed a spatial definition’ and that as Blacks and Whites increasingly 
occupied distinct areas feelings of racial distrust only deepened.39 Sugrue elaborated 
that ‘The barriers that kept blacks confined to racially isolated, deteriorating inner-
city neighborhoods were largely invisible to white Detroiters. To the majority of 
white observers, visible poverty, overcrowding, and deteriorating houses were signs 
of individual moral deficiencies, not manifestations of structural inequalities.’40 
                                                 
38 James Gough, Adam Eisenschitz, and Andrew McCulloch, Spaces of Social Exclusion (London: 
Routledge, 2006), p. 104. 
39 Thomas Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 9. 
40 Ibid. 
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Furthermore, Landry found that while the American process of suburbanization 
began in the early 1940s for Whites, it did not begin until the late 1960s for Blacks. 
While this was partially due to differences in income levels, heightened racial animus 
towards Blacks prevented much of the Black middle class from purchasing suburban 
homes.41 Historians Pietela and Orser have covered this phenomenon in Baltimore 
specifically. Orser has maintained that historians have underplayed the direct racial 
motivations behind White flight; according to Orser, Whites left Baltimore and other 
American cities because they were apprehensive about living near Blacks – not 
because they wished to live suburban lives. Pietela echoed this idea twenty years 
later, writing that in Baltimore ‘Large-scale panic-induced racial turnover began 
during World War II, earlier by about a decade than in many other cities’.42 
Furthermore, in Baltimore, real estate interests were complicit in preventing Black 
homeownership; Pietela cites a newspaper article that notes that while a landlord 
might be content with a 10% percent annual return from a White tenant he will 
demand a 17 percent annual return when the property transitioned to Black 
occupancy.43 While historians may argue whether Whites leaving Baltimore and 
other American cities should be labelled as ‘White flight’ (or to use Marshall’s more 
euphemistic term ‘White avoidance’), the truth is that Whites took advantage of a 
political climate that allowed them to move out of cities into the suburbs.44   
 
The decision of Baltimorean White tenants to leave social housing, followed 
soon by middle class Black tenants, was the primary cause of the city’s housing 
projects’ descent into social decay. Again, while Glaswegian housing developments 
also declined into isolated pockets of socioeconomic depravation, the process 
occurred much more quickly in Baltimore. The reason is painfully clear: as 
                                                 
41 Bart Landry, The New Black Middle Class (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 1-
11. 
42 Antero Pietila, Not in My Neighborhood: How Bigotry Shaped a Great American City (Chicago: Ivan R 
Dee, 2010), p. xi. 
43 Ibid., p. 171. 
44 For a discussion of the differences between White flight and White avoidance, see: Harvey 
Marshall, ‘White Movement to the Suburbs: A Comparison of Explanations’, American Sociological 
Review, Vol. 44, No. 6 (December, 1979): 975-994; Harvey Molotoch, Managed Integration: Dilemmas 
of Doing Good in the City (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972), esp. chapters 7-8. 
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residualization occurred earlier and with more intensity in Baltimore than in 
Glasgow. Baltimorean social housing tenants of all income levels had more 
opportunities to leave for other housing options; indeed in 1955 tenants of the 
Armistead Gardens development in East Baltimore decided to purchase their homes 
collectively and reorganize their development as a cooperative in order to escape 
forced integration.45 In contrast, Glaswegian social housing families had fewer 
housing options and no conflicting ethnic factor, and thus residualization was 
delayed in the city. This however, is one of the primary reasons that social housing in 
Glasgow remained a more stable housing community for longer; while Baltimorean 
social housing projects had become destabilized by the early 1960s, Glasgow housing 
schemes were not viewed as the ‘housing of last resort’ until the later 1970s. The key 
idea to understand at this point is that social housing in the United States served a 
different social function for most of the period that this dissertation examines 
because residualization happened for different reasons and earlier than in Britain, 
and that there may well have been health consequences for occupants.   
 
Due to their interesting similarities, Glasgow and Baltimore are well suited 
case studies for an historical comparison. An examination of the historiography of 
social housing trends in the United States and United Kingdom has shown that the 
cities shared similar housing narratives, with the notable variable of race peppering 
different social housing trajectories. Municipal housing documentation will elucidate 
differences in housing policy. The examination of medical literature, mostly 
longitudinal and cross-sectional studies, will provide insight on health trends 
throughout the study time period. Qualitative analysis of the research findings will 
result in a better understanding of the social and public health implications of social 
housing. This analysis will be buoyed by an understanding of the models of the social 
and environmental determinants of health, mainly the ‘rainbow model’ as presented 
by Dahlgren and Whitehead and the proclamations of the Black Report. Hopefully, 
the succeeding chapters will shed light on the public health crises each city faces.  
                                                 
45 HABC, Quarterly Review, Autumn 1955, Vol. 8, No. 4 & Winter 1956, Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 2. 
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What needs to be explained now is how these cities developed as to face such 
similar public health challenges. An exposition of each city’s historical population, 
housing, and health trends before the twentieth seems pertinent in order to proceed 
with this dissertation’s expressed aim.  
 
Chapter 2: The Growth of Glasgow and Baltimore 
 
Early History and Geography of Glasgow and Baltimore: 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an exposition of each city’s early 
development and ultimately an examination of each city’s respective pre-WWII 
response to the housing and health problems of urbanization is necessary. Hopefully, 
this chapter will illustrate that both cities’ struggle to provide healthy housing 
stemmed from long before the dawn of the twentieth century. Indeed, the cities’ 
past share a number of traits. Glasgow’s origins as a settlement date before 
recorded history, but the city did not mature into an important commercial and 
industrial centre until it took full advantage of its maritime location. Baltimore’s 
success and expansion followed a similar path as Glasgow’s, thanks to its auspicious 
location on the Chesapeake Bay. Although the area around Baltimore had been 
farmed since 1661, Baltimore did not develop into a modern city until its port was 
established in 1706. The Port of Baltimore facilitated trade routes to Britain and 
South America to be established, and thus preceded the colony of Maryland’s 
affluence. The ‘land of pleasant living’ certainly owed its success to the causeway of 
the Patapsco and the natural bounties of the Chesapeake.46 The geographical 
benefits that connect all port cities around the world is not lost on urban historians, 
indeed many historians have argued that the modern commercial world and its 
consequent economic system owes its existence to the trade and interactions 
facilitated by port cities.47 However, historians have not yet woven the narrative that 
                                                 
46 ‘The land of pleasant living’ has been a credo for Baltimore and Maryland generally since the 1960s. 
The phrase originated as a motto for a locally brewed beer, National Bohemian. See: Gilbert Sandler, 
Glimpses of Jewish Baltimore (Charleston, SC: The History Press, 2012), p. 70. 
47 Paul Hohenberg and Lynn Lees, The Making of Urban Europe, 1000-1994 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1995), p. 161; Francois Gipouloux, The Asian Mediterranean: Port Cities and Trading 
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Glasgow and Baltimore have had particularly similar growth patterns, and that their 
industrialization and expansion share many characteristics. Both cities rose to 
economic prominence in the early nineteenth century. This economic expansion, in 
turn, led to population growth. This population growth, in turn, contributed to the 
development of poor urban environmental health, which in turn resulted in 
problems with public health. Glasgow’s and Baltimore’s shared growth, then, was 
not without its hurdles.   
 
Both Glasgow and Baltimore needed to expand their housing stock 
precipitously during the nineteenth century in order to accommodate more 
inhabitants. This last point may seem a bit obvious; as more people move into a city; 
more houses need to be built to accommodate them. Otherwise, more people are 
compelled to reside in the same number of houses, resulting in overcrowding which 
results in the dilapidation of housing. This was an especially important considering 
that the quality of each city’s dwellings varied over time. In Baltimore, early federal 
period wooden and brick shanties gave way to the uniformly constructed rowhouses, 
and in Glasgow architecturally rudimentary stone cottages gave way to the 
impressive multi-storied sandstone tenements which came to define the city. 
Additionally, standards of health changed with the times. Public health and 
municipal officials began to notice the impact of high density living on public health, 
and reasoned that people could not live as they had in past centuries at increasing 
levels of population densities. If urban residents were to enjoy healthy lives, the 
provision of adequate housing would become paramount. While urbanization 
produced economic dividends, the process of urbanization was often unconducive to 
healthy living.48 Infectious disease epidemics were common in the first half of the 
nineteenth century, and continued to occur until the advent of the Second World 
                                                 
Networks in China, Japan, and South Asia, 13th-21st Century (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2011), p. 173-177. 
48 Pope mentions the problems encountered with Glasgow’s urbanization in the late eighteenth 
century, especially noting the problem of housing more and more people in a small housing market. 
Rex Pope, Atlas of British Social and Economic History Since c. 1700 (New York: Routledge, 2002). 
Similarly, Baker notes that in 1890 the mortality rates in American cities were 30 % higher than rural 
areas, and that Baltimore was particularly unhealthy relative to other American cities. Lawrence 
Baker, The Water Environments of Cities (New York: Springer, 2008). 
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War. While social housing was envisioned partly as curbing infectious disease spread, 
housing schemes did not arrive in a large amount in Glasgow until the 1930s; the 
first housing project in Baltimore was completed in 1940. The goal of this chapter is 
to trace the historical development of both Glasgow and Baltimore, and elucidate 
how each city’s notoriously poor housing stock arose. While judgements on what 
factors contributed to this situation (and what preventative measures could have 
been taken) are premature at this point, this chapter will highlight the trends of 
housing and public health in pre-WWII Glasgow and Baltimore. This means 
presenting the environment of each city as they were: dirty, crowded, and especially 
unsanitary. 
 
 A starting point for a comparison of Glasgow and Baltimore would be the 
year of 1707. This was the year of the Act of Union, which united the parliaments of 
Scotland and England, and had great consequences for Glasgow’s merchants. Prior 
to 1707, most foreign trade had to be conducted through London. This ensured 
England’s continued development over Scotland – although this is partly attributable 
to London’s status as the most populous city in the world at the time.49 With the 
passage of the Act, foreign trade privileges were granted to a few more British ports, 
including Glasgow. This ability for Glasgow to brand itself as a ‘port-of-call’ for 
foreign exports in no small way facilitated Glasgow’s commercial prosperity in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.50 With this newfound trading freedom, 
Glasgow became an important depot for the international slave trade. Thanks to the 
‘triangular trade’, Glasgow soon became a leading exporter of slaves and in turn 
imported mahogany and sugar from the Caribbean and tobacco and flour from 
Maryland and other colonies. Baltimore relied on imported British manufactured 
goods and woollen products; this dependence that would only dissipate after the 
American Revolution. True, while neither Glasgow nor Baltimore grew as 
exponentially as Liverpool or New York (two cities that developed a reciprocal and 
                                                 
49 Fogel notes that in 1700, London was the most populous city in the world with 550,000, while Paris 
was a close second at 520,000. However, by 1800, London had a population of 900,000, far eclipsing 
Paris. Robert Fogel, The Fourth Great Awakening and the Future of Egalitarianism (University of 
Chicago Press, 2002) p. 53. 
50 Andrew Gibb, Glasgow: The Making of a City (New York: Routledge, 1983), pp. 57-59. 
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mutually beneficial trade relationship), the two cities’ conjunctive rise was still 
impressive. 
   
Geographically, Glasgow and Baltimore are very similar. Neither city is 
situated on the open Atlantic. Glasgow is situated on the River Clyde, which morphs 
into the Firth of Clyde and finally opens into the Irish Sea. Glasgow’s geographic 
location protected the city from storms and maritime attacks, and consequently the 
city enjoyed a tranquil environment in which to develop. As commercial ships grew 
larger, the Clyde’s depth presented challenges to merchants. Following the passage 
of the Improvement of the Clyde Navigation Act in 1770, however, Glasgow gained 
the authority and resources to dredge the Clyde sufficiently.51 Like Baltimore, 
Glasgow’s auspicious maritime location proved facilitated its blossoming.  
 
 
William Lizars and Daniel Lizars, ‘A Map of Renfrewshire’, George A. Crawfurd, General Description of 
the Shire of Renfrew, 1818, courtesy of Special Collections, University of Glasgow Library. 
 
Both Glasgow and Baltimore owe much of their economic success to their 
auspicious geographical locations. Yet while Glasgow was an ancient settlement that 
grew organically into a large city, Baltimore’s location on the Chesapeake was 
contrived by its eighteenth-century merchant founders. Situated on Maryland’s 
western shore (located in what is now called the Delmarva Peninsula), Baltimore 
                                                 
51 David Goodman, The European Cities and Technology Reader: Industrial to Post-Industrial City (New 
York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 59-61. 
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enjoyed the best of both worlds: easy access to the Atlantic and protection from the 
maritime elements.52  
 
 
Thomas Kitchin, ‘A Map of Maryland with the Delaware Counties and the Southern Part of 
New Jersey’, London Magazine, Vol. 26, August 1757, op. page. 376; courtesy of the George 
Peabody Library, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD. 
 
While Baltimore’s basin is shallower than other ports, which prevents the largest 
contemporary vessels from docking there (this has been suggested as possibly 
contributing to Baltimore’s twentieth century economic decline), the largest 
eighteenth and nineteenth century vessels could dock easily at Baltimore’s 
harbour.53  
 
Baltimore’s proximity to other markets also drew commercial activity. While 
cheap stores of local flour and tobacco were alluring in their own right, the city’s 
southern location on the eastern seaboard (relative to other major American ports, 
such as Philadelphia, New York, or Boston) meant Baltimore was closer to the 
                                                 
52 Gary Browne, Baltimore in the Nation, 1789 -1861 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1980), p. 3. 
53 J T Scharf, The Chronicles of Baltimore: Being a Complete History of Baltimore Town and Baltimore 
City From the Earliest Period to the Present Time (Baltimore: Turnbull Brothers, 1874), pp. 289; United 
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markets of South America than its major American competitors.54 Baltimore thus 
became a depot where British (and later, continental European) merchants could 
find South American goods, without having to travel to South America. In particular, 
guano was highly sought after, and Baltimore became the premier centre of the 
guano trade in the Anglophone colonies. Caribbean sugar and molasses were also 
important South American goods traded at Baltimore.55 In addition to being a more 
Southern port than its competitors, Baltimore also had the distinction of being closer 
to the Western markets, indeed due to the curvature of the North American 
continent Baltimore is 500 miles closer to the Mid-West than New York.56 
Furthermore, goods from America’s Western hinterland, such as furs and timber, 
arrived in Baltimore, and were exported to Europe.57 The city’s geographical location 
provided the basis for Baltimore’s eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
mercantile success, and facilitated its industrialization and further economic growth 
afterwards. 
 
Housing Trends in Nineteenth Century Glasgow: 
 
To skip forward to the nineteenth century, Glasgow’s housing narrative at 
that time can be characterized by one theme: increasing density. By 1911 there were 
over 700,000 people living in the three square miles of Glasgow. No British city at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century had anywhere near the required housing stock 
to accommodate their swelling populations – and Glasgow’s housing conditions were 
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already deplorable from the outset. An influx of migrants and consequent rising 
rents forced many families to occupy dwellings too small for their numbers. This 
undoubtedly coerced many Glaswegian families into insanitary flats. Glasgow 
needed more housing to prevent overcrowding and generally unsalubrious 
environmental conditions. The solution to this problem was the tenement.  
 
As any contemporary pedestrian can report, Glasgow is dominated by 
tenements. The tenements constructed in Glasgow were of high density, usually 
between four and five stories tall, and constructed of local sandstone. While most of 
these buildings appeared uniform outwardly, tenements could host a small number 
of large, middle class flats, or a great number of small, working class flats. These 
tenements were overwhelmingly constructed by private builders, owned by private 
landlords, who let them in the private housing market. This type of housing would 
dominate nineteenth and early twentieth century Glasgow; social housing would 
arrive largely after the Second World War. The lack of municipally subsidized housing 
during the nineteenth century did not mean the Corporation was unaware of the 
city’s housing problems. Still, municipal authorities chose not to intervene 
significantly in housing provision - with some exceptions, housing remained privately 
provided. The lack of a government influence in housing provision raises a question -
why did high density tenement buildings proliferate in Glasgow, if no authority 
demanded this? Put simply, solid high density tenements suited Glasgow’s housing 
needs during a period of population growth, even if these tenements resulted in 
public health problems later.  
 
Yet why settle for un-spacious tenements? In comparable English cities such 
as Liverpool and Manchester, tenements never saturated the housing stock as they 
did in Glasgow. English cities are dominated by terraced housing. In addition to 
providing more living space, terraced housing was often cheaper to construct than 
sandstone tenements. Given terraced housing’s advantages, why then choose multi-
storey tenements? 58 There are several explanations for this disparity. As Glasgow’s 
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population growth was quicker than other British cities (save for Liverpool), 
Glaswegian developers needed to house as many people on as little space as 
possible. Furthermore, Scottish standards of living remained well below English 
standards. Housing market forces drove the construction of smaller, more affordable 
housing units. Scottish construction standards and the business climate may have 
also shaped Glasgow’s housing landscape. A comparison published in 1904 of similar 
two-storey buildings in Glasgow and London (the comparison did not specify 
whether the buildings were tenements or terraced houses) revealed that stone walls 
were 50 % thicker, brick walls were 25 % thicker, and foundations were 114 % 
thicker in Glasgow. Scottish builders tended to be smaller organizations than their 
English counterparts, and thus may have been less able to recoup development 
costs, thereby making multi-family dwelling construction more attractive.59 In any 
case, lower building costs made construction cheaper in England, resulting in more 
spacious accommodation for the English working class. 
 
But the more significant explanation for the housing standard disparity was 
that Scottish property laws provided more incentives to build tenements rather than 
terraced housing. In England, builders leased land from landowners through fixed 
terms. At the end of these terms, ownership of both the title of the land and the 
building reverted back to the landlord. Land lords therefore had a certain degree of 
freedom in setting ground rents - for considering that landowners ultimately would 
have their property returned and improved (i.e. with a building), annual rents could 
be low and adjustable. English property owners could rest easy – whatever 
happened to their land, it was still theirs. In Scotland, however, landowners had no 
such guarantee. Under the feu system, Scots landowners issued a feu-ferm, or lease 
which legally conveyed authority over the use of the land to builders, although not 
the actual property deed. This differentiated the feural system from the actual sale 
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of land, wherein a landowner would receive one lump sum in exchange for the 
disponing of all rights over a piece of property. As Scots landowners maintained 
authority over properties they leased, they had the right to demand feural duties 
indefinitely (although these feu duties were of fixed rates and agreed upon by 
builder and landlord).60 As landowners were of course motivated by profit to lease 
their land, landowners bargained with builders for the largest feu fees they could 
acquire. This in turn spurred builders, who received all rental income after signing 
leases to properties, to maximize income potential on their properties. It was thus in 
Scottish builders’ interest to develop solid, high density housing to fully realize 
future profits.61 Indeed, an early twentieth-century committee found it no 
coincidence that Scotland maintained a feural system and that its cities were 
dominated by tenements: 
 
The exaction of feu duties by persons granting feus on the outskirts of Scottish towns has 
thus a tendency to necessitate the erection of tenements in order to make it profitable to 
develop the land subject to these payments. The high price of land and the erection of 
tenement housing react upon one another, that is to say, the high price of land requires the 
erection of tenements to make maximum use of it and to spread the burden of the feu duty 
over as many payers as possible, and conversely the power to erect tenements and to 
impose upon the land a very considerable property maintains the high value of the land.62 
 
Thus, due to the feu system, and the enticements of profits firmly entrenched, it is 
not surprising that tenements became ubiquitous in Glasgow. High density 
tenements promised more of a profit return for Scottish builders than landowners. 
However, Glasgow’s problems with overcrowding and unsanitary conditions were 
not due entirely to the preponderance of tenements over single family houses. After 
all, tenements can provide perfectly adequate dwellings. However, in order to be 
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acceptable dwellings, tenements must contain sanitary, spacious, and affordable 
flats. The flats available in nineteenth-century Glasgow often failed to meet these 
prerequisites. 
 
It was not simply that there weren’t enough tenements; indeed during the 
latter half of the nineteenth century Glasgow witnessed a construction boom that 
resulted in many of its quintessential sandstone tenement blocks.63 Indeed, as noted 
by Johnson, though Glasgow’s tenements were largely indistinguishable by external 
appearance, class distinctions were expressed by the size of flats and provision of 
amenities.64 A Glaswegian tenement may have consisted of several luxurious 
multiple roomed flats or have been entirely composed of ‘single ends’, or one room 
flats. With perhaps the exception of the provision of bay windows, there was little 
way to distinguish between tenement buildings other than whether they were made 
of brown, red, or beige sandstone. All of these flats were privately built, and most 
flats were privately let by landlords. Yet in addition to sanitary condition, 
affordability remained an issue. Even amongst middle class Glaswegians home 
ownership remained below English levels.65 So while a large number of new housing 
units were added to Glasgow’s housing market, Scottish builders did not fix the 
primary problem: providing affordable, spacious, sanitary homes to working class 
and poor families. 
 
There were even quality disparities present in the affordable housing that 
existed. By 1890, working class housing could be divided into two categories: 
housing for skilled workers and housing for unskilled workers. The differences 
between the two types of accommodation were staggering. Skilled working class 
housing tended to consist of more spacious flats in newer buildings. As skilled 
workers were more likely to have stable incomes, these flats were let through yearly 
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agreements - providing stability for tenants. Unskilled working class housing, 
however, was much less commodious. It usually consisted of the least desirable flats; 
sometimes flats let out to entire families consisted of a single room. As unskilled 
workers had irregular incomes, landlords let these flats through monthly or weekly 
agreements, and in some instances, nightly agreements.66 Tens of thousands of 
working class Glaswegians were obliged to subsist under such conditions.  
Additionally, a surplus of unskilled labour brought down starting wages and 
truncated opportunities for full employment.  Low wages and irregular work thus 
plagued Glasgow workers, and reduced many to a constant state of penury.67 As 
could be expected, tenants of Irish extraction were disproportionately compelled to 
live in the worst flats.68 Large, middle class tenement buildings were ‘made down’, or 
subdivided to create ‘single end’ flats, which were often let to new Irish 
immigrants.69 While these buildings originally provided sanitary, spacious 
accommodation, ‘made down’ tenements were just as crowded as older slum 
dwellings. Overcrowding not only resulted in increased wear and tear on buildings, 
but facilitated the spread of disease. Consider Lord Shaftesbury’s comments on such 
tenements in Glasgow: 
 
The houses themselves had at the same time been made down from houses of three, four, 
five, or six apartments into tenement houses, in which each apartment was occupied by a 
single tenant, responsible only to the landlord or the factor. In the process of making down 
there were no additional means given for ventilation or for air, and in some cases the original 
light and air had been cut off, and passages had been made to give access to as many as six, 
seven, eight, and even ten families. A high rate of mortality was the necessary consequence 
of that system of construction.70   
 
Providing healthy accommodation for working class persons in Glasgow was no easy 
task. Crowding and insanitation occurred even in high-rent districts, if high-end 
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buildings were ‘made down’. The only immediate solution to the affordable housing 
shortage at this time seemed to be the construction of more purposed built 
tenements. While nineteenth-century builders built thousands of new tenement 
building, they never completed enough to meet demand for affordable flats.  
 
 
An overcrowded ‘single end’, or single room housing unit. Department of Health for 
Scotland, Choosing Council Tenants (Edinburgh: HMSO, 1950), p. 19. 
 
Tenement construction continued throughout the latter half of the 
nineteenth century and early twentieth century. It did not continue unabated, 
however. Tenement building waxed and waned; construction was closely tied to the 
health of the general economy. Still, the increase in the city’s housing stock during 
the latter half of the century was impressive. According to Slaven and Keating, the 
most prolific bursts of tenement building occurred during 1869 – 1877 and 1893 – 
1904, periods that mimic Glasgow’s most economically vibrant periods.71 But 
Appendix 1 shows that decennial gains in housing remained impressive throughout 
the century. The most productive decades in terms of units built were 1851-1861 
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and 1891-1901, both decades when the city added 22,000 new housing units. In 
terms of proportional increase, the decades of 1851-1861 and 1861-1871 were the 
most productive. Total available housing units jumped nearly a third and nearly a 
fifth, respectively. With the exception of the post Second World War period, the 
latter half of the nineteenth century would constitute the largest expansion of 
Glasgow’s housing stock. Total available housing units would jump from just over 
100,000 units in 1871 to just over 180,000 units in 1911. As significant as these 
numbers are, it must be reiterated that population growth outstripped even this 
growth in housing stock. As noted earlier, builders did not always develop tenements 
that matched population needs. Even with the aid of ‘five per cent philanthropists’, 
potential profit was the priority, not the provision of affordable housing.72 
 
The profit motive created a wedge between builders and tenants. Even 
though the Scottish feural system motivated builders to construct high density 
tenements, middle class flats were more profitable. Thus, even though a large 
number of housing units were built during this time, disproportionate amount of 
flats were middle and upper income flats, placing them out of reach for most ill-
housed Glaswegians. Additionally, affordable housing was not equally distributed 
throughout the city. Certain working class areas, such as Partick, Govan, and 
Fairfield, suffered particular deficiencies of affordable housing. All three of these 
districts were heavily industrialized, and as working class people preferred living 
closer to their places of employment, these areas were especially popular. 
Affordable housing in these areas was often unavailable, however. Interestingly, 
these districts would experience some of the highest rent hikes in the first decades 
of the twentieth century, sparking the Glasgow rent strike.73 Even if public health 
legislation and building codes improved the average quality of working class housing 
throughout the century, accessibility and affordability remained the primary 
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concerns for tenants. 74 Glasgow thus faced an odd dilemma; the city had nearly 
enough housing units in general, but suffered from a stark deficiency of affordable 
housing units.  
 
Yet despite a persistent need for affordable housing, by the end of the 
nineteenth century housing market conditions had changed. By 1911 the Glaswegian 
economy began to falter. The city’s dominance in traditional heavy industries no 
longer remained unchallenged. Immigration to Glasgow, as well as fertility rates, 
declined rapidly, lessoning the incentive for builders to produce more housing units 
(though this was little comfort to the hundreds of thousands of Glaswegians who still 
endured awful conditions). Tenement building became less profitable as 
construction costs soared and working class wages stagnated. With less housing 
units being constructed, rents inched higher. Tensions over poor housing conditions 
coupled with rising rents eventually come to a boil- collective anger culminated with 
the Glasgow Rent Strike in 1915-1916.75 Despite the gains made by the rent strikers, 
further tenement construction remained slow throughout the first half of the 
twentieth century. During this lull in construction in the years leading up to the 
Second World War, the population continued to grow (although more slowly than 
during previous decades), and hundreds of thousands of Glaswegians continued to 
suffer in unnecessary slum conditions. The problems of overcrowding and insanitary 
conditions would only lessen after social housing arrived in the city. However, the 
Corporation of Glasgow did not stand idly by as public health nuisances and 
overcrowding impacted population health during the nineteenth century. The direct 
provision of housing was at this point not a Corporation prerogative, but municipal 
authorities were not without recourse to combat slum problems. In order to mitigate 
insanitary conditions in the city, the Corporation broadened its scope of authority 
over housing regulations, and began intervening more aggressively into matters of 
housing quality and public health. 
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Housing Trends in Nineteenth Century Baltimore: 
 
The story of the expansion of housing stock in Baltimore in the nineteenth 
century mostly parallels Glasgow’s narrative, with one major exception. While the 
great majority of housing units built in Glasgow were multi-storey tenements, in 
Baltimore the two-storey terraced house (or colloquially, ‘rowhouse’) predominated.  
While tenements made sense in the tight parameters of European cities, rowhouses 
were not only an efficient housing method in American cities but came to be viewed 
as definitive of the American promise of upward social mobility.  Regardless, most of 
the houses built in Baltimore in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were neither 
spacious nor elegant. While eighteenth-century European terraced housing was 
often viewed as the purview of the relatively wealthy, rowhouses were downsized 
and simplified for the working class, to be produced in large numbers for the 
swelling urban populations of mid-Atlantic American cities. Rowhouses were 
relatively inexpensive, quick to erect, and were more space efficient than detached 
dwellings (the predominant housing form in American cities prior to the nineteenth 
century).76 The housing type became so popular and ubiquitous in Baltimore that 
while rowhouses exist in many other American cities, they are most associated with 
Baltimore’s popular culture today.77 The rowhouse changed in terms of composition, 
form, size, cost, and affordability over the next two centuries, but remained 
consistently the preferred housing option for Baltimore builders. Large, high density, 
multi-family tenement buildings that prevailed in New York and Glasgow never 
predominated in Baltimore. Perhaps this can be explained simply by noting that 
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Baltimore was a less populated city relative to New York. Similarly, another 
explanation could be that Baltimore faced less resistance to municipal expansion, 
allowing it to develop lower density residential property with impunity. Yet while 
Baltimore’s geography and demographics impacted its housing patterns, to explain 
rowhouses as merely a product of environment would be inaccurate. Inexpensive, 
relatively sturdy, and generally more affordable and spacious than other nineteenth 
century housing alternatives, it is difficult to overestimate the impact rowhouses had 
on Baltimore’s population.  
 
It must be conceded that in the latter half of the nineteenth century, there was 
no doubt that Glasgow Corporation handled its urban problems better than the City 
of Baltimore. After a series of public health acts enacted after the mid-nineteenth 
century, Glasgow municipal authorities were capable of intervening matters of 
public health and housing. Municipal authorities in Baltimore, however, were much 
less capable of intervening in such areas. Although by 1910 the city was the 7th 
largest in the United States, the city lacked an underground sanitary sewer system 
until 1912.78 Multiple accounts of Baltimore at the turn of the twentieth century 
painted a portrait of a particularly unhealthy environment.79    
 
Clearly, Glasgow Corporation authorities became conscious of the perils of 
poor city infrastructure earlier than the City of Baltimore. However, Baltimore 
municipal authorities were not totally unaware of the problems associated with 
urban growth. Beginning in the nineteenth century, Baltimore municipal authorities, 
in line with other American cities, became interested in urban planning. Although 
early nineteenth-century Baltimorean officials could not have predicted the impact 
of the explosive economic and population growth that followed over the next 
century, they recognized the city was destined to grow. Prior to the nineteenth 
                                                 
78 Campbell Gibson, ‘Population of the 100 Largest Cities and Other Urban Places in the United States: 
1790-1990’, Working Paper no. 27, Table 14 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1998); Although above ground 
gutters and sewer pipes existed in Baltimore before 1912, it was not until 1905 that the City of 
Baltimore opted to construct a city-wide underground sewer system, See: Christopher Boone and Ali 
Modarres, City and Environment (Philadelphia: Temple University, 2006), p. 128. 
79 H L Mencken, The Diary of HL Mencken (New York: Random House, 1991), ed. Charles Fecher, p. 
301. 
 34 
century, residential growth followed up the courses of the Jones Falls and Gwynns 
Falls, the two streams that powered Baltimore’s booming grain mills.80 Other than a 
general alignment with these sources of power, Baltimore’s city development 
showed little rhyme or reason. Interest in coordinating the city’s growth had been 
expressed as early as the first decade of the nineteenth century, but the War of 1812 
disrupted these efforts.81 All of that changed in 1818, when the General Assembly of 
Maryland commissioned a city plan. This plan was the first municipal response to 
unfettered growth in Baltimore, and preceded later acts designed to guarantee 
environmental health and housing standards.   
 
The proliferation of rowhouses in Baltimore can be explained by the city’s early 
foundations in property law and increasing demands on space. Early colonial settlers 
brought the ground-rent system to Baltimore, as was the custom in English cities at 
the time.82 Landowners did not usually sell their land to builders, but rather leased 
the land to builders on ninety-nine year contracts. These contracts contained annual 
interest clauses, usually around five or six percent. After the builder constructed his 
property and sold it, the new owner became responsible for the payment of the 
ground-rent interest. Although this process might seem archaic and meddlesome to 
twenty-first century homebuyers, the system had a few distinct advantages over 
outright sale and ownership of the land. Firstly, because buyers purchased only the 
house, and not the land on which the house sat, house prices were much lower 
overall. New owners became responsible for the ground-rent, but this was much less 
than comparative rental rates. Thus, under the ground-rent system, home ownership 
became available to a broader class of earners in Maryland. Furthermore, the 
ground-rent system provided an incentive to builders to build as many houses as 
possible on their allotted land, to maximize their own profits. This resulted in a 
proliferation of rowhouses, which were much cheaper than detached houses, thus 
                                                 
80 T Whitman, The Price of Freedom: Slavery and Manumission in Baltimore and Early National 
Maryland (New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 8-9; Federal Writers’ Project, Maryland: A Guide to the 
Old Line State (College Park: University of Maryland, 1940), pp. 198-199. 
81 Maryland Historical Society, The Mapping of Maryland, 1590-1914: An Overview (Baltimore: 
Maryland Historical Society, 1982), p. 18. 
82 Lewis Mayer, Ground Rents in Maryland; With an Introduction Concerning the Tenure of Land under 
the Property (Baltimore: Cushings & Bailey, 1893), pp. 43-51. 
 35 
opening home ownership in places like Baltimore and Philadelphia accessible to 
broader class of earners.83 While it is true that similar incentives for builders existed 
in Glasgow, land was exceedingly dearer in Scotland than it was in colonial Maryland. 
In the United States, tenements were not considered economically feasible until the 
late nineteenth century; and only then in the cities of New York and Chicago. 
Baltimore builders had enough land to build outward, so they never bothered 
building high density housing. 
 
An increased housing density, however, was coming to Baltimore whether 
builders or tenants liked it or not. As Baltimore was a commercial city in the 
eighteenth century, land close to the harbour became dearer as the city rose in 
prominence. The city’s industrialization only compounded land price increases. Areas 
near the harbour came to host Baltimore’s manufacturing and industrial centres. In 
contrast, the more desirable residential neighbourhoods moved further away from 
the harbour. This meant, somewhat paradoxically, that while the most expensive 
commercial land was near the harbour, the worst slum housing districts were near 
the harbour as well. According to one study, this increased demand for land near the 
historical core Baltimore initiated a process of ‘land use succession’. This process 
involved residential properties closest to the areas of economic activity (i.e. housing 
areas initially considered undesirable) hosting succeeding waves of the city’s most 
economically marginalized groups, as better off groups moved into more desirable 
areas.84 When street facing houses near employment centres were unavailable, new 
city residents often chose to live in alley houses – Blacks in particular found refuge 
among the city’s many alleys.85 Worse yet, the poorest new residents, often recent 
immigrants, were compelled to become boarders in other persons’ homes, a practice 
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that led to overcrowding and structural damage.86 Soon the swelling numbers of 
newcomers outpaced the traditional ‘succession’ method of housing Baltimore’s 
poorest. To keep up with demand and mitigate the effects of overcrowding, new, 
purpose built working class housing had to be built. Luckily for tenants, nineteenth-
century Baltimore builders were happy to oblige. 
 
In the 1840s, many builders began erecting modestly priced two-story 
rowhouses with liveable attics, topically termed ‘two-story-and-attic houses’. The 
houses were especially designed for newly enriched urban tenants; a family could 
live in the attic and rent the two floors below to another family.87 Three and four 
storey buildings were built for the middle classes, but remained less common. 
Baltimore’s economy proved so resilient, however, that by the 1850s three story 
rowhouses were being built en masse for newly social mobile workers. Over the next 
thirty to forty years builders mass produced entirely new residential neighbourhoods 
block by block. Ethnic ‘savings and loan’ unions provided low interest mortgages to 
new European arrivals, who in turn achieved what few in Europe could ever hope to: 
home ownership. The standard amenities in these houses generally improved every 
decade, though the size of dwellings usually correlated to the health of the industrial 
economy at the time. Although later studies and reports showed that many of these 
rowhouses were built with inferior materials, the allure of cheap homeownership 
generally elicited praise from tenants.  
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Working-Class rowhouses on Franklin Row, constructed by H Peters in 1823. Although they are 
three-storey, their lack of ornamentation and simple lay-out indicates their status.  Photo Courtesy 
Robert Alexander. 
 
Rowhouses, like tenements in Glasgow, came to dominate Baltimore’s 
landscape because they fitted the city’s needs. While eighteenth-century Baltimore 
was a merchant city, nineteenth-century Baltimore was a manufacturing city. 
Manufacturing cities required a large class of workers. In turn, working people 
needed to be housed, and as Baltimore’s population continued to expand until the 
1950s, housing needed to be cheap to construct and cheap to rent or own. In 
Baltimore, rowhouses met all of these requirements. It was thus fortuitous that 
private builders favoured the rowhouse; while profit margins were not high builders 
could count on high turnover. Ranging in size and height (often as small as two bays 
wide and two stories tall), Baltimore’s ubiquitous rowhouses were designed for 
single family occupancy.88 Furthermore, they were intended for owner occupation 
rather than sold to landlords.89 The size and relative affordability of Baltimore’s 
rowhouses did not mean they were incapable of being abused, of course. Many 
rowhouses were subdivided into flats and let to multiple families, particularly in 
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immigrant neighbourhoods.90 Still, despite abuses, rowhouses proved to be an 




 Both Glasgow and Baltimore experienced impressive population growth and 
economic expansion in the centuries leading up to the twentieth century. Both cities 
transformed from mercantilist port cities to leading industrial cities by the 
nineteenth century. The University of Glasgow hosted remarkably talented 
intellectuals, contributing far disproportionately to British academic life, and 
although Johns Hopkins did not found his eponymous university until 1876 the 
institution was immediately recognized as a leading force in the American academy. 
The shared, mostly harmonious growth of these two cities was punctuated by a stark 
reality: both cities cornered their residents into the slums, with the poor 
environmental conditions of slum housing contributing to public health problems. 
Municipal attempts before the twentieth century to counter the problems of slum 
housing were made with good intentions, but ultimately fell short in the provision of 
healthy residential environments. Nineteenth-century intellectuals had identified the 
problem: there was a correlation between poor housing and poor health. At the 
dawn of the twentieth century, however, slum housing was as pervasive as ever in 
both cities; while laws were passed to counter unscrupulous landlords who 
permitted such horrible conditions, the problems continued. It was the duty of early 
twentieth century ‘houser’ intellectuals to articulate a solution to the problems of 
poor housing and health. While many intellectuals did not live long enough to see 
the fruits of their labour, their collective suggestion that municipal governments 
provide safe, sanitary housing gained increasing traction in the years leading up to 
the Second World War. This was the intellectual birth of social housing.  
 
Chapter 3: The Intellectual Debate over Social Housing, 1900 – 1940 
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Much as in the nineteenth century, the early twentieth century was a period 
of growth and transformation for Glasgow and Baltimore. Both cities experienced 
continued population growth, thanks to immigration and natural increase. Glasgow 
solidified its position as the second most important economic centre in the Empire, 
and while other cities eclipsed Baltimore’s economic importance, Baltimore 
remained a crucial piston in the engine of the American economy. Intellectually, 
both cities were buzzing. A series of international exhibitions held around the turn of 
the century highlighted Glasgow as an intellectual centre. Furthermore, despite the 
extent of its notorious slum housing, Scottish urban planner Patrick Geddes labelled 
the city as ‘foremost in invention and initiative.’91 Meanwhile, the city of Baltimore 
quickly became renowned as a centre for innovative learning. Thanks to the 
establishment of Johns Hopkins University in 1876, the first American university 
based on the German research oriented model, intellectuals became increasingly 
aware of this provincial industrial city. In a very short period the university had 
transformed itself (and Baltimore) into a world renowned centre of academic 
excellence, particularly in the medical sciences.92 Clearly, for both these cities the 
early twentieth century was an exciting time.93 Yet as discussed in the previous 
chapter, both cities faced a serious impediment to their growth and prosperity – a 
dearth of safe, sanitary, and affordable housing for the cities’ working populations. 
Scarce healthy housing options prompted crowding, which only compounded 
insanitary conditions in both cities. Additionally, the scarce housing that was 
available usually proved deficient in the provision of sanitary amenities, confounding 
the overarching problem of crowding. Progress had been made in reducing housing 
deficiencies in the last century, notably in the form of minimum housing standards, 
but both cities still struggled with problems of environmental health. In the 
twentieth century, the unhealthy conditions in each city became more difficult to 
ignore, as industrial economies required a steady flow of healthy workers. Old 
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problems lingered on in a new age, and old solutions weren’t working. For a new 
century, both cities needed a novel solution to their shared problems of housing and 
health. Thankfully, the early twentieth century proved an intellectually fecund 
environment; housing experts and public health authorities conceived jointly of a 
potential solution. That solution was social housing. 
 
Yet while the provision of government subsidized housing would ultimately 
become a reality in both cities, the extent of appropriate government involvement in 
housing had yet to be articulated. A wide variety of British and American intellectuals 
engaged in this debate on the proposed nature of social housing. Inquiry into 
housing issues evolved into such an important discussion in American academic 
circles that by the 1920s and 1930s the term ‘houser’ arose to describe varied 
intellectuals who were inspired by the study of housing. Not all intellectuals 
interested in housing were university academics, however. Professionals from non-
academic backgrounds influenced the social housing debate as well. Housers 
included academics, social activists, politicians, bureaucrats, economists, and 
medical and public health professionals. Intellectuals from a wide variety of 
backgrounds all contributed to the social housing debate, and coalesced around the 
idea that a private housing market alone could not provide adequate 
accommodation for the poorest members of modern urban industrial societies. Put 
simply, urban workers were unable to find housing that was sanitary and affordable. 
Housers soon realized that a twentieth-century economy required happy, healthy 
workers; wage earners needed to be able to afford housing conducive to good 
health. Privately let housing available to workers was often deficient in space and 
amenities, and in poor sanitary condition. Furthermore, as landlords were unable (or 
unwilling) to limit their profits and charge charitable rates, workers were compelled 
to inhabit these dwellings. Philanthropic interests first suggested that charitably 
minded private builders or cooperatives build affordable housing and voluntarily 
limit their prospective returns, so dubbed ‘five percent philanthropy.’94 While the 
model communities founded by Cadbury, Rowntree, and Thompson conformed to 
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this ideal, philanthropic housing endeavours never really caught on enough to 
alleviate housing strains on working class families. Government intervention, in the 
form of nationally or municipally operated housing, would be needed to provide for 
the housing needs of workers unable to afford sanitary accommodation. Their 
collective arguing would ultimately contribute to the construction of social housing 
during this period and the later proliferation of social housing after 1945. Although 
scholars and activists differed on just how governments should be involved in 
housing, all parties involved in the debate eventually supported social housing as the 
answer to Glasgow’s and Baltimore’s housing problems. This collective intellectual 
resolution is evidenced by the early examples of social housing that materialized 
before the Second World War, and the mass construction of social housing that 
disrupted both cities’ housing landscape afterwards. Whether housers’ ideas 
impacted Scottish or American housing legislation and whether nascent social 
housing improved the public health of Glasgow and Baltimore, however, are 
questions that remain unanswered. It is thus important to evaluate the influence of 
housers in order to understand the origins and evolution of social housing, and how 
social housing came to be a prominent characteristic of each city’s housing market in 
the latter half of the twentieth century. 
 
Beginning in the early twentieth century, new intellectual movements 
(Pragmatism in America, Fabianism in Britain, Leninism in Russia, etc.) were 
promulgating ideas that challenged established societal conventions. While such 
ideas startled traditionalists, they flourished in the burgeoning university 
environments of Glasgow and Baltimore. The idea of subsidized, municipal housing – 
to improve affordability as well as ensure public health – found academic advocates 
in continental Europe, Britain, and the United States.95 Social housing was a nascent 
concept however, and housers were unsure how best to present their argument. 
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Firstly, housers needed to explain why social housing was a necessity at all. Up until 
this point in time, housing had been the purview of private interests. Property 
owners, speculators, builders, and landlords were motivated by profit, not by actual 
housing needs. Yet according to some then contemporaries, this system was 
perfectly adequate. Many were convinced that those who were subject to squalid 
housing environments had only their moral vices to blame for their condition, a line 
of thought common in the nineteenth century. Consider the words of an anonymous 
social critic, known by the pseudonym of ‘Shadow’, who investigated the living 
standards of Irish migrants in Glasgow in the 1850s: 
 
A shilling a week is paid for the apartment. Both parents are Irish, but speak the Scottish 
dialect; the young wife supports her partner and child by work in a factory. Before we leave, 
the husband enters, a short, stout repulsive-looking man, about twenty-five or thirty-five 
years of age, dressed in dirty corduroys, beard unshaved, and smells of whisky… Leaving Pat, 
somewhat an incorrigible in his way, we saunter forth into the street, by this time, dotted all 
over with little groups of labouring men, lounging about in their week-day clothes, with the 
addition of a clean shirt and neckerchief, just enough to remind them that it is the Sabbath-
day.96 
 
Yet while proponents of the idea that the behaviours of the working class resulted in 
their own poverty was common in the nineteenth century, this view began to wane 
by the dawn of the twentieth century. Still, other voices contended that both cities’ 
housing met their population needs. Unsurprisingly, many real estate interests 
contended that the private housing market met population needs adequately.97 A 
parliamentary inquiry on the housing of the working classes noted the words of 
James Morrison, a convenor of the Glasgow Improvement Trust of 1875, who 
concluded that in Glasgow ‘a sufficient number of [houses] are erected by private 
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enterprise to meet all wants, and no real case of hardship is known.’98 Glasgow city 
councillors noted the tremendous vacancies in their districts, and in an official 
publication the City of Baltimore boasted that for city residents ‘a real home in 
Baltimore is within reach of all.’99 Any municipal intervention into the housing 
market was viewed initially with scepticism. This was particularly true in the United 
States. According to one American contemporary, government intervention into 
housing might set American society on a ‘road to socialism’.100 British and American 
housers thus faced stiff opposition in convincing sceptics of the merits of subsidised, 
municipally owned housing. 
 
Additionally, housers needed to answer a number of questions if politicians 
and municipal officials were going to consider housing legislation. What type of 
housing should be built? How well provisioned should individual units be? What 
kinds of tenants should be rehoused? Should social housing provide for all those in 
need of housing, or maintain tenant selectivity? Should governments directly build 
and maintain social housing, or simply offer subsidized finance to private builders? 
Put simply, nobody knew what ‘social housing’ was supposed to look like. It was the 
housers’ duty to address these concerns, and formulate an agenda. In the years 
leading up the Second World War, housers did just that: dozens of articles, 
monographs, and books were published that not only advocated for the concept of 
social housing, but delineated the style, function, and purpose of the new housing 
form. Whether Glaswegian or Baltimorean municipal authorities paid much 
attention to housers’ recommendations is irrelevant; social housing materialized in 
both cities and came to define the urban environment in both societies. An analysis 
of Scottish and American housers’ work should illuminate the early twentieth 
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century vision for social housing, and the impact their collective opus had on social 
housing development in the latter half of the twentieth century.  
 
While the need for social housing was very real, different intellectuals and 
social activists argued for social housing on different grounds. Each expert on 
housing or public health had a unique perspective on the housing problems of each 
society and a personal agenda for advocating for social housing. Broadly, housing 
advocates can be placed into three distinct categories: the medically oriented, the 
economically and politically oriented, and the morally oriented. The medically 
oriented consisted primarily of state public health officials and university professors; 
their writings mostly provided evidence (or, often, conjecture) that poor housing 
constituted a prime determinant of health, and likely caused the disparities that 
afflicted working class persons. The economically and politically oriented were 
mostly social activists and politicians who had dedicated their professional lives to 
housing issues. Social activists clamoured for better housing on populist grounds, 
arguing that affordable, sanitary housing was a human right that ought to be fought 
for. Some social activists later became full-fledged politicians, such as John Wheatley 
in Glasgow and Lawrence Veiller in New York, thanks to their advocacy of social 
housing. Technocratic bureaucrats, such as John Highton in Scotland and Catherine 
Bauer in the United States, took a less fiery approach, generally arguing that poor 
housing likely resulted in decreased worker productivity and resident happiness. 
Social housing seemed a way to streamline efficiency, and therefore, was a good 
idea. Lastly, there were those who campaigned for social housing on moral grounds. 
For these housing advocates, affordable and sanitary accommodation was a human 
right, one that governments had a duty to ensure to extend to all citizens regardless 
of social status. Perhaps the first true ‘housers’, their admonitions were likely the 
most passionate of the era - authors excoriated real estate interests for profiting at 
the expense of the downtrodden, and extolled their government officials to 
repudiate such charlatans. Yet regardless of which group had the most correct 
grounding of concern, each group moulded the conversation on housing in early 
twentieth century Britain and the United States. The combined musings of housers 
shaped the arguments that legislators presented before their respective 
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governments, which resulted in the materialization of social housing. Their impact 
was integral and observable - and worthy of exposition and analysis. 
 
 Yet while housing intellectuals investigated the proper role of government 
intervention in the housing market, real people suffered the effects of inadequate 
housing. But this assertion raises a legitimate question – who suffered particularly 
from the poor housing stock in both cities? Class obviously played a role in housing 
choice; the working classes in both cities were disproportionately compelled to live 
in inadequate or insanitary housing; the poor almost invariably so. Social prejudice 
also determined housing options for many; immigrants in both cities (in both cases 
disproportionately Catholic) faced ethnic and sectarian discrimination in acquiring 
housing.101 Catholics in both cities turned to fraternal organizations for help with 
housing, with Hibernian Societies aiding Irish Glaswegians, and the various ethnic 
based building and loan corporations aiding Catholic immigrants in Baltimore.102 
However, while Catholic immigrants and their descendants faced similar obstacles in 
both cities, any comparison of ethnic tension in Glasgow and Baltimore must 
acknowledge the differences in both cities’ racial composition. By the early twentieth 
century, Glasgow remained an almost entirely white city. After the Second World 
War, Asian and Caribbean immigrants would arrive in Glasgow, although not as 
many commonwealth immigrants would settle in Scotland as England. The story of 
Glasgow’s changing racial composition is a later, and still continuing, one. 
Baltimore’s racial composition, however, had always been in a state of flux, and in 
the early twentieth century, was experiencing its most radical transition. In the 
1910s, 1920s, and 1930s, hundreds of thousands of Southern blacks migrated to 
Baltimore in search of employment and a more harmonious racial atmosphere. 
Some migrants were lucky enough to find the former, but none found the latter. 
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Baltimore, after all, was a Northern industrial city with a Southern, conservative 
culture – and any social study of Baltimore must recognize the unique hardships 
faced by its black residents. 
 
Baltimore - Racially Motivated Housing Legislation: 
 
             One of the most damaging effects of racial tension in Baltimore was the 
restrictions placed on Black residential expansion. White Baltimoreans’ prejudice 
towards Blacks was so severe that neighbourhoods, real estate interests, and 
eventually politicians colluded to restrict the growth of Black neighbourhoods. 
Consequently, Black Baltimoreans were much more likely to reside in overcrowded 
housing. While it is true that in Glasgow Catholics faced more difficulty in gaining 
higher-wage employment, and thus had less opportunity to afford better housing, 
Catholics never faced strict barriers to their residential expansion. Both Protestant 
and Catholic enclaves arose in Glasgow, and while some evidence existed that 
suggested Irish Protestants were less likely to live in dense tenements, both groups 
were mostly content to reside in enclaves.103 In Baltimore, by contrast, a culture of 
intense racial intolerance coupled with institutionalized racial segregation made the 
city very hostile for Blacks.104 Blacks faced a much harsher existence than Catholics in 
Baltimore; historian Wendy Winters even notes that two once marginalized 
immigrant groups to the United States, the Irish and the Italians, assimilated into 
American culture more quickly than Blacks despite their advantage of having a 
longer presence in the country.105 While Durr contends that the city’s ‘White ethnics’ 
(i.e. European Americans of non-British heritage) did face some employment 
discrimination, Skotnes contends that of the White ethnics only Jews experience 
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severe residential restrictions.106 Indeed, the Catholic White ethnics of Southeast 
Baltimore had assimilated into the wider American culture to such a great degree 
that perennial Democratic candidate George Wallace, the Southern vanguard of the 
old racial order, won these working-class districts in the 1964 Maryland Democratic 
primary.107 A comparison based on the severity of the housing discrimination faced 
by Glaswegian Catholics and Baltimorean Blacks, therefore, is not an equal one. If 
any doubt lingers on this point, the following historical episode should serve as an 
illustration of why special attention must be given to Black Baltimoreans’ difficulty in 
escaping slum conditions.   
 
In 1910, a Black lawyer named W. Ashbie Hawkins decided to purchase a new 
house that better reflected his social class. Hawkins had founded a successful law 
firm to represent Black clients in litigation, as many White lawyers refused to 
represent Blacks. In addition to being a lawyer, Hawkins was active in Black social 
causes. He held a high position in Baltimore’s division of the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and was a regular contributor to The 
Crisis, the NAACP’s official newsletter whose contributors included Marcus Garvey, 
W.E.B. DuBois, and Alain Locke. Through his partnership with George McMechen, 
another Black lawyer, Hawkins grew wealthy. He decided to purchase a stately house 
at 1834 McCulloh Street in Northwest Baltimore. Once he had purchased the house, 
he planned to rent it to his junior partner McMechen. The only problem was that 
McCulloh Street was one block east of Druid Hill Avenue, the accepted ‘colour line’ 
of Baltimore. Every resident of McCulloh Street was White, though with McMechen’s 
arrival the block instantly became ‘mixed’. Further aggravating norms, McCulloh 
street was just a few blocks west of Eutaw Place, one of the most prestigious and 
exclusive residential districts in the city.  For early twentieth century White 
Baltimoreans, Black encroachment on such an exalted area signalled an unbearable 
affront to the city’s established racial hierarchy. Almost immediately, neighbours 
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began to harass the McMechen family. Neighbourhood tensions flared, and locals 
took action. Soon after McMechen’s arrival, residents founded the McCulloh Street, 
Madison Avenue, and Eutaw Place Property Protective Association (MMEPPA) to 
organize White residents in opposition to his arrival. Later nearly 10,000 citizens 
signed a petition to the city council to prevent further intrusion of Blacks into White 
neighbourhoods.108 City politicians were quick to respond to popular demand. To 
assuage growing frustration over the infiltration, Baltimore city council soon enacted 
Ordinance No. 654 (effective April 7, 1911), later amended and strengthened by 
Ordinance No. 692 (effective May 15, 1911).109 Together the ordinances stipulated 
strict residential racial segregation by block, and nationwide this legislative approach 
became popularly known as the ‘Baltimore Plan’.110  
 
 
The ordinance that precipitated the first ‘Baltimore Plan’. 
 
The first ordinance contained two clauses. The first clause prohibited Blacks 
from moving to White blocks, and vice versa. Mixed race blocks, rare but extant, 
were exempted from the law. The second clause prohibited the establishment of 
Black institutions such as churches, schools, or social clubs on White blocks, and vice 
versa. The only exemption to this rule was the allowance of Black domestic servants, 
who were allowed to live in White households.111 The ordinance proved immensely 
popular, and copycat laws were enacted in the Southern cities of Richmond, 
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Greensboro, Winston-Salem, and Louisville.112 The second ordinance clarified any 
potential confusion about what constituted a ‘White block’ or a ‘Colored block’. The 
supplemental ordinance did adhere to a peculiar consistency, however, as the 
addendum forbade White encroachment on established Black neighbourhoods. ‘It 
shall be unlawful for any white person to move into or use as a residence or place of 
abode any house [or block]… as the same are occupied… by colored persons’.113 
Despite popular support and careful legal composition, ultimately, the law proved 
short-lived. The Supreme Court ruled in Buchanan vs. Warley (1918) that the 
ordinance ran counter to the Fourteenth Amendment and that the ‘right of the 
individual citizens to acquire or use property cannot be validly restricted by state or 
municipality on the ground of color.’ 114 Considering the racial climate of the United 
States at the time, it was a testament to the legal prowess of Hawkins and the 
NAACP that they managed to overturn such an injurious impediment to Black 
Baltimoreans’ struggle for housing. 
 
           While the ordinance was overturned relatively quickly, the anecdote still 
serves to illustrate the especial hardships Blacks faced in securing healthy housing in 
Baltimore during the early twentieth century. While the Supreme Court overruled 
Baltimore’s municipal authority to enforce racial segregation, the ruling did not 
mend White Baltimoreans’ racial distrust. The ‘Idea’ proved popular with White 
Baltimoreans and most viewed the ordinance as an essential tool in preventing 
greater Black empowerment in the city. Contemporary commentators noted the 
tension between Baltimore’s White community and Black community over increasing 
housing pressures and historian Jan Voogd argues that the 1918 ruling precipitated 
                                                 
112 Somewhat curiously, White residents of St. Louis clamoured for similar legislation, but the city 
council refused to codify segregation, David Delaney, Race, Place, and the Law, 1836-1948 (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1998), p. 1902. 
113 The Ordinances and Resolutions of the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore: Annual Session of 
1910/11 (Baltimore: Meyer & Thalheimer, 1911), pp. 378-379. 
114 In 1913, Hawkins and McMechen failed to convince the Maryland Court of Appeals in State of 
Maryland vs. Gurry that such racial restrictions on housing were unconstitutional, but the Supreme 
Court of the United States overruled this verdict. Atlantic Reporter: Cases Argued and Determined in 
the Courts of Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, Vermont (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Company, 1918), Vol. 103, pp. 910-911. 
 50 
the city’s race riots in 1919.115 Put simply, early twentieth century Baltimore, in 
contrast to relatively tranquil colonial Baltimore, was not a hospitable environment 
for Blacks.  
 
              Yet McMechen’s struggle can serve as a reminder of the obstacles Blacks and 
Whites both faced in attaining decent housing. For while poor Whites never faced 
housing discrimination anywhere near as intense as Blacks, both White and Black 
workers shared the same need: affordable, and sanitary housing. The difference 
between these two groups’ shared struggle is that while one group only faced an 
economic impediment to attaining decent housing, the other group faced economic, 
legal, and social impediments in securing healthier housing. Thus, while the issue of 
race complicates any comparative narrative on housing in Scotland and the United 
States, a fundamental truth remains: residents of both Baltimore and Glasgow were 
in need of affordable and sanitary housing. Commentators from a wide variety of 
backgrounds interested in housing needed to articulate the problem of poor housing 
and compose a feasible solution to the problems of the status quo. Luckily for the 
working class, situations like McMechen’s incited righteous indignation in British and 
American housers. New legal measures designed to restrict access to housing only 
served to renew intellectuals’ opposition to builders, real estate interests, and 
landlords. In the early twentieth century, social housing advocates had momentum, 
and they didn’t waste their opportunity. While social housing did not appear on a 
large scale until after the Second World War, the scholarly works and political action 
of both Scottish and American housers incubated the concept of social housing, 
precipitated the construction of social housing on a grand scale in the latter half of 
the twentieth century.  
 
Early Arguments for Housing Reform, Charles Booth and Jacob Riis: 
 
        During the nineteenth century, many intellectuals held poverty to be self-
inflicted. People were poor either due to sloth, vices, or poor family planning. 
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Environmental conditions deleterious to health were thus not viewed as causing 
poverty, but rather as resulting from poverty; if the poor improved their behaviour, 
they would consequently avoid impoverishment and its concomitant squalor. While 
the idea that sloth and vice could lead to iniquity had long held traction, during the 
nineteenth century family size became an increasingly popular target of moralists. 
The most prominent population contrarian of this time was Thomas Malthus, who 
ruminated that Britain’s working class induced their own poverty through poor 
family planning, and that this behaviour reflected workers’ intrinsic moral ineptitude. 
Consider Malthus’s criticism of the British poor’s alleged inability to plan and 
impulsive purchasing habits: 
 
The labouring poor, to use a vulgar expression, seem always to live hand to mouth. Their 
present wants employ their whole attention, and they seldom think of the future. Even when 
they have an opportunity of saving they seldom exercise it, but all that is beyond their 
present necessities goes, generally speaking, to the ale house.116 
 
Adding further insult to injury, Malthus suspected that many workers consciously 
spent their wages flagrantly, knowing full well that should unemployment or illness 
affect their family they could rely on the parish for subsistence.117 Indeed, Malthus 
touted temperance as a remedy against poverty. Again, this advice presupposed 
intrinsic character flaws in the poor. Temperance activist Thomas Beggs noted that 
during his investigations he had ‘found very little poverty but what has been self-
induced, or which the abrogation of the drinking habits would remove.’118 In 
addition to alcoholism, Malthus was also concerned with population growth. He 
believed that large family size aggravated poverty conditions, and advised sexual 
abstinence to prevent families from declining into penury. While this view was 
contentious, contraception was viewed with even more suspicion. Thomas Wooler, 
editor of the social journal The Black Dwarf (1817-1824), argued that implementing 
measures to control population (i.e. contraception) would only promote promiscuity 
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in the poor, which would consequently be injurious to their welfare.119 Regardless, 
while many of Malthus’s contemporaries were sceptical of his emphasis on 
overpopulation and his utilitarian solutions, most of Malthus’ early nineteenth 
century contemporaries agreed with the prevailing wisdom that immoral behaviour 
conditioned poverty. 
 
             Malthus’s belief that immorality was intrinsic in the poor did not go 
unchallenged, however. Welsh social reformer Robert Owen, the manager of the 
New Lanark milling community, was a staunch critic both of Malthus’s population 
fatalism and his cynical view of the poor’s morality. He agreed that moral turpitude 
inhibited the advancement of the poor, but rejected the idea that poor people had a 
natural predisposition towards immorality. Instead, Owen felt that diminished moral 
character was the product of home life and physical environment, and felt that 
education and a healthy environment (communal working and living) could remedy 
poor peoples’ immoral qualities.120 The cultivation of good habits would free the 
poor from their chains. In 1805, an alms advocate advised that poor persons avoid 
undue stress, aggravation, and moral inequity, as the author subscribed to Galen’s 
ancient idea that poor mental health precipitated physical illness.121 Edwin 
Chadwick, whose writings led to the implementation of the Poor Laws, also agreed 
that poverty was self-induced. Chadwick’s primary concern was the connection 
between sickness and poverty. Insanitation that caused illness, and illness resulted in 
poverty. While he noted the increased difficulties placed on the poor in maintaining 
a healthy housing environment, he tended to ascribe insanitary conditions more to 
the poor’s bad habits, rather than their inability to pay for adequate housing. Rather 
than ascribe blame innate qualities, Chadwick merely blamed poverty on bad habits; 
if poor people led more sanitary lives, they would not become ill and subsequently 
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poor. 122 The seeds of a more charitable view of the genesis of poverty were being 
sown, however. Gentleman farmer and amateur pamphleteer William Cobbett 
fiercely disagreed with Malthus, and attacked his jaded views on his lower-income 
compatriots. In a vein of thought that seems quite sensible to contemporary readers, 
Cobbett attacked the old view of self-induced poverty, and wrote that though ‘There 
are some men… who are reduced to poverty by their vices… [however] the far 
greater part by bodily ailments, by misfortunes to the effects of which all men may, 
without any fault and even without any folly.’123 While Cobbett did not enjoy the 
popularity (or infamy) of Malthus, he presented the kernel of a transformative idea: 
environmental conditions impact poverty. This conception of the relationship 
between environment and poverty would gain traction later in the century. 
 
        Towards the end of the nineteenth century, intellectuals on both sides of the 
Atlantic began to think differently about poverty. Suddenly it became fashionable to 
view people as victims of circumstance, not morally deprived agents incapable of 
sustaining themselves. In Britain, Charles Booth’s survey of the urban poor in Life 
and Labour of the People in London showed that a high percentage of Londoners 
lived in abject poverty, a percentage even higher than the Socialist Party’s 
estimate.124 Booth’s use of colour-coded maps, detailing the severity of poverty and 
its proximity to areas of great wealth, was particularly disconcerting to British 
readership.125 The multi-volume work, while largely statistical in nature, none-the-
less exposed the extent of poverty to British audiences. Considering that London was 
the capital of the world’s largest and most successful empire, the illustrations of the 
relationship between dire poverty and neighbourhood tenancy must have shocked 
audiences around the world. Yet while Booth drew academics’ attention, he would 
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not receive the same popular attention as would his counterpart in the United 
States, Jacob Riis.  
 
 
‘Extracts from Map 2, Section S.W.’, Source: Charles Booth, Survey of the Life and Labour of the People 
in London (London: 1891), Vol. 2, Appendix. 
 
Published one year after Booth’s sociological treatise, Jacob Riis’s How the Other Half 
Lives horrified an American popular audience with a written and photographic 
exposition of American cities’ poor environmental conditions and a depiction of the 
slums the poor were forced to dwell in. Riis, a Danish immigrant, had known 
unemployment and hunger since his arrival in the United States, and therefore had 
an intimate understanding of the squalor American immigrants were compelled to 
endure. Consider Riis’s introductory statements on the severity of the conditions of 
New York’s tenements: 
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To-day three fourths of its people live in the tenements, and the nineteenth century drift of 
the population to the cities is sending ever-increasing multitudes to crowd them. The fifteen 
thousand tenant houses that were the despair of the sanitarian in the past generation have 
swelled into thirty-seven thousand, and more than twelve thousand persons call them home. 
The one way out he saw – rapid transit to the suburbs – has brought no relief. We know now 
that there is no way out; that the “system” that was evil offspring of public neglect and 
private greed has come to stay, a storm-centre forever of our civilization. Nothing is left but 
to make the best of a bad bargain.126 
 
Yet it was not Riis’s written commentary that shocked polite American society, but 
rather the brutal photographs (rendered as line drawings) of intense poverty that 
captivated readers’ attention. In particular, the images of malnourished and 
homeless children, made possible through Riis’s access to easily portable cameras, 
disturbed polite society, and spurred progressive intellectuals to endorse 
government solutions to end malnutrition.127 Riis’s work achieved a sensationalist 
appeal.128 The book had a significant impact on society – and lent credence to Riis’s 
positions on urban problems. Riis was a strong advocate of slum clearance – and 
supported the 1895 clearance of the Mulberry Bend neighbourhood on the Lower 
East Side of Manhattan, an area populated mostly by poor Italian immigrants. Riis, in 
line with other late nineteenth-century intellectuals, was a proponent of 
architectural determinism – if one could eliminate poor housing conditions, public 
health problems would dissipate. At various points throughout the nineteenth and 
twentieth century, this idea waxed and waned in popularity. When the idea was 
popular, it was upheld as a justification for slum clearance. Yet while slum clearance 
has its merits, it can also prove short sighted; once slums are demolished former 
tenants need to be rehoused. For example, at the time of the Mulberry Bend 
clearance in New York, Riis had no plan to rehouse displaced slum dwellers.129 
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Unfortunately for those impacted by slum clearance, municipal authorities often 
failed to consider how to accommodate erstwhile slum district residents.130 Thus, 
while eliminating slum conditions precipitated better environmental health, 
municipal authorities needed to replace existing slums with affordable and healthy 
housing options for slum dwellers.  
 
             While Riis was more interested in slum clearance than public health 
legislation, How the Other Half Lives and his succeeding works The Children of the 
Poor (1892) and The Battle with the Slum (1901) prompted social activists such as 
Lawrence Veiller to push for public health legislation in the 1890s and 1900s.131 As 
director of the New York Tenement Commission, Veiller enforced existing minimum 
building standards and lobbied to further standards, culminating in the 1901 
Tenement House Law that outlawed windowless rooms, narrow alleys, and other 
nuisances in New York buildings.132 Thus, although Riis’s work was meant to be 
apolitical, How the Other Half Lives altered the public conscious and impacted public 
health legislation. In an American context, Riis was often upheld by later authors 
such as Catherine Bauer and Edith Elmer Wood as the first houser – as his book 
brought such wide attention to the problems of slum housing that in contemporary 
times the phrase ‘how the other half lives’ has entered into casual speech.   
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‘Street Arabs in Sleeping Quarters’, Source: Jacob Riis, How the Other Half Lives (New York: Charles 
Scribner, 1890), p. 202. 
 
           In both Britain and the United States it was works such as Booth’s and Riis’s 
that altered public and intellectual opinion on the causes of poverty. Whether one 
looked at statistical analyses or disturbing images of human suffering, it grew 
difficult to affirm persistently that the poor caused their own condition. Rather, in 
the late nineteenth century people began to consider external influences, such as 
poor economic conditions, feelings of social alienation, and significantly, an 
unhealthy environment as more likely determinants of poverty. Initially, these 
realizations manifested themselves in an intense anti-urban movement; some of the 
late nineteenth century’s best selling novels expounded on this theme, such as 
Josiah Strong’s Our Country (1885), Joaquin Miller’s Destruction of Gotham (1886), 
Edward Bellamy’s Looking Backward (1886), and Ignatius Donnelly’s Caesar’s Column 
(1890). Elements of this anti-urban sentiment would reappear later in the early 
twentieth century with the Garden City movement in Britain and the City Beautiful 
movement in the United States. The anti-urban movement probably climaxed with 
the publication of Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle (1906), which detailed with 
excruciating precision the insalubrious environmental conditions immigrants to 
Chicago were forced to endure. But as the necessity of urban settlement became 
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clear, anti-urban sentiment faded. Cities were here to stay, and it was up to British 
and American housers to ensure that urban housing conditions were as sanitary as 
possible.  
 
Early Urban Planning Voices: Patrick Geddes and John Nolen: 
 
     Yet while public health professionals approached housing from a medical 
background, other Scottish commentators approached housing from a sociological 
perspective. Among the earliest Scottish intellectuals to direct his attention towards 
social housing, and indeed urban sustainability, was Patrick Geddes, the prolific 
polymath of Edinburgh. While Geddes trained originally as a biologist, he later 
turned towards issues concerning societal efficiency, and is most remembered for his 
contributions to urban planning. This transition was precipitated by the largess of 
Scottish-American industrialist Andrew Carnegie, who in 1903 offered a grant for a 
proposal for the restoration of Dunfermline.133 Hiding in his ‘Outlook Tower’, Geddes 
laboured to illuminate the city as a social organism, one that could be cultured and 
likewise neglected, but ultimately resilient enough to flourish.134 However, Geddes 
did not feel compelled to abandon his biological mindset to focus on social issues, 
and would argue that the primary objective of the home is to nurture a healthy 
family.135 Drawing inspiration from Herbert Spencer and Frederic Le Play, Geddes 
sought to fuse an evolutionary understanding of nature with a sociological 
understanding of society to guide the planning of human organization.136 Geddes 
thought that cities evolved much the way biological organisms did (hence the title of 
his first major urban treatise Cities in Evolution), and that just as Mendel could 
manipulate the traits of his pea plants through selective breeding, a planner could 
dictate the path of city development through a proper understanding of societal 
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needs.137 Building on this literal understanding of the city as an organism, Geddes 
adopted Le Play’s conception of society as being defined by ‘place, work, and family’, 
with the city serving as the host of society.138 This ideological trio allowed Geddes to 
argue that ‘work’, or more broadly, human activity, served as the linchpin between 
man and his physical environment. Geddes often re-construed Le Play’s criteria as 
‘environment, function, and organism’, and emphasized the importance of function – 
the interaction between humanity and the world.139 For while human beings are 
organisms like any other life form, they differentiate themselves by consciously 
altering their environment for their own purposes. This activity constituted 
civilization, and the city was the physical evidence of civilization. Concerning the city, 
Geddes was most interested in how it served the needs of the family, which he felt 
was the ‘central biological unit of human society.’140 In a letter to a colleague, 
Geddes wrote that only through ‘stable, healthy homes’ could families cultivate an 
environment which would produce children able to ‘fully participate in life’. It was 
this basic concern for humanity, coupled with a sincere belief that a scientific 
approach to urban problems could heal social deprivation, that led Geddes to 
endorse social housing. Later, he would be joined by many other early housing 
intellectuals in such an endorsement; he co-authored a book on the future of social 
welfare with his London based colleague Victor Branford in 1919.141 Later, in 1923, 
and along with the urban intellectualists Lewis Mumford (a Geddes protégé) 
Thorstein Veblen, Henry Wright, Clarence Stein, and Frederick Ackerman, Geddes 
founded the Regional Planning Association of America, which encouraged social 
housing projects throughout the New Deal era. For while Geddes was a prominent 
Scottish urban intellectual, his influence on the American cities, through his own 
work and that of his protégés, was far greater. For these early American housers, 
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social, economic, and sanitary reform could be achieved through social housing; 
their endorsement was a tacit recognition that a governmental solution appeared to 
be the only feasible option to the problems of housing and health. Furthermore, 
Geddes’ emphasis of a biological conception of the city heavily influenced the ideas 
of these housers.142 However, not all intellectuals approved of social housing 
enthusiastically, and even Geddes was hesitant of social housing initially. 
 
            At first, Geddes viewed state intrusion into housing as injurious to organic 
urban integrity. He even called the slum clearance programme of colonial India as 
‘one of the most disastrous and pernicious blunders in the chequered history of 
sanitation.’143 In fact, Geddes further contended that social housing would be an 
artificial barrier to organic family life, and therefore socially disruptive. Initially, 
Geddes preferred a more traditional conception of urban life, one that followed a 
natural (yet guided) path of development that promoted self sufficiency among 
individuals and families. Rather than impose a contrived, mathematical model of 
housing and development on urban residents, Geddes felt planners should have 
strived to rediscover the past traditions, customs, and mores of localities that 
expressed local conceptions of community and family.144 Geddes felt that this was 
especially important advice for an American audience, for he argued that 
‘[America’s] citizenship has in the past suffered even more arrest and decay than our 
own, under the influence of the extreme economic individualism of her still too 
largely paleotechnic industry, her too individualistic commerce and finance.’145 
Eventually, through his travels and sociological investigations, Geddes understood 
that unguided urban development encouraged the oppression of the working class. 
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Municipal intervention into housing, then, was a good development. With private 
sector domination of housing, rents remained high and conditions remained 
injurious to health. While Geddes felt it was important for cities to develop naturally, 
a solely private housing market facilitated unscrupulous landlords in extoritionate 
rent rates. Only government action appeared strong enough to break the 
domination of the privurate housing market by moneyed interests. Throughout the 
early twentieth century, Geddes and other early intellectuals promulgated this idea 
in their publications. Although each ‘houser’ maintained a different angle, all of 
these publications had a strong moral bent: affordable and sanitary housing was a 
right, and one that ought to be protected and ensured by the government for 
society’s working people. 
 
       If Patrick Geddes was the father of Scottish planning, then John Nolen, a Geddes 
protégé, was surely the father of American planning. Born and educated in 
Baltimore’s mid-Atlantic neighbour Philadelphia, Nolen was inspired by the slums of 
this densely populated port city to advocate urban planning as an antidote to 
America’s urban environmental health crisis. A critic of the American ‘City Beautiful’ 
movement (much as Geddes was a critic of the Garden City movement), Nolen took 
a rational and utilitarian approach to planning.146 Nolen emphasized efficiency and 
sanitation; if cities were professionally planned, sanitation, liveability and aesthetic 
appeal would naturally follow. Specifically, Nolen argued that the contrived ideas 
enumerated in a city plan actually constituted a kind of beauty, lending a kind of 
verve to urban life. In his work The Place of the Beautiful in the City Plan, Nolen 
elaborates on this concept: 
 
What, then, is “The Place of the Beautiful in the City Plan”... The answer, it seems to me, is 
quite simple. It is the city plan that makes the beautiful in the cities possible. Except as a 
diagram may be considered interesting or beautiful, looked at as a diagram on paper, or as 
the city plan as a whole might appear beautiful because of its recognizable order and 
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symmetry and logically good arrangement as viewed from an airplane, the city plan in itself is 
not beautiful at all. Nevertheless ... I venture boldly to assert that there can be no such thing 
as a beautiful city without a city plan conceived and executed not only so as to serve all the 
practical requirements of a city, but also to provide abundant opportunities for the proper 
expression of the beautiful.147 
 
Nolen later noted that while parks and statues and fountains were of course 
beautiful, their beauty was facilitated by the proper planning and maintenance of 
cities. For Nolen, structure begat beauty, and indeed, defined every aspect of city 
life. This emphasis on the importance of planning is what differentiated Nolen from 
many early twentieth century urban intellectuals. Nolen was a direct critic of laissez-
faire urban development (just like Geddes), for he recognized immediately the 
negative consequences of allowing private interests to dominate city development. 
Consider Nolen’s ruminations on the perils of inadequate regulation of land 
development at an early Pan American Scientific Congress: 
 
Public opinion generally was not, and in fact is not yet favourable to the strict public 
regulation and control of the laying out of residential neighbourhoods. It is, indeed, very 
difficult to make an advance, even in sanitary requirements, in measures for the reduction of 
fire hazard, in the reasonable protection of light and air, administrative regulations which 
might naturally be expected to receive attention in advance of grand city planning ... 
[However] There is widespread feeling that public health matters should have first attention. 
Thus, the obstacles to regulating and controlling land subdivision are greatly increased in this 
country by the “Laissez-Faire” doctrine, by what is known as the rights of individual property, 
and by the strength of vested interests.148 
 
It seems that at the beginning of the twentieth century, laissez-faire property laws in 
the United States facilitated lax zoning regulations, which in turn precipitated 
insanitary environmental conditions.149  Given the consequences of private sector 
domination of housing seemed injurious to public health. Nolen found that in 
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American cities, housing standards were much lower than their European 
equivalents. According to Nolen, this could be avoided totally. If much higher 
standards were applied in the planning of new communities or the replanning of 
existing communities, public health problems would be diminished.150  
 
                Fundamentally, housing needed to be affordable, have adequate access to 
light and air, and be located in a pleasant environment. Although Nolen was city 
planner for Cambridge, Massachusetts, then a densely populated working class 
suburb of Boston characterized by ‘triple-decker’ wooden tenements, his ideas on 
what constituted ‘good housing’ stemmed from his childhood in Philadelphia. Nolen 
found the two-story rowhouses of Baltimore, Wilmington, Delaware and his native 
Philadelphia the ideal housing form for families. They were easy to assemble and 
cheap to buy - indeed Nolen was especially impressed with the large numbers of 
savings and loans societies in the mid-Atlantic that allowed working people to own 
their own homes.151 However, Nolen also recognized the impact of urbanization on 
working persons, and their inability to provide healthy homes for their families: 
 
Homes for the new industrial and commercial classes were evolved in muddling, makeshift 
fashion, under dreadful conditions of congestion. The shadows of the factory stack falls on 
ugly rows of houses, mean tenements, with great sacrifice of human values...Inner ugliness, 
unrest, and recklessness saddens and brutalizes human life in many parts of industrial 
society. The development of cities and city life cannot be arrested. It is the historic trend. It is 
left us only to face the by-product of industrialism, the city, and if possible, civilize it.152 
 
Much like Geddes, Nolen maintained that poor housing was the natural result of 
increased urbanization in a capitalist society. However, state action seemed like a 
potential solution to the problem of poor housing. Nolen felt that community 
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organization could provide an alternative to the ruthless demands of the private 
housing market, as evidenced below by his advocacy of collectivism: 
 
We need to make many improvements for the benefit and enjoyment of everybody, for the 
common good. Strong, selfish, almost unchecked individualism still has its sway in our cities, 
and many of the evils which better city planning may help to correct are due to this cause. 
For example, the faults of the street system, the ignorant and ugly condition of waterfronts, 
the failure to link various agencies for transportation, the unsanitary and demoralizing 
influences of slums – these represent the neglect of any large planning authority to control 
and check rank individualism and to exercise collective power in the name of the entire 
community. In this respect how striking is the contrast between American and European 
cities.153 
 
Indeed, ‘rank individualism’, as Nolen labelled it, was counter to the concepts of city 
planning and social housing, and thus injurious to working class welfare. Nolen’s 
collective attitude, while somewhat at odds with the Toquevillian American 
emphasis on the individual, was perfectly in tune with the rhetoric of Franklin 
Roosevelt’s America and the ‘New Deal’. Consider Nolen’s endorsement of European 
social institutions: 
 
About fifty years ago [read: 1870s], Europe began the improvement, replanning, and 
reconstruction of her cities to meet the requirements of modern life. Each city acting with 
strong, well-regulated collective power, endeavoured to provide facilities for wholesome 
exercise, for transportation, for good homes…To furnish advantages such as these should be 
one of the controlling purposes of city planning, for they not only provide wholesome 
recreation as a relief from the grind and fatigue of the day’s work, but they also make a 
definite and, in the long run, an indispensable contribution towards tomorrow’s 
efficiency…This rise and growing power of collectivism in the American democracy is due to 
the same influences which have acted on the European nations, and especially on the 
English.154 
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Thus, if American cities were to succeed in providing a healthy atmosphere for their 
citizens, they needed to copy European models of urban planning. Yet in many of his 
works, Nolen does not comment specifically about housing standards. Indeed, 
initially he argued that housing standards were not a concern for the city planner. 
Later he retracted this position, and argued that explanations for planners’ 
disregarding of housing issues were ‘loosing strength’ thanks to increased public 
awareness of the dismal state of housing in American cities. 155 Nolen later 
understood the importance of social housing, however – he became a regular 
attendee and contributor to the National Conference on Public Housing, an 
organization founded in 1931 for the expressed purpose of promoting social 
housing.156 His advocacy of social housing permitted later intellectuals and politicians 
to agitate for social housing more boldly in the 1920s and 1930s such as Carol 
Aronovici’s Housing and the Housing Problem (1920), Catherine Bauer’s 
monumentally influential Modern Housing (1934), and in Britain, Marian Bowley’s 
Housing and the State (1945).157 Thus, Nolen’s prolific writings on the importance of 
urban planning had a strong intellectual impact on the social housing debate in the 
United States. Yet the issue of housing reform was not confined solely to academic 
minds. Hundreds of thousands of workers in Glasgow and Baltimore were compelled 
to endure overcrowded, substandard housing conditions injurious to health. 
Throughout the early twentieth century, the fiercest proponents of social housing 
were not public health professors or abstract urban planners, but political activists. 
Their exposure of the deficiencies of slum housing in both cities, along with their 
direct agitation against their respective municipal and national governments, led to 
Scottish and American governmental involvement in the provision of housing. 
 
Twentieth Century Political Housers: 
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           Just as Charles Booth and Jacob Riis spurred intellectual action with their 
groundbreaking sociological works on housing and health, early twentieth century 
social activists and politicians (many started out as the former and ended up as the 
latter) were eager to agitate for the implementation of social housing and codify 
public health regulations that mandated housing sanitation standards. Considering 
the similar, although not wholly alike, poor housing conditions working class 
Glaswegians and Baltimoreans were compelled to live in, it is not surprising that 
both cities incubated housing activism. Of course, Scottish and American housing 
activists pursued different strategies. Nevertheless, social activists and politicians in 
both countries aimed for the same goal of improved access to affordable and 
sanitary housing for workers. The purpose of this section is to delineate what their 
specific arguments were, and whether their actions catalysed the implementation of 
social housing legislation.  
 
  Housers in both Glasgow and Baltimore faced unique challenges that resulted 
in different trajectories for housing legislation. The issue of space is particularly 
important in a comparative discussion of both cities; while Baltimore could grow 
freely into the surrounding area, Glasgow did not enjoy a limitless countryside in 
which to expand. Furthermore, while Baltimore faced no objections in annexing 
surrounding farmland and enlarging its borders, Glasgow faced political opposition 
from doing so from other municipalities. This is not to suggest that Glasgow’s 
borders remained unchanged until the early twentieth century, indeed twice in the 
nineteenth century Glasgow increased in area dramatically. After the Reform Act of 
1832 (Scotland), which granted new powers to municipalities that had grown during 
the industrial period, Glasgow absorbed the boroughs of Calton, Anderston, and 
Gorbals in 1846.158 The boroughs of Crosshill, Govanhill, Maryhill, Hillhead, and 
Pollokshields, all close to the historical core of Glasgow, were annexed under a 
municipal expansion agreement in 1891. The larger and more independent boroughs 
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of Partick, Govan, and Pollokshaws managed to remain distinct from Glasgow until 
the Municipal Expansion Act of 1912.159 Clydebank, Rutherglen, and Bearsden 
managed to resist Glasgow’s expansion efforts, though this successful resistance was 
more due to regional pride than genuine economic concerns.160 Thus, although 
Glasgow managed to expand well beyond its original borders, a finite amount of 
space coupled with the resistance of empowered adjacent municipalities prevented 
Glasgow from emulating Baltimore’s suburban sprawl. 
 
  Labour and material costs also influenced housing patterns in both cities. A 
low union presence and unusually high wages characterized Baltimore’s business 
environment, further aided by the United States’ abundant natural resources. The 
business climate was so auspicious that the city managed to avoid any kind of 
industrial action despite the setbacks caused by the fire of 1904.161 Glasgow, on the 
other hand, faced both material shortages and labour unrest. For instance, until 
about 1890 all of Glasgow’s sandstone came from local quarries, however these 
supplies were soon exhausted and sandstone had to be imported from across 
Britain.162 This meant higher building costs for Glaswegian tenement builders. More 
crucially, Glasgow was a centre of organized labour activity, which distinguished the 
city from labour-placid Baltimore. This difference is an important one, for while rent 
strikes in Glasgow certainly catalysed demand for social housing, frequent industrial 
action likely dampened housing construction progress in the early twentieth century. 
In contrast, while housing conditions were poor in Baltimore, it must be noted that 
home ownership was more common than in comparable American cities. Baltimore 
builders chose to construct row upon row of inexpensive two-story brick terraced 
housing, colloquially known as ‘rowhouses’. Put simply, as wages were relatively high 
and home ownership was attainable, early twentieth century (White) Baltimoreans 
were fairly content with the city’s housing environment. These two factors tempered 
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Baltimore’s population, and thus Glaswegian style ‘rent strikes’ did not occur. This 
did not mean that Baltimoreans were complacent about environmental conditions, 
indeed Baltimore’s lack of an underground sewer was a source of municipal concern 
even in nineteenth century.163 Despite real issues of housing quality, however, 
Baltimoreans were much more concerned about the perceived menace of racial 
integration than they were about slum housing or public health issues. 
 
           Indeed, the most striking and important difference between the two cities was 
their racial composition, and how racial concerns affected housing policy in 
Baltimore. While Glasgow’s housing narrative was defined by class, Baltimore’s 
housing narrative was defined both by class and race. Politicians, housers, and slum 
tenants in Glasgow and Baltimore were thus motivated by different factors. 
However, it must be reiterated that in both cities housers and politicians pushed for 
affordable and sanitary housing for their (White) working class populations. The 
results varied, but housing conditions generally improved leading into the Second 
World War. In Glasgow, continued pressures on Glasgow’s slums conditioned 
socialist politics and interest in social housing. Even in Baltimore, where housing 
conditions were relatively better than Glasgow’s, politically oriented housers 
advocated for social housing during the era of early New Deal legislation of the 
1930s. Consequently, social housing arrived in Glasgow and Baltimore under very 
different circumstances. A review of housers’ political advocacy of housing reform in 
both cities is essential to understand the differences in the development of social 
housing in both cities.  
 
Housing Politics, Glasgow: 
 
         In Britain, social housing activism initially sprang from the Independent Labour 
Party (ILP), a party that would eventually come to Glasgow and become the foremost 
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defender of local authority autonomy.164 In particular, the party came to champion 
municipal housing as the best solution to overcrowded and insanitary slum housing, 
long before the Labour Party (itself founded seven years after the ILP) paid attention 
to housing issues.165 The party’s new platform that stressed the need for social 
housing was aptly timed, for although population growth was slowing, growth was 
still continuing and thus the country’s housing infrastructure was increasingly 
strained. For instance, London’s population increased by 65,000 between 1912 and 
1915, however, only 1,500 houses were built in this period.166 Conditions were even 
direr in Glasgow. By 1911, 11% of Glasgow’s housing stock remained vacant as 
property owners held out for better sale prices, contributing to an artificial housing 
shortage.167 As housing demand rose while the supply remained stagnant, rents 
increased accordingly. Interestingly, neighbourhoods that hosted munitions factories 
and were home to more skilled workers, such as Partick and Govan, witnessed the 
steepest rent increases (and concomitant overcrowding) once the First World War 
began. Conditions like these allowed the ILP to flourish in Glasgow, and catalysed the 
implementation of social housing in the city. 
 
         But the ILP did not fabricate demand for social housing in Glasgow arbitrarily; 
indeed the duress caused by poor housing conditions surely would have sparked 
action with or without the party. From the 1910s to the 1930s, stagnant wages and 
rising inequality spurred heavy socialist political activity in Glasgow, and led to a 
social movement now rendered as ‘Red Clydeside’.168 Before the ILP entered 
Glaswegian politics, organizations such as the Glasgow Trades Council, Workmen’s 
National Council, and most significantly the Glasgow Women’s Housing Association 
agitated for rent controls and more consistent housing standards, with mixed 
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results.169 The east end neighbourhood of Shettleston was a particular hotbed of 
radical activity, and in Shettleston the ILP found a receptive environment for their 
ideas in Glasgow.170 There is little reason to wonder why the area became a hotbed 
for activity; conditions in Shettleston were particularly grim.171 Pressures on 
available housing remained intense, despite slowing immigration and decreased 
birth rates. A culture of righteous indignation to landlords’ dubious practices 
developed in Shettleston; strikes and industrial action in retaliation for squalid 
housing conditions were common there before and throughout the First World 
War.172 Of particular note was a political activist who sprang from Shettleston to 
champion social housing in Scotland: John Wheatley. His groundwork activism, and 
later legislative efforts, would ensure the initial development of social housing in 
Glasgow, and would lay the foundation for later massive expansion of social housing 
in the city.  
 
            By 1911, Parliament had already passed the House Letting and Rating 
(Scotland) Act, which granted certain legal rights to working class tenants and 
permitted month-to-month leases.173 Although month-to-month leases might seem 
precarious by twenty-first century standards, these leases allowed working class 
tenants to secure much higher quality housing options which had previously 
required much longer tenancies. While Glasgow Corporation was not keen on 
upsetting land owning interests (even though public discontent was as much their 
problem as the Corporation’s), they were even less keen on having working class 
Glaswegians revolt over poor housing conditions. Yet tensions had already boiled 
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over, and this incited housing activists to protest. In 1913, Glasgow city councillor 
and designated ILP housing expert John Wheatley authored a pamphlet titled £8 
Cottages for Glasgow Citizens. While the pamphlet contained little original research, 
Wheatley managed to highlight the sheer deprivation so much of Glasgow’s 
population was forced to endure. Characterizing Glasgow’s slums as 
‘slaughterhouses of the poor’, Wheatley included evidence that showed that death 
rates for dwellers of overcrowded tenements were as much as five times as high as 
death rates for those who lived in Kelvinside in the west end. Below are the statistics 
for deaths under one year of age in Glasgow neighbourhoods that Wheatley 
included in his pamphlet: 
 
Table 1: Glasgow Neighbourhood Infant Death Rates, 1913 
Neighbourhood Death Rate per 1000 Births 
Cowcaddens 126 
Gorbals 130 
Kinning Park 138 
Townhead 145 
Mile-End 148 
Whitevale  151 
Calton 163 
Black Friars 178 
Kelvinside 48 
‘The death-rate among infants under one year in eight working class wards and in Kelvinside’, source: 
John Wheatley, Eight Pound Cottages for Glasgow Citizens (Glasgow: Glasgow Labour Party, 1913), p. 
2. 
 
Kelvinside, which remains one of the most affluent neighbourhoods in Britain, 
seemed to stir a righteous indignation in Wheatley, who resented the various health 
discrepancies between the area and other wards. Consider the following excoriation 
Wheatley levelled at the affluent neighbourhood and the MOH’s annual report for 
1907 that reported ‘a year of normal experience’:  
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During the last year there was not a single death from scarlet fever, measles, whooping 
cough, or diarrheal diseases in Kelvinside ward, but 1232 deaths from these [diseases] 
occurred in the city. From this we learn that the average length of life in Kelvinside is double 
that in the healthiest of the eight wards quoted....Pardon my reminding you again that this 
was a ‘year of normal experience’.174 
 
Wheatley also noted that while Kelvinside suffered deaths due to tuberculosis and 
pneumonia, these deaths were also few - of the 1545 Tuberculosis deaths in 1907, 8 
occured in Kelvinside, and of the 2565 Pneumonia deaths, 24 occurred in 
Kelvinside.175 Considering these harsh disparities between the neighbourhood and 
the rest of Glasgow, it is easy to understand Wheatley’s consternation.  
 
               But Wheatley was not just upset over the disparity in mortality, he was 
upset over the causes of the mortality. Seeking to remind his readers of the purpose 
of his pamphlet, Wheatley noted that ‘It is now popularly admitted that bad housing 
contributes very largely to the tragedy I have referred to, and that by the general 
enjoyment of healthy homes the people would pass to an all around higher standard 
of life.’176 Furthermore, Wheatley noted that while there were many reasons why 
persons felt compelled to occupy inadequate housing, such as high land prices, 
urban congestion, alcohol addiction, and a lack of suitable housing, the primary 
reason was poverty. This point reiterated a still young paradigm shift; the poor as 
victims of circumstance, not amoral products of sloth. Yet rather than despair, 
Wheatley remained confident that municipally constructed and subsidized housing 
could solve Glasgow’s housing woes. 177 Wheatley proposed that the city start a 
municipal fund, bolstered by the profits of the Glasgow tram system, to collect 
enough money to construct municipal houses. Wheatley did not find using the 
surplus tram fares to fund a non-tram related project inappropriate: 
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This is not a borrowing transaction, but the transfer of capital by the owners from one branch of their 
business where it is not required to another in which it is urgently needed. It is a proposal to do 
collectively what is done individually by the person who builds a house with his surplus wealth. The 
principal would be returned in cash, the interest in health and happiness.178 
 
Specifically, Wheatley suspected tram fares could contribute two to three hundred 
thousand pounds, and envisioned the Corporation using these funds to build 10,000 
four bedroom cottages for working class families. As per the title, the cottages would 
be let at £8 per year. But an old planning problem arose – should these houses be 
built inside or outwith Glasgow? Although the city’s boundaries expanded in 1912, 
the city remained the most densely populated city in Europe. Wheatley lamented 
that while slum clearance and urban refurbishment were useful, ultimately the 
‘Glasgow Boundaries Act of 1912 will not rank as a step towards the solution of 
Glasgow’s housing problem,’ and that it was likely that many Glaswegians would 
need to decant to communities outwith the city.179 However, whether Wheatley’s 
recommendation that Glasgow build cottages outwith municipal boundaries was a 
tacit endorsement of population decentralization is debatable. In a later pamphlet 
Wheatley castigated ‘progressives’ for focusing too much on urban redevelopment, 
arguing that ‘the Progressive Party want to buy out slumlords with the workers’ 
money. That will increase your rates. They want to destroy the Slums. That will cause 
a scarcity of houses and so further enable the property owners to increase your 
rents.’180 While this debate was something of an aside in the early twentieth century, 
Wheatley’s fundamental argument was clear- Glasgow municipal authorities needed 
to pursue social housing if they ever sought to provide affordable and healthy 
housing for city residents. 
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John Wheatley, 1923, Photo Courtesy: National Portrait Gallery (UK) 
 
           Wheatley’s ideas caught the attention of the Pollokshaws based socialist John 
MacLean, who along with Wheatley founded the Scottish Federation of Tenants in 
1913 to agitate for rent control and municipal housing.181 All of these actions, while 
noble, did not reduce inflamed class tensions. In November, 1915, during the height 
of the First World War, tens of thousands of Glaswegians refused to pay their rent. 
This now infamous ‘Rent Strike’ proved so effective that it resulted in the near 
immediate drafting of the Increase of Rents and Mortgage Interest (War 
Restrictions) Bill, which froze rents at 1914 rates and granted tenants more legal 
rights. This wartime legislation, however, did not calm the clamouring for actual 
social housing. Not only had housing become prohibitively expensive, overcrowding 
had reached an unbearable level. Consider the chart below from a 1917 report on 
Scottish housing conditions: 
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Person-per-Room Density in Glasgow, 1911, Report of the Royal Commission on the Housing of the 
Industrial Population of Scotland, Rural and Urban, p. 104. 
 
As of the 1911 census, over 100,000 Glaswegians lived in one room dwellings and 
nearly 370,000 Glaswegians lived in two room dwellings. What’s worse, even 
housing standards dating from the early twentieth century stipulated that houses 
should aim for a person-per-room density of 1, at the most 1.5. Yet in 1911, over half 
of the city’s population lived at a person-per-room density of 2 or higher.182 Real 
legislative changed occurred only after the War. In 1919, after claiming victory in the 
First World War, many Scottish soldiers returning to Glasgow found the slums were 
more overcrowded and consequently in worse condition than when they had left for 
Europe. This was more than a minor annoyance; the Scottish public was rightfully 
angry. In response, Parliament passed the House, Town Planning, etc. (Scotland) Act 
in 1919. The Act, which came to be known as ‘homes fit for heroes’, facilitated the 
construction of the very first council estates in Scotland, houses to built and owned 
by local authorities throughout Scotland.183 The Scottish Board of Health, which was 
charged with enforcing the Act, approved of a plan to build 57,000 new dwellings 
throughout Scotland, with the majority being relatively spacious three and four room 
flats.184 Social housing had arrived in Scotland. 
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        Despite his successes, John Wheatley’s career as a political houser had only just 
begun, however. Wheatley’s efforts, including his pamphlets and his role in the 1915 
rent strike, would eventually land him a position as the first Minister of Health in the 
first Labour government (despite his agitation against the Labour party as a member 
of the ILP). Although Wheatley was only a city councillor at the passage of 1919 act, 
by 1922 he was elected to represent the Glasgow Shettleston constituency at 
Parliament. In 1924, he joined Ramsay MacDonald’s cabinet as Minister of Health. In 
this position, he would supervise all social housing construction and provision, and 
supervise the implementation of his eponymous ‘Wheatley Act’.185 Social housing, 
desperately needed in Glasgow, got a running start in the intervening years before 
the Second World War. During this time, social housing construction in Glasgow 
proceeded at a much faster pace than private housing construction.186 The growth 
and acceleration of social housing construction in the interwar period was in no 
small way preceded and conditioned by the actions of Wheatley and other Scottish 
ILP activists, such as Edinburgh based James Connolly and R E Muirhead.187 The 
interwar period, however, saw an increase in social housing legislation. While the 
1920’s and 1930’s did not witness the massive rent strikes of the 1910’s, the need 
for social housing was just as great during this period, and the housers and 
politicians of the interwar period were cognizant of this need and sought to codify 
their support of housing reform. 
 
     The impact of the 1919 Act and the introduction of social housing on Scotland was 
both immediate and significant. Between 1919 and 1938, of the 344,209 new houses 
built in Scotland, 241,018 of those housing units, or exactly 70%, were social housing 
schemes.188 In contrast, in England and Wales, only 28% of the 4.2 million houses 
built during this period was social housing.189 The Scottish Office, through its various 
departments, set about to alleviate overcrowding and eliminate poor housing 
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conditions. Even with the guidance of benevolent political housers like John 
Wheatley, however, the trajectory for Scottish social housing was not totally clear. 
After the 1919 Act, many housers felt that social housing construction needed to 
target the worst housed Scots, i.e. those who inhabited the most dilapidated 
tenements should be given rehousing priority. Yet the Housing (Scotland) Act of 
1925, passed under the direction of Wheatley consolidated a course of building 
social housing to match general Scottish population needs.190 This meant much of 
the Scottish social housing built during the interwar years was designed specifically 
for middle class occupancy.191 This had a direct impact on the types of housing units 
built during the later 1920s. In Glasgow, a majority of housing schemes built during 
the 1920s were semi-detached housing units. While this housing type had been 
common in England, detached houses in Scotland had almost exclusively been for 
middle class and skilled working class up until this point.192 The image presented 
below of social housing cottages in East Lothian, is representative of the social 
housing built in Glasgow’s more suburban areas of Knightswood, Mosspark, and 
Netherton in the later 1920s: 
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Department of Health for Scotland, ‘Housing of the Working Classes – Scotland: Economically Planned 
Houses of Satisfactory Design, Plans and Photographs’ (Edinburgh: HMSO, 1933), p. 5. 
 
Furthermore, the size of average flats had increased; between 1919 and 1944 about 
60% of Scottish social housing units were three bedroom flats, and a further 25% of 
units were four bedroom flats.193 Although the construction of larger, more 
amenable flats was indeed the point of social housing, again many of these houses 
went to middle class tenants, who presumably were more likely to inhabit better 
housing.  
 
Department of Health for Scotland, ‘Housing of the Working Classes – Scotland: Economically Planned 
Houses of Satisfactory Design, Plans and Photographs’ (Edinburgh: HMSO, 1933), p. 20. 
 
Considering that working class Glaswegians had staged rent strikes during the thick 
of the First World War ten years prior, it is perhaps not surprising that construction 
of cottage style social housing in suburban areas for middle class tenancy stirred 
feelings of resentment. These feelings were heard, and the Housing (Scotland) Act of 
1930 was designed to rectify these grievances; the Act stipulated that social housing 
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must be built solely to replace unfit tenement buildings.194 Put simply, the Act 
designated that social housing construction entail the destruction of insanitary 
tenements and their replacement with more sanitary and subsidized social housing 
for working class tenants. Yet even this revisional Act generated discord. The 1930 
Act drew criticism that local authorities were too focused on the elimination of the 
tenements most injurious to public health – as confirmed by the 1917 report a 
majority of Glaswegians lived in houses that were simply too small.195 Ordinary 
Glaswegian families, who may have been fortunate enough not to inhabit the most 
insalubrious tenements, still deserved better housing. The various voices on the best 
trajectory for Scottish social housing influenced the eventual political compromise – 
the Housing (Scotland) Act of 1935. The 1935 Act, the final significant piece of 
housing legislation to impact Scottish housing before the Second World War, 
mandated that funds for social housing construction be divided equally between the 
two priority allocation groups. Firstly, half of funds were to be reserved for slum 
clearance and the rehousing of families from the most unfit tenements, and 
secondly, half of funds were to be reserved for constructing social housing simply 
with the aim of decreasing overcrowding in Scotland.196 The 1935 Act thus seemed 
to strengthen Scottish social housing policy, and indeed after the Second World War 
tenant allocation policy would continue to make provisions for more middle class 
Scots.  
 
             While the Act placated discontent on the direction of Scottish social housing, 
Glasgow’s interwar social housing building programme ultimately fell short of its 
lofty goals. By 1938, Scotland maintained an estimated deficiency of 300,000 houses, 
most of this demand emanating from Glasgow. Furthermore, according to a study 
stipulated by the 1935 Act, over 4,500 Glaswegian families of four persons or more 
lived in single room flats, with many incidences of even higher densities than four.197 
While nearly a quarter of million social houses were built between 1919 and 1944, 
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there was still a great need for affordable sanitary housing. Indeed, the material, 
labour, and monetary shortages of the years of the Second World War ensured that 
Glaswegian slums deteriorated precipitously. The role of political housers, however, 
in initiating social housing construction in Glasgow, should not be ignored. Due to 
the courageous and deft political action of housers like John Wheatley and John 
Highton, thousands of Glaswegian families benefited from rehousing into social 
housing. The housers’ political activity of the early twentieth century conditioned the 
massive social housing construction boom that transformed Glasgow after the 
Second World War. In Baltimore, however, political housers were not nearly as 
successful before 1940. American housers had to combat fears that social housing 
would lead to racial integration, a prospect that alarmed White residents. 
Additionally, Baltimorean housers had to counter a much stronger real estate lobby 
that was highly successful in delaying the arrival of social housing in the city. A 
review of American political housers’ activism and pre-War housing legislation 
should illuminate the stark challenges social housing advocates faced in early 
twentieth century Baltimore, and help explain the later arrival of social housing in 
the city. 
 
Housing Politics, Baltimore: 
        
             Politicians’ influence was integral in raising awareness of housing and health 
problems in Glasgow. Similarly, politicians had a great impact on social housing 
policy in Baltimore. Just as in Glasgow, Baltimorean housers advanced political 
change by highlighting the depravity of the city’s slums. In the early 1900s and 
1910s, American housers such as Janet Kemp and A.S. Goldsborough detailed the 
atrocious conditions of Baltimore’s poor districts, and examined the connection 
between living in slums and contracting diseases. Although Baltimore’s housing stock 
was more spacious than other American cities, Kemp and Goldsborough, among 
others, revealed that Baltimore hosted its fair share of inhospitable tenements and 
that furthermore the city’s general physical environment was inconducive to healthy 
living. Like their Scottish counterparts, American housers promoted social housing as 
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a solution to housing deficiencies. Ultimately they ensured that social housing 
legislation materialized when it was most needed, during the tumultuous decade of 
the 1930s. It should be noted that the first social housing development in Baltimore, 
the Edgar Allen Poe Homes, did not appear until 1940. Social housing in Baltimore 
before existed only as an idea before 1940. Furthermore, it must be conceded that 
social housing did not receive as warm a welcome in Baltimore as it did in Glasgow–
even though the city eventually succumbed to pressure to implement social housing. 
Yet even in the land of pleasant living, unhealthy environmental conditions could not 
be ignored. Of course, the issue of race complicates the comparison of the 
development of social housing in Baltimore. Truthfully, in Baltimore, racial concerns 
dictated housing policy more so than concerns of affordability and environmental 
health. But American housers were not as concerned with upholding racial 
segregation as Baltimore’s municipal politicians were. American social housing 
proponents in the early twentieth century mimicked British voices and focused on 
affordability and the connection between poor housing and poor health. When 
American housers did write about race, they were careful not to suggest that social 
housing would catalyse racial integration. This was a calculated approach; if housers 
could assuage White workers’ belief that social housing would propel racial 
integration, White workers would consequently be more amenable to social housing. 
Ultimately, this strategy was successful.198 Baltimore, like Glasgow, hosted crowded 
and unhealthy slums, and ordinary people were eager for an alternative. The 
difference between the cities was that Baltimore’s municipal authorities, politicians, 
and indeed White residents, were much more concerned about the preservation of 
racial segregation than environmental conditions. This stalwartness created 
obstacles not just for Black Baltimoreans, but also for American housers and the 
White working class.  
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             As mentioned earlier, the debacle over W. Ashbie Hawkins’ purchase of a 
house in a White neighbourhood ignited racial uproar in Baltimore, and initiated a 
torrent of restrictive housing legislation in the city that persisted for half a century. 
On May 15th, 1911, Baltimore’s Democratic mayor John Barry Mahool signed city 
Ordinance No. 692 into law, implementing immediately a residential segregation 
ordinance to be known as the ‘West Ordinance’, named after city councilman 
Samuel West.199 Even though the ordinance and the oft copied ‘Baltimore idea’ 
would be struck down by the Supreme Court, the ordinance set a precedent of racial 
and socio-economic discrimination in Baltimore that would affect Blacks for 
decades.200 In the early twentieth century, Mayor Mahool and his successor James 
Preston presided over Baltimore during the ‘Great Migration’, or the massive 
movement of Southern rural Blacks to Northern industrial cities. Southern Blacks 
moved to many Northern and Western cities, but as Baltimore was the closest 
industrial city, it was a popular destination for economic migrants.201 Though the 
primary impetus for the Great Migration was economic, many Blacks felt that racial 
animus would be less virulent in Northern cities. While border state Marylanders 
were more enlightened than their Deep South compatriots, Baltimoreans were still 
opposed to the city’s burgeoning Black population.202 Regardless, the Black 
population in Baltimore grew every decade. After 1920, the city’s Black population as 
a percentage of the total population grew, after shrinking in the late nineteenth 
century and into the twentieth century.203 This temporary shrinkage in proportion 
was not due to a decline in real numbers of Blacks in the city, but rather due to a 
faster influx of European immigrants. As the chart below illustrates, the growth of 
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the Black population’s proportion of the total population would only accelerate after 
the 1920s. 
 
Table 2: Proportion of Blacks in Baltimore, 1880 - 1950 
Year Total Pop. Black Pop. Percentage of Total 
Pop. 
1880 332,313 53,716 16.1% 
1890 434,439 67,104 15.4% 
1900 508,957  79,258 15.5% 
1910 558,485 84,759 15.2% 
1920 733,826 108,322 14.8% 
1930 804,874 142,106 17.7% 
1940 859,100 165,843 19.3% 
1950 949,708 225,099 23.7% 
Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, ‘Total and Negro Population in 1900, 1890, and 1880’, Negroes in 
the United States (Washington, DC: GPO, 1904), p. 205; U.S. Bureau of the Census, ‘Cities Having a 
Negro Population of 10,000 or More in 1930’, Negroes in the United States, 1920-1932 (Washington, 
DC: GPO, 1935), p.55; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1940 Census of the Population, Characteristics of the 
Population: United States Summary (Washington, DC: GPO, 1943), and U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
1950 Census of the Population, Characteristics of the Population: United States Summary 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1953).  
 
While the White population grew at a faster pace in the first twenty years of the 
twentieth century, the Black population still grew too quickly for White 
Baltimoreans’ comfort. Baltimore’s demographic transition conditioned its culture of 
racialized politics. White Baltimoreans were not pleased with the changing colour of 
their city – and were determined not to lose political control or submit to residential 
integration. Ardent segregationist politicians of the time, who were mostly 
Democrats, capitalized on the racial paranoia White city residents felt during the 
early twentieth century. To understand just how entrenched these fears of racial 
integration were, consider the words of Henry Grady. A Southern orator who toured 
cities speaking on racial issues in the late nineteenth century, he hoped to heal the 
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cultural rifts between the Southern and Northern states by reminding his audience 
of their shared race: 
 
Two utterly dissimilar races on the same soil, with equal political and civil rights, almost 
equal in numbers, but terribly unequal in intelligence and responsibility, each pledged 
against fusion, one for a century in servitude to the other, and freed at last by a desolating 
war… we are required to carry these two races in peace and honour to the end. Never… has 
such a task been given to mortal stewardship. Never before in this republic has the white 
race divided on the rights of an alien race.204 
 
Grady’s emphasis on the difficulty of supporting two different racial groups ‘on the 
same soil’ must have terrified his Baltimorean audience. While Grady wrote of the 
ideological difficulties of such a scenario, he also pointed to more practical matters; 
he extolled Northerners to ensure that Black political domination of any state never 
occurs: 
 
The Negro vote can never control in the South, and it would be well if partisans in the North 
would understand this. I have seen the white people of a state set about by black hosts until 
their fate seemed sealed… If there is any human force that cannot be withstood, it is the 
power of the banded intelligence and responsibility of a free community.205 
 
Grady’s premonitions of Black political enfranchisement and similar voices of racial 
paranoia anticipated the rise of Baltimore’s segregationist politicians. Municipal 
figures stoked the fires of White prejudice for political gain. The shear prevalence of 
these fears among Baltimore’s White population is evidenced by the heavy coverage 
of racial issues in social literature of the time; the city craved political rhetoric to 
assuage their fears of a growing Black presence. Baltimore, put simply, harboured an 
intense racist climate. Whether Baltimore’s politicians held racialist views personally 
is irrelevant, for they were eager to pander to popular racist sentiment among 
Whites for political gain. In 1911, eager to win re-election, Mayor Mahool reminded 
voters of Baltimore that ‘this is a white man’s city’, and that the city would not 
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kowtow to the demands of Blacks.206 In Baltimore, racism and municipal government 
went hand in hand. In particular, Democratic Party’s role in implementing 
institutionalised racism in Baltimore cannot be ignored. 
 
           For some readers, it might come as a shock that many Democrats pushed for 
discriminatory policies against Blacks and endorsed housing segregation. Yet it is 
important to note that during the nineteenth and early twentieth century both 
political parties entertained a broader spectrum of political perspectives than they 
do currently; the dichotomy of ‘progressives are Democrats’ and ‘conservatives are 
Republicans’ that characterizes the contemporary American political climate is not 
true of past periods of American political history. A brief history of the political 
narrative of each party seems useful at this point. Progressive abolitionists founded 
the Republican Party, and the first elected Republican President was Abraham 
Lincoln, who guided the United States through its Civil War (1861-1865). Southerners 
and Southern sympathizers were slow to forget the Republican aligned Northern 
states’ refusal to permit Southern states’ secession from the Union. After the War 
the South became solidly Democratic, if only because Democrats were not 
Republicans. Furthermore, ardent segregationists, who were disproportionately 
Southerners and border staters, resented the Republican sponsored 13th, 14th, and 
15th amendments to the Constitution. These amendments ended slavery, granted 
citizenship and extended equal rights to Blacks, and guaranteed Blacks’ right to vote, 
respectively.207 Thus, at the middle of the nineteenth century, Republicans 
represented racial progressives and Northerners, while Democrats represented 
racial conservatives and Southerners. However, this definition as well is too simple a 
reduction of each party’s constituency. As the Northern states abolished slavery long 
before the Civil War, they industrialized, and developed a wage based economy 
before Southern states. While the South was not devoid of industry, at mid-century 
it remained a plantation based agrarian economy, sustained by Black slaves and poor 
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White yeoman farmers. Thus as the nineteenth century progressed, Northern 
industrialists, the White middle class, and Blacks came to support Republicans, while 
White Southerners, unified by conservative racial views and an agrarian culture, 
supported Democrats with a newfound intensity.  
           
          Yet this exposition of the United States’ two political parties does not entirely 
explain how Democrats come to control Baltimore municipal politics. After all, 
although Maryland was a slave holding border state, they sided with the Union 
during the Civil War. Why then, was Baltimore not a Republican stronghold? There 
are a number of answers to this question. Baltimore has been aptly characterized as 
a ‘Northern industrial city with a Southern culture,’ and while Maryland is often 
categorized as a Northern state, it maintained slavery throughout the Civil War.208 
Additionally, Maryland’s decision to side with the Union was a reluctant choice. Not 
only were slaveholding interests in Maryland hesitant to support a war against the 
South, Baltimore was a unique hotbed of insurrectionary activity. When union 
soldiers were garrisoned in the city in 1861, clashes ensued between the soldiers and 
the city’s Southern sympathizers. Reinforcements from Pennsylvania were sent to 
solidify Union control of Baltimore.209 Later in the War, there were further riots in 
protest of the military draft. Baltimore, it seemed, was a reluctant supporter of the 
Union. Yet again, sympathy for the Southern cause only partially explains the 
Democratic Party’s dominance of Baltimore. Beginning in the late nineteenth 
century, the Democratic Party began targeting Northern urban working class for 
votes. There was a distinct reason for this targeting. From 1861 to 1878, the 
Republican Party controlled the Presidency. Given that the Northern states were 
already more populous, foreign immigrants were streaming into Northern cities, and 
newly enfranchised Blacks provided a new bloc of support for the Republicans, there 
was no mystery why Republicans were long the dominant political party in after the 
Civil War. The Democratic Party was aware that demographic factors were not in 
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their favour, and developed a strategy to appeal to European immigrant voters, on 
the grounds that urban immigrants and rural Whites were both disenfranchised 
groups. While a political union of Southern rural Whites and Northern urban 
immigrants seems bizarre, there were justifications for this approach. While the 
Republican Party was the party of industrial interests, it was not necessarily the 
party of industrial workers. While industrialization made Northern business owners 
wealthy, that wealth was not equitably distributed. As immigrants from Southern 
and Eastern Europe poured into port cities to work in factories, foundries, and mills, 
they did not find a worker’s paradise. Instead, newly arrived immigrants were 
crowded into unsanitary slum housing and compelled to work long hours for little 
pay. The duress immigrants experienced in America’s industrial cities is chronicled in 
works like Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle or Stephen Crane’s Maggie: A Girl of the 
Streets. The Northern urban working class, it can be safely asserted, was less than 
content and had a number of justifiable grievances. Late nineteenth century 
Democrats saw an opportunity to boost their support; if they could appeal to 
immigrant populations by championing workers’ rights and trade protectionism, the 
Democrats could garner a new bloc of support. Both newly arrived immigrants 
Whites and Southern Whites shared a common adversary: the Northern business 
classes. Furthermore, as immigrant Whites viewed Blacks as competition for low 
wage work, Northern urban residents warmed to segregationist ideas, thus 
reinforcing their odd alliance with Southern rural Whites. By the early twentieth 
century, the Democrats were the party of the Old South (re: White South) and the 
urban working class; the Republicans, the party of the Northern middle class and 
Blacks. Thus, the United States’ political parties could hardly be reduced to a 
particular ideology; America’s political parties during this period held nuanced social 
and political views to placate the disparate groups of people they represented. Put 
simply, Democrats gained control of Baltimore’s municipal government by appealing 
to the working class and segregationist interests of the city’s White population.   
 
           Yet while politicians were concerned with maintaining racial order, housers 
were more focused on environmental and public health issues. While Black 
encroachment on White neighbourhoods was the preeminent popular concern, 
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working class families still faced a dire housing crisis. Although Baltimore was 
renowned as having more affordable housing options than New York or Chicago, the 
city still suffered shortages of decent affordable housing. This was particularly true of 
rental housing, for while home ownership was more widespread in Baltimore than 
other cities – most families were still renters in the early twentieth century. Blacks 
and immigrant Whites were much more likely to be renters than native Whites, a 
shared quality despite these groups’ deep suspicions of each other. True, the single-
family rowhouse predominated in Baltimore. Poor families, however, were often 
compelled into crowded conditions, and many single-family houses were 
transformed into makeshift multi-family tenements to accommodate more 
people.210 Not only did this increase crowding in the city, it had the effect of driving 
up rents – the average cost of a family home in 1885 was $78, by 1902, the average 
cost increased to somewhere around $100.211 Despite these increases, rents were 
still higher in New York. However, while Baltimore’s working class may have enjoyed 
better housing conditions than their other urban American and British counterparts, 
the quality of Baltimore’s housing conditions were almost certainly exaggerated by 
municipal authorities. Baltimore’s City Directory of 1907, popularly known as ‘The 
Baltimore Book’, for example, seems a little too exuberant in its praise of its native 
housing stock: 
 
It has been stated that Baltimore is a City of homes. It is more than this. Baltimore is a City of 
OWNED homes. Houses of any class may be purchased upon terms that place OWNERSHIP 
within reach of the most humble wage-earner…Baltimore is described as a “City of practically 
no tenements,” as the tenement evil is understood in connection with other cities, and the 
report is authority for the statement, which is an established fact, that a house in Baltimore 
can be rented for about one-half a similar house in a like neighbourhood can be rented for in 
New York.212 
 
It is somewhat curious that the report begins its chapter on living conditions in the 
city by boldly proclaiming that Baltimore is a city of widespread homeownership, and 
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then tapers off with a note about the low rents charged in Baltimore. The report 
does not cite a reference for the claim that rented houses in Baltimore cost half as 
much as similar dwellings in New York, although it comments that of the 115,795 
private dwellings in the city, excluding apartment buildings, about 55% were two 
stories in height. Such a proliferation of low-rise housing likely confirmed the 
contention that Baltimore rents were lower – if land prices were dearer, builders 
would have built higher density housing, and rents would likely have increased. The 
report concludes its discussion on working class housing with the following assertion: 
 
A real home in Baltimore is within reach of all. And this home is on a good street, in a 
respectable neighbourhood. Baltimoreans are not stowed away in the uppermost stories of 
unhealthy, insanitary tenement houses, with dubious and doubtful associates under the 
same roof, and in an atmosphere of social, physical, and moral impurity.213 
 
It was certainly true that homeownership rates in Baltimore were higher than in New 
York, and it was probably true that average housing density was lower in Baltimore 
than New York. But what was emphatically untrue was that Baltimore was a ‘city of 
practically no tenements’ or that ‘a real home in Baltimore is within reach of all’. 
Baltimore had plenty of tenements, and though municipal authorities may have 
wished to ignore discussion of them, housers did not eschew criticism of the city’s 
tenements. In 1903, the Baltimore Association for the Improvement of the Condition 
of the Poor engaged Janet Kemp to investigate the conditions of slum housing in the 
city. Her findings were compiled in her report Housing Conditions in Baltimore 
(1907). In addition to providing a detailed account of Baltimore’s less than salubrious 
slum housing conditions, Kemp also levelled some scathing criticism at Baltimore’s 
municipal efforts to counter overcrowding and environmental insanitation. Citing the 
municipal publication, Kemp wrote: 
 
So eminent an authority as the Baltimore City Directory, 1907, declares that “There are no 
tenements in Baltimore.” Doubtless such an impression is more or less widespread in the 
community. The prevalence of this idea is probably due to the fact that the growth of 
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tenements has proceeded so largely with the four walls of dwellings intended for single 
families. Whoever will take the pains to read the report herewith submitted will discover 
how wide of the facts such an impression is.214 
 
With this assertion in the introduction to her report, Kemp extinguished the notion 
that slum housing conditions did not exist in Baltimore: while most Baltimoreans did 
not live in large tenements, crowding and insanitation was just as pervasive in the 
city’s smaller buildings. After the Great Fire of 1904, Baltimore municipal authorities 
managed to enact stricter building regulations in 1908, improving the standards 
enumerated in the Baltimore Building Code of 1893.215 The improved building code 
called for the prohibition of: alley buildings, basement buildings, separate toilet 
facilities for every building, minimum cubic air space requirements, and annual 
inspection of all tenement houses.216 Yet while Kemp conceded that the ‘old style, 
death trap tenement, with its six stories of height’ were increasingly rare in 
Baltimore, she reminded readers that new high density tenements fitted with 
sanitary amenities offer: 
 
Many more of the conditions essential to an ideal home life than can possibly be found in a 
six or eight-room house, in which every room may contain a family, and for which the only 
water supply is the yard hydrant, and an outdoor privy the only sanitary convenience. It is 
largely in houses of this latter type that Baltimore discovers its tenement problem and its 
need for tenement legislation.217 
 
While Baltimore’s municipal government and the city directory were keen to portray 
Baltimore as a housing paradise, the reality was that housing conditions in Baltimore 
were at best only slightly better than other cities. Indeed, Kemp noted that severely 
crowded and unsanitary conditions existed in Baltimore, and that the prevalence of 
single-family houses in Baltimore did not necessarily result in healthy, uncrowded 
houses. Additionally, and again in contradiction with the City Directory, Baltimore 
                                                 
214 Janet Kemp, Housing Conditions in Baltimore (Baltimore, MD: 1907), p.8. 
215 ‘Building Regulations’, Journal of the Proceedings of the first Branch City Council of Baltimore at the 
Sessions of 1907-1908 (Baltimore: Dulcany, 1907), pp. 1063-1064. 
216 Kemp, Housing Conditions, pp. 5-6. 
217 Ibid., p. 14. 
 91 
did host tenement buildings, if not the six plus story tenement buildings of the Lower 
East Side. This is evidenced by the photographs and written descriptions of such 
buildings in Kemp’s study. Specifically, Kemp chose four housing districts in South 
Baltimore for the study: two districts primarily composed of alley houses (small, 
dilapidated houses on alley streets) and two districts primarily composed of 
tenement buildings or single-family houses converted into multi-family dwelling 
units. These buildings were occupied by Baltimore’s poor immigrant communities 
and migrant Blacks, and were as decrepit as any New York tenement building. 
Regarding conditions in Baltimore’s tenements, Kemp wrote: 
 
It would require a highly developed power of projection to be able to realize just what it 
means to live in a two-room apartment where one room has no access to the outer air, and 
the other is ventilated only from a canyon-like opening between two high buildings. Three 
offensive privy compartments open on this narrow passage, directly beneath the windows of 
the apartment in question. The abode of the primitive cave-dweller was more sanitary than 
this home in twentieth-century Baltimore.218 
 
The impact of poor housing conditions on health, it seems, was apparent and 
appalling. Although a low density housing infrastructure existed in the city, crowding 
and a deficiency of basic sanitary amenities made much of Baltimore’s working class 
housing stock detrimental to public health. Baltimore’s vital statistics during the 
early twentieth century, particularly of Black wards, point to a strong correlation 
between poor housing and poor health. 219 Furthermore, White Baltimoreans were 
concerned about the potential health impacts of living near Blacks. Residential 
segregation, the reasoning went, would prevent Whites from contracting ‘Negro 
diseases’ like tuberculosis, pneumonia, or influenza. Racial concerns even influenced 
perceptions of public health, and while Kemp’s intentions were pure, her work likely 
stoked negative perceptions of Blacks. Without question, Kemp’s work encouraged 
Mayor Mahool’s pursuit of Ordinance No. 692, and contributed to a general 
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consensus that quarantining Blacks would reduce civil disturbance, inhibit disease 
spread, and protect property values.220 Mahool was not alone in his beliefs. In a 
treatise on the relationship between the United States government and American 
blacks, author and physician E W Gilliam examined the situation of Baltimore’s Black 
community, where supposedly Blacks enjoyed a relatively high quality of life. Gilliam 
informed his readers that Baltimore was a city where Blacks were ‘abundantly 
supplied with work, and should be living under favourable conditions.’221 In the 
passage below, however, Gilliam described his encounter with a Baltimore health 
commissioner: 
 
Into the object of my visit he entered at once and with alacrity, declaring that the negro was 
living regardless of every law of health and sanitary regulation – that he had no forethought, 
no sense of personal hygiene – that licentiousness, disease, and death were running together 
briskly hand in hand – that the negro was far more susceptible to disease, than in antebellum 
days – that fell consumption, almost unknown among the blacks under the slavery regime, 
was so common that many were calling it the negro malady – that of the startling prevalence 
of loathsome diseases physicians were only cognizant – and that the death rate was 
tremendous, and out of all proportion to the mortality among the whites.222 
 
Gilliam later supplemented his paraphrase of the health commissioner’s maligning of 
Black lifestyle practices with mortality statistics that he suggested corroborated the 
commissioner’s claims. A selection of weekly mortality rates per thousand, divided 
by race, showed that the White death rate per thousand ranged from 12.19 to 15.27, 
while the Black death rate ranged from 32.65 to 39.30.223 These few select pages 
truly highlight the severity of the difficulties Blacks faced in securing sanitary housing 
in Baltimore. Given the harsh, condescending tone of the health commissioner, his 
speculations on Blacks’ lack of forethought and licentiousness, and the reality of a 
higher Black mortality rate - what chance did Baltimore’s Black community have in 
convincing their White working class neighbours they were not a threat to their 
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health and welfare? While employment discrimination likely made securing 
affordable, sanitary housing a difficult prospect, a culture of institutional racism 
made such an aim nearly impossible for Blacks. 
 
               Yet the civil rights movement, which eliminated all forms of de jure racial 
restrictions, would have to wait for another few decades. Baltimore’s housers were 
eager to advocate for social housing in the city, and were willing to conform to 
discriminatory laws to placate segregationists. Given that the success enjoyed by 
Scottish and other European housers, American housers had reason to be optimistic 
that social housing could flourish in American cities. Baltimore’s politicians and real 
estate interests were, however, less willing to compromise. While the advent of 
social housing appeared imminent and irrevocable to New York’s political and 
economic establishment, Baltimoreans still clung to their Southern social mores.224 
Regardless, intellectual agitation for housing reform could no longer be ignored by 
the 1930s, even in Maryland. The city’s Democratic Mayor Howard Jackson, who 
presided over the city for most of the 1920s and 1930s, was the integral arbitrator 
between progressive housers on the left, and the city’s real estate interests on the 
right, who feared social housing as both a competitor to private housing and as a 
catalyser of racial integration.225 Jackson’s handling of the economic hardships of the 
Great Depression, the subsequent radical legislation of the New Deal, and a 
turbulent and divided population secured his reputation as a political houser, if only 
reluctantly. A review of the housing legislation during these decades is essential to 
understand social housing’s progression in early twentieth-century Baltimore. 
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Hon. Howard W. Jackson, Mayor of Baltimore City, 1923-1927, 1931-1943, HABC, Public Housing in 
Baltimore: 1941-1942, p. 34. 
 
              The narrative of social housing in Baltimore is inextricably tied to the policies 
of the New Deal.226 With the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) 
in 1933, the United States federal government had officially expanded their efforts 
to revive an ailing economy. The passage of NIRA resulted in many of the so-called 
‘alphabet’ agencies (due to public recognition of these agencies as acronyms), or 
federal departments created to stimulate economic recovery.227Additionally, NIRA 
promoted infrastructure projects, including slum clearance and housing projects. 
NIRA created the Public Works Emergency Housing Corporation (PWEHC) to 
distribute funds for housing construction projects. The PWEHC, itself a subdivision of 
the larger infrastructure support body Public Works Administration (PWA), was 
awarded a large amount of federal money for the purpose of engaging in:   
 
Low-cost housing and slum clearance projects which otherwise would not be undertaken. It 
will lend every assistance to states, municipalities, and public housing authorities in the 
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development of worthy projects, and it may finance projects outright as a demonstration to 
the country of what can be done.228  
 
The Roosevelt government was not always keen to broadcast such an ebullient 
message. Roosevelt’s Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes, who administered the 
PWEHC, resisted the idea that the federal government intended to directly own and 
operate low-income housing. Indeed, the first New Deal housing acts were intended 
to bolster the private housing market. The National Housing Act of 1934 for example, 
which passed with houser support, created the Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA). The FHA guaranteed mortgage loans in a bid to increase home ownership. The 
programme thus targeted the middle class and the construction industry, rather 
than slum dwellers and housing activists.229 The FHA remained popular throughout 
the twentieth century and rarely garnered criticism like social housing 
programmes.230 In contrast, the PWEHC was created to ‘expedite the 
commencement of construction, but it is intended to operate only where there is a 
reasonable prospect that some type of state or local public agency will be authorized 
eventually to take over the project, thus bringing local interest and responsibility 
into the picture’.231 Thus, while the Roosevelt administration was aware of American 
urban housing deficiencies and sought to provide subsidies to improve housing 
quality, it was not yet willing to act as a direct provider of housing. This reality, 
however, did not directly impede the introduction of social housing to Baltimore.   
 
           In line with the United States’ tradition of federalism, the PWEHC sought to 
grant money to state and local authorities in order for them to spend on housing 
projects. Luckily for Baltimore’s poorly housed, the Maryland Emergency Housing 
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and Park Commission (MEHPC) had been created in 1933 specifically to receive 
federal housing largesse. The Commission initially wanted to accept funds to engage 
in slum clearance and construct social housing development on cleared sites, but 
Baltimore’s real estate interests pressured the Commission to pursue green field 
projects on the city’s periphery.232 Much of the pressure on potential social housing 
plans derived from the machinations of Baltimore businessman Guy Hollyday. As the 
president of the Title Guarantee and Trust Company, a private mortgage company, 
as well as the Real Estate Board of Baltimore, a confederation of city real estate 
interests, Hollyday wielded considerable power. In order to counter the impact of 
the Maryland Commission, Hollyday convinced Mayor Jackson to pass a resolution 
that prohibited the sale of vacant land for social housing at a discounted rate. This 
resolution, along with the lobbying efforts of the Real Estate Board, were successful 
in preventing the construction of social housing in the city for five years. Indeed, 
during the years of 1933-1937, the PWEHC managed to build 51 social housing 
projects containing 21,800 housing units– but not one project in Baltimore.233 Thus, 
for most of the 1930s, real estate interests in collusion with municipal government, 
managed to keep social housing out of Baltimore. It would take more targeted 
federal housing legislation, along with the determination of American housers, to 
bring social housing to Baltimore. 
 
                 Part of the problem rested with federal housing policy; while social housing 
faced stiff local opposition the Roosevelt administration’s early delivery system was 
flawed.  While the PWEHC developed the very first social housing projects in the 
United States, housers were not totally enamoured with the Commission or its 
approach to housing reform. For instance, the Commission’s administrator Secretary 
Ickes was renowned as both stubborn and cantankerous, and was unwilling to 
acknowledge different opinions on housing direction. Yet the most fundamental 
point housers raised was that the PWEHC was a temporary agency; once NIRA funds 
were exhausted, the agency would cease to exist. A permanent and more focused 
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federal housing agency needed to be established. The task of pushing for more 
federal government involvement in housing issues rested with energetic politically 
oriented housers. There was no single houser more influential in the development of 
the United States’ national social housing policy than Catherine Bauer. A young, 
eager, and eventually prolific houser of the era, she first floated the idea of such a 
permanent Cabinet level agency at the National Association of Housing Officials 
(NAHO) annual conference in 1934, which coincidentally was held in Baltimore that 
year. While a litany of housers argued more generally that slums contributed to 
social, labour, and public health problems, much of the discussion around the time 
of the conference focused on criticism of Harold Ickes and proposals for a permanent 
housing agency.234 Thanks to Catherine Bauer, American housers would get their 
wish – just two years after the NAHO Baltimore conference, both the United States 
and the City of Baltimore would have permanent agencies dedicated to social 
housing. Her combination of original academic thinking and political advocacy 
ushered in a wave of support for social housing, and altered indelibly American 
housing policy in the twentieth century. 
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Catherine Bauer, Weimar, Germany, circa 1934-1936, Photo Courtesy: John Simon Guggenheim 
Memorial Foundation. 
 
             In 1934, Catherine Bauer published a profound and seminal monograph titled 
Modern Housing. This book not only shaped the opinions of academic housers in the 
1930s, but had a direct influence on federal housing authorities. While Bauer’s style 
of writing was elegant and her arguments powerful, what distinguished her work 
was the ample evidence she collected while researching social housing in Europe. 
Bauer conducted research independently on housing projects in England, Scotland, 
Germany, Austria, the Low Countries; these societies had already invested much 
money and materials in the development of social housing. Bauer’s research 
provided evidence that not only were European social housing developments 
successful, but that the United States could not long afford to continue without 
some form of subsidised housing. On this point, Bauer wrote ‘Although it is not true 
that any socioeconomic order which could produce good housing would be ipso 
facto a good system, it is certainly true that any arrangement that cannot do so is a 
reactionary and anti-social one.’235 Bauer was disturbed that after the social 
upheaval of the late nineteenth century that American workers could go without 
affordable and sanitary housing. Bauer considered the issue so pressing that she 
dedicated herself to political advocacy of social housing, and joined the National 
Association of Housing Officials (NAHO) as an advisor. She lobbied the Roosevelt 
administration to commit greater federal resources to the provision of social 
housing. Her efforts had a profound impact on federal housing policy, and 
consequently in no small way facilitated Baltimore’s municipal housing 
infrastructure.  
 
                Not long after the Baltimore Conference, noted houser and chair of the 
National Public Housing Conference Mary Simkhovitch, began collaborating with 
New York Democratic senator Robert Wagner on a bill to create a permanent 
American social housing agency. Simkhovitch and Wagner drafted a social housing 
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bill that emphasised slum clearance and rehousing the worst housed, a similar 
approach to John Wheatley’s 1925 Act. Bauer soon joined in on collaboration, 
though she differed greatly about the priority of slum clearance. Bauer saw no 
reason why American social housing policy should not be as progressive as European 
policy, and envisioned a near-future where housing was viewed as, in her own 
words: 
 
the transition of housing from a speculative business, operated solely for a maximum of immediate 
private profit, to a long-time public investment undertaking, recognized as of essential public utility 
and planned and controlled as such.236 
 
While Bauer never realised this utopian concept, she did help edit Simkhocitch and 
Wagner’s congressional social housing bill.237 The bill failed to pass several times. 
Truthfully, there was not much of a broad concern for housing quality and scarcity 
issues in the Congress; the economic depression continued unabated and most 
politicians favoured improving economic conditions before focusing on quality-of-life 
issues. Fortunately for housers, President Roosevelt viewed the development of 
social housing as means to invigorate the construction industry, and thus reduce 
unemployment.238 In a deft political move, Roosevelt ordered that Robert Wanger, a 
progressive Northern Democrat, co-sponsor the bill with Henry Steagall, a 
conservative Southern Democrat. The Housing Act of 1937, known popularly as the 
Wagner-Steagall Act, was enacted on September 1 of that year. The Act articulated 
national housing policy centred on slum clearance (to Bauer’s chagrin) and 
established the United States Housing Authority (USHA). Unlike the Housing Act of 
1934 which established Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and the Federal 
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLC), organizations which were designed 
to bolster the private housing market through mortgage guarantees, USHA was 
                                                 
236 Ibid., p. 224. 
237 The original bill was entitled ‘S 2932’ (Senate version) and ‘HR 6998’ (House of Representatives). 
238 Nicholas Bloom, Public Housing that Worked: New York in the Twentieth Century (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), pp. 36-37; Adam Rome, The Bulldozer in the Countryside: 
Suburban Sprawl and the Rise of American (Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 27-35; Clarissa 
Hayward, How Americans Make Race: Stories, Institutions, Spaces (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 
pp. 139-142. 
 100 
designated specifically to fund social housing projects in major American cities and 
coordinate urban development.239 The Act endowed USHA with $500 million to 
distribute to local authorities who would be responsible for operation, with special 
finance guarantees to maintain low rents for tenants. Essentially, the Wagner-Stegall 
Act legitimised social housing in the United States. Even Bauer, who criticised 
sections of the Act and resented Roosevelt co-opting praise for its enactment, wrote 
that the Act was a ‘radical piece of legislation – perhaps the most clear-cut and 
uncompromising  adopted under the New Deal’.240 Furthermore, the Act had 
profound implications for social housing prospects in Baltimore.  
 
         In September 1937, Baltimore did not yet have a municipal housing authority. 
This was not especially unusual; the neighbouring cities of Philadelphia and 
Washington did not yet have housing authorities either. However, both New York 
(1934) and Boston (1935) had formed housing authorities shortly after the Housing 
Act of 1934 in anticipation of greater federal intervention into housing.241 Indeed, 
with federal funding, it was the city of Atlanta that built the first social housing 
development in the United States in 1936. The housing project was known as 
Techwood Homes (due to its proximity to the Georgia Institute of Technology), and 
replaced a community of wooden shanty dwellings with three-storey brick flats. 
Techwood Homes was designed exclusively for White occupancy. Only two months 
after the Wagner-Steagall Act in November, 1937, however, Baltimore Mayor 
Howard Jackson ordered the creation of the Housing Authority of Baltimore City 
(HABC). The HABC was designed to replace the MEHPC and accept federal housing 
funds. Even after the Wagner-Steagall Act, however, the creation of a municipal 
social housing committee was uncertain. The Real Estate Board of Baltimore was 
alarmed by the Wagner-Steagall Act, though warmed to the idea of social housing in 
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Baltimore when Jackson noted that slum clearance could open up valuable 
downtown property for redevelopment. Almost immediately the HABC received over 
$26 million from USHA, and began the complicated and protracted process of 
excavating potential sites for White and Black social housing developments. The 
arrival of the Second World War would complicate social housing development in 
the early 1940s; federally subsidised housing was built for both White and Black 
defence-workers and most of this housing reverted to municipal control after the 
War. Still, the establishment of the HABC solidified the permanent presence of social 
housing in Baltimore. Although the establishment of the national USHA and the 
HABC did not preclude the powerful opponents of social housing from voicing their 
opinions (or dictating the location of social housing developments) – thanks to 
Catherine Bauer and Howard Jackson – social housing had arrived in Baltimore. 
 
 Yet Baltimore’s leading political men found social housing to be at odds 
with the city’s tradition of homeownership. Baltimore was a city of owner occupied 
rowhouses, not subsidised rental housing. Both Jackson and William Curran, a 
political ally who represented Baltimore’s Catholic Democrats, were sceptical of 
social housing. Their scepticism was bolstered by the fear that social housing could 
potentially expedite racial integration – a fear that would prove prescient. Real 
estate interests stoked these flames by reminding nascent White working-class 
home owners that proximity to Blacks lowered property values; this idea was so 
potent that the tenet became sociological doctrine.242 Nevertheless, real estate 
interests feigned interest in providing housing for Blacks. C. Philip Pitt, the head of 
the Baltimore Real Estate Board for much of the first half of the twentieth century, 
told Jackson that ‘We will have to find some place for the Negro.’243 According to the 
Sun, Pitt qualified this statement by adding later that ‘No one builds houses for 
Negroes and it is up to us to find a place for them.’244 The Afro-American, however, 
reported that Pitt quipped that a possible option would be ‘to put the Negroes in a 
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bag and throw them overboard’.245 Given that the real estate lobby’s resistance to 
building housing for Blacks, one might have expected them to support social 
housing, as it relieved private developers of a legal duty to build houses for all races. 
Furthermore, as building and letting Black housing proved less profitable, it would 
have been understandable for the real estate lobby to embrace social housing as 
allowing them to focus on more lucrative housing developments. This, however, was 
not the case. Considering that the city’s real estate lobby was partially responsible 
for Southern Democrats’ dominance in Baltimore, perhaps it was not surprising that 
Jackson initially was hesitant to endorse social housing. However, Jackson could no 
longer govern Baltimore in a bubble; the winds of political change were sweeping 
the United States in the 1930s, and the newly elected progressive Roosevelt 
administration was eager to broaden the federal government’s role in housing. 
Ultimately, Jackson did not warm to the notion of social housing in Baltimore out of 
compassion for slum dwellers – but rather was compelled to accept the progressive 
housing legislation of the New Deal. This was especially true after Roosevelt’s 
unprecedented third election to the presidency in 1940. 
 
   The 1940 presidential election presented two very different choices for the 
Baltimorean electorate. Franklin Roosevelt, a liberal Democrat who had been in 
office since 1933, had not delivered the economic growth that he had promised. 
Roosevelt’s challenger, Republican Wendell Wilkie, ran on a platform of isolationism 
and business liberalization. Roosevelt won the election handily (despite the dubious 
constitutionality of his decision to run for a third term), and Republicans would not 
control the White House until 1953. What is particularly significant about the 1940 
election, however, were the demographic groups that broke tradition to vote 
Democratic. In Baltimore, a breakdown of the election results revealed shifting 
attitudes towards city ‘machine Democrats’. Roosevelt garnered 65% of the Black 
vote and 96% of the working-class White vote. While both of these statistics were 
shocking (as Blacks had voted Republican since the end of the Civil War and such 
strong working-class support for any candidate was unprecedented), another 
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demographic statistic is more telling: 97% of Baltimoreans who lived in slum housing 
voted for Roosevelt in 1940.246 The writing was on the wall – city residents wanted 
social housing to alleviate slum conditions. Jackson and his aligned Southern 
Democrats had already buckled to pressure and accepted federal money for social 
housing projects, established a municipal housing authority, and opened its first 
housing project just two months after Roosevelt’s re-election. Yet for the Southern 
Democrats, their efforts were too little too late. Although Jackson had been a 
popular mayor Southern Democrats never recovered in Baltimore; after 1943 only 
‘Machine Democrats’ would be elected mayor, with the very notable exception of 
Republican Theodore McKeldin – who proved more progressive than subsequent 
Democratic mayors.247 Baltimoreans had spoken: they were ready for greater 
housing options and viewed social housing as a solution to slum housing. Thus, by 
1940, the city had federal funds for social housing, a new municipal housing agency, 
and elected officials that were willing to implement social housing policy. All that 
remained was to actually build the social housing projects.  
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A cartoon that originally appeared in the Baltimore Sun; United States Housing Authority, What the 
Housing Act Can Do for Your City? (GPO: Washington, DC, 1938), p. 81. 
 
       Social housing arrived in Glasgow and Baltimore under very different 
circumstances. In Glasgow, the poverty and concomitant residential crowding of the 
early twentieth century coupled with the hardships endured during the First World 
War had cultivated a community that welcomed social housing eagerly. Life in 
Glasgow during the interwar years was hard; the razor gangs that roamed the streets 
during these years inspired H. Kingsley Long’s infamous book No Mean City. The 
advent of social housing generated feelings of relief among Glasgow’s hardy, 
overcrowded population. In Baltimore, social housing received a much less 
welcoming reception. While the Great Depression resulted in economic hardship for 
the city’s working population, a strong real estate lobby campaigned against social 
housing and highlighted the prospect of home ownership. This diminished the 
appeal of social housing in Baltimore. Yet despite the differences in the arrival of 
social housing in both cities, both cities benefitted from the dedication of political 
housers. The determination of housers like John Wheatley and Catherine Bauer 
precipitated the introduction of social housing into Glasgow and Baltimore; it is safe 
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to argue that without their tireless efforts, social housing would have been a much 
later development in both cities. Both Wheatley and Bauer maintained the same 
vision: that social housing should provide affordable and sanitary accommodation 
for society’s most downtrodden. Ultimately, both Scottish and American housers 
were successful in pushing for social housing. Yet while political housers stressed 
many hardships endured by working people as evidence for their claims, including 
insanitary environmental conditions, the influence of medical professionals in the 
push for social housing should not be ignored. While many housers were politicians 
and academics with a keen interest in housing, many medical professionals became 
accidental housers due to their interest in public health. A review of early twentieth 
century public health authority commentary on the impact of housing and health 
and their resultant advocacy for social housing is needed to understand their 
importance to the housing reform movement.  
 
Universities, Health Departments, and Public Health:  
 
             By the twentieth century a paradigm shift had occurred, and a more 
sympathetic view of poverty dominated public discourse. This shift of opinion 
facilitated the early twentieth century discussion of social housing, and enabled 
intellectuals to form arguments based on the fundamental idea that a substantial 
number of Scottish and American families were unable to lead healthy and happy 
lives due to a lack of affordable and sanitary housing. Literary figures, academics, 
and social activists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries succeeded in 
raising awareness of problems of housing and public health in Scottish and American 
cities, and these varied housers scored some early gains. Jacob Riis and Charles 
Booth exposed the general public to the trauma of housing deficiency, and John 
Wheatley and Catherine Bauer shamed their political contemporaries into enacting 
social housing legislation. Yet while all of this houser activity benefited poorly 
housed Scots and Americans, most housers were not qualified to comment on the 
exact health implications of poor housing. Pinpointing the public health ramifications 
of poor housing was the domain of the medical and public health professionals. Their 
interest in the problems of overcrowding and insanitary environmental conditions 
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led to their endorsement of social housing as a public health tool. Medical and public 
health professionals, who as the decades progressed quickly learned the importance 
of environmental sanitation, grew to champion social housing as a means to an end 
of poor housing-related health conditions. Many of these health oriented housers 
were university academics; the University of Glasgow and Johns Hopkins University 
both quickly became leaders in the newly established discipline of ‘public health’. 
Further health professionals were municipal employees, who saw first-hand the 
impact of slum housing on the health of urban workers. Their influence in the 
transnational housing debate, particularly in convincing the general public and 
municipal authorities of the health dangers of slum housing, was integral to the 
success of social housing.  A review of the development of the public health 
discourse on the importance of housing is thus essential to understand the arrival of 
social housing in both Glasgow and Baltimore.  
 
           In Glasgow the academic interest in the connection between housing and 
health had roots in the nineteenth century. Beginning in the 1860s, Scottish 
universities began to think critically about matters of public health, after Glasgow 
and other university towns suffered serious cholera epidemic victims.248 To be sure, 
Scottish municipalities were not totally without recourse to combat public health 
disasters; since the Public Health Act of 1872, all British cities large enough to 
maintain sanitary authorities were required to staff a medical officer of health 
(MOH), and many Scottish cities had already instituted the position.249 Yet as the 
Scottish cities’ municipal public health infrastructure expanded, more experienced 
medical professionals were needed to fill new positions. Scottish universities were 
quick to take note, and began including environmental concerns in medical curricula. 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, Scottish universities began offering 
degrees in public health. 
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           During the first half of the nineteenth century, Thomas Stuart Traill had given 
lectures on medical jurisprudence at the University of Edinburgh, and during these 
lectures public health issues crept into discussions under the topic of ‘medical 
policy.’250 However, these lectures were mostly philosophical in nature, and medical 
officers of health (MsOH) needed more practical training to combat environmental 
conditions deleterious to the public health. The University of Glasgow would become 
a pioneer institution in such practical training. William Gairdner, the first MOH for 
Glasgow, laid the foundations for public health courses at the University of Glasgow. 
In addition to being the MOH for Glasgow from 1863 to 1872, he was made Chair of 
Medicine at the University of Glasgow in 1862, a position he held until he retired in 
1900.251 After his death in 1907, his obituary in The Lancet remarked the following 
on his devotion to public health: 
 
He had already shown his interest in the then elementary science of public health, as was 
evidenced by his publishing, in the year of his appointment to Glasgow, a valuable book 
entitled “Public Health in Relation to Air and Water,” which epitomised what was then 
known on the subject, and he was consequently asked to undertake the onerous task of chief 
medical officer of health in the city of Glasgow at a time when the city was crying out for 
sanitary reform… He had to face conditions of dirt and overcrowding such as do not exist in 
Great Britain to-day… his general sanitary work effected a complete change for the good in 
the unhealthy quarters in the city.252 
 
Thus, despite keen interests in cardiology, mental illness, and the physician-patient 
relationship, Gairdner became known primarily for his work on the implications of of 
an insanitary environment on health. Yet while Gairdner was influential in advancing 
an appreciation of public health at the University, the more consequential shaper of 
public health curriculum at Glasgow was John Glaister. Originally a lecturer in 
‘medical jurisprudence’ a la Traill at the Glasgow Royal Infirmary, he gained such 
prominence in this field that he became Professor of Forensic Medicine and Public 
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Health at the University of Glasgow.253  It was at the University of Glasgow that 
Glaister honed his ideas on public health as a science – and documented these ideas 
in his monumental 1902 work A Textbook of Medical Jurisprudence, Toxicology, and 
Public Health. The timing of this work was particularly appropriate, for the year 
before Glaister’s appointment to the University (1889) the Local Government Act of 
1888 stipulated that all MOsH appointed had to hold a degree in public health, 
sanitary science, or state medicine.254 As Glasgow had instituted its Doctor of Public 
Health (DPH) program in 1876, the University was well prepared for the increasing 
cooperation between municipalities and universities in public health matters.255 
Thus, at the beginning of the early twentieth century, while Glasgow continued to 
struggle with poor environmental conditions and preventable public health 
problems, university medical professionals were cooperating with municipal 
authorities to better tackle these problems. The University cultivated an intellectual 
atmosphere conducive to the understanding of public health as a practical science. 
Treating public health as a professional course certainly influenced AK Chalmers and 
Alexander MacGregor, both students of public health at Glasgow who succeeded 
each other as MOH for Glasgow (1898-1925 and 1925-1946, respectively). With 
professional training and a scientific understanding of public health, Glasgow’s 
municipal health workers were much better prepared to tackle housing and health 
issues in the twentieth century than in years prior. Across the Atlantic, the 
development of public health courses at a much more junior institution would have 
a profound effect on housing and health issues in another city. 
 
          The wealthy Baltimore philanthropist Johns Hopkins bequeathed money in his 
will to found a university and a hospital, and the eponymous institution was 
established in 1876. From the beginning, Johns Hopkins University differentiated 
itself from its contemporaries. The university sought to emulate German universities 
and focus primarily on research and the instruction of practical skills rather than 
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teaching the Classics to privileged youths.256 The medical school rose to fame almost 
immediately. Abraham Flexner, author of the Carnegie Foundation funded 
investigation of American universities in 1910, wrote the following about Johns 
Hopkins:  
 
This was the first medical school in America of a genuine university type, with something 
approaching adequate endowment, well equipped laboratories conducted by modern 
teachers, devoting themselves unreservedly to medical investigation and instruction, and 
with its own hospital in which the training of physicians and the healing of the sick 
harmoniously combine to the infinite advantage of both. The influence of this new 
foundation can hardly be overstated.257 
 
By the dawn of the twentieth century, Baltimore rivalled Glasgow, Heidelberg, and 
Paris as a centre for medical education. Still, even at Johns Hopkins medical curricula 
often eschewed instruction on environmental and public health problems. This 
deficiency would be corrected. Just as the Carnegie Foundation had funded Flexner’s 
investigation of medical education, another philanthropic organization, the 
Rockefeller Foundation, decided in 1916 that it wished to ‘co-operate with the 
University in the establishment of a School of Hygiene and Public Health for the 
advancement of knowledge and the training of investigators, teachers, officials, and 
other workers in these fields.’258 The choice of Johns Hopkins as the recipient of such 
philanthropic largesse was a testament to the strengths of Hopkins’ medical 
education model, and the Foundation’s decision excited university staff greatly.259 
This offer was accepted, and in October of 1918 the Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene 
and Public was established.260 Indicative of the university’s reputation for forward 
thinking, the school had an ideological running start, and stated that the school’s 
mission was to ‘establish courses for the training of qualified persons in public 
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health, to promote investigative work in hygiene and preventative medicine and 
provide opportunities for the training of investigators in these subjects, and to 
develop the adequate means for the dissemination of hygienic knowledge.’261 
Hopkins instituted a Doctor of Public Health degree, and sought to instruct its 
students in bacteriological analysis of food, water, and sewage; nutritional and 
environmental hygiene; sanitary engineering, among other subjects.262 The 
professional response to Johns Hopkins’ efforts was laudatory. A physician at the 
School of Hygiene wrote an article to a popular American journal that while it was 
commonly believed that ‘any physician could step into the office of health officer of 
a large city, without any training, and do the work satisfactorily,’ the truth was that 
the preservation of the public health was a diligent and arduous task and ordinary 
physicians were ‘no more fitted to undertake it than he is to do the work of a skilled 
surgeon’.263 Just like Glasgow, the city of Baltimore now had a university dedicated 
to the preservation of public health. These two institutions helped cultivate 
intellectual atmospheres that promoted the study of the relationship between 
housing and health, and while this discussion bellowed in lecture halls, some public 
health professionals joined the effort for housing reform.  
  
 The idea that the slums were injurious to health was already supported by 
Glaswegian and Baltimorean public health professionals. Yet before the advent of 
social housing in both cities, health professionals were often dismayed by how little 
they could assuage insanitary environmental conditions. Social housing arrived in 
Glasgow in 1919, but there were still far more many slum dwelling families by the 
Second World War. In Baltimore, slum dwellers were more concerned with 
preserving racial segregation rather than healthy living. The Great Depression and its 
resulting poverty softened many Baltimoreans’ attitude towards institutional 
largesse, which eased efforts for Hopkins and municipal medical staff. Despite the 
hazardous conditions of Glaswegian and Baltimorean slums, public health oriented 
housers often found it difficult to persuade the working class of the benefits of social 
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housing. While the social housing movement was successful, the input of health 
professionals lent credibility to its arguments.  
 
 During the inter war years, health professionals in both cities were involved in 
studies of housing and health. The MOH for Glasgow, Alexander MacGregor, was 
convinced that Glasgow’s slum housing contributed to its unnecessarily high 
morbidity and mortality rates, and wrote several publications on the subject. In the 
United States, officials from the Public Health Service and USHA were concerned 
about the detrimental impact of slum housing. Hugh S. Cumming, the United State’s 
Surgeon General from 1920-1936, wrote the following on the connection between 
housing and health: 
The United States Public Health Service wishes to endorse strongly a program which will 
further the demolition of slum areas and the construction of low-cost houses. Reduction of 
mortality and sickness rates in the future will rest to a great degree on extending to the total 
population the health standards of the more favoured groups. One necessity is that a sanitary 
environment be available. It is not to be implied that such an environment will immediately 
change the health or “house-keeping” habits of any group of the population – the slow process 
of health education must play their part –but the ultimate effect, I confidently believe, would 
be enormous.264 
 
This above quotation was included as the preface of article on the relationship 
between housing and health by the USPHS’s senior statistician Rollo Britten. Britten 
was even more direct than Cumming in his endorsement of social housing, arguing 
that ‘there is definite evidence that the elimination of slum districts in cities and the 
provision of housing which meets adequate sanitary requirements would have an 
immeasurable effect on the future health of a population.’265 Still, Britten’s 
affirmation of the relationship between poor housing and poor health was not 
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original; he himself noted that evidence had been accumulating for years that the 
relationship was both tangible and observable. Britten himself had reviewed public 
health literature, and found the connection between housing and health 
unignorable. In particular, Britten noted that infant mortality, pulmonary 
tuberculosis, and pneumonia were directly related to housing quality.266 In a federal 
investigation on childhood mortality, a report noted that ‘the infant death rate in 
families which lived in homes with 2 or more persons per room was 2½ times that in 
families which lived in homes with less than 1 person per room. The variations in 
mortality … from respiratory diseases were especially marked.’267The infant mortality 
rate of Baltimore infants whose mothers had tuberculosis was higher:  
 
 
Robert Woodbury, U.S. Department of Labor, Casual Factors in Infant Mortality: A Statistical Study 
Based on Investigations in Eight Cities (Washington, DC: GPO, 1925), p. 35. 
 
As the table above illustrates, proximity to tuberculosis resulted in an increased 
likelihood of contracting tuberculosis, and in overcrowded dwellings there was more 
constant exposure to tuberculosis. Furthermore, British investigations found that 
social housing tenancy lowered infant mortality and provided better respite from 
tuberculosis. In the table below, the MOH for Liverpool (a city similar in some 
respects to Glasgow) AA Mussen compared vital statistics of social housing 
developments and slum neighbourhoods in Liverpool in the years 1923-1929: 
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A A Mussen, Report on the Health of the City of Liverpool during the Year 1930 (Liverpool: C Tinling, 
1931), p. 254. 
 
While Liverpudlian social housing tenants experienced higher death rates than the 
city average, they enjoyed a marked improvement over slum dwellers. What 
emphasises the impact of social housing even more dramatically was that according 
to this same study: 
Houses in the [slum neighbrohood] are … visited by sanitary staff, and where nuisances have 
been found to exist, the usual notices have been served upon the owners, the streets and 
passageways are cleansed, sewers and private drains are regularly flushed, and in addition 
baths and washhouses, infant-welfare centers and clinics have also been provided in close 
proximity to the area.268 
 
Additionally, the previous MOH for Liverpool EW Hope wrote on the public health 
impact of rehousing slum dwellers in Liverpool more than ten years prior to the 
report,  and found that tenants rehoused into social housing on developments built 
on slum clearance land experienced a decline in morbidity despite living in the same 
location.269 Thus, in Liverpool, two different MOsH found that rehousing slum 
dwellers into social housing had a significant impact on public health. Evidence from 
Glasgow corroborated the growing health professional consensus. The truth, 
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however, was that while social housing flats were better equipped, better ventilated, 
and provided more natural light, they were not categorically transformative. Poor 
health could still thrive in good flats. American houser Lawrence Veiller wrote the 
following of the Glaswegian rehousing experience: 
 
The public officials of Glasgow have learned, as indeed public officials of all cities who have 
attempted to deal practically with this problem have learned, that the people who have been 
living in the slums cannot all of a sudden adjust themselves to a new environment and to a 
new way of living, that if slum clearance is going to be successful and the people rehoused 
are to be permanently benefited by this important change in their environment, it is 
necessary that they should be guided and helped in that transition period – in a word, taught 
how to live.270 
 
While Veiller’s language may seem patronising to contemporary readers, he did 
illustrate a fundamental truth: the guidance of health professionals in the difficult 
(and sometimes traumatic) process of rehousing only improved healthy living among 
those fortunate enough to secure social housing tenancy. Glasgow MOH Alexander 
MacGregor reinforced this sentiment in his Annual Report: 
 
 Management involves something more than the collection of rents and attention to repairs, 
and implies attention to human needs. As a result of experience and observation over the past 
few years, it can be affirmed that the majority of tenants will respond to efforts made to 
improve their environment; but the extent of the response depends on the degree of wise and 
helpful aid rendered by appropriate officers of the local authority.271 
 
Luckily for Glaswegian social housing tenants, Glasgow Corporation hired dozens of 
public health aides, all women, to act as housing ‘inspectresses’. These inspectresses 
were not only charged with training tenants in the practice of good ‘house-keeping’, 
but were also tasked with (somewhat clandestinely) ranking the cleanliness of 
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homes as either good, fair, or dirty. The MOH Annual reports during the 1930s show 
that the great majority of tenants kept their homes in either ‘good’ or ‘fair’ 
condition, which seemed to surprise the female health professionals. While social 
housing provided an environment more conducive to healthy living, public health 
aides were welcomed encouragers of healthy practices.  
 
Conclusion: 
 Ultimately, the early twentieth century Scottish and American housers were 
successful in their endeavours. By the end of the Second World War, social housing 
had arrived in both Glasgow and Baltimore, although admittedly social housing had 
become far more expansive in Glasgow before 1945. Regardless, social housing 
dramatically altered the post-war housing landscape of both cities, thanks in large 
part to the collective efforts of academic, political, and medically oriented housers. 
While housers of different stripes applied their unique perspective to the social 
housing debate, Scottish and American housers were united by the same goal: to 
eliminate unhealthy slum conditions that urban workers were compelled to endure. 
Housers were united by the conviction that social housing could provide an 
alternative to slum housing that would be conducive to healthy living. In Glasgow, 
housers relied on the strong political support for subsidised, municipally controlled 
housing in the working-classes. Their political activity, coupled with Westminster’s 
focus on housing problems after the War, resulted in a city committed to social 
housing. In Baltimore, the housers faced a tougher battler. The city’s municipal 
establishment was opposed initially to social housing, and backed by a powerful real-
estate lobby. Housers targeted the federal government for assistance, an effort that 
proved fruitful as the Roosevelt administration was considerably more progressive 
than most American city’s political establishments. Yet while Baltimore was blighted 
by slum districts, many Baltimoreans were wary of social housing – some viewed it 
as a device to enforce racial integration. These fears, though totally prescient, were 
quelled by promises of segregated social housing. Once housers had won the 
ideological battle, however, came another challenge: to build enough social housing 
units to meet demand. After the war, both Glasgow and Baltimore municipal 
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authorities set upon a massive house building operation. Both cities, however, faced 
difficulties in composing social housing policy and building logistics. The following 
chapter seeks to elucidate the divergence in the social housing paths in both cities.  
Chapter 4: The Arrival of Social Housing and Glimpses of Better Living 
 
 By the end of the Second World War, the impact of the slums on Glaswegian 
and Baltimorean quality of life had become unignorable. After the defeat of the Axis 
countries, the idea that the men and women of Allied nations should be compelled 
to live in overcrowded, insanitary conditions offended both professional and general 
opinion. Enough was enough; the slum dwellers of both cities had endured an era of 
austerity and hardship (Glaswegians suffering a great deal more than Baltimoreans, 
albeit) and were ready for housing options that could facilitate healthy and happy 
family environments. Thanks to the determined efforts of independent housers and 
their governmental and municipal allies in the decades before 1940, the public 
health dangers of poor housing were now more directly acknowledged. Even 
Baltimore’s powerful real-estate lobby came to accept social housing as inevitable, 
although they did advocate for alternatives to social housing into the mid 1950s.272 
Additionally, the Scottish and American general public’s indignation over meagre 
conditions had become more palpable; it was embarrassing that Glasgow and 
Baltimore’s poor lived in such horrendous conditions. Thus, by the middle of the 
twentieth century, Glasgow and Baltimore were ripe for social housing development. 
The trajectory of social housing development in both cities diverged almost 
immediately due to differences in extant housing stock, economic opportunity, and 
(most importantly) demographics. Yet external forces did not mould social housing 
policy in each city completely. Glasgow and Baltimore’s municipal governments took 
different approaches to implementing social housing, given their different 
population needs. Furthermore, while both cities’ slum dwellers suffered similar 
health problems due to inadequate housing, the discrepancies in the effectiveness of 
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rehousing efforts that surfaced in later decades can be attributed largely to 
municipal policy choices in the immediate post-war period.  While Glasgow’s 
municipal government developed social housing with gusto, Baltimorean attempts to 
rehouse its slum dwellers appear lacklustre in comparison. Though thousands of 
social housing units would be built in Baltimore, social housing opponents managed 
to repel the most progressive and encompassing plans for rehousing in the years 
leading up to 1965. A review of the policy debates and construction strategies of 
social housing in both cities is necessary to understand the two cities’ different social 
housing landscapes.  
 
Post-War Glasgow and Baltimore, a Portrait:  
 
 The two factors that most determined social housing policy in Glasgow and 
Baltimore were economic class and race. Put simply, Glasgow’s working class 
expected social housing to replace substandard tenement housing while Baltimorean 
Blacks hoped social housing would offer reprieve from racially restrictive housing 
covenants. Still, one significant reason that social housing developed so differently in 
both cities was the differences in standards of living for Scots and Americans. The 
austerity of the Second World War period only exacerbated these trans-Atlantic class 
differences. While the American middle class had enjoyed access to middle class 
housing during the twentieth century, the Scottish middle class had long contended 
with labour strikes, much higher land prices, and of course housing shortages. This 
resulted in fiercer demand for fewer housing options; the middle class Scot endured 
less spacious and more expensive housing than the ordinary American. The 
devastation of the War coupled with the general deterioration of housing in the city 
due to a virtual halt on repairs only compounded the issues faced by Glasgow’s 
poorly housed. A clean, amenable flat in the open spaces of the city’s periphery – 
like so many of the social housing flats built in the 1920s and 1930s - must have 
seemed like paradise to Glaswegians. Indeed, by the 1960s reports surfaced that 
people preferred social housing flats even after Glaswegian housing authorities 
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began to renovate and refurbish Victorian tenements.273 White Baltimoreans, 
including working class Baltimoreans, were drawn out of the city to new suburban 
developments; fully detached houses on quarter-acre lots in new communities like 
Dundalk, Arbutus, and Pikesville. Such housing was beyond the grasp of most Scots. 
Yet although housing standards were generally higher in Baltimore, it must be 
reiterated that many Baltimoreans resided in substandard housing, especially 
Blacks.274 The advent of social housing promised as much reprieve for slum dwelling 
Baltimoreans as Glaswegians. Black Baltimoreans were particularly warm to social 
housing – as evidenced by the strong involvement of the Baltimore Afro American 
newspaper in its social housing coverage beginning in the 1940s.275 Thus, given the 
great need for social housing in both Glasgow and Baltimore after the War, in 
addition to general enthusiasm of slum dwellers, it is not surprising that social 
housing construction accelerated rapidly in the 1940s. 
 
It should be noted, however, that social housing’s societal role evolved 
differently in both cities due to economic factors. While Glaswegians faced a dour 
economy, shortages of men and materials, political uncertainty, and the daunting 
task of rebuilding, Baltimoreans faced a period of unprecedented growth and social 
mobility. As the United States was physically removed from most of the fighting, 
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American manufacturing capabilities were not damaged. Thus, America’s isolation 
from wartime destruction, along with reduced competition from European countries 
(due to their rebuilding efforts) led to an auspicious period of economic growth in 
the United States. The American middle and working classes prospered, and soon 
departed central cities in a great suburban exodus. The reality of cheap land, 
government guaranteed mortgage loans, and plentiful jobs lessened the appeal of 
social housing in Baltimore and other American cities. Furthermore, due to 
Americans’ wide variety of accessible housing options, social housing descended into 
the housing of last resort much quicker than it did in British cities.276 Put simply, it 
must be acknowledged that social housing in Glasgow and Baltimore did not develop 
in tandem, but rather on very different trajectories. As the years unfolded, 
developments labelled ‘social housing’ in both cities resembled each other less and 
less.  
 
Yet to acknowledge the differences in standards of living between the two 
cities does not mean that Baltimore’s slum housing conditions were distinctly better 
than Glasgow’s; as Kemp’s 1910 study Housing Conditions in Baltimore showed – 
Baltimore’s housing conditions were not as favourable as many contemporaries 
claimed. In two of the neighbourhoods where Kemp collected data, the Albemarle 
Street district and Thames Street district, 58% of houses maintained densities of at 
least two persons per room, and 27% of houses had at least three persons per 
room.277 These density statistics are similar to those recorded for Glasgow in the 
1950s, which suggests that while Glasgow’s crowding problems were very severe, 
Baltimore experienced at least similar conditions. Considering the lack of affordable 
spacious housing in Baltimore, it is easy to understand why the city’s economically 
marginalized residents, both White and Black, welcomed social housing as a reprieve 
from dilapidated rowhouses just as Glaswegians did with overcrowded tenements. 
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Social housing promised spaciousness, cleanliness, greater household amenities, 
relief from predatory landlords, and a renewed sense of family dignity. For many 
Scottish and American slum dwellers, early social housing did not fall short of these 
promises. Still, while social housing might be considered an early success in both 
cities, the later decades of the latter half of the twentieth century proved that it was 
not a perfectly executed panacea. 
 
Case in point: while social housing constituted a majority of Glasgow’s 
housing stock by the early 1970s, social housing never eclipsed private housing in 
Baltimore by a long margin. Still, there were early success signs in both cities. By the 
mid-1960s social housing had broadened housing options for Baltimorean slum 
dwellers, particularly Black Baltimoreans. In Glasgow, while structural and social 
problems ensued, as late as 1971 90% of Glaswegian social housing tenants reported 
that they were satisfied with their accommodation.278 In Baltimore, after the 
Supreme Court ruled racial segregation in social housing was unconstitutional in May 
of 1954, the BHA’s executive director argued that the desegregation of housing 
projects might facilitate the desegregation of wider neighbourhoods.279 The press 
was not always wholeheartedly receptive of social housing policy, however; in 
Baltimore the Afro-American could be quite critical of municipal housing decisions, 
even after desegregation. Regardless, city officials viewed social housing in both 
Glasgow and Baltimore as a solution to the slums.  
 
Of course, racial integration complicated public perception of social housing 
in Baltimore. White Baltimoreans reacted negatively to racial integration of social 
housing projects, and exited social housing with increasing frequency. By the mid-
1960s, less than 10% of all tenants were White. Due to stigmatization, Baltimorean 
social housing encountered a lot of structural and social problems much earlier on 
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than in Glasgow, and this had an impact on tenant health. In contrast, social housing 
construction did not peak in Glasgow until the late 1960s, as a less healthy Scottish 
economy social housing attracted a wider variety of tenants.280 Put simply, a tenancy 
composed of lower-middle and skilled labour classes, fewer private housing options, 
and the absence of fear of racial integration allowed social housing to dominate 
more in Glasgow than Baltimore. This did not mean that social housing in Glasgow as 
thrived without disruption. Despite the various auspicious conditions that would 
allow social housing to succeed in Glasgow, ultimately, Glaswegian schemes 
encountered many of the same problems as Baltimorean projects. The social, 
physical, economic, and medical problems that would plague social housing tenants 
in the 1970s and 1980s would be sown in the expansion period of the 1950s and 
1960s.  
 
 Yet, despite the different obstacles that each city faced, a common theme 
united both cities: a hope (indeed, an earnestly held belief), that social housing 
would result in healthier, happier residents. While the housers of the 1920s and 
1930s had little evidence to justify social housing’s potential, by the post-War period 
both Glaswegians and Baltimoreans seemed ready for social housing. As Wilson and 
Kelling later documented, unresolved nuisances spawned unhealthy environments – 
fixing nuisances quickly prevented potential problems from developing.281 
Unfortunately, both Glaswegian and Baltimorean housing authorities discovered that 
this proved an arduous task. Nonetheless, both municipal governments persisted. 
Both cities saw social housing growth from the late 1940s to the mid-1970s, 
afterwards a steady decline in social housing stock began. This chapter explores 
social housing’s physical and social development in Glasgow and Baltimore from its 
boom to its apex, and establishes the context for the next chapter on social 
housing’s early public health impact. 
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Demographic Changes in Baltimore:  
 
 After 1945, Black Baltimoreans population growth relative to the White 
population became more precipitous. A review of the demographic changes in 
Baltimore is essential to understand the unique challenges that Baltimore housing 
authorities faced. Unlike Glasgow, the primary cause of housing deterioration was 
population influx and the artificial concentration of Black residents, rather than lack 
of maintenance or lack of building materials. While Glasgow’s population growth had 
slowed over the previous decades, Baltimore’s population continued to grow rapidly 
due to the migration of Southerners, both White and Black.282 As housing 
construction did not keep up with population influx, and codified racial segregation 
kept Blacks from residential expansion, it is easy to comprehend why Black 
Baltimoreans became early advocates of social housing.  
  
  In the decade between the 1920s and 1930s, the Baltimore’s Black 
population increased by 31%, while the White population increased by only 6%.283  
Many Blacks came to Baltimore during the First World War for factory job. While 
they were soon displaced by returning White soldiers, Black Baltimoreans sent word 
to their Southern relatives that the city appeared relatively hospitable and at least 
the chance at gainful employment.284 This influx placed obvious strain on existing 
segregated housing stock in the city. On top of this, the Great Depression had slowed 
housing construction in the United States. In 1938, American builders produced 
406,000 houses, while in the same year British builders produced 340,000 houses. At 
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the time, the United States was three times as populous as Britain.285 This figure 
illustrates just how sluggish the American economy had become; despite a growing 
population, housing production ground to a near halt.286 Furthermore, most of the 
new housing built was intended for White occupancy. Blacks tended to acquire new 
housing through the filter-down process, or residing in poor housing that White 
tenants had left for better housing. Additionally, Black urban residents annexed 
White housing on the periphery of existing Black neighbourhoods.287 As historian 
Thomas Sugrue notes up until the mid-1960s, Blacks were coerced into housing 
areas of horrendous condition, into houses which were even worse than the houses 
in the poorest White areas.288 A 1937 Civil Works Administration report found that of 
the 1,587 black families surveyed who lived outside of Baltimore’s Druid Heights 
neighbourhood, only 5.4% of these families lived in housing categorized as ‘good,’ 
whereas 64.2% of these families lived in houses categorized as ‘poor’.289 While Black 
homeownership rates were higher in Baltimore than other cities, housing covenants 
crowded the Black population into tight residential pockets. Indeed, two thirds of the 
145,000 Blacks that lived in Baltimore in the 1930s lived four census tracts adjacent 
to the central business district.290 This meant that a quarter of the population lived in 
an area less than a fifth of the area of the total city. As the map below shows, by 
1950 Blacks occupied mostly a small area in the city centre, branching outwards only 
as Whites left for suburban communities in the 1950s. 
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Photo from Towards Equality: Baltimore’s Progress Report (Sidney Hollander Foundation, 1960). 
 With the advent of the Second World War, housing construction did 
increase temporarily. This increase can be attributed almost entirely to the 
construction of federally owned and operated defence-worker housing. Baltimore 
produced steel, ships, airplanes, and ball-bearings which were crucial to the war-
effort; as production increased workers flooded the city to fill extra work positions. 
While defence-worker housing was segregated, housing was built for both White and 
Black workers. After the War, the housing developments were relinquished to 
municipal control, and became impromptu social housing developments. Still, just as 
in previous decades, population growth exceeded housing expansion in Baltimore. 
As the years progressed, Black Baltimoreans’ population growth only accelerated, 
stressing existing housing stock to the breaking point. According to the 1950 census, 
Baltimore experienced the largest influx of Black migrants during the decade 1940-
1950, and received more migrants than any other city. During this period, Baltimore 
gained 99,658 Blacks and 30,950 Whites. Considering that the 1950 census reported 
723,655 White persons living in Baltimore and 225,099 Black persons living in 
Baltimore, this demographic transformation can be viewed as particularly severe.291 
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The table below illustrates that this demographic trend would continue in the 
coming decades, and by the mid-1970s Blacks would constitute a majority 
Baltimore’s population. 
Table 3: Population Demographics of Baltimore, 1940-1980 
Year Total Pop. White Pop. Black Pop. Black Percentage of 
Total Pop. 
1940 859,100 692,705 165,843                         19.3% 
1950 949,708 723,655 225,099 23.7% 
1960 939,024 610,608 325,589 34.6% 
1970 905,759 480,377 420,147 46.4% 
1980 786,775 345,080 431,153 54.8% 
United States Census Bureau, 1952, 1962, 1972, 1982. 
 
 Baltimore’s demographic transformation had a profound impact on the 
direction of housing policy. By 1945, social housing, or ‘public housing’ as it is known 
in the United States, seemed more and more a pertinent solution to Baltimore’s 
housing woes. As discussed in the previous chapter, during the 1930s housers had 
worked diligently to improve the governmental and public perception of social 
housing. Thanks to Catherine Bauer and the support of Mayor Howard Jackson, 
housers succeeded in soliciting federal funds for social housing projects. Yet, even 
with these new funds and the creation of the Baltimore Housing Authority (BHA) in 
1937, the task of housing all of the city’s new residents and rehousing the city’s 
inadequately housed seemed daunting. The years leading up to 1965 presented a 
host of new challenges for Baltimore’s municipal government, the primary challenge 
being the effort to rehouse the city’s burgeoning Black population and maintain 
racial peace. It should be noted that while Glasgow Corporation needed to build far 
more social housing units, Baltimore City faced the arduous task of housing the Black 
community without upsetting White racial boundaries. Ultimately, Baltimore’s 
housing authorities could not escape criticism, from either the Black or the White 
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community. Thus, while neither city government faced an easy task, Baltimore’s 
municipal government faced unique resistance to social housing development.  
 
Post-War Housing Policy in Glasgow:  
 
 While social housing already existed in Glasgow by 1945, construction 
accelerated greatly after the War. This accelerated social housing construction 
required the attention of both Glasgow municipality and Westminster. Yet while 
both Glasgow Corporation and the Ministry of Health (then responsible for housing 
matters) sought the same outcome, to rehouse Glasgow’s slum dwellers into 
spacious and sanitary accommodation, neither could agree on just how to 
accomplish this goal. The ensuing years would amount to an intellectual tug-of-war 
between Glasgow Corporation, the Scottish Office, and Westminster. These 
differences on how to proceed did lessen gradually, with Glasgow Corporation 
determining housing policy to a greater degree. Yet in the years immediately 
following the War, Westminster was involved in major local decisions. An initial 
agreement on social housing expansion in Glasgow needed to be forged. Very 
simply, there were very different opinions on whether social housing should be built 
within Glasgow’s city limits or outwith the city limits. Considering the differences of 
opinion on such an important issue, few probably suspected that the initial plan of 
action enumerated in 1946 would be followed precisely in the coming decades.   
 
 By 1945, Glasgow Corporation not only faced the daunting task of 
improving housing conditions for hundreds of thousands of people, but also the 
public’s growing impatience with the city’s overcrowded tenements. The city needed 
to quickly charter an urban redevelopment strategy to placate public discontent. 
Glasgow Corporation hired two specialists, London based architect Patrick 
Abercrombie and Edinburgh based architect Robert Matthew, to draft a prospective 
guide to help Glasgow authorities tackle its problems with poor housing and 
residential growth. The result of their efforts was the Clyde Valley Regional Plan 
(CVRP), published in 1946, a monumental tome that detailed a path towards 
rehousing much of Glasgow’s population. The primary aim of the plan was to devise 
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a solution to rehousing Glasgow’s population that pleased both the Corporation and 
the Scottish Office. While London (and by extension, the Edinburgh based Scottish 
Office) wanted to resolve overcrowding by moving Glaswegians out of Glasgow and 
into new communities in the surrounding countryside (a process known as 
‘decantation’), the Corporation favoured the redevelopment of slum housing and the 
expansion of municipal boundaries as needed (as Glasgow had past done, most 
recently in 1912).292 The CVRP proposed a compromise: relocate 200,000 
Glaswegians to several new towns in the West of Scotland (Cumbernauld, Bishopton, 
Houston, and East Kilbride), and further locate 250,000 Glaswegians to new housing 
developments towards the periphery of Glasgow’s municipal boundary (Drumchapel, 
Easterhouse, Pollokshaws, and Castlemilk).293 Both parties accepted the idea, albeit 
reluctantly, and Glasgow initiated a dual process of population decantation and 
decentralization. The acceptance of the CVRP did not equate to a seamless 
transformation for Glasgow, however. Though the plan was published in 1946, 
neither the Corporation nor the Scottish Development Office had come to a 
consensus about the size and location of the first new town, East Kilbride. This did 
not prevent the Scottish Development Office from rushing to plan, execute, and 
construct the new town of East Kilbride in 1947 just south of the city boundary 
without the Corporation’s expressed consent.294 Regardless of disagreements about 
East Kilbride, the Greenbelt, or the ring road, the general agreement to split social 
housing development between new towns and peripheral schemes (and later inner 
city slum clearance and redevelopment) dictated Glasgow’s social housing policy for 
the next thirty years.295 
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 The mass construction of social housing that followed in Glasgow over the 
next thirty years altered the city’s urban geography indelibly. While many ordinary 
Glaswegians took relocation to newer houses in stride, some housing professionals 
viewed slum clearance and relocation to new developments with suspicion. One of 
these circumspect professionals was Robert Grieve. A young civil servant who had 
helped draft the CVRP, Grieve presented a paper on Glasgow’s ongoing 
transformation seven years after the Plan’s publication. Grieve, who later became 
the chief planner for the Scottish Office (1960-1964) and then a professor of town 
planning at the University of Glasgow (1964-1974), noted just how peculiar 
Glasgow’s urban landscape had become: 
 
The odd picture of a central core of very high density, a diminishing scale of densities 
through the rest of the City to the immediately pre-War and post-War housing near the 
outskirts and then a sudden jump to high density building over very large areas on or near 
the boundaries.296 
 
Grieves’ comments would later prove remarkably prescient – much of Glasgow’s 
later problems with poverty and social isolation hark back to problems of density. 
Furthermore, these problems that the peripheral estates encountered were not 
unique to Glasgow; social housing developments in Paris and Birmingham 
experienced similar issues with social and economic isolation.297 Throughout the 
twentieth century, Glasgow’s peripheral schemes would offer varying levels of 
sustainability, and by the late twentieth century had devolved into Glasgow’s ‘new 
slums’.298 Regardless, the size and scope the peripheral schemes, and the provisions 
of their individual flats, had a profound impact on ordinary Glaswegian perceptions 
of housing. 
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 The countryside location of the schemes illustrated the benefits and trade-
offs of high density and low density living. Since the eighteenth century, when cities 
in Britain grew exponentially, intellectuals such as Robert Graham noted the simple 
connection between better health and wide, open spaces. Low density rural life 
seemed better for one’s health.299 By contrast, in the early twentieth century, 
intellectuals such as Lloyd Rodwin noted the benefits of high density urban living, 
and criticised the garden city movement in Britain and the United States. Living at a 
high density (such as in a tenement) in or close to a city provided better access to 
employment opportunities and other amenities, while suburban communities posed 
transportation problems.300 Yet while low density rural dwellers balanced the 
benefits of healthy environment with the disadvantages of economic isolation, and 
high density urban dwellers balanced the benefits of economic opportunity with the 
disadvantages of public health nuisances, the peripheral estates of Glasgow 
developed into high density, suburban communities. Put simply, the peripheral 
estates combined the worst aspects of both styles of residential development: the 
communities were too compact for residents to enjoy a ‘country’ lifestyle, but too 
removed from Glasgow to enjoy the economic and social perks of city life.  While 
one hesitates to deem the peripheral estates worse than the inner city slums they 
replaced (though Glasgow scholars Mooney, Damer, and Pacione have dared to do 
so), Grieves’ remarks resonate eerily with the state of Glaswegian social housing in 
the twenty first century.301 Glasgow’s peripheral schemes, while sorely needed, were 
thus not completely positively received by housing commentators.   
 
 Yet during the 1940s, the potential pitfalls of social housing were of little 
concern to working-class city residents. In fact, at this point an intense optimism 
fuelled the city’s social housing movement. Glaswegians lucky enough to be selected 
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for East Kilbride tenancy filled its streets immediately. While many Glaswegians later 
lamented on being detached from their neighbourhoods, most leapt at the chance to 
get a flat in one of the new towns or peripheral estates that popped up in the 1950s 
and 1960s.302 The preservation of social connections, therefore, was an 
afterthought. With Westminster’s approval and a willing populace, the Corporation’s 
development plan was clear: it was dedicated to housing its citizens as best as they 
could (providing that much of the city’s population remain in Glasgow) – by building 
outward and later upward.303 But while the Clyde Valley Regional Plan was an 
ambitious intellectual effort to reconcile nation and municipal voices to catalyse the 
development of social housing – Westminster did not stand idly by as Glasgow 
implemented the strategy. The Ministry of Health (and Housing), while not as crucial 
to planning direction as the Corporation, still played a role in the direction of social 
housing policy in the city. 
 
 After the War, the Ministry of Health dedicated itself to two objectives: 
establishing the National Health Service and rebuilding Britain’s housing stock. Under 
Bevan’s tenure, the Ministry focused on providing high standard, low density 
housing. Although Scottish social housing would later be defined by tower blocks, 
during the 1940s the Ministry of Health and Housing favoured more traditional 
housing options: two storey terraced housing in England and four storey flats along 
with ‘four-in-a-block’ maisonettes in Scotland. Considering that most Scots lived in 
tenement buildings, maisonettes were considered somewhat luxurious.304 Building 
to generous standards with traditional (and due to shortages, expensive) materials, 
production pace was frustratingly slow. Eventually, this strategy backfired politically 
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for Bevan. In the 1951 parliamentary election, it was the Conservatives, not Labour 
that made the slow pace of housing development a primary campaign point. The 
Conservatives were inspired by the newly formed ‘One Nation’ advocacy group: they 
promised to promote modern construction techniques to facilitate the production of 
300,000 new housing units a year.305 Unlike in 1945, the Conservatives won the 
election. Harold MacMillan replaced Hugh Dalton (who adopted Bevan’s policies) as 
Minister of Housing and Local Government, and would set in motion a policy of rapid 
tower block construction. During his years as Minister of Housing, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, and Prime Minister (1951-1963), over a million social housing units were 
built in Britain. While this pace of rapid construction was popular at the time, 
Bevan’s response to Conservative criticism of his housing policy has vindicated his 
position and become housing dogma ‘While we shall be judged for a year or two by 
the number of houses we build, we shall be judged in ten years by the type of houses 
we build..’306 Since then, much of the tower blocks the MacMillan government built 
have been torn down, whereas the Bevan houses were the among the first houses to 
be purchased from councils during the ‘right-to-buy’ years. It is true that social 
housing in Britain encountered a number of problems as the years progressed. It is 
also true that many of those problems could have been avoided easily. But British 
and Scottish housing authorities were keen to provide decent houses that were 
improvements upon, not just replacements of, slum tenements. Like Bevan, early 
Scottish housing authorities were circumspect of rebuilding too rapidly: the potential 
perils of poor planning such as the breakup of neighbourhoods, shoddy construction, 
and improper location were evident even in the 1940s.  
 
  In 1944, the Scottish Housing Advisory Committee (SHAC) issued a report 
that brought attention to the severity of housing deficiency in Scotland, particularly 
in Glasgow. Titled Planning our New Homes, the report (also known as the 
Westwood Report) acknowledged that while 337,000 permanent houses had been 
built in Scotland in the interwar period to alleviate overcrowding, more than half a 
million houses still needed to be built. Scotland’s population natural increase, 
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coupled with a wartime moratorium on building repair, had resulted in this severe 
shortage.307 Furthermore, and in line with Bevan’s ideas on quality, the report noted 
the importance of building well rather than building quickly: 
 
It is clearly of fundamental importance that the houses comprised in this huge total should 
be designed, planed, and equipped in a manner worthy of the people of Scotland and worthy 
of future generations of Scots folk who in their turn will make these houses their homes. The 
lesson is clear. While we are most deeply conscious of the great urgency of providing houses 
in maximum numbers in the intermediate post war years … yet this report would have failed 
its purpose if it did not seek to formulate as a basis of long term post war housing policy 
standards of quality in design accommodation planning, and equipment which posterity will 
judge worthy of ideals and aspirations of our time, and unworthy of its own.308 
 
The report’s recommendations were written to assuage feelings of uneasiness that 
were brewing in politicians wary of general strife, and to reinforce housing 
legislation that conformed to Bevan’s quality over quantity paradigm. Before the 
introduction of the CVRP, the Housing (Scotland) Act of 1944 put in place measures 
to encourage the construction of spacious, amenable, long life residential buildings. 
In addition to promoting the use of new construction materials and techniques – the 
Act mandated more generous housing standards. The minimum square footage of a 
three bedroom council house had been set at 750sqf in the mid 1930s, but the 1944 
Act mandated 800-900sqf for such residences. The Dudley Committee, which 
convened the same year to discuss the provisions of the Ministry of Health’s Housing 
Manual, called for 950sqf for such residences in England.309 The report Planning our 
New Homes focused its attention on Scottish housing, and echoed calls for more 
generous square footage but differentiated itself from the Dudley Report in calling 
for a larger percentage of flats to be built in Scotland.310 While it may seem that the 
Scottish report set lower expectations for Scottish cities, the report simply reflected 
an historical precedent and cultural preference for flats over terraced housing.311 
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One might have expected a Minister in charge of housing to scoff at such seemingly 
impractical and contrived high standards; thousands of Britons remained ill housed 
and under great duress and needed to be rehoused as quickly as possible. But Bevan 
not only favoured the recommendations, but set even more generous square 
footage standards in England. Furthermore, he encouraged local authorities to 
implement even higher square footage and amenity standards whenever possible.312 
Relying on the tried and tested housing types – such as terraced housing and four-in-
a-blocks – Bevan slowly but steadily increased the English and Scottish social housing 
stock.313 
 
Table 4: Housing Construction in Scotland and England and Wales, 1945-1951 
 











1945 1,428 141 508 937 
1946 3,811 499 21202 29720 
1947 10,773 1354 86567 39626 
1948 19,547 1541 170821 31210 
1949 24,180 1102 141766 24688 
1950 24,314 782 139356 26576 
1951 20,997 1145 141587 21406 
Data from B R Mitchell, British Historical Statistics (Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 392.  
 
 The passage of the Housing Act of 1949 only furthered Bevan’s policy of 
quality over quantity. While the 1944 Act launched the first push of social housing 
development in Scotland after the War, the 1949 Act sought to improve existing 
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houses rather than build new ones.314 Existing houses that were improved would not 
simply be handed over to private landlords, but bought by the municipality to 
become social housing. According to the 1949 Act, houses that received subsidy for 
renovation were required to be rebuilt to match local surroundings. So for instance, 
if a dilapidated Glaswegian tenement were to be rebuilt, builders were required to 
build in sandstone; they were prohibited from using much cheaper brick and mortar. 
Regardless of Bevan’s push for quality, tens of thousands of social housing units 
were completed in Scotland during his tenure in office, and not just for working-class 
families. Before 1949, nearly all Housing Acts contained the provision that funds 
allocated be used for ‘housing for the working-classes.’315 As legislators felt that 
funds were best used to support economically marginalized groups, previous 
Housing Acts were designed specifically to help working-class persons. While the 
Housing Act of 1949 was the first Act to remove this requirement officially, Bevan 
had discouraged the assignation of social housing solely to working-class persons as 
early as 1945.316 Bevan believed that if social housing was viewed as benefiting the 
working-class specifically, it would stir resentment in the middle class. Yet after the 
harrowing experience of the War, class tensions had softened throughout Britain. 
Social housing now seemed attractive to ‘Middle Britain’, and more and more people 
considered themselves Middle Britain. For this reason, the Housing Act of 1949 
removed the provision that funds allocated be used towards housing for the 
‘working-classes.’ The 1949 Act sought not only to subsidise housing for the middle 
class, but to create diverse, economically mixed communities. The early years after 
the War was a productive period for social housing construction, particularly in 
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Scotland. The table below provides statistics on Scottish social housing achievements 
during the post-War Labour government: 
 
British Information Services – Reference Division, Housing Progress in Britain 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1952), p.5. 
 
 Still, while the government faced the crucial task of constructing permanent 
houses for the future, the pressing need to house displaced persons immediately 
was no less paramount. The Ministry of Works (MoW) was responsible for the 
construction of temporary houses – and while many British citizens were housed in 
existing military barracks, the MoW took charge to manufacture temporary 
dwellings on an industrial scale to meet demand. Utilizing aeronautical factories, 
over 157,000 temporary houses (many of them Quonset huts) were built for 
displaced Britons.317 The Scottish share of 32,000 constituted more than a fifth of the 
total. Considering that Scotland received much less of the brunt of Axis bombing 
(with the notable exception of Clydebank), that so many temporary houses were 
constructed in Scotland illustrates just how inadequate was existing Scottish 
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housing.318 Further reports by SHAC only highlighted this reality. In a report titled 
Modernizing our Homes, the committee found that 400,000 Scottish (permanent) 
houses had no private toilets. This represented 30% of all Scottish houses – with 
Glasgow being disproportionately represented in this figure.319 Additionally, 
thousands of other Scottish houses did not have access to shared toilets while others 
still had toilets without proper ventilation or lighting. The poor condition of British 
housing, and its detrimental impact on quality of life, was the primary reason that 
Bevan insisted on such high standards in housing construction; he did not feel that it 
was appropriate to replace inadequate housing with further inadequate housing. 
Regardless, construction pace remained an issue, especially in Scotland. In 1950, 
25,811 permanent houses were built in Scotland, and while this was an increase of 
almost 75 percent since 1946, it was still not enough to meet demand.320 Social 
housing did dominate construction, however, for in 1950 just 782 were built for the 
private market, although in the three preceding years over 1,000 private houses had 
been built in Scotland.321 Yet all of this housing progress was not enough to keep 
Labour in power. The desperate housing shortages, the horrendous conditions of 
Scottish housing led to a Conservative parliamentary victory in 1951, and prompted 
the more cut-and-dry housing legislation of the 1950s. The Housing Repairs and Rent 
Act of 1954 required local authorities in England and Scotland to submit proposals to 
the Ministry of Housing for increased slum clearance. Additionally, the Housing Act 
of 1956 provided extra funding for slum clearance as an incentive to local authorities 
to demolish slum housing. Yet while English local authorities accepted an invigorated 
programme of slum clearance, Scottish local authorities were more hesitant; even 
though Glasgow was the most overcrowded city in Britain, the city prioritized the 
construction of green-field social housing developments over slum clearance. Annual 
reports issued by the DHS held that in 1954-1958 only a few thousand Scottish 
houses were subjected to slum clearance each year, compared with hundreds of 
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thousands of English houses.322 Clearly, Scottish local authorities in the 1950s felt 
that the decantation of slum dwellers to green field sites was of greater importance 
than the physical demolition of slum buildings.  
 
 Yet while the Conservative government of 1951-1964 was keen to promote 
social housing quantity over quality, the debate over the standard of housing quality 
was not totally settled. Bevan was aware of criticism of his tenure as Minister of 
Health, but retained his position on the primacy of social housing standards even 
after his party had lost the 1951 election. In 1948, the first Girdwood Report noted 
that perhaps more than one quarter of the total cost of social houses being built 
could be attributed to the improved standards used over those of the 1930s.323 The 
average Bevan house built in 1946-1951 was 1044 sqf, 37% larger than those built in 
the 1934-1939 period.324 Soon, the British public became aware that much of the 
delay in providing social houses could be avoided, and political attitudes towards the 
once highly esteemed Bevan had soured.325 In an attempt to save costs, Bevan 
turned (reluctantly) to new methods of construction. Much of the Bevan era social 
houses built in the late 40s and early 50s were built with experimental combinations 
of wood, steel, and concrete, mimicking the style of houses being produced in Nordic 
countries at the time. With the formation of the Ministry of Housing and Country 
Planning, the new ministry called for reductions in ‘circulation space’ to diminish 
housing size. This was a not so subtle message that the incumbent government was 
aware of the public’s desire to have quality houses built and costs kept down; to 
have their cake and eat it too. The Conservatives fulfilled their promise; construction 
costs and social housing unit spaciousness declined in the 1950s. By 1954, the 
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average space for a five bedroom house had decreased by 120 sqf. The sturdily 
crafted Bevan houses would be replaced by gleaming towers of steel, concrete, and 
glass to be tried and tested in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Ultimately, in Scotland 
and other parts of Britain, concerns of quantity overtook concerns of quality. 
 
 The early post-War years altered Glasgow’s housing landscape irrevocably. 
While much of the slum housing units in the city’s tenement neighborhoods 
remained, working-class Glaswegians had gained something in the intervening years: 
housing options. Hundreds of thousands of social housing units were built in 
Scotland, and the majority were located in or near Glasgow. The peripheral estates 
designated by the CVRP, constructed between 1945 and 1955, were viewed as 
luxurious and modern antidotes to slum housing. Each of the peripheral 
developments, all located at different corners of Glasgow’s periphery, each scheme 
contained over 10,000 dwelling units that ultimately housed 50,000 people each. 
The three and four storey flat blocks that comprised these peripheral schemes were 
initially viewed as a welcome reprieve from the filthy closes of Victorian tenements; 
the criticisms that the peripheral schemes contributed to social and economic 
isolation surfaced later. Slum clearance and the redevelopment of central-city 
tenements provided thousands of additional rehousing options for Glaswegians, 
though before the 1970s tenement refurbishment was surpassed greatly by social 
housing construction on green-field sites. While Glasgow’s slums would eventually 
have to be demolished, this strategy of rehousing resulted in better living conditions 
for ordinary city residents. As a result of progressive housing legislation after the 
War, over 381,000 permanent houses were built in Scotland in the years 1945-1959. 
Only around 8% of these houses were private construction, a figure that highlights 
just how dominant social housing became in Scotland in such a short period of time. 





DHS, Report of the Department of Health for Scotland, 1957-1959(Edinburgh: HMSO, 1960), p.11. 
 
 The advent of social housing changed Glasgow and Scotland permanently. 
Furthermore, the 14 years of social housing construction in 1945-1959 were no 
anomaly. The trend of building more social housing than private housing would 
continue in Scotland up until the mid-1970s, and the majority of Glaswegians would 
live in social housing until well after the ‘right-to-buy’ scheme of the 1980s. In the 
mid-1980s, 63 percent of Glaswegians lived in social housing, in addition to 57 
percent of Dundonians and 48 percent of Aberdonians.326 Indeed, just under half of 
all of Scotland’s current housing was constructed between 1945 and 1979.327 It was a 
heady period for Scottish social housing advocates of all varieties, and though social 
housing would later come to be associated with social and economic deprivation, the 
provision of social housing flats in replacement of insanitary and overcrowded slum 
tenement flats during these years is heralded as defining aspect of contemporary 
Scottish history. 
 
Housing Policy, Real Estate, and the Black Press in Baltimore: 
 
 At first, the political leaders of Baltimore in the 1940s saw little merit in 
social housing. The Democratic Party controlled the city’s political establishment, 
and viewed social housing as potentially upsetting its base.328 As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, the city’s political establishment was a convoluted hodgepodge of 
progressive and conservative voices. Like most Border States at the time, Maryland 
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was often labelled as a ‘three party state’; politics were dominated by two branches 
of the Democratic Party, one branch representing labour and immigrants and one 
branch representing the middle class and old-stock Whites. Until the mid-1950s 
Republicans were largely a minor force in municipal politics; in Baltimore they were 
stereotyped as representing only the interests of businessmen and Blacks.329 
Southern Democrats controlled a majority of city council seats during the first half of 
the twentieth century and held the mayoralty from 1923-1927 and from 1931-
1943.330 While Southern Democrats and business interests were once vehemently 
opposed to social housing in Baltimore, the economic impact of the Great 
Depression and political popularity of the New Deal had changed the political 
perception of social housing. After the passage of the Wagner-Steagall Act in 1937, 
American municipalities were more-or-less compelled to accept federal funding for 
social housing construction. The city’s Democratic mayor, Howard Jackson, skilfully 
attenuated opposition to social housing in the city by arguing that it would not 
compete with private housing nor lead to racial integration. With the creation of the 
Housing Authority of Baltimore City (HABC) in 1937 to act as recipient of federal 
largesse, the arrival of social housing seemed inevitable. Once the housing authority 
had been established and the money allocated, the difficulty became constructing 
social housing in a way that met working-class needs but neither disturbed racial 
boundaries nor upset real estate interests.  
 
  Luckily for social housing advocates, the years leading up to 1945 witnessed 
a softening of resistance to social housing. In the 1930s, the Baltimore Urban 
Rehabilitation and Housing Agency (BURHA) were established to advocate housing 
improvement and promote Black causes. The HABC was established in 1937 as the 
city’s first municipal housing organisation, though the first purpose-built social 
housing project was not completed until 1940. This did not mean that by 1945 there 
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was only one completed social housing project; on the contrary. The federal 
government built several thousands of units of housing for defence industry workers 
in Baltimore. While many of these housing units consisted of temporary housing that 
would be immediately dismantled after the War, some developments were 
permanent. Most of these developments were transferred over to municipal 
ownership after 1945, the most significant projects being Armistead Gardens in East 
Baltimore for Whites and the Cherry Hill complex in Southwest Baltimore for Blacks. 
While Armistead Gardens remained an all-White development (its residents voted to 
divest the development from municipal ownership in order to become a co-op in 
1956, aided by funds from the Public Health Authority), many developments would 
transition to serve Black families solely.331 Regardless, all of the thousands of the 
federally-built housing units were relinquished to municipal control after the War.332 
In effect, the city of Baltimore was gifted thousands of social housing units. 
Furthermore, even during the War, the HABC built social housing projects at such a 
pace that mimicked Glasgow’s yearly output in the 1920s and 1930s. In 1940-1946, 
the HABC built 12 social housing projects, totalling 6025 permanent units. 
Additionally, the Brooklyn Homes project in the southwest of the city provided an 
additional 457 temporary units, and the Armistead Gardens housing project (still 
under operation by the Department of Defense) provided 1,674 additional units of 
subsidised housing.333 Construction during the 1950s was just as robust, with the 
construction of purpose-built Black projects quickly outpacing purpose-built White 
units. Given the city’s complicity in preserving housing segregation (both actively and 
later tacitly), Baltimore’s early dedication to the construction of Black housing 
projects should be acknowledged. While Baltimore’s housing authorities sought to 
maintain the city’s racial hierarchy for as long as possible, the city made sure to build 
an equitable amount of Black housing and White housing (although as Black 
Baltimoreans were in more dire need of housing options, the city’s early 50-50 
approach still benefited White tenants disproportionally). 
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A mother and daughter stock their kitchen in their new apartment in Latrobe Homes, circa 1941. The 
development remained a White – Only development until 1954, photo courtesy of Langsdale Library. 
 
The prospect of racial integration defined housing policy in Baltimore before 1954, 
and afterwards the advent of integration changed the course of social housing 
permanently. After the Brown vs. Board of Education Supreme Court decision 
invalidated the concept of ‘separate but equal’ and mandated the integration of 
public schools throughout the United States in May, 1954, the HABC knew that its 
social housing projects, which were currently segregated by race, were in potential 
violation of federal law. Acting pre-emptively, the HABC decided to halt the 
consideration of race in social housing tenancy allocation, effectively integrating all 
social housing projects in the city. This decision was not wholly altruistic; the HABC 
considered integration a necessary political decision to avoid federal legal challenges 
and prevent racial discontent. Consider the following tempered address given to 
HABC employees on the integration decision: 
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Quite aside from the wide array of moral and philosophical considerations that naturally 
come to bear when a decision of this kind is made, there was present the unmistakable trend 
of legal opinion in this country to the effect that racial segregation is a violation of the 
constitutionally guaranteed rights of the Negro as an American citizen. As a public agency 
operating a public program, the Authority must constantly be evaluating its practices to 
insure that it is fulfilling all of its statutory responsibilities.334 
 
While the HABC handled racial integration as deftly as could be hoped, the end of 
segregated housing projects in Baltimore catalysed White flight from social housing 
so that by the early 1960s a great majority of Baltimorean social housing residents 
were Black. While this racial transformation resulted in a greater number of housing 
options for Black Baltimoreans, it instilled further scepticism of social housing in 
Whites. As White Baltimoreans gradually fled social housing voluntarily, Blacks 
gained more spacious and sanitary housing options. Furthermore, social housing 
projects offered a housing environment relatively free of prejudice: municipal 
landlords, affordable rents, subsidised maintenance, and the security of a Black 
majority neighbourhood. Once social housing in Baltimore became popularly 
associated as ‘Black housing’, however, the city’s housing authorities faced new and 
invigorated obstacles to constructing new housing projects. Every new project built 
was viewed as a potential harbinger of Black residential expansion; site location for 
new developments became one of the most politically charged aspects of social 
housing.335 Still, the HABC continued to build new projects throughout the 1950s and 
early 1960s, even as alternatives to social housing such as public-private urban 
redevelopment plans gained traction among the city planning elites. Yet, as much as 
Blacks and poor Whites relied on social housing during this period, ultimately 
Baltimore’s municipal authorities failed in their objective. The City sought to 
cultivate spacious, sanitary, and affordable housing environments – homes for 
tenants to raise their families happily. While it is true that the HABC oversaw the 
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construction of tens of thousands of housing units during this period, the city never 
produced enough housing units to meet demand. The riots that erupted in Baltimore 
in 2015 even have a root in the lack of decent social housing; Freddie Gray’s death 
was precipitated by his upbringing in a lead paint encrusted slum rowhouse.336 Gray 
died from complications of a severed spine due to the effects of riding in a police van 
without being properly secured; had Gray not had such intense exposure to lead 
paint his spine might have been strong enough to resist severing during transit. Just 
as in Glasgow, social housing projects in Baltimore eventually became associated 
with problems of social and economic isolation, diminishing the attractiveness of the 
housing form. Regardless, in the 1940s and 1950s social housing was championed as 
a tool of housing equality for Baltimore’s slum dwellers, especially its Black slum 
dwellers. In particular, the city’s Black press was instrumental in championing social 
housing and chronicling its development.  
 
 Just as in Glasgow, the construction of social housing faced political 
impediments. Considering that some groups felt that social housing should not even 
exist, such as the real estate lobby, it was perhaps not surprising that social housing 
continued to face opposition even after the passage of the Wagner-Steagall Act. In 
Baltimore, real estate interests and segregation-oriented neighbourhood community 
organizations (often known as ‘neighbourhood protection groups’) opposed the 
construction of social housing projects for a number of reasons, but mostly wished 
to preserve the city’s racial hierarchy. Conversely, there were a number of civic 
organisations that sought to promote social housing, most notably the Citizens 
Planning and Housing Association (CPHA) and briefly, its predecessor the Citizens 
Housing Council of Baltimore (CHCB). The CPHA worked diligently to produce original 
research on the impact of social housing, covered local municipal housing policy 
decisions, and advocated for the provision of social housing on both economic and 
moral grounds. In 1937, the CHCB accomplished its main goal when Baltimore City 
Council’s sole Republican Daniel Ellison, proposed legislation to create a Baltimore 
Housing Authority. Ellison, whose family had doubtless experienced housing 
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discrimination due to his Jewish heritage, probably felt that his proposal would 
antagonize Howard Jackson.337 The city’s Democratic mayor amended the legislation 
and adopted the bill as his own; the legislation passed later in 1937 and Baltimore 
had its own housing agency. Afterwards, the CHCB disbanded and reorganized as the 
CPHA, which continued to advocate for social housing. 
 
 Similarly, throughout the twentieth century the Baltimore Afro-American, a 
highly influential local Black newspaper, was a stalwart proponent of social housing. 
The Afro viewed social housing as a tool of racial progress and empowerment, and 
praised the construction of new housing projects in its columns. Furthermore, the 
Afro viewed social housing as providing a public health benefit, and detailed the 
attachment of medical clinics to housing projects as bettering Black access to 
healthcare services. Similarly, the Afro argued that city housing projects would 
provide relief from Baltimore slums’ infamous problems with lead paint and rat 
infestation. However, Baltimorean opponents of social housing never ceased to 
inhibit expansion in the twentieth century. The HABC walked a difficult tightrope; it 
had to cultivate a housing policy to please poor Whites and Blacks, but was not so 
progressive that it upset real estate interests or ardent segregationists. In a deft 
political move, Jackson appointed George Murphy, the brother of Afro-American 
editor Charles Murphy, as one of the five directors of the HABC. The Black 
community and CPHA housers were ecstatic; Murphy’s appointment was a rare 
gesture of racial reconciliation. While Murphy had little sway in helping the HABC 
procure more housing funds from the federal government, he did ensure that funds 
received would be used to benefit Black Baltimoreans. Thus, in order to understand 
the progress of social housing construction in Baltimore, a delineation of post-War 
advocacy is necessary. 
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 As discussed in the last chapter, housers agitated for federal intervention 
into the housing market during the 1920s and 1930s.  
 
Yet even with the successful reorganization of Baltimore’s municipal structure to 
accommodate a new federal intervention in the housing market, many of the city’s 
prospective social housing tenants faced an additional hurdle to housing access that 
Glaswegian tenants did not face – racial discrimination. From the beginning, the 
issue of racial segregation and equal housing access complicated Baltimore’s social 
housing narrative. Blacks were the most poorly housed marginalized group in 
Baltimore, yet city housing authorities were wary of appearing to dedicate most of 
their efforts to the provision of Black housing. Not only would this offend Baltimore’s 
poor White community (whose support was crucial to any politician in Baltimore), it 
could have potentially upset real estate interests who feared difficulties in selling 
properties in close proximity to ‘Black housing’. Considering that Baltimore would 
not have a Black Mayor until 1987, it is likely that without significant pressure 
Baltimore’s municipal government would have provided as little social housing for 
Black occupancy as they could. Thus, in order to secure a fair amount of social 
housing for Black occupancy, the Black community had to mount pressure on the 
municipal government. Considering that Baltimore maintained de jure and de facto 
racial segregation throughout most of the twentieth century, this task was not 
without difficulties. Yet just as housers had to fight against currents of political 
opinion in the 1920s and 1930s, Black voices influenced housing policy in Baltimore 
through the highly influential Black press. Though the community faced an upward 
battle in securing social housing for their community, articles in The Afro exposed 
unfair housing practices and praised new Black housing projects. Just like the pre-
War houser movement, the post -War Black struggle for social housing was an 
intellectual, social, and political one – and certainly not an endeavour in which they 
were considered equal participants. Still, Baltimore’s Black community succeeded in 
garnering access to social housing – and by mid 1950s there would be over 9,000 
social housing units in the city. By the mid-1950s, a modest majority of social housing 
was Black tenancy. While social housing did not provide a total escape from social 
and economic deprivation, it is remarkable that in such a short period of time Blacks 
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pushed for the development of social housing in Baltimore, pressed for their equal 
admission into social housing, and became the majority of tenants. The period of 
1940-1965 in Baltimore’s social housing narrative, then, can be viewed as a triumph 
for Black civil rights in Baltimore.  
 
 The most distressing aspect of Black Baltimore’s accelerated population 
growth was that it did not result immediately in any increased political capital or 
economic improvement. Although Blacks constituted a majority of births by the mid-
1960s, and a majority of the population by the mid-1970s, Black Baltimoreans never 
reached economic parity with White Baltimoreans. In order to garner more political 
power, and fundamentally to orchestrate greater access to housing, Blacks had to 
participate in a political system that did not treat their community as equal under 
the law. The Black press helped mitigate the community’s political disadvantages. 
With the aid of popular Black support, a concise and professional Black press, and 
sympathetic White politicians, Black Baltimoreans were able to secure better 
housing options for their community. While this movement included the 
enforcement of fair rental laws and better access to mortgages, the initial and 
primary goal of Black leaders in Baltimore during the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s was to 
promote social housing in Baltimore as a remedy for Black housing woes. Yet thanks 
to a booming population and the influence of The Afro – such detrimental 
environmental conditions would not persist much longer. During the post-War 
period, the Black press clamoured for better housing options for their community. 
Social housing filled this need for Blacks, and initially provided relief for poorly 
housed Whites.338 Even the alternatives for social housing presented, mainly urban 
redevelopment programmes and subsidised home mortgages, gained support in the 
Afro. It should be reiterated, though, that the press’s advocacy of social housing in 
Baltimore was primarily motivated to better Black Baltimoreans’ quality of life. While 
it was not rare for the Afro to frame arguments for social housing as benefitting the 
public health, generally articles simply pointed to the need for more spacious and 
affordable housing options for Blacks. The city’s post-War Black advocacy for social 
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housing rights helped shape the broader Civil Rights movement. Furthermore, the 
1968 riots that damaged the city indelibly have been attributed partly to an 
insufficient demand of social housing, and the Afro reminded its readers that it had 
long supported social housing and Martin Luther King’s fair housing legislation.339 
 
 Black leaders had long clamoured for the City of Baltimore to provide 
housing relief for its citizens, but societal pressures and municipal apathy delayed 
the first social housing development in Baltimore until 1940, three years after the 
establishment of the HABC. Black neighbourhood residential expansion was 
frustratingly slow; the central belt of the city remained the city’s Black ghetto. 
Considering that the Supreme Court had struck down housing covenants several 
times in the first half of the twentieth century, an outside observer might have 
believed that there were relatively weak obstacles to expanding housing options for 
Blacks. However, despite the Supreme Court’s rulings on housing covenants, 
unspoken agreements between banks, realtors, and zoning authorities prevented 
Blacks from making headway during this period.340 Following Baltimore’s enactment 
of a system of racially exclusive zoning ordinances in 1911 (known nationally as the 
‘Baltimore Plan’, though this same moniker would later describe an urban 
redevelopment programme in the 1950s), the Supreme Court ruled that such 
restrictions were illegal as they violated the Fourteenth Amendment in Buchanan v. 
Warley in 1917. The Supreme Court reiterated this opinion thirty years later with 
Shelley v. Kraemer in 1948 and again twenty years later with Jones v. Mayer in 
1968.341 While the law, at least, was clear (i.e. Blacks had the right to purchase any 
property they wished), real estate interests and their municipal sympathisers 
maintained de facto segregation through professional policy, mortgage refusal, and 
outright intimidation. Even after social housing arrived in Baltimore, the city’s Black 
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community struggled for fair housing. While the post-War period witnessed a boom 
in social housing construction, Black Baltimoreans struggled throughout the period 
to gain sufficient access to social housing. A review of the development of 
Baltimore’s first social housing projects during the years leading up to the mid-1960s 
is necessary to understand the struggles that Black Baltimoreans faced in securing 
spacious, sanitary, and affordable housing. 
 
Early Construction, Baltimore:  
 
 In 1938, Baltimore’s first social housing development seemed imminent. 
Mayor Howard Jackson voiced nominal support for social housing by this point, and 
with the establishment of the HABC the battle over social housing seemed to have 
been fought and won. Two years after the establishment of the HABC, the very first 
social housing project in Baltimore opened. Construction began on Poe Homes in 
November, 1940. The social housing development was designed solely for Black 
tenancy and would be located in the Black working-class neighbourhood of 
Poppleton, in west central Baltimore. This was undoubtedly, a sign of respect 
towards the Black community. Construction did not begin immediately, however. 
The neighbourhood needed to be cleared of its overcrowded slum dwellings. Despite 
being adjacent to the Johns Hopkins Hospital, Poppleton was a neighbourhood 
defined by overcrowded and dilapidated housing. The photograph below, taken by 
the CPHA around the time of construction, shows West Lombard Avenue, three 




Lombard Avenue, circa 1940, photo courtesy: Langsdale Library Special Collections. 
 
The Poe Homes were intended to be a dramatic improvement over the existing 
housing stock. The project contained 298 housing units; housing units so well 
equipped they must have seemed almost luxurious to the new residents.342 Both the 
Afro American and the Sun, newspapers that represented the Black perspective and 
White perspective respectively, heralded the opening of the development as a new 
stage of progress for the city. Despite the positive press, however, the development 
was not welcomed universally. The slum clearance conducted by the HABC resulted 
in 3,000 people being displaced; only 47 would be rehoused in Poe Homes.343 
Furthermore, it’s likely that those displaced wound up paying higher rents for 
similarly slum dwellings in adjacent neighbourhoods.344 It would not be the only 
instance of slum clearance with adverse effects in Baltimore. Thus, while housing 
projects were built for a noble purpose, the community devastation caused by Poe 
Homes and subsequent projects is a reminder that the social housing movement had 
unintended consequences in Baltimore. While social housing was welcomed as a 
progressive reprieve from the environmentally dangerous conditions of the slums, 
rehousing slum dwellers into housing projects did not result in an urban utopia of 
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health and happiness. Over the next twenty years, thousands of social housing units 
would be built in the city, creating a new (and purportedly improved) housing option 
for Baltimore’s economically marginalized populations. Again, while the HABC was 
committed to the provision of social housing, access to social housing remained a 
problem for Black slum dwellers. Two racial issues soured social housing policy 
immensely in Baltimore. In the 1940s and early 1950s, the HABC struggled to find the 
appropriate balance of purpose-built Black housing and purpose-built White 
housing. After 1954, the prospect of mixed housing projects resulted in a White 
exodus from social housing into the private housing market. While these issues 
would never really disappear from public conscious, once social housing in Baltimore 
became totally dominated by Black tenants social housing issues became ‘Black’ 
issues and faded from White public conscious. To understand social housing in 
Baltimore, the politics of race and integration have to be acknowledged.  
 
 By 1945, only five years after Poe Homes, there were 11 additional social 
housing projects in the city. Although the developments were split amongst Black 
and White tenancies initially, most projects were located in areas with significant 
Black populations. While this may seem like a progressive designation, the location 
of social housing projects reflected then contemporary prejudices. By placing 
projects in what were considered the most insalubrious neighbourhoods (i.e. poor 
Black neighbourhoods), the HABC was placating social housing opponents. The 
message was clear: while projects would be built in the city, they would be placed 
strategically so as not to alter neighbourhood racial demographics. Consider the map 
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Before racial integration in 1954, the distribution of social housing among White and 
Black tenants was an issue of contention among Black and poor White Baltimoreans. 
All of the key players in the social housing movement, from the municipal 
government to advocacy groups to real estate interests, maintained opinions on 
matters relating to race and housing. In the 1930s, nine housing developments were 
proposed. Six of these developments were intended for Black occupancy.345 
Considering the particularly dire housing conditions Blacks were compelled to 
endure, this seemed a reasonable concession even in institutionally segregated 
Baltimore. This early focus and concentration on Black housing proved premature, 
however. For while many slum dwelling Whites viewed social housing with as 
potentially beneficial – any perceived special attention paid towards Blacks elicited 
jealously. If social housing was to be built – poor Whites wanted their share. For the 
sake of political and cultural stability, the HABC acquiesced to this social demand. 
Despite significantly less proportional demand for social housing among Whites than 
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Blacks, by 1945 six of Baltimore’s 12 social housing projects were reserved for 
Whites. This did not mean, however, that the HABC wished to continue this trend in 
perpetuity. Blacks simply needed more suitable housing at the moment; the idea 
was to reach a kind of housing parity. As building new Black housing projects proved 
socially contentious, the HABC struck upon an idea. Much of Baltimore’s former 
defence-worker housing had been reserved solely for White tenancy. Now that these 
projects were under municipal control and the War was over, there was little reason 
why many of these projects could not be converted into Black tenancy projects. 
Defence-workers made artificially high salaries during the 
War and could afford to purchase houses in the private market; their housing 
projects were built to accommodate migratory influx and were built adjacent to 
essential factories. Even though many war-worker developments were intended to 
be temporary dwellings, many such complexes were converted into permanent 
social housing by the HABC for both White and Black tenants, though many units 
transformed from White to Black tenancy after the War. In 1945, the HABC issued on 
a pamphlet on the likely effects this transition would have for Black Baltimoreans, 
coupled with a discussion on the benefits of slum clearance and the construction of 
social housing.  
 
  The later 1940s were just as eventful for social housing advocates in 
Baltimore as the early 1940s. In May 1947, Thomas D’Alesandro, Jr. was elected 
mayor of Baltimore. His election rattled the city’s elite – D’Alesandro was a 
progressive Democrat and Italian Catholic – his rise to power heralded a new age of 
populist politics. His detractors were right to be wary of him. Within two months of 
election, D’Alessandro created a housing court designed to fine slumlords and 
compel them to improve their properties. D’Alessandro’s housing court was indeed 
the first of its kind in the nation.346 The housing court was so successful it 
conditioned a programme that borrowed the name of the 1911 racial segregation 
protocol. The second incantation of the ‘Baltimore Plan’ was a comprehensive 
municipal approach to demolish slums on large scale and promote housing 
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refurbishment through the enforcement of fines, court orders, and monetary 
incentives (The Plan will be discussed in greater detail in chapter five). The Plan was 
so successful and was copied widely, and supported by the Afro and general 
newspapers.347 Further still, Baltimore’s housing court was so inspiring in urban 
planning circles that it prompted national legislation. With the reinstatement of 
Harry Truman as President in 1949, the Truman administration launched his 
ambitious ‘Fair Deal’ programme to expand upon the legacy of the New Deal 
programmes. Unfortunately for Truman, the only major bill to be enacted was the 
Housing Act of 1949. The 1949 Act, however, was monumental in scope. In addition 
to providing millions of dollars in federal funding for slum clearance programmes 
and urban regeneration, the Act provided funds for 800,000 social housing units 
nationally.348 In proceedings discussing the potential impact of the bill, D’Alesandro 
was not only cited, but asked to report to a congressional hearing on his municipal 
success. In particular, D’Alesandro felt compelled to comment on claims by real 
estate interests that the Baltimore Plan might be a private sector alternative to social 
housing. D’Alesandro, although the originator of the hugely successful Plan, 
disagreed fervently: 
 
It has been claimed that public housing is not needed in order to get rid of our slums. Slum 
conditions, it is said, could be eliminated if each city were to adopt an adequate set of 
housing standards and then see that these standards were enforced. These claims seem to 
have been based, to a great extent, upon our experience in Baltimore with a housing law-
enforcement program…. As mayor of Baltimore and as the responsible head of a city 
government which is carrying out the this law-enforcement program, I want to clear up once 
and for all the confusion and exaggerated claims which are being made… I strongly believe 
that other cities should consider adoption of the Baltimore Plan as an interim method of 
relieving slum conditions to some extent, but do not let anybody kid you into thinking that it 
is, in any sense,  a substitute for an adequate slum clearance, redevelopment, and public 
low-rent housing program.349 
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Even the originator of the heralded alternative to social housing in Baltimore felt 
that the Plan was insufficient in its aims. While the Plan proved somewhat successful 
in eradicating the most conspicuous environmentally hazardous dwellings, the Plan 
provided for no new housing provision. As D’Alessandro and his newly enfranchised 
Democratic administration contended, the provision of social housing was necessary 
to fully eliminate the slums. Luckily for Baltimoreans, the Public Housing Authority 
(PHA) allocated 10,000 new social housing units for the city.350 Not all municipalities 
were so lucky - according to Chudacoff the full 800,000 units promised nationally in 
four years would take 20 years to fulfil.351 Regardless, the 1949 Act helped propel 
social housing even further in Baltimore, through federal money and endorsement.   
 
 Thus, by the early 1950s, social housing existed relatively harmoniously in 
Baltimore. The HABC was staffed by professional and enthusiastic staff, municipal 
coffers were supported by federal funding, and roughly half of all housing projects 
built were designed for Black occupancy – which did not seem to provoke discomfort 
in the White community. The aspect of race and social housing, however, could not 
be untwined. Furthermore, there were concerns that the Baltimore Plan had become 
anathema to the goals of the city’s social housing programme. In 1951, George B. 
Nesbitt, an advisor on racial relations for the Housing and Home Finance Agency 
(HHFA), argued that Baltimore’s urban renewal and housing programs would result 
in the fulfilment of Robert Weaver’s ‘triple threat’: Negro clearance, the conversion 
of racially mixed areas into racially exclusive areas, and the reduction of land areas 
available to Negro residence. The Truman administration and indeed the subsequent 
Eisenhower administration were committed to the improvement of racial relations 
and the gradual integration of public facilities. Thus, even before Brown v. Board, the 
HABC grappled with the prospect of racial integration as inevitable. Attempts to 
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provide proportional amount of social housing for Blacks proved lacklustre; Blacks 
were in far more need of social housing units than poor Whites and thus deserved a 
far greater percentage of race-specific housing project allocations. No real attempt 
was made to create interracial housing before the Brown v. Board decision in 1954. 
Indeed, many of the early housing projects designated for Blacks were hastily built 
and poorly planned – features that would accelerate their later decline as desirable 
communities. Indeed, the largest amount of additional units for Black occupancy 
passed after the 1949 Act were admitted as an addition to the Cherry Hill Project in 
Southwest Baltimore, a former defence-worker project far from the city centre. 
 
 
A mother and daughter sweep the pavement surrounding their new home in Somerset Courts, circa 
late 1940s, photo courtesy of Langsdale Library, University of Baltimore 
 
 The watershed moment for Baltimore’s social housing was on June 25, 
1954. It was on this day that the HABC eliminated race as a factor in admission 
selection into social housing. In other words, from that point on Baltimore’s social 
housing developments were open to any tenant irrespective of race. The decision 
came after the Black press pressured the D’Alesandro administration to apply the 
Brown v. Board decision to municipal housing. The decision came shortly after 
Baltimore parochial schools announced their intentions to begin integration, even 
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though they were not legally compelled to do so. That these dramatic changes to 
social order all occurred in about a month highlighted the differences between 
D’Alesandro and past municipal administrations. The concomitant rise of Black 
influence through the press and legal challenges in the mid-1950s also rattled the 
established order of Baltimore politics.352 Yet similarly, the decision to integrate 
seemed both necessary and even overdue to social housing tenants and housing 
professionals. Given that a growing number of people, both Black and White, 
depended on social housing to provide an environment conducive to healthy 
lifestyles, the stark segregation that existed in its developments began to seem 
anachronistic, even by 1950s standards. In particular, non-traditional families 
(termed ‘broken families’) of both races were depending increasingly on social 
housing due to its subsidised rent rates. The table below illustrates the increase in 
such vulnerable tenants during the 1950s: 
 
 
BURHA, ‘Types of Families Living in Baltimore’s Low-Rent Projects, 1951-1957’ (Baltimore: BURHA, 
1958), p. 2. 
 
As the graph above shows, with every passing year more and more vulnerable 
tenants moved into social housing in Baltimore. This trend would continue into the 
1960s and 1970s, and the growing percentage of single-parent families would 
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contribute to some of the problems of social instability that later was associated 
with housing projects. In particular, housing projects became a refuge for Black 
single-parent families. The table below shows that in 1957, just three years after 
racial integration, there were three times the number of Black broken families as 
White broken families in social housing projects: 
 
 
BURHA, ‘Table 5: Detailed Distribution by Number and Percent of Types of Families, By Race, Low-Rent 
Projects, 1957’ (Baltimore: BURHA, 1958), p. 15. 
 
While the HABC was quick to integrate the city’s housing projects, this did not mean 
that the transition was smooth or received without controversy. In 1954, the HABC 
operated 13 housing developments - six for Blacks (Poe, McCulloh, Gilmor, Douglass, 
Somerset, and Cherry Hill) and seven for Whites (Latrobe, Perkins, O’Donnell 
Heights, Brooklyn, Westport, and Claremont).353 Additionally, two other segregated 
projects were under construction: Lafayette Courts for Blacks and Flag House Courts 
for Whites (though by 1960 more than half of Flag House’s tenants would be Black, 
and by 1970 more than 90% of tenants would be).354  
 
Compare the map below with the previous map on housing project location, which 
shows just how quickly the demographics of Baltimore’s housing projects had 
changed in nine years: 
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‘Public Housing and Areas of Minority Concentration, 1950’, Research Maps Volume 2: Selected Data Sets for 
1998, Department of Housing and Urban Development (Washington, DC: GPO, 1998). 
 
 This trend of increased Black tenancy would only continue, and by the late 
1950s a clear majority of social housing tenants were Black. However, while the legal 
end of segregation in Baltimore was indeed an historic moment, it was certainly not 
the end of discrimination against Black tenants. Indeed, Black commentators were 
very concerned over the safety of Black social housing tenants in White majority 
projects - much more concerned than they were over the safety of school children 
after desegregation. Black commentators feared that White social housing tenants 
would resent the proximity of Black tenants to their family homes. The following 
article from The Afro-American, the national parent newspaper to the Baltimore 
Afro-American, specified this concern: 
 
Whenever the subject of desegregation has been brought up in the many conversations I 
have had with innumerable groups and individuals, it is always pointed out that housing 
presents a vastly different situation than education. That is true, but when attention is called 
to the difference between a six hour per day controlled situation in schools and a 24-hour 
per day basis without formal controls in housing, the assumption is that desegregation won’t 
work.355 
                                                 
355 ‘Housing’, Afro- American, 03/07/1954, p. 7. 
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White social housing tenants in Baltimore were strongly opposed to racial 
integration. The decision to halt racial segregation, coupled with FHA mortgage 
backed suburban expansion, only expedited White flight from Baltimore social 
housing projects and the inner city generally. Historian Rhonda Williams’ field 
research resulted in former White social housing tenants’ recollections of being 
labelled ‘nigger lover’ by other Whites for their decision to remain in social housing 
after 1954.356 Further research by Williams revealed that the first Black family to 
move into Brooklyn Homes, one of the last all-White social housing developments in 
Baltimore, resulted in Klan style intimidation tactics by existing residents.357 Not only 
did Whites seek to prevent Blacks from entering their projects, as social housing 
applicants were able to state a preference to where they wanted to live, applicants 
tended to self-segregate. As the 1960s approached, Baltimore’s sixteen social 
housing developments were not the shining examples of racial harmony that some 
had hoped for. In 1956, Armistead Gardens, an all-White housing project of 1,696 
units under management of the FPHA, elected to become a cooperative, rather than 
risk takeover by the HABC and endure racial integration. While the Armistead 
Gardens strategy was never repeated by any other housing project, it remained a 
glaring example of the fear of integration. By 1959, only three projects remained all 
White (Brooklyn, Claremont, and O’Donnell) and seven remained all Black. Four 
projects had mixed tenants successfully, with the percentage of Black residents 
ranging from 33 to 77 percent. In two projects, there were a handful of White 
tenants in predominately Black occupied developments.358 While municipal reports 
do not give an explanation of why some White tenants chose to stay in majority 
Black developments, it is likely that many former White developments became 
naturally aging communities, whose tenants were too old or too infirm to leave 
social housing. Regardless, by the early 1960s, social housing in Baltimore had 
reached its transformative moment. Although some White tenants remained in 
some housing projects, social housing in Baltimore had evolved into subsidised 
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housing for poor Blacks. This new demographic reality would result in consequences 
for social housing policy in the city in later decades, as municipal authorities viewed 
housing projects as a form of social welfare that benefited Black Baltimoreans 
exclusively. Additionally, as social housing evolved into concentrations of poor Black 
families, public health professionals became increasingly suspicious that housing 
projects might not cater to the special needs of Black tenants. Regardless, social 
housing had arrived in Baltimore and by the 1960s was set to assume its new role as 





 The post-war period resulted in a transformation of the housing landscapes 
in both Glasgow and Baltimore. In Glasgow, in the years leading up to 1960 nearly all 
housing units produced were social housing. Tens of thousands of Glaswegians were 
rehoused into new social housing developments, whose flats were more amenable 
than most working-class Glaswegians could have ever hoped to occupy previously. 
While Glasgow Corporation fought diligently to pursue a housing policy that avoided 
population decantation, ultimately a process of population decentralisation 
occurred. In particular, the peripheral estates of Drumchapel, Easterhouse, 
Castlemilk, and Pollok, which ultimately rehoused a quarter of a million people, 
dramatically altered the city’s housing geography. Glasgow, once the densest city in 
Europe, witnessed its population fan out to peripheral estates and new towns. While 
some social housing developments in Glasgow eventually descended into social 
distress, the physical improvement of social housing flats over tenement flats could 
not be denied. In Baltimore, the municipal housing authorities never produced 
nearly as many social housing units as in Glasgow, despite being a similarly sized city. 
Regardless, social housing had a profound impact on the housing landscape of 
Baltimore, particularly in the newfound provision of housing options for Black 
residents. The city’s first housing project was for Black tenants, which signalised the 
racial importance of social housing in the city. Indeed, while social housing in the city 
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remained segregated for 14 years, after integration social housing quickly became a 
social welfare policy in benefit of Black Baltimoreans solely. This had both positive 
and negative implications. Social housing provided reprieve from the legal and 
cultural segregationist practices in Baltimore; well after Brown v. Board nullified the 
judicial concept of ‘separate-but-equal’, real estate interests and the municipal 
government colluded to enforce residential segregation. The integration of social 
housing, however, soured White Baltimoreans’ perception of social housing and 
bolstered public backlash against the building of new housing projects. Working-class 
White Baltimoreans did not want to live in integrated housing projects or even in the 
vicinity of integrated housing projects, even after an HABC investigation into inter-
racial housing relations concluded that integration softened racial prejudices.359 
Similarly, the process of slum clearance had both positive and negative implications. 
In the period 1950-1964, over 25,000 Baltimoreans would be displaced by the 
policies of slum clearance, urban renewal, and social housing construction. Of those 
displaced, 90% were Black, and not all displaced persons were fortunate enough to 
receive social housing accommodation. Yet slum clearance and the housing courts 
enacted by the ‘Baltimore Plan’ did yield results; thousands of slumlords were 
reprimanded for keeping their property in environmentally hazardous condition and 
ordered to restore their rental units to an acceptable condition. Even if slum 
clearance was favoured by some as an alternative to social housing (i.e. Baltimore’s 
real estate lobby), slum clearance facilitated suitable locations for social housing 
development, at a time when housing project location had the potential to provoke 
strong animosity. While social housing had become cemented into the urban fabric 
of Glasgow and Baltimore, a question lingered in commentators’ minds on both sides 
of the Atlantic: did social housing result in healthier tenants? 
 
 Given that social housing was still a novel idea in the post-War period 
(particularly in Baltimore), it is perhaps not surprising that both housers and public 
health professionals were interested in the health implications of rehousing. While 
many speculated that social housing would invariably lead to healthier tenants, hard 
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evidence did not yet exist to prove or disprove this hypothesis. Furthermore, there 
were several aspects of social housing life that were both original and un-
conventional. In Glasgow, housers and medical voices wondered what the impact of 
peripheral living would have on tenant health, in Baltimore, those same voices were 
concerned about the affect of close interracial proximity would have on the social 
environment. In both cities there were urban planners who extolled the potential of 
social housing developments as almost working-class utopias and still others that 
warned that if not carefully administered social housing developments would 
devolve into the ‘new slums’. In terms of public health, medical investigators were 
curious if not opinionated about the prospective health benefits of social housing. 
Both Scottish and American public health academics investigated the health benefits 
of rehousing, and included their findings in a multitude of cross-sectional and 
longitudinal studies. These studies influenced professional opinion about the 
connection between housing and health, and contributed to the burgeoning public 
health sub-discipline of environmental health. The next chapter is a review and 
analysis of the findings of these studies, and their impact on professional opinion on 
the connection between housing and health. 
 
Chapter 5: The Health Impacts of Social Housing, 1940-1964 
 
 By 1940, the connection between poor housing and ill health had become an 
important question in the public health dialogue. Thanks in part to the efforts of 
housers, health professionals in both Glasgow and Baltimore now acknowledged the 
strong correlation between built environment and personal health. An insanitary 
house could result in poorer health and early death. Public health professionals in 
both Glasgow and Baltimore, who had long noted the decrepit housing conditions in 
their respective cities, were now inclined to conduct studies of the relationship 
between housing and health. Furthermore, in an era of increased recognition of the 
importance of the science of public health, the medical community now viewed 
housing improvement as their prerogative. If better housing led to improved health, 
then health professionals should have felt at ease in advocating for better housing. 
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This concern had municipal public health ramifications. In Baltimore, the 
Commissioner of Health Huntington Williams clamoured (successfully) for the 
Baltimore City Health Department (BCHD) to add a Housing Bureau, and in Glasgow, 
the city’s Medical Officers of Health (MOsH) Stuart Laidlaw and William Horne 
focused their efforts greatly on the health of rehoused slum dwellers. Furthermore, 
as discussed earlier, Aneurin Bevan as Minister of Health paid great attention to the 
provision of healthy housing for the working-class.360 Recognition of this 
relationship, however, was only the first step. Medical professionals understood that 
not only did slums have to be cleared, but new housing would be needed to replace 
the slums – and that furthermore this new housing would have to be built in such a 
way that it would not facilitate slum behaviours. In short, urban public health rested 
on soundly planned and managed social housing. This proved a difficult task, 
however.  Public health professionals of all varieties were excited by the prospect of 
treating social housing developments as an experimental field laboratory; only a 
small number of British and American public health studies existed on the 
relationship between housing and health at this point. Both cities, however, had 
committed to the building of large numbers of social houses by the mid 1940s, and 
thus the social housing environment was ripe for academic dissection. There was no 
doubt that social housing would play a larger role in urban society. But plenty of 
doubt remained as to whether social housing would actually improve tenant health. 
 
Public health professionals and the wider medical community were optimistic 
that social housing could improve tenant health, however. A 1949 newspaper article 
on public health of Glasgow by Thomas Ferguson, a professor of public health at the 
University of Glasgow, asserted this idea. Ferguson found that his colleagues were 
much too preoccupied with the rollout of the new National Health Service. 
Glasgow’s housing problems, he attested, were much more pertinent to public 
health problems than access to physicians. In newspaper article Ferguson wrote that 
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‘To pour social and medical services into those wretched places was certainly 
uneconomic and often quite useless. Slum housing was still the greatest blot on 
Scotland’s social welfare.’361 Even in the era of dramatic upheaval in methods of 
medical delivery care, Ferguson found the age-old problem of housing to be 
Glasgow’s most pressing public health issue. His transatlantic contemporary, 
Huntington Williams, echoed these sentiments. Environmental health, he found, was 
just as important to good health as curative medicine. In a preface to a pamphlet 
discussing new housing regulations meant to improve hygiene, Williams wrote: 
 
For the next generation or so there must be a program of more positive action for the 
prevention of blight and slums, equally important as a health measure as the curative 
nuisance abatement activity of the past fifteen years. Combined, much hard work and 
teamwork in both these related efforts should lead to the elimination of our disease-
breeding slums and to a genuine upgrading of the physical and mental health of the 
inhabitants of the city.362 
 
Yet despite early stern warnings on the importance of good housing – and 
proclamations on the necessity of social housing – health professionals could not 
predict accurately how social housing would impact public health before it was built. 
More research into the affects of rehousing was needed for such a judgement.  
 
Predictions that social housing would constitute a complete failure, or 
alternatively, a panacea for housing and health woes, both proved equally 
inaccurate.363 What can be asserted with confidence is that social housing in 
Glasgow and Baltimore both preceded and coincided with a period of marked 
improvement in public health and standard of living. It is also true that after the mid 
1960s social housing tenants in many cities across Britain and the United States 
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reported a tremendous decline in quality of life, and that indeed many of these 
problems surfaced long before the mid 1960s.364 Additionally, these problems persist 
in American social housing units today, according to the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD).365 Regardless, the impact of social housing on public 
health and the fabric of urban geography showed that government subsidized 
housing were anything but irrelevant to tenant health. In addition to the general 
improvements in public health in each city, professionals who investigated life in 
social housing, such as Thomas Ferguson in Glasgow and Daniel Wilner in Baltimore, 
found that people reported feeling healthier after being rehoused into social 
housing.366 Both municipal officials and the general public (especially Black 
Baltimoreans) seemed convinced that social housing could improve the condition of 
many persons’ lives. This did not mean that social housing proved flawless; both 
Wilner and Ferguson (and later Jephcott) conducted studies that reported that social 
housing had some clear negative effects on tenant health. Overall, however, the 
social and structural problems that came to define social housing in the public 
conscious in later decades were not as severe in the early post-War period. Thus, 
public health professionals set out to investigate whether social housing was an 
effective tool in the improvement of public health, or whether it was an expensive 
and ineffective boondoggle. A review of public health studies that focused on social 
housing in Glasgow and Baltimore during the years 1940-1965 is necessary to 
understand whether social housing provided any reprieve from slum conditions 
deleterious to public health in the post-war period.  
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Tenant Selection Policies in Baltimore: 
 
 The role of social housing as a determinant of population health in the years 
leading to 1965 was contingent on a number of factors. Of all these factors, the 
selection criteria used to determine potential tenants were most crucial to the 
impact of social housing on tenant health. If a social housing development selects 
healthy tenants, and vice versa, it would be easier to cultivate a healthy 
environment. The importance of the tenant selection process in shaping social 
housing outcomes and area public health has been commented on by scholars of 
both environmental health and the urban environment.367 In particular, in the United 
States, especially strict tenant selection criteria is cited as one reason that such a 
great majority of social housing developments are located in predominately Black 
neighbourhoods.368 Similarly, fluctuating tenant selection criteria in Scotland has 
been cited as a reason for Glaswegian social housing’s later social problems.369 While 
environmental factors shape the health of all classes, as social housing selection 
policy began to favour more marginalised groups (e.g. the ‘broken’ family), social 
housing tenants as a cohort became unhealthier, and social housing developments 
became more unstable and unhealthy places. As will be discussed in chapters five 
and six, this trend in housing the most marginalized subgroups explains greatly the 
development of social problems in social housing after the 1950s. Before the 1960s, 
however, housing authorities in both cities managed to avoid these problems by 
implementing moderated tenant selection policies and cultivating strict housing 
management policies. Although social housing was always meant to benefit slum 
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dwellers, housing authorities aimed to mirror the general public in tenant 
composition as best they could, for as long as they could. 
 
 In Baltimore, early independent housers warned municipal authorities of the 
need to prioritize social housing allocation to the most destitute slum dwellers. The 
Citizens Housing Council of Baltimore (CHCB), an organization of private citizens that 
later became the highly influential Citizens Planning and Housing Association (CPHA), 
argued in a report that social housing units should go to the most needy Baltimorean 
families. The poorest families, the CHCB argued, would benefit most health-wise if 
allowed to relocate to social housing. For this reason, in 1940 (the year of the first 
social housing development in the city), the CHCB suggested somewhat strict 
parameters to guide social housing allocation. Although Baltimore in the 1940s was 
swelling with working-age single men looking for work in the defence industry, the 
CHCB felt that social housing should focus on families with young children. 
Significantly, while the United States Housing Authority (USHA) labelled ‘young 
children’ as under sixteen years of age, the CHCB argued that seventeen and 
eighteen year olds should be classified as dependents, arguing that a stable home 
environment at early adolescence would have positive long-lasting health effects. On 
the issue of home environments and adolescents, the CHCB reported:  
 
This age group, although legally able to work, finds it extremely difficult to find employment. 
They are also very conscious of their home surroundings, which, if not of good standard, 
cause them to spend much time away from home. This often leads into further difficulties, 
and in some instances they become delinquent.370 
 
The idea that families with children, especially older adolescents, should be given 
preference for social housing seems remarkably prescient, considering the problems 
with youth gang violence that arose in social housing developments all over the 
United States in the 1970s.371 It must be noted however that families with children 
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are not categorically ‘unhealthy’, while a large family may be in dire need of housing 
the individuals that comprise that family may be healthier relative to persons with 
illnesses or chronic conditions. The CHCB recognized this point as well. Considering 
the need for allowances for the sick and needy, the report remarked:  
 
There was considerable discussion in the council as to whether persons with illnesses which 
might be benefitted by good housing should be given preference for occupancy if other 
factors in eligibility are equally. Basic in the philosophy of public housing is the concept that 
it should benefit people whose health and social adjustment are endangered by their home 
environment.372 
 
Thus, the above quote illustrates that housers associated with the CHCB were 
convinced that rehousing persons into social housing could influence positively social 
behaviour. While this official recommendation suggests the CHCB was unified in 
their support of allowances for unhealthy persons and families, the minutes of 
meetings held before official publications were issued reveal that housers held 
different opinions on the use of health criteria for tenant selection. On a meeting in 
early 1940, the Council reported: 
 
The Council discussed whether or not health needs and health problems should be taken into 
consideration. The Council seemed to be divided on this point, some thinking that persons 
with contagious diseases, such as tuberculosis, should be excluded, whereas others felt that 
in the community as a whole there is no such protection against these people. By having 
such a ruling [to exclude those with pre-existing conditions], the people admitted having 
such diseases would be eliminated, but others who did not know of their condition or who 
did not disclose it would be admitted. We also questioned how much health needs, such as 
having a cardiac person living on the first floor, could be considered in an undertaking as 
large as the housing project.373 
 
Just as Thomas Ferguson contended in Glasgow in the 1950s, Baltimorean housers 
were concerned that the introduction of contagious tenants could potentially spread 
disease. Tenant selection, based on health reasons, was not so cut-and-dry. 
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Furthermore, although the first social housing development in Baltimore would not 
open for another five months, housers associated with the CHCB were already 
worried about the potential impact social housing could have on persons with 
medical conditions. For instance, tenants with weak hearts could find walking up 
several flights of stairs especially strenuous (or at least this was a concern among 
Baltimoreans, who were used to low level terraced housing). The CHCB was clearly 
more concerned with family composition and more chronic conditions than it was 
with tenants with infectious disease. In Baltimore, an obstacle for housers and 
municipal authorities loomed ahead; social housing needed to be built with the 
unhealthy in mind. The question was – who deserved to be rehoused due to their 
status as ‘unhealthy’? 
 
 While independent housers associated with the CHCB and other groups 
advocated certain criteria for tenant selection, the eligibility requirements for social 
housing in Baltimore rested primarily with the HABC. In 1940, the year of Baltimore’s 
first social housing development, the HABC had sole responsibility for setting 
standards for tenant selection. As discussed in the previous chapter, the HABC was 
created in response to the United States Housing Act of 1937 (Wagner-Steagall Act) 
in order to receive federal funds that were mandated for social housing projects. 
While there were many forces opposed to social housing in Baltimore in the 1930s 
(real estate interests, anti-communists, and even a reluctant Mayor Jackson), once 
the Wagner-Steagall Act passed it became compulsory to build social housing in 
municipalities that were allocated federal funds. Yet before social housing units were 
even built in Baltimore, the HABC needed to clarify what exactly was meant by 
‘social housing’, and who was going to get to opportunity to be rehoused.  
 
 In order to explain social housing to the general public, in early 1940 the 
HABC published a booklet entitled Questions and Answers about Low-Rent Housing 
in Baltimore. After describing what public housing is and why it is being built in 
Baltimore, the booklet delves into crucial aspects of tenant selection. On rental 
issues, the HABC decided that a family that made five times the rental cost of a social 
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housing unit was ineligible for selection.374 This rather specific cut-off had been 
carefully calculated; if selection policies were too lenient social housing could 
balloon into cushy subsidized housing for unpopular transient defence-workers, if 
selection policies were too strict, social housing could be beyond reach of the 
‘working poor’, whom the general public felt were most deserving of rehousing. In 
the same section, the booklet enumerated the size of families that may apply for 
certain units, with two people maximum allowed for one-bedroom houses and six to 
eight persons maximum allowed for four-bedroom houses.375 While the eight 
persons to four bedrooms maximum might have seemed strict (especially for 
Glaswegian families, who were subject to much more severe overcrowding), the 
purpose of social housing was to improve housing conditions for Baltimorean slum 
dwellers, not to create federally subsidised slums. Additionally, those who were 
already poorly housed were given preference over those who were ‘house poor’: 
defined as families who occupy adequate housing but are forced to pay an overly 
large share of their income to afford such housing.376 Commenting on a repeated 
question, the booklet details that ‘If they [slum dwellers] remain in the low-income 
brackets and are otherwise eligible [families with prescribed housing grievances, i.e. 
crowded conditions], they will be given preference in the selection of tenants’, 
solidifying the idea that those who lived in dilapidated neighbourhoods were most 
likely to benefit from the introduction of social housing.377 Furthermore, while 
childless families were not barred from application, ‘families with small children 
were preferred’, though families that included adolescent children were preferred as 
well.378 Early in its existence, the HABC had articulated its vision: large families with 
children were the preferred tenants, unhealthy and diseased tenants were not 
intended to compose a majority.  
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 Interestingly, the HABC pushed the idea of tenant empowerment to promote 
the general welfare and social harmony. While slum dwellers in Baltimore were 
subject to the whims of duplicitous landlords and irascible neighbours, the HABC 
intended to be a more sympathetic housing manager. For this reason, the HABC was 
an early proponent of tenant representation in housing projects. In a 1943 letter 
addressed to residents of Gilmor Homes, a housing project for Black occupancy in 
West Baltimore, the HABC asked that residents elect a resident leader to form a 
tenant council. The tenant council was meant to be an official group designed to deal 
with the HABC, and represent tenant desires, questions, and complaints. In the 
letter, the authority declares: 
 
We are sending you this letter and asking you to be kind enough to recommend one of the 
tenants in the building in which you live to be your representative on the Tenant Council 
Steering Committee…These persons receiving the majority of the votes of the tenants for 
each building will be considered the persons to represent your building… We wish to draw to 
your attention that every person living within the area as a tenant will have the right to 
attend and vote at any general meeting called by the council or the authority thereafter… 
[they] will endeavour to set up the programs arranged for the various items that will bring 
enjoyment and pleasure to all of the tenants throughout the area.379 
 
In this letter, the HABC made clear that not only did it intend to provide adequate 
housing for its tenants, but liveable housing, made so by the inclusion of tenants in 
housing decision processes. Perhaps even more importantly, this letter (and others 
like it) was addressed to Black tenants, more than ten years before Brown v. Board. 
For many Black Baltimoreans, participating on a tenant council may have been their 
first political experience, for in segregated states even voting proved difficult. While 
this letter would not have been available to the general public outwith social 
housing, word must have travelled among Black Baltimoreans that social housing 
tenants had more than just roofs over their heads: they had agency.380 Baltimoreans 
who lived in social housing had the ability to help determine how they lived, a power 
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that slum dwellers had never retained. News of these powers must have, at least 
temporarily, increased the popularity of social housing among slum dwellers, 
particularly Black slum dwellers. Thus, tenant empowerment, along with child-
friendly and low income-friendly selection policies, helps explain the continued 
popularity of social housing throughout the 1940s and 1950s. Although many 
Baltimoreans were drawn to the suburbs thanks to new government subsidised 
mortgages, this was not a viable option for many slum dwellers. The city’s social 
housing projects promised not only spacious, sanitary, and affordable 
accommodation, but agency over their own home environments. Social housing 
applications increased yearly during the post-War period.   
 
 To stem the flow of extra applications for tenancy, particularly among Black 
Baltimoreans, the HABC further stressed the importance of adherence to tenant 
selection criteria. Social housing had transformed from a novel oddity to a highly in-
demand commodity. In the years leading up to 1954, the health of families and the 
housing conditions of families remained the paramount reason for social housing 
allocation. After 1954, the Brown v. Board decision and Mayor Jackson’s formal 
denouncement of housing discrimination compelled the HABC to allocate more 
social housing to Black applicants, thus mitigating the importance of ‘health’ criteria. 
Very quickly, social housing became a welfare programme aimed at combatting 
housing injustices endured by Blacks. However, as Black Baltimoreans were 
compelled to endure housing conditions that were worse than even the poorest 
Whites neighbourhoods, the idea that social housing was intended for the 
unhealthiest Baltimoreans persisted. While more social housing units were allocated 
to Black tenants after 1954, health factors did not cease to be important factors in 
tenant allocation policy.  
 
 Those who occupied overcrowded and insanitary dwellings were also 
deemed especially worthy of rehousing. In a HABC document on the admission and 
continued occupancy of social housing in Baltimore, one of the first listed eligibility 
requirements for new applicants for social housing is that at the time of application 
families must be ‘living in dwellings determined be unsafe, insanitary, or over-
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crowded as defined.’381 While previous publications by Baltimore housing authorities 
had been vague in their interpretation of poor housing or unhealthy conditions, the 
1954 Statement of Policies defined clearly what constituted an unsuitable house. The 
document listed several conditions the HABC deemed unacceptable for human 
habitation. The statement noted that a house may be deemed unacceptable if ‘the 
location... is such, either externally or within the structure, as to cause the constant 
presence of a health, fire, safety, or other environmental hazard to the occupants of 
such dwelling unit.’382 On the condition of the structure, the statement noted that 
‘the presence of serious safety hazards resulting from the need for major repairs to 
roof, walls, ceilings, floors, or stairs, or through the presence of serious health 
hazards resulting from continuous dampness or exposure brought about by 
negligent or dilapidation.’383 Further stipulations included the necessity of access to 
potable water, a sewer system, toilet facilities, bath facilities, a well-equipped 
kitchen, adequate lighting and heating, ventilation, and lack of overcrowding 
(defined loosely as when two families occupy one house).384 In any case, the 
Statement of Policies on tenant selection in Baltimore made its point clear: city 
residents should not be compelled to endure slum conditions, and slum dwellers 
were especially deserving of rehousing into social housing.   
 
 Up until 1954, this policy was designed for both Black and White 
Baltimoreans. While more Blacks than Whites endured environmental conditions 
deleterious to health, and thus deserved more social housing units allocated 
proportionally, the HABC generally aimed to provide an equal amount of social 
housing to Baltimoreans of both races. At the time, this was a relatively progressive 
concession. After official desegregation, however, Whites fled social housing for the 
literal greener pastures of the suburbs, and social housing in Baltimore took on a 
new function: subsidized housing for Blacks. The use of health criteria in tenant 
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selection proved less controversial in Glasgow, however. Housing in Scotland had 
long been the domain of the Department of Health, and early Scottish housers were 
strong advocates for social housing as a healthier alternative to slums. Even with a 
much greater shortage of suitable housing than in Baltimore, due to the stresses of 
the War, Glasgow Corporation seemed keen to grant preference to unhealthy and 
socially distressed families. While social housing allocation in Baltimore became 
defined by race, allocation policy in Glasgow focused on the overcrowded and the 
sick. 
 
Tenant Selection Policies in Glasgow:  
 
               In a preface to a 1935 trans-European study conducted by the Department 
of Health for Scotland (DHS), the Secretary of State for Scotland Godfrey Collins 
wrote that ‘There exists in Scotland a growing realization that in our efforts to 
provide new dwellings for the working classes, we must aim at something more than 
the provision merely of adequate and healthy internal living accommodation.’385 
While Collins continued this point by stressing the importance of aesthetics in the 
design of social housing, the authors of the study, who travelled to several European 
countries to visit their social housing complexes, were more interested in how other 
countries managed to cultivate such seemingly healthy social housing communities. 
 
  Unlike Collins, who focused primarily on aesthetics or more casually ‘curb 
appeal’, the authors of the study (two architects and two health professionals) were 
concerned more with liveability.386 After visiting several social housing complexes in 
continental Europe, they found that they were much more habitable than their 
Scottish counterparts. According to the study, the primary determinant of this 
increased habitability was stricter methods of tenant selection. European housing 
authorities chose good tenants, which resulted in stable social housing communities. 
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Furthermore, the Scottish authors were impressed with European management 
strategies, and felt that Scottish cities needed to emulate their continental 
counterparts’ diligence in tenant selection. 
 
                In a subsection of their report dubbed ‘social considerations’, the visiting 
Scottish officials noted that the residential harmony that characterized German, 
French, and Austrian social housing developments seemed to stem from the 
variation of economic classes (poor, working-class, and middle class tenants) that 
inhabited these developments. Although social housing in Glasgow would serve 
many economic classes after the Second World War, in the late 1930s social housing 
still conjured up notions of subsidized housing for indigent veterans. In Scotland, 
many people still referred to government funded housing as ‘homes for heroes’, 
even though the Addison Act (from which the ‘homes for heroes’ term derived) ran 
out of funding in 1921.387  Furthermore, a stigma existed around social housing that 
it existed only to placate the working class political malcontents of the ‘Red 
Clydeside’ era. Waldorf Astor, Parliamentary Secretary to the Local Government 
Board of Lloyd George’s administration, in 1919 referred to social housing as 
‘insurance against Bolshevism and Revolution’.388 While the Addison Act was passed 
more than fifteen years prior to the publication of the continental study, the authors 
were convinced that the limited economic diversity among Scottish social housing 
tenants was intentional.  Commenting on the variety of tenants in continental 
Europe, the report noted: 
 
The tenants housed in the schemes we visited covered perhaps a wider scale of social grades 
than do the tenants in Scottish housing schemes. Many of the houses particularly in 
Germany and France were specifically provided for better class tenants... Even where 
schemes were occupied entirely by the low wage earner class, the authorities had apparently 
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been able to exercise a wider discretion in selecting tenants than Scottish authorities can 
always exercise in their 1930s Act activities.389 
 
Thus, the Scottish authors were impressed that even in developments designed for 
low wage earners, careful consideration went into tenant income level balance. 
Normally middle class tenants provided social stability, which promoted the general 
welfare. While the primary aim of the report was to comment on social housing 
trends in continental Europe, the authors were just as keen to chastise Scottish 
tenants for not living up to a higher standard. In stark contrast to the more 
sympathetic and accommodating tone of post-war British writers, the authors took a 
more dyspeptic tone; poverty did not cause unkempt Scottish tenants, unkempt 
Scottish tenants ensured their own poverty. For instance, on the topic of the 
behaviour of rehoused slum dwellers the authors wrote the following: 
 
Large schemes consisting of nothing but slum clearance tenants produce the poorest results. 
Where a group of bad tenants are congregated in one block, it is unnecessary to enter... the 
condition of the common stairs and general appearance of the surrounding ground, railways, 
and windows tell the tale... the interspection of undesirable tenants among the good is 
socially the more constructive tenant.390 
 
Thus, for Scottish housing authorities in the 1930s, tenants defined housing; housing 
did not define tenants. The success of social housing, these men postulated, would 
depend largely on the type of tenants who occupied social housing. While it is true 
that problems with social housing ensued in later decades when developments 
began accepting more socially marginalised tenants (e.g. ‘broken’ families), the 
authors’ attitudes of the continental report seem callous given the severity of 
Scotland’s housing shortage. Nevertheless, the report highlighted an essential truth: 
stable tenants would cultivate stable housing environments. What Glasgow housing 
authorities realized, thus, was that a carefully formulated tenant selection policy 
could mould the success of social housing schemes. After the War, Glasgow 
Corporation cultivated such a strict tenant selection policy immediately; the result 
                                                 
389DHS, Working Class Housing, p. 9.  
390 Ibid., p.11. 
 178 
was the development of a successful, healthy living environment. With meticulous 
precision, the Corporation designed a calculus to determine which Glaswegians were 
eligible, and which Glaswegians would ultimately be selected, for social housing 
tenancy. This method of tenant selection, much like Baltimore’s early methods, 
ensured the stability of Glaswegian social housing during the 1940s and 1950s. 
 
               The impact of the Second World War on tenant selection policies in Glasgow 
could not have been more dramatic. While Glasgow did not suffer structural damage 
from bombing to the same extent as London or Coventry, years of building inactivity 
in a city that was already overcrowded resulted in a truly dilapidated housing stock. 
As such, once social housing construction began again in 1945, the Corporation was 
aware that allocation policy would have to reflect a greater demand for housing 
across all income levels. Put simply, in post-war Scotland, middle class families 
competed with working-class families for social housing units. A 1950 Department of 
Health for Scotland (DHS) publication on social housing allocation titled Choosing 
Council Tenants noted that:  
 
In the first decade of this century, the lack of dwellings, like the lack of food and fuel, was 
confined to the lowest income groups, and they alone had a claim on the assistance of the 
state... Since the war, as a result partly of greater scarcity, partly of deliberate control of 
distribution, an even larger fraction of the population has come to rely on the State for the 
meeting of its needs; and the relationship between means and the extent of this dependence 
is far less direct.391 
 
Given this reality, tenant selection policy would have to be defined explicitly in order 
to distribute social housing equitably among all prospective tenants. On the one 
hand, there were many Glaswegians who due to severely inadequate conditions or 
medical infirmity were completely destitute and thus in dire need of social housing. 
On the other hand, there were great multitudes of ordinary people who had worked 
steady jobs, served their country during the war in some capacity, and cultivated a 
healthy lifestyle – they too deserved better housing. In order to instil a healthy ratio 
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of middle class tenants and working-class tenants, municipalities in Scotland, 
including Glasgow, developed point systems to determine which applicants could 
become tenants.  These systems would be the basis on which Scottish social housing 
tenants would be chosen.  
 
           In point systems, points were awarded to families for a number of claimed 
factors involving housing status. Regarding an applicant’s current housing standard, 
points could be awarded for: overcrowded housing, insanitary housing, 
homelessness, or living in a slum dwelling. While being classified as living in an 
‘overcrowded’ house depended on number of family members, structural conditions 
determined whether a house was ‘insanitary’ or a ‘slum’. Applicants classified as 
‘homeless’ were not usually truly indigent, but rather young couples without a house 
of their own. Applicants could also claim other factors unrelated to housing to better 
their chances. Applicants who cited health deficiencies often had a family member 
with a chronic medical condition, such as arthritis or tuberculosis. With a chronic 
condition, a social housing unit was viewed as improving the tenants’ general quality 
of life. Other factors, such as being elderly, having veteran status, and even being an 
agricultural or industrial worker could benefit an applicant’s chances.392 As housing 
authorities dealt with a deluge of Glaswegians who wanted social housing, a strict 
adherence to a point based system of tenant selection seemed to be the only way to 
wade through all the applicants, for better or worse. An analysis of the mechanics of 
the point systems, and the determinants of the selection calculus, helps explain how 
social housing in Glasgow ended up becoming simultaneously subsidized housing for 
the middle classes and a sanctuary for unhealthy slum dwellers. 
 
 Two types of point schemes for housing allocation prevailed in Scotland 
after the War. These were the ‘straight points’ scheme and the ‘group plus points’ 
scheme. In the ‘straight points’ system, all applicants for social housing were 
arraigned on one list, and value points are given to each applicant for each specific 
eligibility claim Fmade for social housing. For instance, an applicant might claim 
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eligibility for living in a slum dwelling, in addition to having to raise three children in 
a one bedroom flat. All of the points claimed would be aggregated into one 
application, and the application would be judged against all other applicants for the 
same social housing units. The ‘group plus points’ system, however, did not judge all 
applicants against each other. Rather, under the group system, certain categories of 
applicants were allotted a guaranteed number of social housing units, and applicants 
were judged against applicants in the same category for those units. The group 
system arose because many local authorities and municipalities found that it was 
impossible to compare objectively different families with different needs; who could 
decide definitively whether a young veteran with a pregnant wife or a slum family 
with five children was more deserving of social housing accommodation? In 
Glasgow, whose housing authority adopted the group scheme, the situation was 
even direr. According to the 1950 report, in Glasgow ‘the problem of allocating 
tenancies is one of deciding which families shall be rehoused at all, and not merely of 
deciding the order in which they shall be rehoused.’393 Thus, to avoid offending 
certain groups, Glasgow Corporation allocated a certain number of social housing 
units for each category. Each applicant’s points were aggregated just as in the single 
point system, but applicants were only judged against other applicants in their own 
category.394 While the Corporation had no trouble finding willing tenants for its new 
social housing developments, some groups, such as persons compelled to endure 
severely overcrowded living conditions, probably felt underappreciated. Indeed, the 
report noted, regarding the importance of rehousing slum dwellers, that: 
 
There can therefore be no doubt that the rehousing of families from overcrowded or 
insanitary homes must be one of the chief aims of an allocation scheme, and that the two 
conditions are so frequently associated that they cannot be used to divide these families into 
two groups. We have therefore regarded these families as the… “badly-housed group.”395 
 
Even as early as 1950, housing professionals at the Department of Health for 
Scotland understood that slum dwellers faced particular hardships in cultivating 
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healthy lives, and thus deserved special housing attention. Regardless, the 
Corporation felt that for social housing developments to succeed, they needed to 
maintain a balance between less risky and riskier tenants.  
 
                 The disagreement on whether or not to allocate social housing based on 
health grievances, however, remained pressing even after the decision to include the 
unhealthy as a category in the point system of allocation. The debate divided 
Glaswegian housing authorities, as contradicting advice on tenant selection policy 
was published in the years after the Second World War. As the above quotation 
illustrates, the DHS felt that overcrowded families and slum dwellers should have 
precedence in tenant allocation, and not families with sick members. Indeed, the 
1950 report commented on the status of tuberculosis on social housing allocation: 
 
It is commonly asserted that the one evil (tuberculosis) results from the other 
(overcrowding), and… that cases of infective pulmonary tuberculosis should receive absolute 
priority in rehousing: that is, that in each local authority’s area, all these cases should be 
rehoused before any houses were allocated to other families…But on the evidence before us 
we do not feel justified in recommending that infectious cases of this disease should receive 
absolute priority in the allocation of houses.396 
 
At the time, the DHS felt that relationship between overcrowding and the spread of 
pulmonary tuberculosis was not wholly proven, and regardless, many TB negative 
persons suffered in overcrowded slum conditions as well. This view was not wholly 
callous; it cannot be overstated that Glasgow’s housing situation was worse than any 
other British city. For instance, in 1876 only 5,746 housing units were built in 
Glasgow, and nearly 70% of those units consisted of two rooms or less.397 Only in 
two years in the years leading up to 1944 did the number of units built exceed that 
number, despite the city’s high birth rates, high levels of immigration, the 
devastation of two World Wars, and the general deterioration of housing over 
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time.398 Put simply, there were many Glaswegians who needed better housing, not 
just the chronically ill and diseased. Ultimately, the general need for better housing 
in Glasgow pushed the Corporation to concentrate its efforts on rehousing slum 
dwellers and overcrowded families, and not families with sick members. The British 
government concurred with Glaswegian authorities. In 1948, the  DHS publication 
Planning our New Homes recommended that newly built social housing be reserved 
primarily for: those who lived in slums, those who lived in overcrowded houses, and 
families without homes at all, primarily newlywed veterans. 399 The report noted that 
there was a deficiency of nearly half a million adequate houses in Glasgow, houses 
that either did not have washing facilities or enough space to raise a family of four 
etc., and that this figure did not even account for future population growth or 
subsequent expectations of a higher standard of living. 400 The opinion expressed in 
this report, then, was that  persons who lived in overcrowded or slum houses were 
of greatest priority to be rehoused, not those with medical complaints. Signifying the 
national government’s disregard of health as a criterion for rehousing, the only 
mention in this report of health as a criterion in tenant selection is a restatement of 
the importance of living space: 
 
The fundamental relationship between housing and health of the people is widely recognized 
and the question of determining standard of living space is obviously one of the highest 
medical significance and importance. Public health and social legislation of the past 80 years 
contains a multiplicity of provisions dealing with the matters.401 
 
Yet while housing authorities agreed that those who lived in severely overcrowded 
houses needed to be rehoused, some Scottish housers believed that families with ill 
members deserved the chance to be selected for social housing tenancy. The DHS 
report Choosing Council Tenants published two years after Planning our New Homes 
noted just how difficult poor housing made life for the disabled and debilitated. 
Persons with cardiac disease, paralysis, arthritis, or those who were blind, could 
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benefit from a social housing unit on the ground floor. Persons with bronchitis or 
colostomies could benefit from having a private bedroom. Similarly, persons with 
asthma, insomnia, and psychotic disorders would benefit from a private bedroom. 
Even those families with medical complaints had to be prioritized, however, as 
certain conditions did not ‘endanger the health of the community’, and were thus 
less worthy of social housing accommodation than families with contagious 
members.402 The report’s concession that not all medical claimants could be 
rehoused, however, did refute a commonly held premise: that persons with 
debilitating or contagious medical conditions deserved to be allocated social housing 
accommodation. On how to classify different applicants for social housing, the 
report stated the following: 
 
There is... no doubt that causes of ill health or disability, such as we have instanced, increase 
the burden and dangers of overcrowded or unsatisfactory houses and we have therefore 
placed these families in a special group which we have called the ‘health group.403 
 
Ultimately, the view that pre-existing health conditions should factor into tenant 
selection prevailed, albeit not to the point that pre-existing health conditions 
overrode overcrowding or slum dwelling in importance. Glasgow housing authorities 
allowed for health considerations to factor into social housing applications by 
accounting for ‘health’ through the group points scheme.404 Under the group plus 
points scheme, Glaswegian families could apply for social housing either under the 
‘badly housed’ group or the ‘health group’, in addition to several other groups.  
Social housing in Glasgow would serve a humanitarian role by ensuring housing for 
those who endured uninhabitable housing conditions and those debilitated by 
disease or chronic illness. The selection of unhealthy tenants for rehousing did not 
end the Corporation’s involvement in health matters, however. The admission of 
‘health’ tenants may have derived from philanthropic intentions, but the results of 
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this policy proved real and persistent. Furthermore, just as in Baltimore, in later 
years Glasgow social housing schemes would house more ‘broken’ families, whose 
needs and requirements stretched the capacities of many Glaswegian schemes.    
 
 Yet while tenant selection policies could be used in both cities to help 
cultivate a healthy population, many housing officials could not point to concrete 
data that rehousing improved slum dwellers’ health. Indeed, one of the earliest 
British studies on the impact of rehousing on health pointed to the opposite 
conclusion: M’Gonigle found that slum dwellers rehoused onto social housing 
estates in Stockton during the 1930s were forced to spend a higher proportion of 
their income on rent, leaving less money for nutritious food. Nevertheless, public 
health professionals were interested in the potential health benefits of rehousing, 
and sought to investigate the exact effect of rehousing on tenant health. Two 
academics stand out as exemplar investigators of the relationship between social 
housing and health. In Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University professor Daniel Wilner 
conducted a massive six year longitudinal study of both slum dwellers and rehoused 
former slum dwellers. In Glasgow, University of Glasgow professor Thomas Ferguson 
conducted extensive cross-sectional research on the health of both slum dwellers 
and the recently rehoused A review of both Wilner and Ferguson’s work should help 
illuminate the impact of social housing on tenant wellbeing in both cities in the post-
war era.  
 
A New Era of Public Health in Baltimore, 1945 to 1960: 
 
 With the new enfranchisement of the multiple agencies dedicated to 
ensuring environmental health and the provision of sanitary housing in the post-war 
period, Baltimore’s municipal engagement with community health had just begun. In 
the years since 1941, Baltimore’s municipal agencies, along with the help of the 
CPHA, had transformed much of Baltimore’s worst slum housing neighbourhoods 
into environmentally healthy areas. By 1954, through the second incantation of the 
‘Baltimore Plan’, the HABC and the BCHD had cleared or refurbished 131 acres of 
slum housing. In terms of social housing construction, the HABC had built 6,939 
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social housing units and had 2,337 more units scheduled for completion.405 
Furthermore, housing officers and designated police officers were enforcing the 
strict adherence to housing ordinance principles laid out in the Baltimore Plan in 200 
blocks in south Baltimore, and were referring unscrupulous landlords to the 
relatively new (and, supposedly, politically independent) housing court for public 
health violations.406 Clearly, the city’s municipal efforts to ensure healthy housing 
were in full swing. But a fundamental question remained; were Baltimore’s residents 
experiencing a discernible and definite health benefits from relocating from slum 
housing into social housing? The animating force behind social housing in Baltimore, 
and in Glasgow similarly, was to provide a healthy alternative to slum dwellers who 
could not afford better housing. The question itself proved so difficult to answer that 
it spawned several studies on the connection between housing and health in the 
city, the most famous being Daniel Wilner’s longitudinal study tracking the health of 
slum dwellers and former slum dwellers rehoused to social housing projects. An 
exposition of these studies (with an emphasis on Wilner) and the municipal response 
to the health outcomes of housing measures should reveal whether social housing 
had a positive, negative, or negligible impact on public health in Baltimore. 
 
  In 1954, with a grant from the USPHS, the HABC initiated a collection of 
public health studies under the umbrella name ‘The Baltimore Study on the Hygiene 
of Housing’, often known simply as the ‘Study of Health and Adjustment’.407 Four 
academics affiliated with Johns Hopkins University conducted studies over a period 
of five years. Marcia Cooper launched a study on pica consumption and childhood 
nutrition based on case studies from the Mother’s Advisory Service, H. Carl Reich 
analyzed the impact of housing on tuberculosis recovery in Baltimoreans, and J 
Douglass Shepperd, a medical student at the University of Maryland, conducted a 
study of the health of Baltimoreans who had not availed themselves of the many 
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BCHD services and facilities.408 The most important and impressive study included in 
the ‘Study on Hygiene of Housing’, however, was the massive longitudinal study of 
slum dwellers and social housing tenants made by Daniel Wilner. These Hopkins 
affiliated medical and public health professionals initiated the first sociological 
examination that focused on poor housing as the primary factor in health outcomes, 
particularly in mental health and family stability. Most significantly of course, 
Wilner’s study sought to understand the efficacy of rehousing slum dwellers into 
social housing projects. An analysis of the structure of Wilner’s study will not only 
shed light on early public health studies’ methodology, but will point to Wilner’s 
eventual conclusion; that there were real and definite public health affects to 
rehousing Baltimorean slum dwellers into social housing. 
 
 
Daniel Wilner’s undergraduate (University of California, Los Angeles) yearbook photograph, 1947. 
 
 Essentially, Wilner’s study sought to determine whether relocating from slum 
housing into municipal housing projects had a positive impact on tenant health. Both 
the HABC and the USPHS were keen to provide evidence that social housing provided 
                                                 
408 BCHD, Annual Report (Baltimore, MD: 1956), pp. 104-105. 
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a healthier environment than slum housing; the lack of such definitive evidence 
prompted the grant for academic study. The study was conducted from 1954 to 
1960, and published in 1962. The idea for the study emanated from suggestions 
from a joint committee of the American Public Health Association (APHA) and the 
National Association of Housing Officials (NAHO) that occurred five years previously. 
Not by coincidence, Huntington Williams, Baltimore’s Commissioner of Health, 
happened to be a member of NAHO.409 The rehousing of slum dwellers, particularly 
Black slum dwellers, into new social housing projects seemed the perfect natural 
experiment to examine whether this kind of transition had any kind of impact.410 To 
determine this impact, the study included a test group, 400 families who lived in 
slum housing previously but were rehoused into housing projects, and a control 
group, 600 families who lived in slums and had applied to live in social housing, but 
who had been rejected initially for relocation on suitability grounds. The social 
housing development chosen for the study, Lafayette Courts, was built in 1954, and 
both the control group and the test group came from the immediate area.411 On this 
latter point, Wilner noted that the groups were not ‘perfect’ for the study, in fact in 
some ways they were quite unrepresentative of Baltimore social housing tenants 
and slum dwellers. Firstly, all subjects came from the same neighbourhood, so there 
was no geographic diversity of participants. Secondly, there was no racial diversity 
among subjects; the study groups contained no White families and relatively few 
Black veteran families (although this was by design). Thus, the study groups were 
somewhat unrepresentative of both social housing tenants and slum dwellers in 
Baltimore. Throughout the duration of the study there were still White tenants in 
city housing projects and plenty of White slum dwellers. The study allowed for these 
discrepancies, however, on the basis that poor, non-veteran Black families were the 
majority of social housing tenants and slum dwellers, and thus ‘sufficient to permit 
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the drawing of comprehensive generalizations from our findings.’412 Wilner noted in 
the methodology section of his study, however, that over the duration of the survey 
several families in the control group were eventually offered social housing tenancy. 
Wilner and his research team continued to monitor these families, on the grounds 
that it was only to be expected that some slum dwellers would leave the slums. 
Furthermore, these families helped make up for the (slight) loss of test group 
participants. Minor levels of attrition did not detract from the overall aim of 
monitoring both the test and control groups: to isolate the factor of social housing in 
a study of public health. While the study sought to elucidate the connection 
between housing and health and maintained a positive hypothesis, Wilner’s 
thorough investigation ultimately revealed surprisingly modest results. A review of 
Wilner’s methodology is both pertinent and necessary to understand his findings.  
 
 Wilner and his colleagues looked at a number of housing variables to 
understand the potential impact of the transition from slums to social housing. They 
examined: structural integrity, the variety and condition of household amenities 
(such as bathrooms, kitchens, water supply, and heating), and structural 
maintenance. Furthermore, they also considered the impact of density, measuring 
density on the basis of persons per floor area, persons per room, and persons per 
bedroom. All of these metrics informed Wilner of the differences between daily life 
in housing projects and slum dwellings. Additionally, the study included both a 
longitudinal analysis of data and a cross-sectional analysis of data. Admittedly, 
Wilner noted there were problems with the orchestration of the cross-sectional 
study: it was impossible to extricate completely certain factors from the housing 
factor. While it was true that both groups had similar incomes, similar family sizes, 
and that both groups showed they were capable of social ‘know-how’ in their 
applications for social housing, even Wilner concluded that social housing tenancy 
was probably not the sole determinant of physical and mental health. The aspect of 
social housing, however, was the subject of his study, and worthy of a study that 
isolated social housing tenancy as a factor. With this caveat, Wilner noted that the 
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longitudinal study was far more effective in determining the relationship between 
health and housing than in determining the relationship between health and various 
other metrics. 
 
 Yet despite the various and obvious physical improvements of social housing 
over slums (such as spaciousness, structural integrity, and affordability), Wilner had 
trouble establishing the direct connection between improved housing and potential 
improved health outcomes. At the very least, Wilner struggled to separate the factor 
of housing from other environmental and social determinants that impacted health. 
After all, the families in both the control and test groups were demonstrably poor, 
and it had already been established that poor families who lived in slum housing 
suffered health consequences due to their living environments.413 In one third of 
families there was no father figure and one third of the families received public 
welfare. Even the attempt to illustrate that housing projects might offer a healthier 
environment than slums housing was flawed. The social housing project into which 
study participants moved (Lafayette Courts) was brand new, of better structural 
quality than surrounding slums, and offered a wider range of amenities.414 However, 
it was plausible that lower income private housing stock could have provided similar 
accommodation. Only a few years prior to the start of the Wilner study, sociologist 
John P. Dean wrote an article titled ‘The Myths of Housing Reform’ in which he 
suggested that urban planners were wrong in believing that removing slum buildings 
also nullified all the social problems associated with socio-economic deprivation. On 
the efforts of slum clearance in the 1940s and 1930s, Dean wrote: 
  
In city after city-Buffalo, Birmingham, Cleveland, Denver, Detroit, Hartford, Indianapolis, Los 
Angeles, Milwaukee, Newark, Washington, and others- slum areas have been shown to be 
the areas of poorest health and the greatest personal and social disorder. The implication is 
this “Remove the slums and you remove the social ills!” But it would be just as illogical to say 
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that ills of slum areas are caused not by substandard housing conditions, but by the absence 
of telephone service, which also correlates with indexes of social disorder.415  
 
Just as social housing tenants defined a project’s character and served as an 
indicator of a development’s stability, slum residents were the prime determinant of 
the social, economic, and public health characteristics of slum neighbourhoods. This 
train of thought was not a brand new revelation: in his article Dean cited sociologist 
Abraham Goldfarb’s dissertation on juvenile delinquency in Harlem, wherein he 
proclaimed that ‘the one unmistakable conclusion that emerges from the study is 
that is that there is no relationship between bad housing in its physical aspects and 
juvenile delinquency as revealed by court records.’416 Nevertheless, Wilner was 
convinced a connection could be uncovered. While it was true that Lafayette Courts 
was in the same neighbourhood as the slums from which tenants came (and thus, 
consequently, the surrounding social environment of the participants was not 
radically altered during the study), Wilner and his colleagues found that there were 
some tangible observable results from moving into social housing. As will be 
discussed later, this proved justification enough for Wilner that the process of 
rehousing slum dwellers into housing projects was worthwhile.  
  
  
With the housing project selected and relevant literature reviewed (including 
Scottish studies on the connection between housing and health), Wilner needed to 
select the test and control group families.417 Once these families had been selected, 
Wilner needed to conduct initial interviews with to both groups not only for the 
purpose of establishing base medical characteristics of the groups from which to 
measure changes, but also to prove the suitability of the groups for comparative 
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study. Thus, the initial survey included a housing quality inventory survey that 
utilized the American Public Health Association (APHA) Appraisal Method, a 
morbidity survey of the members of each family, and an adjustment inventory which 
measured less tangible factors such as inter-family relationships, relationships with 
neighbours, morale, and mental health.418 The background questions revealed that 
for the most part, families in both groups were very similar in terms of average 
income, family size, marital status, and public welfare receipt. In the table presented 
below, Wilner reported the differences in background statistically: 
 
   
 
Daniel Wilner et al, ‘The Effects of Housing Quality on Morbidity’, American Journal of Public Health, 
Vol. 48, No. 12 (Dec., 1958), p. 1609. 
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While the data suggests that families in both groups were quite similar, the two most 
striking details were the differences in the metrics of income and application date. 
Firstly, the control group families were 4% more likely to have an annual income 
over $2,500 a year, suggesting that even as early as 1954 the HABC favoured 
selecting median income Black tenants over higher income Black tenants, despite 
the gross discrepancy in averages between Black incomes and White incomes 
generally. Secondly, the test group families were nearly 5% more likely to have 
applied for social housing admittance by 1952 or earlier, three years (April, 1955) 
before the construction of Lafayette Courts. This eagerness for admittance was 
indicative of the ‘social know-how’ that Wilner had referenced in earlier 
publications.419 Regardless, the family characteristics were very similar. Indeed, the 





                                                 
419 Daniel Wilner et al, ‘How Does Quality of Housing Affect Health and Family Adjustment?’, 
American Journal of Public Health, (Jun., 1956), Vol. 46, No. 6: 742. 
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Daniel Wilner et al, ‘The Effects of Housing Quality on Morbidity’, American Journal of Public Health, 
Vol. 48, No. 12 (Dec., 1958), p. 1609. 
 
The comparison of housing amenities showed that for nearly every metric measured, 
the test group families had endured less liveable housing conditions than the control 
group families. Again, this discrepancy, however slight, reinforces the idea that HABC 
tenant selection policy sought to offer social housing tenancy to families that not 
only seemed stable, but who also were deemed to have lived in the most unsuitable 
housing. For Wilner and the study staff, however, this preliminary data provided the 
best possible condition for their experiment: they had chosen subjects nearly 
identical to each other in a wide variety of ways. For Wilner, this meant that any 
subsequent changes in morbidity, mortality, social adjustment, and mental health 
among the groups would be due primarily to housing change or housing stasis. While 
the study methodology was not perfect, Wilner’s efforts have been heralded in 
subsequent decades by academics impressed with the study’s expansiveness.420 
Finally, a public health study had been devised to eliminate as many variables as 
possible with the aim of answering a single question that professionals of all kinds 
were desperate to know: did social housing tenancy improve the health outcomes of 
rehoused slum dwellers? 
 
There were some indications of the study’s findings before final publication in 
1962. Though the study was conducted between 1954 and 1960, Wilner published 
several articles detailing the morbidity results of household interviews in the 
intervening years.421 The early results of the study suggested that while there was 
some evidence of small improvements in social outcomes that could aid potentially 
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tenant health outcomes in the long term, there were no dramatic health 
improvements among test group participants. Put bluntly, the data showed little to 
no difference in morbidity or mortality between the test and control families. 
Furthermore, Wilner could not blame the unexciting results on the issues of 
transition from slum-to-projects. In a report on early morbidity results, Wilner 
included two ‘periods’ of questioning, an ‘initial period’ which followed test families 
as they moved into Lafayette Courts from April, 1955 to March, 1956, and an ‘after 
period’, wherein the study staff conducted interviews in an eighteen month period 
after March, 1956. Both periods of questioning yielded similar results for both the 
test and control groups.  The results of the initial period were particularly similar, as 
the table below illustrates: 
 
 
Daniel Wilner et al, ‘The Effects of Housing Quality on Morbidity’, American Journal of Public Health, 
Vol. 48, No. 12 (Dec., 1958), p. 1610. 
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Commenting on these disappointing results, Wilner noted that ‘our general 
impression is that for the 18-month rehoused period under examination the move to 
good housing has not on the average resulted in measurable improvement in rates 
of episodes and related matters for the test group as a whole over the control 
group.’422 Wilner posited that the study would yield more discernible results as time 
progressed, and reiterated his faith in the suitability of the study subjects (both test 
and control) and the suitability of the interview methodology.  Wilner did offer, 
however, several hypotheses that would explain the negligible differences in early 
reported data. The first hypothesis offered was that though the test family dwellings 
were better appointed than control family counterparts (enough so for Wilner to 
refer to social housing frequently as ‘good housing’), certain aspects of life in 
Lafayette Courts may have worsened symptoms of morbidity. In particular, Wilner 
noted that most of the test families lived in 11-storey 110 family unit buildings, quite 
in contrast to the control families who lived in low-level slum rowhouses.423 
Consequently, the test families were subject to much higher density of persons per 
square footage than were the control families, even though test families’ individual 
flats were more spacious. Wilner theorized that the high-rise development could 
possibly be more conducive to the ‘aerial transmission of certain diseases’, such as 
upper respiratory infections and childhood diseases.424 The second hypothesis 
offered was that study families’ level of attrition affected results. Yet as already 
noted, the rate of participant family attrition was remarkably low. However, at 
earlier points in the research, Wilner speculated that test family participants who 
dropped out of the study might be particularly healthy and/or socially mobile, 
whereas control family participants might be especially unhealthy and/or 
economically disadvantaged. Such a scenario would compound the similarities 
between the two groups. However, the early published reports were prescient; the 
fully published study pointed to less than earth-shattering results. Wilner’s 
discomfort with his own study results was abated, however, by the more edifying 
results that he managed to discern.  
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 In the introduction to the full study, Wilner noted that studies of housing and 
health had been published before 1962. Of the 24 articles on the connection 
between housing and health that Wilner cited, 14 were British studies, including two 
Scottish studies.425 These various studies, however, failed to account for differences 
in outcomes that could potentially have been due to differences in education, 
income, or social factors. More importantly, as Wilner noted ‘Because of the 
research design principally employed – the cross-sectional study – it has been 
difficult to rule out the effects of non-housing factors.’426 Wilner’s study then was 
revealing not just because it produced results, but because it produced results 
derived from longitudinal analysis. While it was true that Wilner conceded that the 
results were not as dramatic as he and his study partners had hypothesized, his 
efforts did point to a (slight) tangible benefit to rehousing, even though there were 
several metrics measured wherein the control group fared better than the test 
group. Despite this concession, Wilner’s study produced results that were 
undoubtedly indicative of a correlation between living in social housing and 
improved tenant health, even if the results were not as dramatic as had been hoped 
for. The most illustrative results from the study were measures of morbidity, 
mortality, and school performance. The morbidity results in particular were 
informative, though the explanations for the variations in morbidity data between 
test and control data were somewhat convoluted. In particular, the morbidity data 
revealed a difference in outcomes for different ages: people under 35 benefitted 
from rehousing, whereas people over 35 did not benefit from rehousing. Among 
children and young adults under 20, there was a slight decline in instances of certain 
illnesses. During the last two years of the questioning period (1957-1958), rates of 
infectious diseases (mostly childhood diseases), digestive conditions, and accidents 
were lower in the test group. The decline in the incidence of accidents in this age 
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group provided some of the most dramatic results of the study; reported accidents 
were a third lower in Lafayette Courts than in the control group’s slum housing. 
Among adults (20-34 years of age), test group rates were slightly lower than control 
group rates of illness episode covered a wide range of conditions, such as allergic, 
endocrine, metabolic, circulatory, and mental disorders. Only in persons above the 
age of 35 did the control group fare better in morbidity, likely due to the stresses of 
moving house and loosing community ties.427 Thus, while morbidity rates were not 
dramatically improved through rehousing, there was evidence that supported the 
thesis that rehousing could reduce morbidity rates in younger slum dwellers. 
 
 In terms of mortality, twelve study participants died in the duration of the 
entire study (1954-1960). Ten deaths were from the control group, while two deaths 
were from the test group.428 While this simple breakdown of study participant 
deaths seemed to suggest that social housing provided an environment much more 
conducive to healthy living, a further exposition of the deaths reveals a more 
nuanced picture. Of the two test deaths, both were children under 6 years old, the 
very study participants who benefited most from rehousing. The control deaths, in 
contrast, were split evenly – while there were five deaths among very young 
children, the remaining deaths were in persons over 60 years of age. The deaths of 
the senior participants were due to the following: two due to cerebral haemorrhage, 
two due to pneumonia, and one due to stomach cancer.429 Considering that only 
forty persons over 60 were included in the study, twenty each in the control and test 
group, Wilner was convinced that rehousing had a much more profound impact on 
senior mortality than adult or childhood mortality. While no rehoused seniors died 
during the entire length of the study, a full quarter (5) of slum dwelling seniors died. 
The graph below presents the mortality data from the study: 
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‘Statistical Significance of the Difference in Mortality’, Wilner et al, The Housing Environment and 
Family Life, Appendix 11, p. 324. 
 
While the data is numerically low, the statistical advantage of rehousing for seniors 
was more statistically significant. Wilner commented that if one only considered the 
factor of the mortality rate in estimation the effectiveness of rehousing’s impact on 
mortality, one could divide the test death rate by the control death rate to yield a 
percentage of 0.7976. This figure could be assessed as signifying that the test group 
experienced a level of 80% protection from mortality, or more simply, that rehousing 
resulted in the survival of 80% of preventable deaths.430 Given the low sample size, 
Wilner noted that there were different professional views on whether analyses could 
be drawn from such numbers, and offered two contrasting perspectives.431 Wilner et 
al were confident enough in the results to report the mortality data from the study. 
The study staff were not confident enough, however, to conduct morbidity research 
on senior study participants, who were much more likely to die during the duration 
of the study. While most senior study participants did not die, Wilner qualified this 
omission by noting that‘[senior study participants] had the highest rates of episodes 
of illness and disability of any of the age categories in the study.’432 For this reason, 
morbidity data was not collected from the senior study participants, as the study 
staff determined they could not evaluate how housing affected morbidity 
independent from the generally poorer health of older study participants. Similarly, 
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as there were only seven deaths in study children under the age of 6, there was little 
point in statistical analysis. The fact that of these seven deaths five were control 
group children was interesting in-and-of-itself, however. While the study mortality 
data was smaller than the study morbidity data, considering that the morbidity 
analyses indicated a slight improvement in young rehoused children, it seemed 
reasonable that relocating from slum dwellings to social housing reduced the 
likelihood of childhood mortality. 
 
 Yet as already noted test group participants did not experience a dramatic 
reduction in morbidity or mortality rates. Similarly, investigations into what Wilner 
classified as ‘social psychological adjustment’ (e.g. relations with neighbours, family 
relations, and psychological state) only showed modest improvements after 
rehousing; Wilner himself categorized these improvements (somewhat ineffectually) 
as ‘at least a directional trend confirming the expectations specified for the area’.433 
Although there was some evidence to support Wilner’s thesis – that moving into 
social housing improved tenant health – there were no significant improvements in 
the morbidity, mortality, or psychological metrics among test group tenants. Wilner 
looked at one more indicator of health, however, and this last indicator was the 
metric that changed the most dramatically after rehousing: school fulfilment. The 
only caveat to this apparent benefit of social housing, however, was that social 
housing improved school performance in a totally unexpected, secondary way. 
Initially, Wilner thought the test group children would benefit from rehousing due to 
the larger size of social housing units. In Lafayette Courts, there were more rooms 
per dwelling, which meant ostensibly that children would have more opportunities 
to find quiet study spaces. Additionally, the study staff believed that rehousing 
would result in a ‘heightened general morale, increased educational aspirations of 
parents for their children, and more parental participation in educationally 
promotive activities with children’.434 In order to comprehend whether or not test 
group children performed better than their control group peers, students from both 
groups were selected for comparison against one another. The study collected data 
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from 293 test children and 287 control children, and adjusted data for comparison 
by similar age, sex, and grade. The students were subjected to three different 
intelligence tests: one for general intelligence, one for arithmetic achievement, and 
one for reading achievement. The study staff noted that both groups of children 
selected performed at similar levels at the start of the study; this was to assure that 
‘brighter’ children were not more represented in social housing. Initially, the results 
of the test comparisons were extremely disappointing. Put simply, there was little 
difference in test scores for all ages, sexes, and grades of study children. The thesis 
that social housing would improve academic performance, then, proved incorrect. 
The study reproduced the results of the intelligence test data below: 
 
 
‘Table 6 - School Performance: Intelligence, Arithmetic, and Reading Test Scores’, Wilner et al, The 
Housing Environment and Family Life, Appendix 11, p. 324. 
 
The investigation into juvenile academics did yield some unexpected and positive 
results on the benefits of rehousing, however. The study staff found that test group 
children experienced an advantage in school progression over control group 
children. Test group children were much more likely to complete each grade and 
subsequently be promoted into the next grade than were control group children, 
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despite little difference in academic proficiency. While 82% of test group children 
progressed normally, only 68% of control group children did. Ultimately this would 
likely lead to greater high school completion rates and subsequent improved job 
opportunities for test group children. While this was certainly a significant result, 
Wilner viewed the result as a kind of consolation prize.435 For instance, Wilner 
supposed that there were subjective factors that contributed to grade promotion, 
such as differing standards at different schools and the collegiality of individual 
teachers. Consequently, Wilner did not find school progression nearly as accurate a 
determinant of school success as academic performance. The study did posit, 
however, that test children were promoted more due to their more consistent 
school attendance. Wilner argued that social housing tenancy had a direct impact on 
ability to attend school.  Additionally, the test group children maintained lower 
reported levels of morbidity. Consequently, as rehoused children were less likely to 
become sick, they were less likely to miss school, and thus more likely to be 
promoted normally to the next grade level. Wilner and the study staff had found, 
albeit accidentally, what they were looking for: a definitive positive impact of social 
housing on quality of life. While this result was less dramatic or expansive an impact 
than Wilner had hoped for – it did give support to his contention that from a public 
health perspective social housing was a worthy endeavour.  
 
 Yet despite the positive results of the school progression data, Wilner’s 
longitudinal study The Housing Environment and Family Life otherwise did not reveal 
exciting results. The morbidity data was somewhat conflicting and only pointed to 
modest improvement. Drawing conclusions from the mortality data was difficult due 
to the small sample size of the data. The psychological experiments showed that test 
group tenants reported feeling better about their housing environment, but 
reported little change in personal mental well being. Even investigations into 
rehoused children’s academic performance showed an insignificant improvement in 
                                                 
435 Contemporary scholars have produced studies that show that social housing residency can 
improve school performance dramatically, and find this to be an important indicator of public health. 
For a review of such literature, See: Jean Anyon, Radical Possibilities: Public Policy, Urban Education, 
and A New Social Movement (New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 103-105. 
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test scores – the agreed upon best method by which to track cognitive ability. Social 
housing tenancy did not seem to correct the great health disparities suffered by slum 
dwellers – at best it seemed to improve quality of life mildly. Nonetheless, the study 
did produce empirical evidence (however modest) that supported the claim that 
social housing improved the health of tenants. Housers for decades had made this 
claim, and it took a six year study that culminated in 1960 to lend credence to the 
claim. The study did not show that social housing improved health categorically; 
rather it showed that social housing provided an environment that bettered certain 
aspects of certain types of peoples’ lives. Wilner and the study staff acknowledged 
the mixed and somewhat unexciting results of the study in their conclusion, and 
noted that social housing would not cure the problems that plagued disadvantaged 
communities.436 It was, however, an illustration of what social housing could 
provide: better housing for working-class persons (especially Black persons in 
Baltimore). The arrival of social housing would not eliminate slum conditions, nor 
would it resolve much of the social problems that had developed in Baltimore. Social 
housing tenancy could make life better for those fortunate enough to gain entrance, 
however. In Glasgow, studies similar to the Wilner sought to ask the same question: 
did social housing improve tenant health or at the very least the quality of life for 
working-class persons? In a sense, the health studies in Glasgow had more impact as 
social housing came to play a more important role in the development of the socio-
spatial fabric of the city. Regardless, public health professionals were eager to 
highlight what their counterparts in Baltimore had by 1960: that relocating from the 
slums to social housing improved the health of tenants. Just as Wilner had 
discovered in Baltimore, however, investigations into the connection between social 
housing and health often produced surprising results.   
 
A New Era of Public Health in Glasgow, 1945-1960: 
 
Five months before V-E Day, an academic and public health professional 
joined the University of Glasgow’s Department of Public Health and Social Medicine 
                                                 
436 Wilner, Housing Environment, pp. 241-243.  
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who would leave an indelible mark on the institution’s involvement in the question 
on housing and health. In January of 1945, Thomas Ferguson assumed an 
appointment as the Henry Mechan Chair of Public Health, a position he would hold 
for more than two decades. From this position, Ferguson would conduct numerous 
studies on the social welfare of Glaswegian families; though for much of his career 
he focused on juvenile delinquency.437 However, it was his studies on Glaswegian 
slums and the rehousing of slum tenants into nascent social housing developments 
in the 1950s that resulted in greater academic acclaim. For in 1954, Ferguson 
published jointly two studies in the Glasgow Medical Journal that would have a 
monumental impact on the growing housing and health debate. His first study was 
an expositional cross sectional study of the health of 388 families who lived in 
dilapidated slums, and his second study was a comparative cross-sectional study of 
718 slum families who had been rehoused into social housing either for a period of 
10 to 14 years or a period of 15 to 19 years.438 These investigations into housing and 
health, conducted between 1952-1953, were the Glaswegian predecessors to the 
Wilner study (indeed, Wilner referenced Ferguson). While Ferguson’s investigations 
were not nearly as exhaustive as Wilner’s six year long longitudinal study, Ferguson 
sought similar objectives to his Baltimorean counterpart: to determine if there was a 
link between better housing and better health. Just as Wilner would, Ferguson 
surmised that rehousing slum dwellers into social housing would improve their 
health and quality of life. Also similar to Wilner, Ferguson’s studies would reveal 
recognizable but surprising results on the impact of rehousing. Despite this, later 
academics have recognized that Ferguson’s studies influenced prevailing thought on 
                                                 
437 Thomas Ferguson and James Cunnison, The Young Wage Earner: A Study of Glasgow Boys (Oxford 
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the efficacy of rehousing, and his work reinforced the prevailing housing planning 
attitudes in Scotland.439  
 
Like his future Baltimorean counterpart Daniel Wilner, Thomas Ferguson had 
had extensive experience in public health research before he published his seminal 
studies on the health of slum dwellers. Born in Falkirk, Ferguson graduated with an 
MBChB from the University of Edinburgh in 1922. After serving a variety of public 
health positions as an MOH across Scotland, he joined the staff of the Department of 
Health for Scotland (DHS) in 1933. By 1937, he had been promoted to Deputy Chief 
Medical Officer for the DHS and participated in a number of environmental health 
committees including the Industrial Health Research Board, the Committee on 
Scottish Health Services, and the Committee on Housing of the London School of 
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.440 Ferguson’s research credentials, then, were 
impressive. It is not surprising that when Ferguson announced his decision to leave 
the DHS and accept a new academic role at Glasgow’s Department of Public Health, 
Andrew Davidson, the Chief Medical Officer for the DHS, reported that ‘Dr. 
Ferguson’s departure from the Department is a serious loss to central health 
administration, although it is good to know that his wide experience of public health 
administration, both central and local, is still to be available in Scotland.’441 With his 
career already well established by his arrival in the University of Glasgow, Ferguson 
was well prepared to conduct his research into slum conditions and health 
outcomes. Yet like all housers, Ferguson had intimated his opinion on the role of 
housing in health before he began serious research on Glaswegian slums and 
rehousing. In a lecture given in Glasgow City Chambers shortly after his 
appointment, Ferguson emphasized the importance of individual effort in 
maintaining health. According to an article in the Herald, while Ferguson noted the 
importance of decent housing, food, and standards of amenity in the maintenance of 
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healthy lifestyles, such maintenance required the ‘full and intelligent use of these 
things’ and that it had become ‘increasingly difficult to make progress without the 
co-operation of the individual citizen’. In particular, Ferguson was concerned by 
what he perceived to be Glaswegian mothers’ apathetic reception of special vitamin-
enriched foods dispensed by municipal authorities.442 While Ferguson may have 
been viewed as a progressive public health reformer at the time, he seemed to hold 
critical views of working-class social behaviour patterns. Indeed, in a commentary on 
a juvenile delinquency study nearly ten years after his housing studies Ferguson 
remarked that ‘It is undoubtedly to the parents that there belongs most of the 
success or failure of training a lad away from delinquency’.443 Regardless of 
Ferguson’s stringent commentary on personal responsibility, his extensive training 
and experience in public health prepared him for his studies on the impact of social 
housing on health. 
 
 
Thomas Ferguson (1900-1977) was the Henry Mechan Professor of public health from 1944 to 
1964, Photo Courtesy: University of Glasgow 
 
                                                 
442 ‘Public Health: Citizens’ Co-operation Essential’ Glasgow Herald, 26/2/1945, p.3.  
443 ‘Admissions to Remand Home Criticized – “Insulting and Sabotaging”’ Glasgow Herald, 15/5/1961, 
p. 8. 
 206 
At this point, a note on the difference in methodology between Ferguson and 
Wilner seems appropriate. While Wilner employed a longitudinal approach, and 
evaluated changes in reported data collected at set intervals over a period of time, 
Ferguson employed a cross-sectional approach, i.e. he evaluated data collected at 
only one point in time. Social scientists generally agree that longitudinal studies offer 
more meaningful data than cross-sectional studies, as repeated measurements of 
the same data offer more reliable results than a single examination.444 Yet while 
both Ferguson’s studies were cross-sectional, they serve as a kind of longitudinal 
‘light’ purpose: for the studies compared the social and health characteristics of 
families of different lengths of slum tenancy and different lengths of rehoused 
tenancy. While the second study of 718 rehoused families provided much more 
conclusive data, a look at the first study of 388 slum families helps establish the 
social state and health characteristics of Glaswegian slum dwelling families. Put 
simply, these were thorough, sophisticated studies of housing – and are equivalent 
in importance to the Wilner study. A review of Ferguson’s studies reveals an 
impeccable attention to detail. Ferguson began his first study with a comparison of 
contemporary slum families with those of the early nineteenth century. Ferguson 
noted that in James Cleland’s study of Glasgow (1819-1820), the average family size 
was 4.68, as opposed to the city’s 1950s average family size of 4.36. Despite this 
slight drop in fertility, housing density had increased substantially in the intervening 
years. In Cleland’s study, the average person-per-room density of a Glaswegian 
household was 2.06, in Ferguson’s study, the density of the selected slum dwelling 
families was 2.52, a figure almost twice as high as the average household room 
density for Glasgow as a whole in 1952-1953 (1.27).445 The physical dwellings that 
these slum families occupied were very stark and contained few amenities; 
considering the slow pace of tenement construction in the early twentieth century it 
is surprising that average density was not even higher. While all of the housing units 
Ferguson investigated had running water, only ten families in the study had a private 
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toilet. No fewer than 256 of the 388 families shared a toilet with four other families, 
and in 15 instances toilets were shared by eight families.446 If any doubt remained 
that Glasgow’s slums were an inadequate place to raise a family, Ferguson’s early 
description of these dwellings’ qualities and his review of historical accounts of 
nineteenth-century slums, extinguished these doubts. Regardless of Ferguson’s own 
opinions on the causes of poverty and poor health, it seemed obvious that 
Glaswegian slum tenements were inconducive to healthy living and thus inadequate 
for working-class occupation. Indeed, commenting on a public health grant he was 
awarded shortly after the war, Ferguson remarked that ‘a man’s fitness and 
enthusiasm for work often depended on as much on factors outside the workshop as 
on factors inside.’ Ferguson had come to the conclusion that slum conditions 
hampered tenant health, and hypothesized that rehousing would result in better 
health. 
 
Yet Ferguson’s first study did not just seek to describe the quality of 
Glasgow’s slums. It sought to answer a fundamental question: what factors 
contributed to the different health and social outcomes of slum dwellers? After all, if 
study families all inhabited the same slum neighbourhood, shouldn’t they experience 
similar outcomes? This presumption proved incorrect, however. Ferguson found that 
the two most important factors that predicted the health of slum families were 
weekly income and, inversely, length of tenancy. Furthermore, length of tenancy and 
weekly income were related: the newer a family was to a slum, the higher their 
average weekly income. Ferguson attributed this relationship to the acute housing 
shortage in Glasgow after the War – which drove a wider range of socio-economic 
classes into the slums. More recent slum families were more likely to be headed by a 
skilled or semi-skilled worker. Therefore, these families were more likely to garner a 
higher wage. The higher a family’s weekly income, the better the family’s health, 
social stability, and economic prospects. To quote Ferguson – ‘the “atmosphere” of 
the home tended to improve as more money became available’.447 This language is 
reminiscent of Ferguson’s earlier comments on the importance of family influence 
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on juvenile success; indeed within this study Ferguson investigated the importance 
of the father-figure in slum families. Ferguson dissected the 388 study families to 
determine how income and father skill-set impacted the health outcomes of each 
family. The study results illuminated the factors that contributed to poor health and 
social isolation within slum communities, and provided context for the results of 
Ferguson’s second study of rehoused slum dwellers.  
 
According to Ferguson, of the surviving 317 fathers of the 388 study families, 
54 (13.9%) were skilled workers, 67 (17.3%) were semi-skilled, and 267 (68.8%) were 
unskilled. Health aides affiliated with the study classified 68% of the skill-set fathers 
as having ‘good’ health, which was nearly identical to the 64% of the unskilled 
fathers classified as having ‘good’ health.448 Yet while there was little health disparity 
among different classes of fathers, the health of mothers correlated directly to 
income. While 70% of the wives of skilled labourers were classified as being of good 
health, only 38% of the wives of unskilled labourers were.  Ferguson argued that this 
was likely due to the added strains placed on the wives of unskilled husbands; they 
were not only expected to take charge of domestic duties, but work outside the 
home to provide extra income as well. With regards to childhood mortality, Ferguson 
deemed household crowding the primary determinant.  While class seemed to have 
a small affect (18% skilled-class children died as opposed to 20% of unskilled-class 
children), childhood mortality correlated more strongly with family size – families 
with three children or less suffered an 8% mortality rate, while families with eight 
children or more suffered a 36% mortality rate.449 The more children per room, the 
more likely was it that children died prematurely. Thus, weekly income seemed only 
to have a direct impact on the health of slum mothers while there were negligible 
differences in father and child mortality. The skill-set of fathers did impact the 
apprenticeship rate of children, however – while 36% of older sons of skilled workers 
served in apprenticeships, only 18% of older sons of unskilled workers did so. 
Furthermore, the length of slum tenancy determined economic achievement of sons: 
of families who had lived in the slum for less than ten years, 42% of age eligible sons 
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served apprenticeships, of families who had lived in the slum between ten and 
fourteen years, 27% of age eligible sons served apprenticeships, and of families who 
had lived in the slum for twenty years or more, only 20% of age eligible sons served 
apprenticeships. The negative impact of slum life, then, was apparent but delayed. 
The children of newer-entry slum families could still thrive despite a less than 
salubrious home environment, while the qualities of ‘slum life’ were more deeply 
ingrained in the children of longer tenancy families. This initial data pushed Ferguson 
towards a conclusion that many academics would come to share: as slum behaviours 
were so deeply entrenched in long term slum dwellers that simply rehousing socially 
deprived persons was not a panacea to the problems associated with slums. Put 
simply, removing a person from the slums was easy, extinguishing the slum 
behaviour was more difficult. Ferguson had discovered that a family’s income and 
length of tenancy determined health and social outcomes more than mere residency 
in a slum – but this data pointed to the broader and more salient truth about the 
long-lasting impact of the slums.  
 
 Indeed, the study’s investigations into the role of income produced 
interesting and surprising results. There were limitations to his methodology, 
however. Ferguson noted that determining the direct impact of weekly family 
income on health would have been difficult. In fact, Ferguson claimed that it would 
have been difficult to even calculate families’ exact weekly income – given the 
sporadic employment of some of the families. What Ferguson did manage to 
quantify was the average weekly allowance available for housekeeping – or the 
money household mothers had at their disposal to spend on maintenance. Ferguson 
hoped that by measuring average housekeeping allowance against family size, he 
could determine if slum tenancy impacted quality of life. In general, the amount of 
money available for housekeeping increased with the size of the family. This 
increase, however, was not usually proportional. A look at the table below illustrates 




‘Table 2: Money available for housekeeping (weekly) in relation to number of persons in household’, 
Ferguson, ‘388 Families’, Glasgow Medical Journal, p. 177. 
 
Somewhat paradoxically, housekeeping allowance tended to increase the higher a 
flat’s rental price, but in actuality the difference was relatively small. In households 
that had less than 100s per week for housekeeping, 60% of families paid less than 7s 
in weekly rent; in households that had 160s per week or more, 51% of families paid 
less than 7s in weekly rent. Put simply, in Glasgow’s slum districts, rent did not 
account for a large percentage of household expenditures, regardless of families’ 
income. Furthermore, it stood to reason that higher weekly income families had 
more disposable income to spend on housekeeping; the slums hosted a variety of 
socio-economic classes and some slum families had more income to spend on life’s 
necessities than others. Yet this did not mean that slum families’ health outcomes 
were wholly determined by weekly income. As noted before, what seemed to 
account for differences in health and social outcomes of slum families was a family’s 
length of tenancy in slum housing.  
 
 Yet if length of tenancy was the primary determinant of differences in family 
health outcomes, what were these different outcomes? Ferguson’s comparisons of 
families who had lived in slums for less than ten years and more than ten years 
provided the most decisive data of his first study. For instance, Ferguson noted that 
in the 218 families that had resided in the slum for more than ten years, 68 fathers 
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had died, but of the 130 families that had resided in the slum for less than ten years, 
only 3 fathers had died.450 This health metric was related to income, but also to age; 
younger fathers were of course less likely to die. As the table below shows, families 
that resided in the slum less than ten years tended to be headed by younger fathers: 
 
 
‘Table 3: Age of father in relation to length of occupancy of present slum house’, Ferguson, ‘388 
Families’, Glasgow Medical Journal, p. 180.’ 
 
As shorter tenancy families were more likely to be headed by young, skilled fathers, 
these families experienced better health and socioeconomic outcomes due to the 
greater reliability of their household heads. Again, younger families were more likely 
to be driven to slum tenancy out of lack of housing options rather than economic 
necessity. The advantages of younger fathers is further evidenced by the general 
increase in average housekeeping allowance among the newer tenant families, as 
demonstrated by the graph below: 
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‘Table 4 Money available for housekeeping in relation to length of occupancy of present slum house’, 
Ferguson, ‘388 Families’, Glasgow Medical Journal, p. 181. 
 
While a slightly higher percentage of longer tenancy families had 140s or more 
weekly for housekeeping, the average shorter tenancy family spent much more 
money on housekeeping. Most strikingly, nearly a third of longer tenancy families 
had less than 80s a week for housekeeping, whereas less than six percent of shorter 
tenancy families had so little funds. Yet while this data implied that slums simply 
reflected the economic purchasing power of its residents, this was not Ferguson’s 
point. Ferguson’s purpose in including this data was to strengthen his thesis that 
relocation to social housing would not eliminate slum problems – there were 
underlying issues of socio-economic deprivation. Furthermore, Glasgow’s slums had 
caused enduring, perhaps even indelible, traumatic damage to its tenants. In 
conclusion of his first study, Ferguson offered the following summation of the state 
of Glasgow’s slums in the early 1950s: 
Many of the miserable, decrepit houses still remain, though doubtless relatively less 
numerous than they were a generation or two ago; the most striking change is in the people 
[emphasis added] of the slums. Many slum areas are still ‘tough’ spots, but now to a much 
greater extent than formerly many of the inhabitants are hard-working, often skilled or semi-
skilled operatives in regular employment, earning good and steady wages. Poverty is much 
less prevalent than it was and is no longer a major factor in driving people into a slum 
environment, except in the case of a relatively small number of unfortunate old people. Most 
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of the people who have been driven into slum houses since the end of the war have gone 
that way because of sheer inability to obtain better accommodation, for which they were in 
the great majority of cases willing and able to pay.451 
  
Regardless, Ferguson’s study of rehoused slum dwellers was necessary to gauge the 
impact of the slums upon lower income Glaswegians, and to place the process of 
rehousing in proper context. While Ferguson did not specify if families moved into 
social housing or into improved private housing, the term ‘rehousing’ in a British 
context has invariably always meant that families were moved from privately let 
slums to social flats.452 Furthermore, as such a dominating percentage of new 
housing construction in Glasgow after the War was social housing; it was highly 
unusual for Glaswegian families to be moved into subsidized private housing rather 
than social housing.453 In any case, Ferguson’s thesis was not so much that rehousing 
slum dwellers was a poor curative measure against the problems associated with 
slum environments, but rather that rehousing in-and-of-itself would not alleviate all 
the deleterious health characteristics of slum families. His second study, which 
observed the health and social outcomes of 718 families rehoused into social 
housing, only seemed to confirm that thesis. This study helped refine Ferguson’s 
attitude on the relationship between housing and health, and would influence later 
debates on the merits of the concept of architectural determinism.  
 
The second study was conducted in much the same vein as the first study – 
just as with the first study tenants were categorized by length of tenancy. The study 
recorded the characteristics of 718 slum families who had been rehoused from 
periods ranging from 10 years to 27 years. The purpose of the second study, in 
Ferguson’s words, was to ‘present a picture of the present mode of life of these 
rehoused families, and, if possible, to make some broad comparisons between them 
and the families still living in slums, though it was realised that it would be difficult to 
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draw close comparisons between the two series.’454 Furthermore, Ferguson wished 
to show that the longer families had been rehoused, the more their social and health 
outcomes would improve. Just as with Wilner, Ferguson examined a number of 
indicators of health and wellness. Much like Wilner, however, Ferguson was 
disappointed by what he perceived to be uninspiring study results. While Ferguson 
compared a number of outcomes (overcrowding, housekeeping allowance, infant 
mortality) between different families, it seemed that neither length of tenancy in 
social housing nor continued tenancy in slums created any disparity between 
outcomes. Yet a deeper analysis revealed that the data collected was not entirely 
indistinguishable. Specifically, Ferguson discovered an interesting characteristic of 
the impact of rehousing on infant mortality – the most valued health indicator for 
public health researchers. For after accounting for similarities between the mothers, 
i.e. by comparing infant mortality rates for mothers of the same age and with the 
same number of children (as opposed to comparing infant mortality rates for all 
mothers), Ferguson observed that rehoused mothers experienced a decline in infant 
mortality. Similarly, rehoused families who were not overcrowded experienced 
lower infant mortality than did families who were too numerous for the flats into 
which they had been rehoused. This was a significant study result: rehousing families 
with young mothers seemed to lessen the likelihood of infant mortality. The study 
had provided concrete evidence of the effectiveness of social housing’s ability to 
improve Glaswegian slum families’ health and welfare. The children of rehoused 
families fared better than those of slum families, even if other variables contributed 
to poor health and social outcomes. Furthermore, Ferguson had established a 
precedent that Wilner’s research would reinforce: the younger the tenant, the 
greater benefit rehousing would have on their health. 
 
Just as with his first study, Ferguson also described the qualities of the slums 
and social housing developments examined in the study. The social housing units 
were all built in 1927-1952, and the great majority were classified as being of ‘good’ 
condition. The average number of persons in rehoused families was higher than slum 
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families; 6.52 persons as opposed to 4.36 persons. Significantly, however, the 
average number of persons per room was less in the rehoused families, 2.03 persons 
as opposed to 2.52 persons. This data indicated that Glasgow Corporation preferred 
to select larger families for rehousing.455 This explains how smaller families in slum 
dwellings could experience a higher degree of crowding. Similarly, the Corporation 
expressed preference for tenants from less affluent backgrounds. The fathers of the 
rehoused families were disproportionately unskilled: of the 718 fathers, 73 (10.2%) 
were skilled, 143 (19.9%) were semi-skilled and 502 (69.9%) were unskilled. 
Furthermore, Ferguson noted that ‘the general level of health was higher among 
skilled and semi-skilled workers than among the unskilled,’ suggesting that from a 
health perspective, the lesser-skilled headed families were in much greater need of 
sanitary accommodation.456 This condition was complicated further by the fact that 
rehoused family fathers were much older on average: while 53% of slum families 
studied were headed by fathers over 40, a full 90% of rehoused families were 
headed by such fathers.457 Again, considering the conclusions of the first study, the 
longer families had resided in slum housing the greater the impact of slum housing 
on their socio-economic prospects. Furthermore, on account of their more advanced 
age, the paternal mortality rate was much higher in rehoused families. Conversely, 
slum family fathers were more likely to be classified as of ‘good’ health – although 
again this may have been primarily been due to their relative youth. All of these 
differences in family characteristics made Ferguson’s attempt at objective 
comparison more difficult, but the study nonetheless stimulated academic 
discussion on the relationship between housing and health.458 While the debate over 
the influence of the housing environment on tenant health continued long after the 
early 1950s, Ferguson’s survey helped illuminate a fundamental truth about the 
nature of Glasgow Corporation’s tenant selection policies and the impact of these 
policies on health. While all socioeconomic classes were represented in Glaswegian 
social housing, the Corporation preferred to admit families headed by low-income 
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workers; this resulted in a lowering of mortality rates in the most vulnerable families. 
This was undoubtedly a calculated approach undertaken by the Corporation to the 
disadvantage of more affluent slum dwelling families. While it was certainly true 
even in the 1940s and 1950s that some slum families would have eschewed social 
housing in the hopes of finding better private accommodation in the future, it is also 
likely true that many of these families would have benefited from rehousing – if only 
temporarily. Ferguson had not only highlighted the character of social housing 
tenant selection, but exposed the impact of Glaswegian housing policy on public 
health. 
 
 Yet as with the first study, other indicators besides mortality needed to be 
investigated. Ferguson examined rehoused families’ average amount of money 
available for housekeeping, and drew conclusions from this data on their health. 
While Ferguson admitted that housekeeping allowance was difficult to quantify, the 
study attempted to record weekly housekeeping allowance in relation to family size. 
As in the first study, the amount of money increased with family size, though not 
necessarily proportionately. The table below illustrates the difference in money 




‘Table 2: Money available for housekeeping (weekly) in relation to number of persons in household’ 
‘718 Slum Families’, Glasgow Medical Journal, p. 190. 
 
The relevance of housekeeping allowance to health and social outcomes was 
discussed at greater length in the second study. Ferguson referenced the work of 
Schultz, whose delineation of a ‘human needs diets’ for the period of study indicated 
that most of the families listed on the table had adequate income for food and other 
necessities.459 Ferguson noted however, that the study did not collect data on 
feeding habits, and furthermore speculated that some rehoused families may be 
driven back to the slums due to the strain of paying a higher percentage of income 
on rent.460 Yet while Ferguson later concluded that this speculation was unfounded, 
the study did reveal that the amount of money available for housekeeping was an 
indicator for child mortality. In households where weekly housekeeping allowance 
was less than 100s, 27% of children died before the completion of the study, in 
households with 100-139s weekly, 19% of children died, and in households with 140s 
weekly or more, 14% of children died.461 Other factors, such as household density 
and household size, contributed to these mortality rates. Ferguson had shown, 
however, that there was a correlation between household income and mortality in 
rehoused families.462 While Ferguson had provided novel research with his dissection 
of the health outcomes of rehoused families, a more fascinating issue had not been 
resolved. What remained to be answered was whether rehoused families or slum   
dwelling families enjoyed healthier lives. 
 
 Yet it was the comparison between slum families and rehoused families that 
made Ferguson’s second study so important. Above all other factors, social housing 
flats offered slum families a reprieve from overcrowding. Indeed, while social 
                                                 
459 Beginning in 1941, Schulz wrote papers half yearly detailing the minimum dietary needs of a family 
of five, based partly on the dietary outlines of Seebohm Rowntree expressed in his works Poverty and 
Progress and The Human Needs of Labour. For a detailed description of Schulz’s recommended 
minimum for 1952, See: T Schulz, Oxford Bulletin of Statistics, Vol. 14, No. 6 (February, 1952): 310-
324. 
 
460 Ferguson, ‘718 Slum Families’, p. 194.  
461 Figures exclude still-birth children.  
462 Ibid., p. 195.  
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housing flats were larger in size than slum flats, additionally, the Corporation tried to 
reduce person-per-room density by awarding larger flats to larger families. For 
example, while 65% of two roomed flats in the slums suffered a room density of 3 
persons per room or higher, only 47% of social housing flats suffered such a density. 
As crowding was less severe in social housing units, housing conditions were easier 
to maintain. According to Ferguson, 80% of two roomed social housing flats were 
assessed as being of ‘good’ condition, whereas only half of two room slum flats were 
assessed as such.463 The only benefits to living in slum housing seemed to be lower 
rents and a shorter distance between home and workplace. However, the practice of 
sitting down to a regular ‘family meal’ was no higher in the social housing flats. 
Again, despite the clear spatial and structural improvements, a more consequential 
benefit existed; rehoused families experienced was a significant decline in infant 
mortality. In a comparison of 52 pairs of mothers, thirteen between 30 and 34, 
twenty five between 35 and 39, and fourteen between 40 and 44, mothers in 
rehoused families suffered slightly fewer miscarriages and stillbirths, and suffered 
significantly fewer premature infant deaths. The table below presents the full data:  
 
Table 5: ‘Fifty-two mothers of the same age and with the same number of pregnancies living in old 
slum properties and in rehousing areas’, ‘718 Slum Families’, Glasgow Medical Journal, p. 201. 
 
                                                 
463 Ibid, p. 197. 
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As infant mortality was so much greater in the slum families, Ferguson declared that 
changes in purchasing power distribution and tenant selection policy had nullified 
the thesis of M’Gonigle. In 1936, George M’Gonigle, the MOH for Stockton-on-Tees, 
investigated recently rehoused low-income slum dwellers, and found that rehoused 
tenants had to reduce their expenditure on food to meet increased rents. 464 The 
results of the investigation proved sensational, and provided fodder for critics of 
social housing.465 Ferguson found that rehousing slum families in the early 1950s did 
not result in these families spending less money on food and necessities. Ergo, in the 
rehoused families examined there was no indication of increased infant mortality. 
The relationship between higher rents and lower food budgets that McGonigle and 
others articulated in the 1930s had likely been mitigated by the lower food costs and 
higher average wages of the post-War period. While early 1950s Scotland was not 
without its economic hardships, there was low unemployment and stable wage 
growth. While it was true that rehoused families were burdened with higher rents 
than their slum dwelling counterparts, the reduction in infant mortality showed that 
paying higher rents was not a poor bargain for social housing tenants. In Glasgow, 
there were real health benefits to living in social housing. Slum families who were 
lucky enough to be rehoused could not expect luxurious accommodation; they could 
however expect relief from the overcrowding, the provision of adequate amenities, 
and structural deficiencies that contributed to a higher incidence of infant mortality 
in slum dwelling families.466 Social housing, then, seemed the healthier option for all 
income-levels of tenants.  
 
 Yet the outcome of the study did not satisfy Ferguson. Despite the study data 
pointing to a real decline in infant mortality in rehoused families, Ferguson was 
                                                 
464G M’Gonigle and J Kirby, Poverty and Public Health (London: Gollancz, 1936), pp. 108-127; See: J 
Orr, Food, Health, and Income: Report on a Survey of Adequacy of Diet in Relation to Income (London: 
Macmillan, 1937); R Titmuss, Poverty and Population (London: Macmillan, 1938); Elizabeth Denby, 
‘Housing and Malnutrition’, Highway, No. 29 (1937): 114-115. 
465 ‘Review: Poverty and Public Health’, Town and Country Planning, Vol. 4, No. 16 (1936): 147. 
466 In several studies of twentieth century Glasgow, a rise in infant mortality coincided with increases 
in density in slum districts. See: Judah Rumney and Sara Shuman, A Study of the Social Effects of 
Public Housing in Newark, N.J. (Housing Authority of the City of Newark, NJ, 1944), p. 53. In Dublin, 
similarly degraded slum conditions produced an even higher infant mortality rate than Glasgow’s. 
See: Murray Fraser, John Bull’s Other Homes: State Housing and British Policy in Ireland, 1883-1922 
(Liverpool University Press, 1996), pp. 66-67. 
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disappointed that he did not discover more direct links between rehousing and 
improved health. Just as Wilner would feel ten years later, Ferguson hoped for 
dramatic evidence to point to social housing improving tenant health across a wide 
variety of health metrics. Ferguson hoped to show that living in social housing 
improved every facet of slum dwellers’ lives. Put simply, his study could not supply 
data to support such a conclusion. Regardless, Ferguson used the study results to 
bolster his positons on social housing. He lamented the lack of suitable social 
housing in Glasgow, and noted that ‘proportion of young tradesmen driven into the 
slums has risen of recent years’ and felt that every Scottish family deserved to enjoy 
the stability of social housing tenancy.467 Yet Ferguson also remained sceptical of the 
effectiveness of social housing in altering health or changing social behaviour. 
Adding with some prescience that adolescent delinquency continued in rehoused 
families (despite housing authorities’ efforts to target large families in part to 
extinguish this very issue), Ferguson wondered openly if slum behaviours could ever 
be mitigated through rehousing. Referring to James Russell’s work published almost 
a century prior, Ferguson revealed his support of the idea that habits cultivated in 
the slum would take generations to undue. Indeed, after the publication of these 
studies he turned his attention almost entirely to juvenile delinquency. On this point, 
Ferguson ended his study with the following declaration on the limitations of 
rehousing:  
It is abundantly clear that many rehoused families require a great deal of help and 
encouragement to make the transition from the slums to a new life: this study shows again 
that the eradication of slum sickness does not come with the mere erection of new 
houses.468 
 
With this final proclamation, Ferguson offered a significant caveat to his study 
results. Rehousing slum families into social housing in Glasgow facilitated a decline in 
infant mortality, but it could not relieve slum families of the anti-social behaviours 
that plagued their communities.  
                                                 






 The latter half of the twentieth century posed interesting challenges to 
housing authorities and public health professionals. The debate over whether social 
housing was to be built at all had been settled. The questions of where social 
housing should be located, and more importantly who should be admitted into social 
housing were not yet settled, and indeed would continue to vex housing 
professionals throughout the twentieth century. Arguments over the minutiae of 
tenant selection policy troubled not just Glaswegian and Baltimorean municipal 
authorities however – this debate involved the input of academics, real-estate 
interests, and prospective tenants. As subsequent investigations into social housing 
on both sides of the Atlantic revealed – tenant allocation played a significant role in 
defining social housing environments. Yet while all parties involved recognized the 
importance of tenet allocation – the attention paid towards this process seemed to 
repudiate a main houser claim: that the rehousing of slum families into social 
housing could alter their condition. More specifically, many housers had claimed that 
rehousing working-class families into social housing would improve their 
health.  City-level public health improvement coincided with social housing 
developments in each city (ecological evidence). This was not a totally unfounded 
assertion. At the end of the Second World War, implementers and experts at the 
time thought that social housing would improve health. The American Journal of 
Public Health had issued its ‘Basic Principles of Healthful Housing’ in 1941 and 
advocated social housing as the best method to correct the deficiencies of the slums. 
Additionally, in the years leading up to 1964, city-level public health improvement 
coincided with the construction of social housing developments in both cities. 
Furthermore, early studies showed relatively better health for residents who had 
recently moved into social housing. Rumney and Shuman had found that rehousing 
Newark slum dwellers into social housing resulted in improved health and social 
outcomes. Yet as this chapter has revealed, public health professionals were still 
intrigued by the prospect of health-restorative housing, and sought to investigate 
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whether social housing had as direct an impact on tenant health as many claimed. In 
Baltimore, Daniel Wilner examined whether rehousing slum dwellers would improve 
mortality and morbidity rates, and in Glasgow Thomas Ferguson investigated the 
same question. In neither Baltimore nor Glasgow did rehousing slum dwellers result 
in a marked reduction in mortality and morbidity rates. Such results were indeed 
disappointing, and many social housing detractors later pointed to these and similar 
studies to bolster their claim that social housing was a wasteful expenditure. Yet 
both Wilner and Ferguson both discovered that social housing did not have an 
inconsequential effect on tenant health. Wilner discovered that while older slum 
dwellers did not experience many improvements in personal health, younger 
persons responded better to their new environments. In particular, young children 
who were rehoused enjoyed much better chances at normal school progression than 
their slum dwelling peers. In Glasgow, Ferguson encountered a similar phenomenon: 
rehousing had a much greater impact on the health of young people. Specifically, 
while rehoused Glaswegian fathers did not record any marked improvements in 
health, infant mortality increased significantly in rehoused families. Thus, while the 
Wilner and Ferguson studies did not prove that rehousing slum families improved 
upon every aspect of their lives, they did show that social housing did have a positive 
impact on tenant health. Whether or not social housing developments in Glasgow 
and Baltimore retained this quality in later decades, however, is the subject for the 
next chapters.  
 
Chapter 6: The Politics of Social Housing, 1964-1980 
 
The years leading up to 1980 were momentous for social housing 
developments in both Glasgow and Baltimore, if only because the housing form had 
become embedded in the urban fabric of both cities. In the United States, Lyndon 
Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 after less than a year in office. The Act 
proclaimed any and all discrimination based on race, creed, or sex illegal. One of the 
main impetuses of the legislation was to extinguish institutional racial housing 
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segregation, particularly in the South, which had persisted despite previous legal 
injunctions ordering desegregation (Brown vs. Board). In Baltimore, racial 
segregation in social housing had been illegal since 1954. This decision in turn, 
however, prompted White flight from city projects and indeed the city proper to the 
suburbs. As more Whites fled mixed-race areas for the suburbs or White enclaves 
within the city, racial segregation in some ways became more entrenched in the 
1960s than it had been in the years following 1945. As social housing in Baltimore 
increasingly fulfilled the stereotype of ‘Black housing’, the problems that befell the 
city’s housing projects worsened and worsened. The city’s remaining White social 
housing tenants grew concerned over racial integration – even those who had 
previously felt unperturbed by the prospect. In a 1957 interview with outgoing 
residents of Baltimore’s Latrobe Homes and Perkins Homes, over three quarters of 
interviewees from both developments responded negatively about having Black 
neighbours. Furthermore, over a third of Latrobe residents and over a quarter of 
Perkins residents confirmed that the presence of Blacks provided an impetus to 
move out of social housing.469 This report would prove remarkably prescient, for by 
the mid 1960s more than four fifths of Baltimore social housing tenants were Black. 
While this demographic transition can be viewed as a boon for Baltimore’s Black 
community, the Housing Authority of Baltimore City (HABC) and other municipal 
agencies would find in the following decades that it was difficult to handle the 
challenges of managing such a concentration of a socially and economically deprived 
minority community.  
 
 In Glasgow, while social housing had come to dominate the landscape of the 
urban periphery, housers faced obstacles during this period as well despite 
continued expansion. By 1964, Glasgow Corporation had demolished 32,000 slum 
dwellings and moved their inhabitants to the peripheral estates. Such a massive 
undertaking was bound to unnerve some Glaswegians. Many were distressed that 
the city was being effectively hollowed out; population decantation to the new 
towns located outwith Glasgow remained a popular option with the Scottish Office 
                                                 
469 BURHA, ‘Attitudes Towards Integration’, Why Eligible Families Leave Public Housing (Baltimore, 
MD: HABC, 1957), p. 54. 
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until the early 1970s. By this time, nearly 200,000 people had been moved to these 
new towns, accounting for almost a fifth of Glasgow’s 1951 census recorded 
population of nearly 1.1 million.470 Regardless, by the early 1970s, the city had 
become the largest landlord in the United Kingdom. Glasgow Corporation owned 
nearly 170,000 houses in the city, or 56% of the city’s entire housing stock.471 
Despite this growth, problems ensued in Glasgow’s social housing developments just 
as in Baltimore’s projects. The 1971 census of population showed that for the first 
time, Glasgow’s highest levels of unemployment had shifted from the inner city to 
the social housing estates on the city’s fringes.472 By the early 1970s, even the most 
optimistic supporters of social housing were concerned that they had evolved into 
the ‘new slums’.473 Clearly, while social housing construction expanded precipitously 
during the 1960s and 1970s, the problems that precipitated their transformation 
into the ‘new slums’ reared their ugly heads during this period. Social housing in 
Glasgow and Baltimore was here to stay – but its newly earned patina of social oasis 
had already begun to tarnish.  
 
 Yet even with the increase of liveability problems associated with social 
housing, in many ways it was during the post 1964 period that social housing 
developments took the shape that the housers of the 1930s and 1940s had always 
envisioned. In Glasgow, the Scottish economy was strong enough to support the 
construction of high-rise tower blocks, and an unbridled enthusiasm for a ‘new 
Scotland’ mitigated the post-War worries over neighbourhood breakup.474 Although 
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these high-rise tower blocks would also come under fierce criticism in the 1970s, 
after their arrival they were lauded as icons of modernity for Glasgow. In Baltimore, 
changing municipal demographics and civil rights legislation had empowered Blacks 
more than they had ever been, and federal funding for social housing developments 
(coupled with municipal funding for slum clearance) allowed for more slum residents 
to become social housing tenants. Additionally, alternatives to social housing, mainly 
efforts that fit under the broad umbrella of ‘urban renewal’, grew in popularity 
during the period.  In Glasgow, the traditional focus on slum clearance gave way to 
the focus on private housing stock refurbishment (i.e. the restoration of 
overcrowded tenements rather than their demolition). New community based 
advocacy organizations known as housing associations sprang up to promote the 
restoration of tenement blocks to preserve community ties.475 From 1976-1987, the 
Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal (GEAR) programme sought to shift housing policy 
from slum clearance to slum regeneration. Similar to the Springburn renewal 
programme of the 1960s, GEAR influenced Glaswegian housing policy in the late 
1970s. In part, GEAR lessened enthusiasm for social housing; alternative forms of 
low-income housing only grew in popularity in Scotland after the 1980s. In 
Baltimore, social housing evolved fully into a safe-haven for working-class and poor 
Black families. Additionally, Baltimore’s housing projects offered respite for special 
needs tenants, especially the elderly and large families. The various urban renewal 
programmes following the Housing Act of 1954 cultivated an air of urban 
transformation that saved the city from even more severe population flight. While 
social housing began to draw fiercer criticism during the 1970s in Baltimore, social 
housing construction accelerated during the decade. This is in contrast to Glasgow, 
where construction pace decelerated. A review of the maturation of social housing 
policy and construction in the 1960s and 1970s in both cities should provide enough 
background to understand their eventual decline. Furthermore, this chapter should 
provide context for an evaluation of the public health impact of social housing in 
these decades in the following chapter.  
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Expansion in Glasgow and the Hutchesontown Case Study, 1960-1970: 
 
By the early 1960s, social housing’s impact on Glasgow’s urban geography 
was already apparent. The four peripheral developments of Drumchapel, 
Easterhouse, Castlemilk, and Pollok had already been established, and though 
construction would continue in these areas into the later years of the decade, by the 
1960s these developments had already taken form. While the peripheral schemes 
constituted the most populous social housing developments, through slum clearance 
programmes much of Glasgow’s most dilapidated tenements would be replaced by 
social housing.476 The Comprehensive Development Area (CDA) strategy, an idea that 
originated in the early 1940s but did not materialize until 1957, contributed to much 
of the slum clearance and social housing redevelopment efforts in the city centre. 
While this strategy ultimately subsided in importance compared to other 
redevelopment programmes (the last CDA, Woodside, was named in 1964), Glasgow 
Corporation continued to invest money in designated CDAs until 1977.477 Yet while 
the Corporation was enthusiastic about the CDA strategy, the strategy did not 
escape criticism. Later critics lambasted municipal authorities for cultivating 
environments without sufficient amenities, and city architect AG Jury predicted 
(correctly) that the CDA strategy would displace far more persons in an area than 
rehouse them. 478 This criticism was levelled despite a reported agreement that: 
 
Business in buildings retained in the area will not be displaced by the corporation, and that 
provision will be made, as far as practicable for those displaced to have accommodation 
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either in the area as redeveloped, in an appropriately zoned area in the city, or in an overspill 
area.479 
 
Even later critics pointed to the social degradation present in newer schemes.  
Regardless, the CDA strategy was an effective tool of deceleration against population 
overspill. Furthermore, the CDAs were optimal for experimentation with high-rise 
social housing in Glasgow in the 1960s.480 Unfortunately, the CDAs themselves would 
descend into the ‘new slums’ in the coming years, and many prospective sites were 
cancelled due to the failures of existing CDAs.481 
 
Yet while the CDA strategy was meant to be a practical solution to housing 
shortages in the city, the strategy was rooted in fear rather than hope. Glasgow 
municipal officials were becoming wary of population overspill into the new towns 
outside of the city, and saw CDAs as keeping slum dwellers in the city. Their concerns 
were not without merit - the city’s population declined from 1,055,017 in 1961 to 
825,668 in 1975, a reduction of over 20%.482 Even the peripheral estates, which were 
a compromise from the Abercrombie era to retain rehoused families within the city 
borders, seemed to dampen the city’s power and prestige.483  Put simply, the 
Corporation wanted to retain control over Britain’s ‘second city’, not it’s it third or 
fourth. Furthermore, city officials were frustrated by the relatively slow construction 
pace of new houses. Indeed, even as late as 1958, Glasgow Corporation had a 
waiting list of 100,000 families for social housing, and the Glasgow MOH had 
decreed that 30 percent of existing housing stock was either: totally unfit, 
unacceptable, or incapable of improvement.484 In 1957, the Secretary of State for 
Scotland John Maclay approved the city’s first CDA. The first areas chosen for urban 
redevelopment were Hutchesontown-Gorbals, Govan, Townhead, and Royston. 
Hutchesontown-Gorbals, on the south side of the city, was by far the most deprived 
                                                 
479 ‘New Gorbals Plan Goes to Minister’, Glasgow Herald, 16/04/1965, p. 4. 
480 ‘Returning to the Rural Roots’, Glasgow Herald, 30/10/1986, p. 25. 
481 Tan, ‘Palimpsests’, p. 348. 
482 Thomas Markus, ‘Comprehensive Development and Housing, 1945-1975’, Glasgow: The Forming of 
a City (Edinburgh University Press, 1993), ed. Peter Reed, p. 160. 
483 Owen Hatherly, A New Kind of Bleak: Journeys Through Urban Britain (London: Verso, 2012), pp. 
296-299. 
484 Slaven, Development of the West of Scotland, p. 253. 
 228 
area of the four, and was thus selected to be the first CDA. Even the name ‘Gorbals’ 
reflected its deprivation; a newspaper article reported that the name itself made 
‘many Scots shudder’.485 Furthermore, municipal authorities intended that the two 
smaller neighbourhoods of Laurieston and Hutchesontown, which comprised the 
Gorbals, would ultimately replace the Gorbals as a geographic identifier. This was an 
ironic hope, as the Gorbals existed before Glasgow.486 Although the name Gorbals 
never disappeared from the Glaswegian dialect, the name ‘Hutchesontown’ did take 
on a special significance. For due to the extreme slum clearance and rebuilding 
efforts in Hutchesontown, the area would become synonymous with both planners’ 
ebullient attitude toward social housing in the 1960s and the problems that later 
befell the schemes in the 1970s. Although there was initially much fan-fare for the 
redevelopment efforts, much of the ‘Hutchie’ flats would ultimately end 
ignominiously. Some of the buildings lasted less than twenty years before 
condemnation and subsequent demolition.487 Never-the-less, the Hutchesontown 
social housing schemes represented both the highest aspirations and the practical 
limitations of urban planning in Glasgow, and thus warrant analysis.  
 
 
Basil Spence’s vision for Hutchesontown-C development, 1959, Photo Courtesy: Royal 
Commission on the Ancient and Historical Monuments of Scotland, Item SC 358382 
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 The greater Hutchesontown CDA was a massive endeavour. It entailed a 
combination of slum clearance, urban regeneration, and social housing construction. 
As the first comprehensive CDA, the Hutchesontown flats were a kind of proving 
ground for innovative social housing designs throughout the city. The Corporation 
divided the designated 111acres on the city’s south side into five parcels (areas A-E). 
Each parcel was allotted to a different architect to showcase different social housing 
designs. Although there were a multitude of housing designs implemented, the 
Hutchesontown area came to be defined by high-rise flats. The first area, 
Hutchesontown-A, was the least controversial. Located on the northern side of the 
neighbourhood, the construction contracts were awarded to Wimpey builders, who 
by the early 1960s had already become prominent social housing builders in 
Scotland. Given the firm’s success with more traditional architectural forms in the 
peripheral estates, Wimpey chose to build low-rise maisonettes to replace the 
existing slums in area A. Similarly, Area D was later filled primarily with lower-rise 
buildings, though Area D was nonetheless considered innovative for being 
constructed with direct labour though the newly formed Scottish Special Housing 
Association. The area was characterized by four 24-storey blocks, a few smaller 
maisonettes, and a few mid-rise 8-storey buildings. By 2004, two of the towers had 
been demolished while two were refurbished; the smaller dwellings still stand. 
However, the more innovative schemes, and consequently more controversial 
schemes, were area B and C. In 1964, the Corporation awarded these two areas to 
two different private architectural firms. The city awarded area B to Robert 
Matthews, while area C was awarded to Sir Basil Spence. Although both 
developments were celebrated initially, area B and C suffered entirely different 
fates: while Matthews’ developments have survived into the twenty first century, 
Spence’s developments were demolished by the early 1990s. Only Area E, 
affectionately known as ‘Hutchie-E’, experienced a still more sordid existence and 
demise.488 
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Areas A and B, with C and D under construction, 1965, Photo Courtesy: Royal Commission on 
the Ancient and Historical Monuments of Scotland, Item SC 676678 
 
In the Hutchesontown-B development, Robert Matthew decided upon a 
mixed development strategy of high-rise towers and lower blocks. Matthew 
designed four 17-storey towers along with a smattering of lower storey tenements, 
developments that came to define the ‘new Gorbals’.489  Glasgow had long suffered 
population decline due to decantation to new towns outwith the city boundary, but 
there was still a shortage of available land for housing development. High-rise 
towers were viewed as a solution to the problems of space and cost concerns, albeit 
architectural critics noted that except for a few exceptions most high-rise 
developments did not use less land or cost less.490  Furthermore, high-rises were 
much more expensive investments; in addition to the higher construction costs 
(labour, cranes, reinforced concrete), maintenance costs were far higher, lifts 
needed to be installed and maintained regularly, insulation needed to be replaced 
(although with unexpected frequency), and vandalism needed to be extirpated. 
Thus, while high-rise towers were initially met with enthusiasm, the problems 
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associated with living in these buildings were realized quickly by tenants.491 Despite 
many tenants’ trepidation towards living in high-rises, construction of high-rise social 
housing continued en masse until 1978, well after the Housing Act of 1967 rescinded 
public subsidy for high-rise development.492 Additionally, this circumspection of high-
rises was exacerbated by the accidental gas explosion in Ronan Point, a tower-block 
in East London in 1968.493 Yet high-rise social housing had not yet reached its zenith 
in Glasgow; indeed the Matthew’s Area B still stands and is considered one of the 
most successful social housing developments in the city. But while Robert Matthews 
would leave Glasgow to take a planning position in London, there was another 
prolific Scottish architect who left his mark on the Hutchesontown-Gorbals CDA. Sir 
Basil Spence would design area C, and while Spence was celebrated even more than 
Matthew at the time of construction, his high-rise designs came to embody every 
single problem associated with Glaswegian social housing.   
 
 
View of Area B from west, Photo Courtesy: Royal Commission on the Ancient and Historical 
Monuments of Scotland, Item SC 676551 
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Although both Spence and Matthews had been awarded their land 
allotments by the Department of Health for Scotland in 1958, the Hutchesontown-C 
flats were not ready for occupation until 1965. It took three years for construction to 
begin, and even after Queen Elizabeth laid a commemorative stone on the building 
site in June of 1961, it took four more years for the flats to open.494 The slow pace of 
construction was particularly conspicuous; while construction on Area A and Area C 
started around the same time, Wimpey Builders completed development in their 
area by early 1961. Additionally, the Corporation gave Spence considerable artistic 
leeway. While the Scottish Office normally demanded that the construction costs of 
individual flats not exceed £2,800, Spence was allowed to exceed this price. Even 
David Gibson, the fiery chief of the Corporation’s Housing Sub-Committee agreed to 
suspend the city’s usual expectations of speed and output, in order to accommodate 
the CDA’s flagship development.495 Yet this special treatment did not preclude any 
kind of suspicion of Spence. Many Britons were mortified by his ultra-modern 
Coventry Cathedral, which debuted in 1960, though Spence earned respect in his 
native Scotland for being chosen among all architects to design such an important 
symbol of British perseverance.496 Furthermore, a 1962 editorial in the Glasgow 
Herald detailed Scottish local authorities’ difficulties in dealing with grandiose 
architects like Spence: 
 
The problem for local authorities… is one of balance – between the development companies 
some of whom possess valuable and perhaps unique experience of the problems of urban 
redevelopment, and the architects whose contribution to successful development may be 
very great indeed but who may not always be the best judges of how a particular site should 
be used.497 
 
Despite objections, construction on Area C commenced in May of 1961. 498 Spence 
contracted the noted London based construction firm of Holland, Hannen and 
Cubitts to carry out his designs, which lent credence to the grand expectations for his 
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design.499 In particular, architectural commentators were impressed with the firm’s 
use of highly mechanized equipment and prefabricated materials.500 
 
 
Hutchesontown C under construction with tenements in foreground, 1961, Photo Courtesy: 
Royal Commission on the Ancient and Historical Monuments of Scotland, Item SC 681261. 
 
From the outset, Spence’s vision was clear: to imitate French architect Le 
Corbusier. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Le Corbusier developed a modernist 
style that he called Unite d’Habitation (‘Housing Unit’) which emphasized utility and 
spaciousness. Le Corbusier built many multi-storey tower blocks out of reinforced 
concrete (as steel became an expensive commodity in post-War Europe), and Spence 
drew his inspiration for Area C from these blocks. After considering a number of 
different designs for Area C – Spence settled on two twenty-storey towers, 
containing a total of 400 housing units for 1280 people. Of particular note were the 
development’s ‘hanging gardens’, as Spence called them, or suspended patios. The 
idea of providing each flat with a patio was to stimulate the community spirit of the 
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Gorbals – each family could chat and socialize with other families from their 
respective patios, in theory lending a suburban feeling to the development. Once the 
flats were completed, there was great fanfare initially, and enthusiasm for the 
‘hanging gardens’ concept. It did not take long, however, for the development to fall 
into disrepair, and for the design faults to reveal themselves. Glasgow’s unforgiving 
weather, coupled with the construction firm’s cut corners, exacerbated the 
development’s decline. The flats were damp, mouldy, and without adequate 
ventilation. The open balconies, while meant to be the development’s main 
attraction, made the flats difficult (and thus expensive) to heat. Some authors have 
even suggested that the Area C towers were worse for tenant health than the 
nineteenth century tenements they replaced.501 Ironically, even when the flats were 
demolished in 1994, they were injurious to health: debris from the explosion killed 
one viewer.502 Thus, Hutchesontown-C, despite its grandiose aims, had an 
inauspicious existence with an equivalently inglorious destruction. Only Area E 
suffered a shorter life span, though it did not enjoy as much infamy as Area C.503  
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Facade of Area C from, 1964, Photo Courtesy: Royal Commission on the Ancient and Historical 
Monuments of Scotland, Item SC 1052317. 
 
In 1969, work began on the Hutchesontown-E development, a series of 
tower-blocks also meant to showcase a grand Corbusian design for Glasgow. The 
towers were constructed with a prefabrication technique designed by a Franco-
Algerian construction firm.504 Opened officially by Queen Elizabeth in 1972, the flats 
only lasted fourteen years before being vacated in 1986, and were demolished 
entirely in 1987.505 The general public viewed the development as a complete 
failure, and reflective of housers’ overly grandiose vision for social housing.506 The 
‘Hutchie-E’ flats closed due to problems with damp, mould, and poor ventilation, 
mostly due to the Franco-Algerian firm’s unfamiliarity with the Scottish climate. The 
materials used to construct the flats were so porous the walls allowed wind and rain 
to permeate into them. 507 Clearly there were good justifications for the 
development’s quick demolition.  
 
While there was not a Baltimorean social housing development that was 
demolished as quickly, the conspicuously short existence of Area E draws 
comparison to the Pruitt-Igoe social housing development in St. Louis, Missouri. The 
Pruitt-Igoe project, similar to the Hutchesontown schemes, was a much anticipated 
social housing development. Yet the social environment of Pruitt-Igoe descended 
into chaos so quickly that the project was only inhabited from 1954 to 1968, and was 
demolished in 1971.508 The project, one of the United States’ most infamous housing 
projects, came to symbolize the all the problems associated with modernist 
architecture, urban redevelopment, and the concentration of poverty.509 Similarly, 
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with the quick decline of ‘Hutchie-E’, ordinary Glaswegians were beginning to 
understand what social scientists had only just discovered: that social housing 
tenancy did not guarantee healthy living. 
 
 
A seven storey block in Area E in disrepair shortly before demolition, 1986, Photo Courtesy: 
Royal Commission on the Ancient and Historical Monuments of Scotland, Item SC 883892 
 
While the Hutchesontown flats were not the only social housing units to 
endure mixed results, they were the first implementation of the CDA strategy, and 
were constructed under the greatest of expectations. The failure of the 
Hutchesontown flats (as well as other schemes), however, was not just dependent 
on structural deficiencies in construction or the perennial admission of riskier 
tenants. Much of the blame for the problems that arose in Glasgow’s social housing 
schemes in the 1960s and 1970s can be attributed to municipal politicians’ bungling 
of urban planning. To wit, most of Area D, built with direct labour by the Scottish 
Special Housing Association, remains today while much of the other area schemes 
were demolished. While Glasgow’s social housing developments were paved with 
good intentions, the Corporation and the Scottish Special Housing Association (SSHA) 
were overwhelmed with the responsibility of housing so many tenants. It would take 
especially dedicated agents to cultivate healthy environments in Glaswegian social 
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housing developments. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, progressive municipal 
housing figures and private housing authorities collaborated to ensure that working-
class Glaswegians had access to sanitary and safe houses. Their dedication and 
combined effort helped alleviate some of the social problems that befell the city’s 
social housing communities in these years. 
 
The political climate of Britain during the 1960s and 1970s was capricious. 
Britain in the 1960s saw two Conservative governments followed by one Labour 
government, and in the 1970s saw one Conservative government followed by two 
Labour governments. Harold MacMillan had become Conservative leader by in the 
late 1950s by criticizing the former Atlee led Labour government’s slow building pace 
of social housing, promising famously to deliver 10,000 houses a year. This proved 
appealing, and once Prime Minister he delivered what he promised. However, the 
renewed construction pace was not fast enough to satisfy Glasgow’s housing 
advocates. Glasgow’s municipal authorities believed that in order to usher in an era 
of housing modernity, the city government would have to be more proactive and 
vociferous in their support of social housing construction. Glasgow Corporation’s 
housing committee convenor, David Gibson, epitomized this renewed sense of 
urgency in housing matters in the early 1960s. His comments on the importance of 
social housing for Glaswegians, and in particular his endorsement of the high-rise 
tower block style development, were emblematic of the political temperament on 





A model of three 23-storey flats proposed for the Woodside development in the 
North end of the city. Glasgow Herald, 07/05/1963, p. 16. 
 
In 1961, Glasgow Corporation selected Bailie David Gibson to be convenor of 
the committee’s housing committee. Although not wielding as much power or 
influence as New York’s near mystical planner Robert Moses (or even Leeds’ housing 
committee chairman, Karl Cohen), Gibson became the prime champion of ‘building 
up’ during the early 1960s in Glasgow.510 Gibson was so enthused with the issue of 
housing that he even declined a nomination to run in a Parliamentary by-election for 
the Bridgeton division of Glasgow as he reported that he would feel guilty 
abandoning his housing post so quickly, and that he thought he should contribute to 
ridding Glasgow of its ‘housing shame.’511 Although not trained as a planner or an 
architect, Gibson was completely convinced by the modernist vision of ‘houses in the 
sky’; the answer to Glasgow’s housing shortage was to build ‘up’ on land previously 
found undesirable.512 In an official address as housing convenor, Gibson remarked 
that: 
 
In the next three years the skyline of Glasgow will become a more attractive on to me 
because of the likely vision of multi-storey houses rises by the thousand... The prospect will 
be thrilling, I am certain, to the many thousands who are still yearning for a home. It may 
appear on occasion that I would offend against all good planning principles, against open 
space and Green Belt principles – if I offend against these it is only in seeking to avoid the 
continuing and unpardonable offence that bad housing commits against human dignity. A 
decent home is the cradle of the infant, the seminar of the young and the refuge of the 
aged.513 
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Councillor David Gibson (left) and George Bowie, Chief Architect of Crudens, Ltd, inspect a 
model of a proposed extension to a scheme. Photo Courtesy: Miles Horsey, Tenements & 
Towers: Glasgow Working-Class Housing 1890-1990 (Edinburgh: Royal Commission on the 
Ancient and Historical Monuments of Scotland, 1990), p. 44. 
 
His remarks proved somewhat prophetic. Not only did high-rise tower blocks 
predominate in social housing construction during the decade, but conventional 
urban planners, who previously endorsed population decantation, would soon 
endorse centre city redevelopment over population overspill. Yet Gibson’s oratory 
prowess did not convince every Scottish politician of the merits of inner-city 
redevelopment. In 1963, Willie Ross, the Labour MP for Kilmarnock who would later 
serve as Secretary of State for Scotland during the prime ministerships of Harold 
Wilson, argued that the only way to alleviate Glasgow’s slums was through a 
dramatic expansion of the new town programme. The Glasgow Herald reported Ross 
as remarking that: 
 
One could not, he said, expect 100 years of the worst industrial slums to be dealt with in the 
normal way of a small town getting subsidies to build houses. The Glasgow problem was a 
challenge to the whole country and could only be met with new towns spread throughout 
Scotland. It was ridiculous, he said, to fix a small area with an overspill.514 
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In some ways, Willie Ross got his wish. The new towns of Irvine and Livingston were 
both built in the 1960s, and Cumbernauld was expanded to receive more residents in 
1973. But Cumbernauld’s expansion in March of 1973 would be the last hurrah for 
overspill advocates: just three months later in July of 1973 the proposed new town 
of Stonehouse was shelved due to popular opposition. Later, several Glasgow 
municipal agencies joined forces with the Scottish Office on a massive centre city 
redevelopment scheme called G.E.A.R (Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal). Though 
David Gibson would die young in 1964, his efforts to promote high-rise development 
came into fruition. What he could not have predicted, however, was just how much 
the new high-rise social housing developments would come to resemble the old 
slums they replaced. While the intentions of slum clearance and tower block 
enthusiasts can be sympathized with, it remains true that much of Glasgow’s social 
housing developments devolved into insalubrious, unhealthy environments in the 
1960s and 1970s. The problems associated with high-rise social housing would only 
worsen in the 1970s, and though Glasgow municipal authorities would make earnest 
attempts to rectify these social and structural ills, they were largely unsuccessful in 
improving the public image of the high-rise. This was especially true by the 1980s, 
when the Thatcher government’s policy of the ‘right-to-buy’ disrupted social housing 
policy throughout Britain. Similarly, in Baltimore, the problems of poverty, crime, 
and social deprivation began to overwhelm social housing. While there would never 
be a ‘right-to-buy’ scheme in Baltimore, the problems associated with social housing 
were both apparent earlier and more severe in the charm city. With increasing 
speed, the city’s projects were evolving into inharmonious concentrations of at-risk 
tenants. An examination of the problems Baltimore’s housing authorities had in 
building social housing, in addition to managing the changing tenant demographics, 
should prove illuminating.  
 
Social Housing in Baltimore, 1960-1970: 
 
 The city of Baltimore underwent an extraordinary transition in the 1960s and 
1970s independent of the expansion of social housing. Very quickly, Baltimore 
 241 
became a majority Black city.515 Although the 1980 Census was the first to declare 
city majority Black, indicators of Baltimore’s demographic transition occurred much 
earlier: the public schools became majority Black in 1960 (though this development 
was partly due to White parents withdrawing their children from public schools).516 
The demographic trend of Whites leaving the city and Blacks increasing in both 
numbers and percentage had continued unabated since 1943, and in 1959 Black 
births accounted for 47.5% of all births, almost double the 1940 percentage.517 Yet 
despite these trends, by 1960 the housing shortage for Black occupancy had 
worsened, not improved. For although the residential areas considered socially 
acceptable for Black occupancy were expanding, they were not expanding fast 
enough to keep up with population growth. Black Southern migrants continued to 
stream into the city until the mid 1970s, further straining the available housing. 
While less than a quarter of the city’s population was Black in 1950, by 1960 nearly a 
third of residents were Black. As the map below illustrates, Black neighbourhoods 
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“Public Housing and Areas of Minority Concentration, 1960”, Map Courtesy: Applied Population 
Laboratory, University of Wisconsin- Madison. 
 
Furthermore, due to legal and social restraints on Black residential expansion, 
competition for existing housing available to Blacks increased rental prices. This 
forced Black Baltimoreans to spend an even higher share of their income on housing, 
pushing more and more Blacks into the ‘house poor’ category. For instance, while 
only 28% of Black Baltimoreans were lucky enough to spend under one fifth of their 
income on rent, half of Whites were so fortunate.518 Furthermore, the city’s private 
housing stock was ill-equipped to handle multi-occupancy living. While Glasgow’s 
tenement blocks were easily (if haphazardly) subdivided into smaller flats, 
Baltimore’s two storey rowhouses were difficult to convert into multi-family housing 
units.519 This reality did not preclude rowhouses from being made down into flats, 
however. Furthermore, this process created less incentive for real estate interests to 
build new multi-family housing units. By 1960, more than half of all of the city’s 
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houses were built before 1920, with many of those houses built well before 1900.520 
Additionally, the combined efforts of slumlords, blockbusters, lacklustre housing 
code enforcers (despite a new Housing Court and the second Baltimore Plan’s 
national attention), and slovenly tenants contributed to Baltimorean housing 
decrepitude. In the words of one report: ‘Every day these four factors –age, 
obsolescence, slum landlords, careless tenants- are working together to create 
greater blight in Baltimore – blight that is costly in dollars, in health, in safety, in 
morale.’521 Furthermore, very little of the new housing that was built in Baltimore in 
the years up to 1960 was built explicitly for Black occupancy (excluding social 
housing), which made neighbourhood expansion more difficult.522 Even higher 
income Blacks had difficulty attaining suitable housing. A 1971 newspaper article 
chronicled a Black doctor’s struggle to rent an upscale apartment in the suburban 
Cheswolde neighbourhood, a White neighbourhood in the transitioning northwest.  
The couple were denied tenancy repeatedly (ostensibly due to a lack of available 
apartments), though later White applicants managed to secure tenancy. Ironically, 
Walter Gans and Frederick Scheiman, the landlords of the building, were Jews – and 
were thus still prohibited by housing covenants from living in the nearby upscale 
neighbourhoods of Roland Park and Guilford.523 Put simply, the city’s private housing 
stock did not provide an environment conducive to happy and healthy living for 
Black Baltimoreans – social housing units, when available, were especially attractive 
for Black city residents.  
 
Given the limitations of private housing in the city for Blacks, it is not 
surprising that Black community leaders advocated for more social housing projects 
as a civil right. During the 1960s, the Afro-American newspaper was a keen supporter 
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of social housing expansion in the city. A 1963 article anticipated the near 
completion of the Murphy Homes, the first new social housing project built in the 
decade (though an extension had been built on the Westport Homes in 1960). 
Murphy Homes was also the first high-rise development since 1956, when the 
Lafayette (February), Lexington (April), and Flag House (May) were all constructed. 
Named after George B. Murphy, a Black educator and board member of the Afro-
American, the project would be completed in November of that year and its units 
were intended to ‘serve as an important source for the relocation of those families 
eligible for public housing’ who would be displaced by an urban renewal projects.524 
This statement can be read somewhat euphemistically, as the Murphy Homes were 
the intended product of urban renewal, which displaced far more Black residents 
than it rehoused. Furthermore, the Murphy Homes were only for elderly residency, 
and thus would include a considerable amount of White tenants.525 Despite the 
relatively limited focus of Murphy Homes, Baltimore’s Black community was 
enthused about the continued construction of social housing projects in the city 
generally, and found social housing to have a positive impact on Black Baltimoreans’ 
lives. Yet after 1954, prospective Black tenants did not need to wait for the 
construction of new projects: all social housing units in the city were available for 
Black occupancy.  
 
Indeed, while the Afro-American celebrated new projects, the more 
significant development in social housing was not an expansion of units but the 
demographic transition in existing units during the 1960s. For it was during this 
decade that nearly all projects in Baltimore became uniformly occupied by Black 
tenants. With the exception of three projects on the city’s periphery (Brooklyn, 
O’Donnell Heights, and Claremont), White tenancy in Baltimorean social housing 
past 1970 was negligible. This transformation was due to a number of factors. The 
HABC’s 1954 decision to stop segregating tenants by race, following the Supreme 
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Court’s Brown v. Board decision of the same year, was certainly a catalyst for White 
flight from social housing. As the map above illustrates, by 1964 the majority of 
social housing projects in the city had become at least 90% Black occupied. However, 
while demand for social housing lessened among Whites due to integration, it was 
also true that municipal housing authorities began to focus more attention towards 
the needs of Black Baltimoreans. Put simply, the HABC came to accept its role as a 
socially conscious landlord for Black residents. Social housing advocates were 
sensitive to this new role as early as 1960; an Afro-American article quoted George 
Constable, the president of the Health and Welfare Council (HWC) of Maryland, 
urging housing officials ‘in urban renewal areas to follow a policy of non-
discrimination in the disposition and use of housing and other facilities.’526 The 
advice, while well intentioned, was somewhat superfluous: Black occupancy of social 
housing rose steadily and precipitously throughout the 1960s.527 A look at the 
increases in Black tenancy in a selection of previously all-White projects from 1959 
to 1960 reveals just how early this transformation surfaced: 
 
Table 5: Demographic Change in Selected Baltimore Housing Projects 
Project: Black % - 1959 Black % - 1960 Change in % 
Latrobe 53.8 60.0 6.2 
Perkins 38.8 43.7 4.9 
Westport 83.4 88.9 5.5 
Flag House 35.4 48.4 13.0 
 
 
Source: BURHA, ‘Some Background Information For Participants in the December 1, 1960, Meeting On 
Nondiscrimination Clauses in BURHA Land Disposition Contracts’, Memorandum, 25/11/1960, p. 6. 
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In addition to these racially mixed projects, in 1960 there were nine all Black projects 
and three projects that remained all White, including one development, Westport in 
the south-western quadrant of the city, that had transitioned from all White tenancy 
in 1950 to all Black tenancy in 1960.528 By 1970, only four projects (Perkins, 
O’Donnell Heights, Claremont, and Brooklyn) would have any sizeable White 
populations, and by 1980 there would be no projects with less than 90% Black 
occupancy. Thus, by the 1960s, the entire dynamic of social housing tenant selection 
had changed for prospective Black tenants. The problem was no longer racial 
discrimination in tenant selection, but rather the limited supply of available units. In 
1960s Baltimore - social housing was viewed as an important commodity. Yet while 
social housing construction continued during the 1960s, it did not proceed as 
speedily as in Glasgow. While Glaswegians marvelled at the massive schemes 
constructed at Hutchesontown and Red Road as icons of modernity, such giant 
developments of cultural significance never arrived in Baltimore. Indeed, partly due 
to the on-going civil unrest in the city, social housing construction slowed 
considerably. During the 1960s, only three new social housing projects were built in 
the city – and one extension to an existing project in 1960. The table below details 
the new units constructed in the city during the decade: 
 
Table 8: Baltimore Housing Projects Constructed in the 1960s 
Project: Date: Number of Units: 
Westport (Extension) June, 1960 232 
G. B. Murphy Homes October, 1963 758 
Mount Winans November, 1963 140 
Oswego Mall December, 1969 35 
Total: … 955 
 
Source: HABC, Baltimore Public Housing (Baltimore: Housing Authority Commission, 1970), p. 5. 
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Although there would be a total of 10,616 units of social housing in Baltimore by 
January of 1970, only 1,165 new units were built during the 1960s.529 Consequently, 
competition for social housing during this period in Baltimore was fierce. While 
White flight from social housing opened more units for new Black tenants, demand 
still outstripped supply. With the chaotic disruptions of the Civil Rights movement, 
social housing must have seemed a safe reprieve for Black families. Conversely, it 
was an age of the growing appeal of alternatives to social housing – particularly the 
refurbished slum housing in urban renewal areas. The area considered acceptable 
for Black residence expanded precipitously through the decade. Just as quickly as 
Whites left their rowhouses for the suburbs, Blacks were just as eager to occupy 
them. This contributed to a demographic phenomenon in Baltimorean projects: as 
wider private housing options materialized for Blacks, social housing increasingly 
allotted more units to at-risk tenants. Although there was still demand for social 
housing units in the general Black population, a greater percentage of social housing 
units was awarded to more unstable Black tenants. This development would have a 
profound impact on tenant selection policy and housing planning in the city. 
 
During the 1960s, the social housing policy shifted from the general needs of 
the entire Black community to the needs of more specific sub-groups. Groups such 
as the elderly, single-parent households, and specifically families displaced by urban 
renewal programs, now garnered more attention. It was not that housing authorities 
were not sympathetic to the needs of ordinary slum dwelling Black families. Given 
just how quickly social housing had become majority Black since 1954, the HABC 
could not be accused of neglecting the needs of Black tenants. Rather, the HABC 
began to view social housing as a tool aimed towards society’s most downtrodden, 
rather than just subsidized housing for the general Black community. Indeed, just as 
Blacks had secured the right to access all social housing units, private housing 
options become available to Blacks. The increased complexity of the urban housing 
market for Black residents led to the creation of the Baltimore Urban Renewal and 
Housing Agency (BURHA) in 1957. The agency united the Housing Bureau of the 
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Health Department, the Housing Authority of Baltimore City, and the neighbourhood 
planning section of the Department of Planning all under one administration. This 
new agency was designed to utilize all housing and planning resources available to 
better accommodate the complex needs of the city’s growing Black community. Take 
for example BURHA’s prescriptions in a 1964 memorandum on proposed increases in 
housing units for the next year. The memo notes that additional units should be 
designed for explicitly for: 
 
1) To meet the relocation needs of families to be displaced by expressways, school sites, 
urban renewal, and other public programs. 
 
2) To make available additional small units to provide low-rent housing for the elderly with 
limited incomes. More than half the units proposed are for this purpose.  
 
3) To begin action toward meeting the needs of large families. The Housing Authority has too 
few accommodations suitable for this group, and large families of low income often 
represent a major relocation problem. This program would provide some 156 new large 
units. 
 
4) To clear areas which represent some of the worst slums in the city. 
 
5) To assist with the renewal plan for Harlem Park by removing the blighting influence of 
some vacant structures and solving some of the problems represented by financial hardship 
cases.530 
 
Ultimately, 641 of the proposed new housing units were built in 1965 as addendums 
to existing projects, and 100 new units were rehabilitated existing private structures 
in the Harlem Park Renewal Area (an urban redevelopment site in West Baltimore). 
While the difference between traditional social housing projects and rehabilitated 
private dwellings in designated urban renewal areas might have seemed stark, the 
truth was more nuanced: BURHA was trying to meet both the increased general 
demand for social housing and accommodate different prospective tenant groups. 
By the mid 1960s, BURHA could not justify letting social housing units solely to more 
                                                 
530 BURHA, ‘Additional Public Housing’, Memorandum (July, 1964), p. 1. 
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stable tenants. The demographic composition of Baltimorean projects was changing 
rapidly. Gone were White tenants. Increasingly, middle class Black tenants were 
eschewing social housing for other options. The city’s social housing applicants were 
increasingly drawn from the very poor, the elderly, single parented families (an 
increasing phenomenon among Black families as detailed in Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan’s 1965 study), and large families.531 For these applicants, social housing 
was not an alternative, temporary housing option to slum housing at exorbitant 
rents (as it had been for Black middle class tenants), but rather a permanent option 
instead of slum housing.  
 
While BURHA had come to terms with its role as landlord of ‘Black’ housing, it 
was not yet prepared to assume the role of caretaker of an indigent Black 
community. The change in tenant needs after the mid-1960s was described 
succinctly by the Department of Housing and Community Development (DHCD), the 
organization which in 1968 replaced the decade-old BURHA as the city’s 
consolidated housing authority. In their annual report 1969, the DHCD noted: 
 
As originally conceived, public housing was intended to help families over the rough spots, 
providing low-cost housing on a temporary basis. Over the past ten years, the family with 
this type of need has been increasingly replaced by the low income family requiring a decent 
home on a long term basis.532 
 
The report, published at the end of the decade, also noted that many more social 
housing developments were planned for the 1970s, accelerating the slump in 
construction during the 1960s. Despite accelerated population loss during the 1970s, 
the prevalence of socio-economically deprived families in the city facilitated growth 
in social housing demand. The same report by the DHCD noted that an additional 
1,019 units of social housing specifically for occupation by the elderly were planned 
                                                 
531 Office of Planning and Policy Research, The Negro Family: The Case for National Action 
(Washington, DC: GPO, March, 1965). For a comparison of marital separation in Baltimore and other 
cities, see p. 57. 
532 DHCD, Annual Report (1969), p. 14. 
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for construction, and that the majority of those planned units would be finished by 
the end of 1970. 
 
 
Social housing sites and urban renewal areas, 1969, Department of Housing and Community 
Development, Annual Report 1969. 
 
 Yet while elements of Baltimore’s Black community welcomed the expansion 
of social housing as a relief from slums, the projects were not always conducive to 
healthy living. Just as in Glasgow, unexpected problems with social housing, 
particularly high-rises, arose. It was during the 1960s that the city’s high-rise projects 
(Lafayette, Lexington, Flag House, and Murphy Homes) began to reveal their design 
flaws, and display signs of social problems. Children contributed to vandalism, 
adolescents formed gangs, and adult tenants succumbed to drug and alcohol 
abuse.533Additionally, an argument existed that Baltimoreans were particularly 
unsuited to high-rise accommodation, considering that the city was defined by 
                                                 
533 ‘Public Housing Can Succeed if Projects Are Made Liveable’, Toledo Blade 16/03/1974, p. 8L; ‘Public 
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decidedly low-rise private housing.534 Critics in both Glasgow and Baltimore were 
concerned that the break-up of traditional neighbourhoods would lead to social 
disharmony, and that many tenants would adjust poorly to high-rise living.535 While 
this criticism seems condescending, these fears were not wholly unfounded. In the 
1950s, sociologists Michael Young and Peter Willmott compared social life in Bethnal 
Green and a newly built social housing development in East London. They discovered 
that while residents of Bethnal Green enjoyed the benefits of strong neighbourhood 
kinship, the residents of the high-rise social housing development felt isolated and 
had much fewer closer relationships than neighbours who lived in low-rise housing. 
Consequently, social housing residents reported a lower quality of life.536 The 
counter argument to social housing equivocators was that many of the problems 
facing social housing tenants were issues slum dwellers faced already. In 1965, newly 
established and empowered BURHA director Richard L. Steiner noted in a 
memorandum that: 
 
The problems about which we are concerned are not unique to high-rise public housing 
projects. Problems of crime, vandalism, and sanitation are, today, characteristic of all urban 
communities not only in the city of Baltimore but throughout the nation as a whole. 
However, with respect to public housing, this Department is concerned with these problems 
as regards frequency of occurrence, extent, and tenant and community reaction.537 
 
Thus, it would seem that BURHA’s position was that much of the criticism directed 
towards social housing was misplaced; the problems that befell the projects were 
the same problems that befell the slums. The problems that social housing tenants 
encountered were not due to high-rise living, or even slum living, but rather 
stemmed from systemic poverty. The very next paragraph of the same 
memorandum, however, conceded that there were indeed especial challenges in 
operating high-rise social housing: 
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The very nature of the high-rise structures provides a multitude of opportunities for 
vandalism and other acts of unwholesome and malicious substance. The types of crime and 
vandalism in public housing, as everywhere else, present serious social problems. We are 
convinced that we must employ new and different techniques, exercise greater practical 
imagination, and perhaps spend more money in order to find solutions.538  
 
Given the problems with high-rise social housing in Baltimore, it is not surprising that 
municipal authorities were concerned about the longevity of social housing, 
particularly high-rises, as a viable solution to the city’s housing woes. In 1967, the 
Baltimore City Department of Planning (BCDP), one of the few extant municipal 
organizations that managed to escape reorganization into BURHA and the 
subsequent DHCD, published a policy plan on future urban development. Although 
highly optimistic, the plan noted with some despondency the difficulty in solving 
housing problems through urban planning in Baltimore: 
 
Much of the housing and the residential environments in the inner city of Baltimore are unfit 
for human occupancy. Many of the newer housing and residential environments built 
recently in the city are poorly designed and form the beginnings of the slums of the 1980s.539 
 
While the first statement on the unsuitability of Baltimorean housing was 
unprovocative, the second statement, that new urban housing (i.e. mostly social 
housing) was poorly designed and likely to deteriorate into slum-like conditions, was 
revealing. Even before 1970, the correct prognosis was apparent – if not properly 
planned and maintained, social housing projects in Baltimore (and other American 
cities) could devolve into the ‘new slums’.  
 
Although many more social housing projects would be built in Baltimore in 
the years leading up to 1980 – the prediction that 1980 would be social housing’s 
nadir was not only remarkably prescient but signified just how evident the problems 
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that affected social housing were as early as the 1960s.540 The problems of crime, 
social isolation, and deteriorating health, all of which were documented in Daniel 
Wilner’s longitudinal study, continued unabated in Baltimorean social housing during 
the 1960s and into the 1970s. Despite this, construction in the 1970s far exceeded 
the previous decade; sixteen new projects and four extensions of existing projects 
would be built between 1970 and 1980. Yet while projects continued to be built, 
enthusiasm for social housing began to wane. Both housing authorities and the Black 
press exhibited a growing disillusion with the merits of social housing during the 
1970s, and this signalled the end of public positive perception of social housing in 
the Baltimore and the United States. While the 1970s saw increased social housing 
construction in both cities (particularly in Baltimore), both municipalities were 
already becoming less enamoured with the idea of social housing. The municipal 
authorities that once championed (or at the very least, acquiesced to) social housing 
were now suspicious of the extent that social housing could ameliorate slum 
problems. The so called ‘urban renewal’ projects in Baltimore and Glasgow that had 
emerged during the mid 1950s were by the end of the 1960s viewed much more 
favourably. In both cities in the 1970s, slum clearance programmes regained 
momentum, often at the expense of the provision of decent housing. A new 
emphasis on slum clearance did not equate to an abandonment of housing 
construction, however; as mentioned in Baltimore many new developments were 
built and in Glasgow housing authorities contributed to the refurbishment of many 
slum tenements.541 Thus, the 1970s proved the final testing ground for social 
housing in both cities, and the policy decisions sowed in the 1980s that led to social 
housing’s inexorable decline were in large part based on the disastrous results of 
1970s urban planning and social housing policy in both cities.  
 
Changes in Glasgow: the Advent of GEAR and Housing Associations, 1970-1980: 
 
                                                 
540 See: Hal Pawson and David Mullins, ‘Conclusions’, After Council Housing: Britain’s New Social 
Landlords (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010) pp. 299-307; R Hays, ‘New Directions in Housing 
Assistance: 1973-1980’, The Federal Government and Urban Housing (Albany: SUNY Press, 2012), 3rd 
edn., pp. 139-164. 
541 HABC, Baltimore Public Housing (Baltimore: Housing Authority Commission, 1970), p. 5. 
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 The 1970s was a transitional decade for social housing in Scotland. In the first 
year of the decade, Scottish housing unit completions peaked at 43,000 units built, 
up from 28,500 in 1960.542 Of these houses, 81 % were social housing units, with 
65% constructed by local authorities and 35% constructed by national entities such 
as the Scottish Special Housing Association (SSHA).543 Of that national total, 3,051 
housing units were built in Glasgow, with 2,845 of these built by Glasgow 
Corporation.544 The beginning of the decade, then, seemed to represent the ultimate 
realization of Scottish housers’ dream: a full embrace of social housing as a tool to 
eradicate slum conditions and improve the environment of the poorly housed. This 
was not the case however; the decade saw Glasgow’s social housing decline in both 
quality and perceived societal importance. For example, although Scottish housing 
completions peaked in 1970, housing unit completions declined every year leading 
up to 1980 (save for 1975 and 1976).545 Furthermore, social housing’s decline in 
relation to the number of housing units built in total was even more dramatic; while 
81% of housing completions in 1970 were social houses, this percentage declined to 
39.5% by 1980.546 Lastly, the end of the decade would culminate with the passage of 
the Tenants Rights, etc (Scotland) Act of 1980, which established a framework for 
social housing tenants to purchase their homes at significant discounts. Ultimately, 
this would result in the sale of nearly 130,000 social housing units across Scotland.547 
Put simply, the decade of the 1970s heralded social housing’s decline in importance 
in Glasgow and Scotland. As Scotland became a wealthier nation, there was less of 
an acute need for social housing, and as problems emerged in existing social housing 
developments (particularly high-rise tower blocks), new alternatives for slum 
dwellers were explored. New urban planning projects coupled with the activities of 
private neighbourhood-based housing associations led to the diversification of 
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housing options for working-class Glaswegians. This did not mean, however, that the 
decade proved uneventful in social housing policy. The trajectory of urban planning 
and rehousing efforts changed considerably during the decade – with the aim of 
shaping social housing to better fit changing tenant needs.  
 
 The fundamental shift for social housing in Glasgow was housing 
authorities’ change in focus from the provision of as many units as possible to the 
provision of units that met specific tenant group needs. During the 1970s, Glasgow 
Corporation and other housing authorities, particularly the SSHA, became less 
concerned with the sheer number of social housing units, and more concerned with 
the general quality and particular specifications of new and refurbished units. This 
paradigm shift reflected an acceptance in the changing demographics of prospective 
tenants; as middle class and skilled class tenants increasingly eschewed social 
housing, new tenants with new needs filled their place. Increasingly, social housing 
in Glasgow catered to the elderly, the disabled, the long-term unemployed, and lone 
parented families. Yet, just as in Baltimore, authorities soon realized that many of 
the existing housing units were ill suited to the needs of more deprived tenants.  Lifts 
were too small to accommodate stretchers or coffins, many tower blocks were not 
ergonomically designed and were located far from public transportation options, and 
day care and crèche facilities were rare as mothers were expected initially to remain 
home to care for their children. Thus, as the prospective tenants of social housing 
changed, the units themselves changed. Tower blocks fell out of favour with 
planners and architects alike.548 Perhaps even more significantly, population 
decantation slowed as city authorities united to retain people in Glasgow. While the 
New Towns were met with excitement during the 1950s and 1960s, enthusiasm for 
population decantation began to wane during the 1970s.549 In 1976 the planned 
community of Stonehouse south of Glasgow was cancelled just three years after 
being planned. Even the much heralded CDAs had reached their peak of popularity. 
                                                 
548 See: Scottish Housing Advisory Committee, Planning for Housing Needs: Pointers Towards a 
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549 Peter Booth and Robin Boyle, ‘See Glasgow, See Culture’, Cultural Policy and Urban Regeneration: 
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Of the original 29 planned CDAs conceived in 1957 (which were famous for their 
adoption of high-rise development), only nine would be developed, the last of which 
commenced in 1973.550 With new prospective tenants increasingly poorer, and 
problems associated with CDA life (isolation, economic stagnation, etc.) beginning to 
emerge, municipal authorities began to direct their energy towards centre-city urban 
renewal. Specifically, the District Council (after local government reorganization, 
‘Glasgow Corporation’ became the District Council) employed a significant plan to 
revitalize its urban core neighbourhoods.551Just like Baltimore with its second 
‘Baltimore Plan’, the District Council adopted a renewal programme to restore its 
existing housing stock to a habitable quality. In 1976, Glasgow District Council 
launched the Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal (GEAR) project that sought to revitalize 
slum housing tenements in an area of nearly 4,000 acres in the city. While the 
project fell short of its grand aims, the project still embodied Glasgow’s two social 
housing policy goals of the decade: develop better social housing units and locate 
them centrally in the city. Though social housing production slowed dramatically 
during the decade, in the later 1970s new and more sustainable social housing units 
became available for working-class Glaswegians in areas closer to their original 
residence. The GEAR programme and similar efforts by private housing authorities 
need to be reviewed to fully understand housing policy in Glasgow during this 
period.  
 
Much of the city’s gradual disaffection with social housing beginning in the 
1970s can be attributed to a growing disillusion with high-rise tower blocks. By 1971, 
nearly half of social housing units built in Glasgow since 1957 were high-rise tower 
blocks. While tower blocks did not constitute the majority of social housing in 
Glasgow at this point, they were the most conspicuous reminder of the city’s 
embrace of social housing. Newspaper articles commented that such schemes were 
                                                 
550 As originally planned, the goal was to have a considerable amount of the CDAs completed by 1980. 
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inherently unliveable. They were viewed as highly susceptible to fires.552 Children 
were at a high risk of falling out of windows or off of balconies to their death.553 
Vandalism was not only unstoppable, but injurious to tenant health.554 Lifts, which 
were prone to malfunction, were also subject to power shortages.555 Furthermore, 
whether rightly or wrongly, many viewed tower blocks as conducive to (and even 
facilitating of) criminal behaviour. A warden of Petershill Court, a high-rise 
development in Balornock, spoke of ‘the muggers, the glue-sniffers, the vandals who 
have turned sweet dreams of home into nightmares for the 120 families under his 
protection’ and alluded to his residence in Petershill ‘as though it were a prison 
sentence.’556 The Red Road flats, perhaps Glasgow’s most notorious, were 
considered by former tenants to be so uninhabitable that there were serious calls to 
designate all floors above the twenty first storey for university 
accommodation.557Clearly, by the end of the 1970s, both tenants and the press were 
voicing increased frustration with high-rise housing’s design flaws and social 
conditions.  
 
Yet while the Glaswegian public had grown disaffected with high-rise 
developments, they nevertheless remained an essential component of city housing 
stock. Indeed, high-rise tower blocks continued to grow as a percentage of total 
Glaswegian housing up until 1973, when their relative share began to decline slowly. 
Mostly this trend can be attributed to the District Council favouring lower storey 
development and the rise of private housing associations refurbishing traditional 
tenements. However, the trend towards lower average storey height can in part be 
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attributed to the demolition of substandard high-rise tower blocks, including some 
housing schemes that had not even been finished!558 The graph below illustrates the 
growth of high-rise tower blocks over the years leading up to the middle 1970s, 
when they began a slow decline in percentage of total housing stock: 
 
 
Glasgow Corporation Housing Committee, ‘Multi-Storey Dwellings as a Percentage of All Corporation 
House Stock’, Farewell to the Single End, p. 60. 
 
Additionally, during the tower blocks’ zenith in the early 1970s, the height of 
individual blocks grew higher and higher. By 1974, while nearly a third of tower 
blocks in Glasgow were ten storeys or under, over two thirds of blocks were sixteen 
storeys or higher.559 A look at the table below illustrates the composition of storey 
height in Glaswegian social housing schemes: 
 
                                                 
558 Anne Power, ‘Marginal Housing Estates in Europe’, European Integration and Housing Policy 
(London: Routledge, 2005), p. 222; Andrew Gibb and Duncan MacLennan, ‘Glasgow: From Mean City 
to Miles Better’, Housing Markets and Housing Institutions: An International Comparison (Berlin: 
Springer, 1991), pp. 296-298. 
559 Glasgow Corporation Housing Committee, ‘Storey Heights by Percentage as at December 1974’, 
Farewell to the Single End (Glasgow, 1975), p. 60. 
 259 
 
Glasgow Corporation Housing Committee, ‘Storey Heights by Percentage as at December 1974’, 
Farewell to the Single End, p. 60. 
 
The prevalence and prolific spread of high-rise social housing schemes in Glasgow 
did not spare the city’s tower blocks from academic and professional criticism, 
however. Just as high-rises fell out of favour with journalists and the general public, 
academics recorded tenants’ dissatisfaction with high-rise living and the generally 
poor environment of social housing communities. In a review of housing sociologist 
Norman Dennis’s seminal work People and Planning, a journalist articulated the 
growing professional sentiment on urban planners and their developments: 
 
Planners are the metropolitan scapegoats of our time; in the process of renewing our cities 
they have been accused of generating ‘planning blight’ through their insensitivity. Complexes 
of multi-storey blocks containing families with young children are cited as indices of their 
ignorance of the elements of family living; and contiguous housing and urban motorways are 
pointed out as making a mockery of ‘planning’ as such.560 
 
Clearly, as this inflammatory preface underscored, urban planning efforts and high-
rise social housing schemes had become categorically unpopular. Indeed, an article 
on the problems of high-rise social housing in Australia noted that Glasgow’s Council 
had been forced to reconcile with the ‘tremendous and insoluble problems created 
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by trying to put welfare housing customers into 20-storey blocks’ and that ‘these 
buildings, which were claimed 20 and 10 years ago to be the answer to public 
housing are being torn down to make way for low and medium-rise housing.’561 Even 
the peripheral schemes, which had been lauded as a great compromise at their 
inception (given their location outside the city centre but within city boundaries) had 
begun to wane in popularity. A 1971 article, commenting on the rapid pace of 
housing construction of the period, commented that ‘Many of the inhabitants of 
peripheral housing estates, and not a few of the car-owning critics of the scheme, 
would prefer to live in more central areas if sufficient houses with full amenities 
were available there.’562 The Scottish government was not deaf to this criticism. The 
cancellation of the much heralded Stonehouse new town development was a direct 
response to a growing populist sentiment: working-class Glaswegians did not want 
to be pushed out of their own city.563 Regardless, a great many Glaswegians had 
made their homes in high-rise social housing schemes, and though many tenants 
were unhappy with their accommodation, the District Council simply did not have 
the financial resources to rehouse every prospective tenant into a lower rise scheme. 
There was, however, a movement to revitalize some of Glasgow’s old tenement 
buildings to a habitable standard. This movement, a collaboration between public 
and private authorities gained traction in the 1970s. A review of both the public and 
private approaches to housing issues should illuminate the trajectory of social 
housing in the city during the decade.  
 
The idea that direct municipal construction of subsidized housing for working 
class families was not the sole solution to the housing crisis was not unique to 
Glasgow. In the early 1950s, municipal authorities in Baltimore decided to 
implement the second ‘Baltimore Plan’, a public initiative to improve slum housing in 
concentrated areas of the city. The Plan, though only implemented for a few years, 
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refurbished about a dozen acres in East Baltimore to a habitable standard. BURHA 
attempted to revive the Plan with its Harlem Park Renewal Area in 1958, but this 
effort was not a tremendous success.564 In Scotland, early rumblings on the efficacy 
of social housing policy and urban planning were apparent. Since the mid-1960s, the 
Scottish Office had been concerned about the effects of Glasgow’s population 
decantation and the impact of this policy on the city’s urban core.565 Ultimately, the 
Scottish Office mustered enough political capital to implement a dramatic 
experiment that had the potential to drastically alter Glaswegian housing policy. The 
Scottish Office, in concert with the newly established District Council and Strathclyde 
Regional Council, the Scottish Special Housing Association (SSHA), and the Scottish 
Development Agency (SDA) (with the later cooperation of the Housing Corporation 
and the Greater Glasgow Health Board), sought to initiate a programme aimed at 
revitalizing an area of the city plagued by slum conditions and population flight. 
Proposed in 1974, the Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal (GEAR) project sought to 
eradicate slum conditions in one of the city’s most blighted areas in the hopes of 
creating a stable working-class environment. The project was no small measure. The 
area selected for regeneration covered 4,000 acres (1,600 hectares) and constituted 
nearly 8% of the city’s total area.566 The area was considered the heart of the East 
End of Glasgow, and though the city had long hosted industrial activity the area had 
begun to deteriorate into physical and social decay. This decline in industrial activity 
and economic vitality was in part due to the area’s rapid growth in the late 
nineteenth century. The area was completely dependent on economic activity in 
support of Glasgow’s shipbuilding and engineering industries; once these economic 
foundations evaporated due to global competition, the area began its irrevocable 
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A location of the GEAR area and constituent projects, M Barke and D Sim, ‘Getting into Gear – 
Urban Renewal in the East End of Glasgow’, Geography, Vol. 66, No. 4 (November, 1981): 317. 
 
Although elements of the GEAR project were devoted to economic 
redevelopment, the primary purpose of the plan was to improve slum housing. 
Indeed, the civil servants and local councillors who had instigated the calls for GEAR 
were convinced that the CDA strategy and the prevalence of high-rise social housing 
tower blocks was actually harming urban development, and contributing to the 
population flight experienced by all Scottish cities.568 The GEAR project, however, 
aimed to change this pattern of urban development in favour of tenant 
rehabilitation. Since the 1930s, when the Department of Health for Scotland (DHS) 
issued a report on the social housing developments of continental Europe, Scottish 
housers had known of the Scottish cultural preference for medium-level tenements 
over terraced housing. Indeed, it was this preference for tenement life that may 
have convinced later planners that Scots would naturally acclimate to high-rise living. 
                                                 
567 David Rich, ‘The Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal Scheme’, Geographical Review, Vol. 71, No.2 (Apr., 
1981): 214. 
568 Urlan Wannop, ‘The Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal Project: A Perspective on the Management of 
Urban Regeneration’, The Town Planning Review, Vol. 61, No. 4 (Oct., 1990): 457. 
 263 
As has already been discussed, Scots did not overwhelmingly enjoy tower block 
accommodation; they posed many challenges that tenement life did not. Regardless, 
the GEAR project aimed to renovate traditional tenement buildings to a healthy and 
aesthetic standard for working-class residents. At its core, GEAR sought to improve 
neighbourhood stability through the improvement of the local housing stock. The 
image below is representative of a GEAR restoration of an interwar social housing 
tenement: 
   
 
Photo: Wannop, ‘The Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal Project’, The Town Planning Review, 
Vol. 61, No. 4 (Oct., 1990): 457. 
 
Yet while the project was ambitious, there were early signs that GEAR 
proponents had promised more progress than it could deliver. The programme was 
funded until 1987, when funding was halted ungraciously due in part to opposition 
towards the programme by Tory government. This opposition was not wholly 
unjustified, however. Throughout the late 1970s and the 1980s, social deprivation 
and unemployment worsened in the GEAR area, although in fairness this was true 
throughout all of Britain. The SDA, one of the more principal organizations involved 
with managing GEAR, commissioned two reports to determine the efficacy of the 
programme in achieving its goals. One review was published during the middle of the 
project in 1982, and another published at the end of the project in 1987. The first 
report, known as the Deloitte report, was conducted by academics from the 
University of Glasgow and University of Strathclyde, and sought to evaluate whether 
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the GEAR programme had achieved any of its goals.569 Put simply, the academic 
reviewers felt that the project fell short in achieving many of its objectives. However, 
this negative evaluation rested partly on what the report authors felt was the 
grandiose aims of the GEAR experiment. For instance, the authors found that GEAR 
did not result in improved employment conditions or a decrease in crime and 
vandalism. The Deloitte study contended that GEAR did improve housing conditions 
significantly, and this was obviously beneficial to area residents. Regardless, 
economic and social deprivation worsened during the GEAR experiment and thus the 
Deloitte study did not endorse GEAR as successful. The second report, known as the 
Pieda study, was conducted by economists, and largely echoed the findings of the 
Deloitte study. The Pieda study offered a much rosier evaluation of the efficacy of 
GEAR, however. 570While the study concurred with the former study on the 
lacklustre impact of GEAR economic stimulus aspects, the study argued that 
environmental health in the GEAR area was greatly improved, and that furthermore 
private house construction increased dramatically and the levels of amenity in 
individual flats improved as well. The study also noted that relative to similar urban 
regeneration programmes in London and Merseyside, GEAR was a comparative 
success despite the obstacles posed by economic recession. Thus, while the GEAR 
project seemed to have failed in restoring the East End of Glasgow to economic 
sustainability, the project did manage to improve the local housing stock and expand 
housing options for working-class neighbourhood residents. For this reason alone, 
GEAR can be viewed as successful municipal effort in housing improvement, even if 
the majority of housing units refurbished were of private housing stock.  
 
The number of Glaswegians who lived in social housing continued to increase 
until the early 1980s. Indeed, while the GEAR project had shown that social housing 
was not the sole tool capable of expanding housing options or improving 
environmental conditions, the private housing improvement movement started in 
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the late 1960s. In 1967 the urban planning academic Barry Cullingworth authored a 
report titled Scotland’s Older Houses which, in addition to advocating for a 
demarcation between high priority tenant and general tenant allocation policy, 
argued for increased slum clearance coupled with intense inner-city housing 
development.571 The report, which subsequently became known as the Cullingworth 
Report, posited that Glasgow’s large, imposing (if austere) tenement blocks were 
perfectly adequate for urban habitation, and that most dilapidated tenements 
needed little structural repairs; only the interiors of flats needed to be refurbished. 
The report had a profound and lasting impact on Scottish housing legislation and 
policy. The 1969 Housing (Scotland) Act provided grants for local authorities across 
Scotland to induce slum clearance and refurbish salvageable tenements.572 More 
specifically, the Act introduced the concept of Housing Treatment Areas (HTAs), 
areas that were targeted for both slum clearance and the restoration of viable 
tenement buildings. Yet the HTAs themselves were not without criticism, indeed 
many Glaswegians found them counterproductive towards neighbourhood 
regeneration. Specifically, the HTAs awarded powers of compulsory purchase to local 
authorities; if property owners failed to restore their units to the liking of the local 
council, property could be repossessed.573  Perhaps most famously, the residents of 
Old Swan and Oatlands, the two slum districts in Glasgow’s south side, successfully 
resisted compulsory purchase orders for the purpose of slum clearance and 
rehousing into social housing. While Old Swan and Oatlands were poor 
neighbourhoods, long-time residents were hesitant about leaving their 
communities.574 Although some Scottish housers viewed the HTAs in 1969 as 
potentially progressive, they fell short of even modest expectations. Indeed, by 1974 
only a 140 HTAs had been declared across Scotland, representing only 8,000 housing 
units.575 Regardless, the HTA experiment spawned a new force in urban planning in 
Glasgow that shaped housing improvement effort in the 1970s: the community 
based housing associations (CBHAs). These voluntary organizations, founded by 
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Scottish housers disaffected by municipal social housing policy, sought not only to 
stop population decantation to peripheral schemes and new towns, but to promote 
the rehabilitation of Glasgow’s ubiquitous tenements. These were completely non-
governmental organizations; in truth much of the attraction of CBHAs was derived 
from the perception that they were truly neighbourhood movements. Their 
organized activities of the CBHAs during the 1970s precipitated wider resistance to 
slum clearance and rehousing into tower blocks, and promoted ideas of urban core 
regeneration.  
 
The very first CBHA grew out of the graduate thesis of a University of 
Strathclyde architecture student. In 1972, Raymond Young was awarded a grant to 
establish a university research centre named the ‘Tenement Improvement Centre’ 
that was designed to offer free housing advice to working-class Glaswegians.576 
Later, the Centre became independent of the university and reorganized itself as a 
community advice organization. After receiving additional grant and philanthropic 
aid and was renamed ASSIST.577 With its first office located in Govan, Young helped 
develop the concept of the Community Based Housing Organisation. Young and his 
partner Jim Johnson, his former university advisor, imagined HAs as aid organizations 
to help would-be tenement improvement advocates navigate through the complex 
legal, regulatory, and logistical aspects of tenement restoration. A year later, ASSIST 
formed the Central Govan Housing Association as the very first CBHA. The 
association’s first task was to refurbish 212 tenement housing units on Taransay 
Street facing to the Clyde, in an area later designated as the Taransay Street 
Treatment Area.578 The CBHA was so successful in helping locals restore the 
tenements to a habitable condition that ASSIST started CBHAS in neighbouring 
Govanhill, Linthouse, Partick, Rutherglen, Yorkhill, and Reidvale in the following 
years. By 1982, there were over thirty CBHAS in Glasgow – and that year it was 
estimated that approximately 19,500 housing units were owned by CBHAs across 
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Scotland and let at fair-rent rates. 579 While these CBHAs were centred in different 
neighbourhoods (although the CBHA ‘Glasgow Jewish’ focused on solely 
rehabilitating Jewish occupied flats!), they were all dedicated to the same goal of 
revitalizing the city’s iconic tenements to a habitable condition. They were 
remarkably successful. Glasgow’s CBHAs sought to retain the local population as 
much as possible in any tenement building or area they rehabilitated. The physical 
structures of selected tenements were reinforced and cleaned. Most interior 
restoration consisted of practically gutting the inside of tenements and building new, 
larger flats with modern kitchens and bathrooms. Electrical rewiring was also 
considered especially important, as the wiring standards of the 1930s and 1940s 
were by the 1970s considered categorically haphazard.580 Each year, new 
neighbourhood oriented CBHAs sprung up and devoted time, energy, expertise, and 
finances towards the rehabilitation of the city’s tenement buildings. It was a massive, 
organic movement to retain Glasgow’s population and dense urban character. But 
not only did CBHAs prove extremely popular, they were especially effective at 
achieving their goals. While private organizations undertook 7 % of all tenement 
rehabilitations in 1971, by 1979 they undertook 81 %.581 Thus, the decade of the 
1970s represented a paradigm shift for urban planning and housing policy in 
Glasgow. While slum clearance and government construction had characterized 
housing policy in decades past, the remainder of the twentieth century seemed to 
belong to those who wished to preserve and refurbish the city’s tenements. By the 
dawn of the 1980s, Scottish housers were no longer concerned with how many new 
housing units they could provide, but rather how many dilapidated properties they 
could redevelop into suitable working-class housing environments.  
 
Although Glasgow in the 1970s was defined by the success of the municipal 
GEAR programme and the myriad of private citizen CBHA initiatives during the 
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1970s, in Baltimore the political climate was quite different. As the city of Baltimore 
had already experimented with a private/public partnership in housing rehabilitation 
(its second incarnation of the ‘Baltimore Plan’ in the 1950s), the mood for private 
housing rehabilitation by the 1970s had soured somewhat. Indeed, in the minds of 
Black Baltimoreans, the terminology of ‘housing associations’ likely conjured up 
memories of the ‘neighbourhood organizations’, or local groups dedicated to the 
preservation of racial segregation. Furthermore, many poor and working-class Black 
Baltimoreans occupied housing units that were beyond preservation and restoration; 
social housing was both new and more amenable than existing housing for Black 
tenants. Social housing retained its allure at the dawn of the 1970s among primarily 
because it offered Black tenants a reprieve not only from slum conditions but the 
confines of racialized housing legislation and practices. While social housing 
construction in Glasgow was at its highest in the 1960s, in Baltimore the greatest 
number of units were built in the 1970s. This period of increased construction did 
not mean that Baltimore’s social housing projects were any more inhabitable; indeed 
those who could fled the projects for better housing options in more suburban 
Northwest Baltimore, which transitioned from a Jewish area to a Black area in the 
1970s. Regardless, the decade in Baltimore was not defined by community 
organizations but rather by the continued construction of social housing. What 
challenged housing authorities in Baltimore was not meeting demand for more units 
(though in Baltimore, demand always outstripped supply), but rather meeting the 
needs of changing tenant demographics.  
 
Changes in Baltimore and the Attempt at Urban Renewal, 1970-1980: 
 
In Baltimore, the decade of the 1970s represented the apex of social 
housing’s dominance in the provision of working-class housing. The housing form 
was no longer a novelty, and while urban planners and housers had lost some of 
their enthusiasm for social housing, its advocates had pushed successfully for the 
construction of more projects throughout the city. By January, 1970, a total of 
10,616 units of social housing had been built in Baltimore since 1940. This did not 
mean there were not lulls in social housing construction: there were no projects built 
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in Baltimore during 1947-1952 and none built during 1963-1969. There were thus 
eleven years between 1940 and 1980 when no social housing units were built in 
Baltimore.582 Such a lull never occurred in Glasgow. Furthermore, while 5,421 social 
housing units had opened during 1940s, only 4,259 units were opened during 1950-
1969 period.583 Whether this signified a lessened enthusiasm for social housing or 
just procedural hurdles is debatable. During the 1970s, however, construction of 
social housing increased and remained steady. Despite a previously undulating 
construction pace, by October of 1980, the total of social housing units built since 
1940 reached 17,349 units. Thus, with 6,733 additional units being built during the 
decade, the 1970s was the most prolific period of social housing construction in 
Baltimore.584 Regardless, even by 1970, social housing had impacted the city’s 
housing landscape. Baltimore was then a city of 905,759 persons, split almost evenly 
between Blacks and Whites. Some 10,819 families – or 38,536 people – lived in social 
housing, representing 4% of the city population. Not surprisingly, the trend of 
increased Black occupancy in social housing continued unabated. While more slightly 
more Whites than Blacks lived in the city in 1970, that same year Whites constituted 
only 16.2% of social housing tenants, while Blacks constituted 83.8% of tenants. The 
map below illustrates the geographic distribution and racial composition of social 
housing projects in 1970: 
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“Public Housing and Areas of Minority Concentration, 1970”, Map Courtesy: Applied Population 
Laboratory, University of Wisconsin- Madison. 
 
The complexion of social housing tenancy had changed considerably in the 
years leading up to 1970; social housing tenants were no longer average 
Baltimoreans, as American housers had originally envisioned. While the average 
Baltimorean family income was around $7,000, the average social housing family 
income was $2,881. Nearly 60% of tenants received welfare aid. The types of families 
that lived in social housing had changed as well, as children and the elderly had 
become more represented among tenant families. While two thirds of tenants were 
under the age of 21, single persons over the age of 62 and elderly families occupied a 
fifth of total social housing units. Additionally, less than half of all families with small 
children had both parents present. 585 Daniel Patrick Moynihan had warned of the 
social implications of the collapse of the Black family in 1965; considering the 
increased proportion of lone-parented Black families in social housing in the city, the 
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consequences of this demographic composition were dire.586 Though this change 
was mostly independent of social housing policy, city housing authorities were quick 
to adapt to the evolving needs of prospective tenants. Just as in Glasgow, tenants 
with special needs began to constitute a larger percentage of the total social housing 
population. The increase in elderly tenants in Baltimorean social housing was not 
incidental: it was a conscious effort by the DHCD to meet the demands of a growing 
demographic group. In the years 1971-1973, the city added 1,459 social housing 
units, through two extensions to existing projects and two new projects.587 
Additionally, more than 2,400 units were under construction in 1973 alone.588 More 
than half of all the units built in these years were for elderly residency. Lakeview 
Tower, a fifteen storey high-rise built solely for elderly occupation, was the first 
project to open during the decade (January, 1970). Lakeview, though not the first 
project built for elderly residence, was a harbinger for social housing trends; all 
subsequent high-rise projects would be built exclusively for elderly residence. 
Furthermore, Lakeview was a ‘turnkey’ project, which housing authorities were 
eager to pursue. Under this system of development, a private developer purchased 
the land, constructed the project (to agreed upon specifications, which in Lakeview’s 
case, included building a gerontology oriented clinic in the project), and sold the 
project to the DHCD. Located next to scenic Druid Hill Park in the Northwest 
quadrant of the city, Lakeview represented the DHCD’s new policy direction: housing 
projects that targeted needs-specific groups. Future elderly projects, such as Bel Park 
Tower and Govans Manor, were built in a similar manner to Lakeview: high-rise 
tower blocks, privately constructed but municipally operated, and located in more 
suburban, peripheral areas of the city. Some twenty years after the fact, Baltimore 
was mirroring Glasgow’s original social housing policy of placing tower blocks on the 
urban periphery. What differentiated Baltimorean social housing policy from in the 
1970s was that Baltimorean housing authorities sanctioned a massive increase in 
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total available units with the full knowledge that a greater number of tenants would 
be special demographic groups. 
 
 
An older White tenant in newly built Lakeview Tower, ‘There’s an Air of Gracious Living at 
Sparkling Lakeview Tower’, Baltimore Sun, 10/02/1971, p. C 1. 
 
Indeed, the disproportionate focus on elderly residents was somewhat in 
response to a legitimate need for elderly housing, though there were ulterior 
explanations for the increased construction. The Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD), a cabinet level department established in 1965, issued a 
moratorium on social housing construction on 5 January, 1973.589 Although housing 
projects in the planning stage were allowed to be constructed, HUD set new 
desegregation guidelines for social housing projects. Social housing projects were 
now required to be built outside of inner-city cores, as concentrating projects inside 
dense areas was now seen as contributing to residential segregation. Whites still 
constituted 53% of Baltimore’s population in 1973, but increasingly lived in the city’s 
outer districts. New federal guidelines on the dispersal of social housing 
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developments, however, proved difficult to enforce. Considering that many Whites 
had fled their old neighbourhoods to escape proximity to Blacks, municipal housing 
authorities often faced opposition in suggesting locations for new projects.590 
Housing projects specifically for elderly occupation, however, faced much less 
opposition. Even though many projects intended for the elderly were high-rises, and 
thus viewed as eye-sores with the potential to reduce property values, outer-city 
neighbourhood dwellers understood that the prospective elderly tenant pool were 
unlikely to cause disharmony.591  Unfortunately for single parented families and 
families with many children, projects designed for them faced much stiffer 
procedural and popular resistance. While several housing projects designed 
specifically for elderly occupation were completed with little impediment, projects 
designated for large and poor families faced much stiffer hurdles. It was not that 
municipal housing authorities resisted such tenants, but rather that there was fierce 
neighbourhood resistance to the construction of such projects. Providing housing for 
an increasing amount of higher-tenants while maintaining social harmony became 
the objective of city housing authorities.   
  
 Despite the general inadequate supply of social housing units for large 
families, advocates for large families existed early on. In a BURHA monograph 
published in 1965, housing researchers noted the particular needs of large families. 
‘While some households with six persons or more might require only three 
bedrooms, others – depending on the distribution by sex and age – would require 
four.’ By 1965, of the city’s 275, 597 households, 35, 255 households, or 12.8% of all 
households, were composed of six persons or more. Of these large households, 
16,574 were renter families, and as the reported noted, these families were 
disproportionately Black. ‘Among the 16,574 large families… non-whites numbering 
11,573, more than double the 5,001 whites.’592 In one paragraph, BURHA had 
                                                 
590 League of Women Voters of Baltimore, ‘Where Will Everyone Live?’ 10/02/1970, p. 6; Sally Merrill, 
Evaluation of the Performance Funding System: Technical Components, Decision Rules, and 
Administration (London: ABT Associates, 1980), p. 28. 
591 Gottlieb, ‘The Effect of Site Selection Policies’, p. 46.  
592 BURHA, Housing Needs of Elderly, Large, and Lower-Middle-Income Households (Baltimore: 1965), 
p. 31. 
 274 
highlighted the bleak prospects faced by large Black families, and the problems 
housing authorities faced in rehousing them. Yet it was not just municipal authorities 
that recognized the problem, however, housers of all kinds advocated for large 
families. As early as 1960, Frances Morton, the Baltimore social worker who had 
become a prominent figure in the CPHA, argued that high-rise towers were 
particularly unsuited to receive large families. ‘Most public housing tenants have 
large families; and, despite many valiant efforts (e.g. totlots in the sky) to make 
elevator-apartment living and large families with small children compatible, it is not 
an outstanding success.’593 It may have been that concern for the housing welfare of 
children was rooted in maternal instinct. In 1970, the League of Women Voters of 
Baltimore published a brief wherein they discussed housing issues that large families 
faced. In a section titled ‘Weaknesses of Public Housing’, the League noted that 
while social housing’s original mission had changed, the units themselves had not 
conformed to the needs of the growing number of large families: 
 
Originally, public housing was to be a way-station for rising young families. Over the last ten 
years the projects increasingly have become a collection of large, poor, broken families and 
older persons requiring a decent home on a long-term basis….[however] Large families do 
not have adequate facilities; most of the older apartments have two bedrooms or less.594 
 
Luckily for larger families, the plea for housing units designed for their 
tenancy was heard. Baltimore’s housing authorities focused more of their attention 
on large families in the 1970s. This did not mean there were not hurdles in doing so - 
while the city municipal government was keen to expand social housing and aid large 
families, federal financial support for Public Housing Authorities (PHAs) throughout 
the country waned throughout the 1970s. The federal government had a chequered 
history when it came to financial assistance for social housing. For much of the 1950s 
and 1960s there were construction cost ceilings placed on social housing projects, 
making it difficult to build flats with more than four bedrooms.595 As more large and 
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economically distressed families began to enter social housing, project maintenance 
costs soared. Consequently, rental fees were increasingly insufficient to cover costs. 
In 1950, the median social housing tenant family income was over 60% of the 
American median income, but by 1975 it had plummeted to 30% of the national 
median.596 This problem was not viewed as a serious threat by municipal housing 
authorities before 1973. For although municipal bonds were used to pay for social 
housing projects initially, by the 1960s the federal government came to subsidize the 
budgets of municipal housing authorities. Under the guidance of the Kennedy 
administration, Congress passed the Housing Act of 1961 to subsidize maintenance 
costs for elderly projects. Additionally, the Fair Housing Act of 1964 expanded 
available subsidies to include social housing tenants who had been displaced by 
urban renewal. The last major piece of federal housing legislation was the Housing 
Act of 1968, which authorized federal subsidies to cover the costs of housing very 
low-income families and large families.597 With federal backing, it may have seemed 
an easy chore for Baltimore’s municipal government: spend the money and build the 
housing projects. As has been discussed, however, this proved easier said than done. 
As PHAs throughout the country were encouraged to cater to especially distressed 
groups, however, operating costs, and their concomitant federal subsidies, 
skyrocketed. By 1973, subsidies to PHAs had bloated so precipitously that the Nixon 
administration placed a moratorium on federal subsidy commitments to new 
housing projects.598 Indeed, at the time Nixon described social housing projects as 
‘monstrous, depressing places – run down, overcrowded, crime-ridden, falling apart’ 
and further commented that ‘the residents of these projects are often strangers to 
one another – with little sense of belonging. And because so many poor people are 
heavily concentrated in these projects, they often feel cut off from the mainstream 
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of American life.’599 Regardless of his policies’ negative impact on social housing 
viability, Nixon’s sentiments on the physical and social environment of housing 
projects were echoed by contemporaries.600  
 
While President Ford lifted the ban towards the end of 1974, for the much of 
the 1970s the federal government was less supportive of municipal social housing 
programs than it had been in previous decades.601 While this inconvenienced social 
housing development in Baltimore, it by no means halted construction of new 
housing projects. As noted earlier, 6,733 social housing units were built in Baltimore 
during the 1970s – with an especial focus on providing housing for the elderly and 
large families.  While Baltimore’s social housing policy had changed dramatically 
during the 1970s to meet a changing applicant needs, 70s era housing policies did 
not have a chance to mature before being dismantled. 
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President Kennedy signs the Housing Act of 1961, Photo Courtesy: John F. Kennedy Presidential 
Library, Item AR6672-C 
 
The city’s housing authorities, primarily the DHCD, had the difficult task of 
locating housing projects in areas that were both beneficial for tenants and 
inoffensive to privately housed Baltimoreans. The heated local political debate in 
Baltimore and other American cities on the placement of social housing spawned a 
now infamous acronym to describe the contentious attitude white urban residents 
had towards housing projects: NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard).602 Furthermore, the 
type of intended housing project influenced location. As mentioned, the DHCD found 
that neighbourhood locals were not as resistant to housing projects for the elderly. 
Given that in the early 1970s the DHCD was primarily concerned with expanding 
social housing options for the elderly (with, as of 1973, five projects for elderly 
habitation, four more under construction, and six planning stages), this proved 
advantageous. When these units were completed, Baltimore had a total of 3,700 
social housing units for elderly occupation.603 Yet demand still outstripped supply. 
That same year, there were 9, 232 eligible applicants for social housing while the 
turnover rate was approximately 120 housing units a month becoming available.604 
 
The 1980s, however, proved the beginning of the inexorable decline for the 
city’s social housing, with more housing demolished than constructed during the 
decade. Further federal legislation on social housing mandated that personal rents 
never exceed 25% of tenant income. While the federal government was obliged to 
subsidize municipal PHAs throughout the country, Baltimore’s municipal government 
charged that HUD had shirked its financial responsibilities. Regardless, thanks to 
both federal directive and municipal initiative, the total number of social housing 
units in Baltimore increased during the 1970s. Just as with Glasgow, social housing 
declined in professional favour and popular report throughout the 1980s. In the 
early 1990s, literally every single high-rise housing project in Baltimore was 
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demolished due to the negative associations of high-rise life. Both Glaswegians and 
Baltimoreans would eventually come to the same conclusion - that social housing 
developments were not always the most optimal way to house the poor. Due to the 
several factors that prevented Baltimore’s Black community from accessing the same 
housing options as White residents, however, social housing remained popular with 




 The years 1960-1980 were difficult for social housing proponents in both 
Glasgow and Baltimore. Existing housing developments in both cities began to show 
wear and tear, new social problems were becoming apparent in housing 
communities, and perhaps most damningly, middle class tenants (and it Baltimore’s 
case, White tenants) were becoming disillusioned with social housing life and leaving 
for greener pastures. While it can be argued that social housing developments 
weathered these critical years quite well (especially as demand for housing units 
always outstripped supply), the downside of the schemes/projects were exposed 
and the difficulties of social housing daily life surfaced. While it was true that 
applicants continued to outnumber available housing units in both cities, this was 
partially due to the aggressive and haphazard slum clearance policies in both cities in 
the years leading up to the mid 1960s. Furthermore, though the high-rise tower 
block received some early heralding in the early to mid 1960s, both urban planners 
and tenants realised quite quickly that these buildings were unsuitable environments 
in which to raise families or to rehouse the elderly. Private/public housing 
rehabilitation programmes were somewhat successful and provided alternative 
housing options for working-class persons in both cities, however, the scope of these 
programmes never rivalled the amount of housing units social housing provided. In 
both cities, social housing construction continued throughout the decades, indeed in 
Baltimore the 1970s were the most prodigious in terms of unit construction. 
Regardless, the sheer number of units provided was only one aspect of the impact of 
social housing. Whether social housing provided a categorically better housing 
alternative for working-class persons to live healthy lives was a more complicated 
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question. Just as Wilner and Ferguson had investigated the health consequences of 
social housing tenancy in the 1950s, academics and public health professionals 
sought to answer whether social housing was truly providing a healthier alternative 
to slum housing. Those who analyzed the impact of social housing on health in the 
years 1960-1980 discovered, however, that the myriad of changes that the housing 
form underwent in these years affected tenants’ ability to live healthy lives.       
 
Chapter 7: The Health Impacts of Social Housing, 1965-1980 
 
 In both Scotland and the United States, the mid 1960s produced a growing 
awareness of the crisis of urban life: Scottish and American cities were failing to 
provide healthy environments for their working-class residents. It was not that 
academics, public health professionals, or even politicians were unaware of Glasgow 
and Baltimore’s deteriorated neighbourhoods before the 1960s. Housers had long 
protested slum conditions, and postulated that the slums themselves might be a 
cause, rather than just a symptom, of the public health problems associated with 
social deprivation. Beginning in the 1930s, they advocated for social housing as a 
solution to poor environmental health conditions. With the advent of social housing 
developments in both cities in the 1940s, the housers could claim success. By the 
1960s, social housing was well established in both Glasgow and Baltimore, and the 
housing form garnered mostly positive reviews.605 Furthermore, both British and 
American policy makers now accepted social housing as a basic component of 
twentieth-century urban geography.606  Both central governments continued to pass 
legislation to further enable social housing. In 1964, Britain passed a Housing Act 
that established the nation-wide Housing Corporation (responsible in Scotland to the 
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Secretary of State) to shore up the nascent housing associations (such as the SSHA) 
to promote affordable housing. In the United States, the Johnson administration 
pushed successfully for the passage of the Fair Housing Act in 1968 to end 
segregation practices in housing.607 Both Scottish and American governmental 
authorities, then, were aware of urban housing problems and sought to solve these 
problems. Their benevolent intentions, however, did not result in efficacious 
solutions to these problems. The troubling realization of the late 1960s was that 
social housing had failed to alleviate urban blight, particularly in the United States.608 
Municipal authorities’ new scepticism was bolstered by a continued deterioration in 
the urban housing stock (despite the advances of urban renewal programs such as 
the Baltimore Plan, GEAR, and the CBHAs), continued flight from the centre cities, 
and evidence of declining health among urban populations.609 What many came to 
realize after the mid 1960s, then, was that social housing was not a panacea for 
housing woes or associated public health problems. Academics from a variety of 
backgrounds continued to investigate aspects of social housing that were deleterious 
to tenant health, and composed studies that reminded municipal governments that 
the simple provision of lodging was not enough to improve the public health. It was 
their findings on the health impact of social housing tenancy that precipitated much 
of the elevated criticism of social housing of the 1970s and 1980s.  
 
Thus, while municipal planners and public health professionals cheered the 
advent of social housing in the 1940s into the early 1960s, by the late 1960s and 
1970s housing and health experts had become more sceptical of the benefits of 
rehousing slum dwellers. Although in regards to the provision of amenities, social 
housing units surpassed their slum counterparts (individual bathrooms, central 
heating, ventilation), critics by this point had become disenchanted with the 
supposed transformative aspects of social housing. While social housing 
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developments survived the 1960s and 1970s, their relatively untarnished reputations 
did not. Perhaps most damningly, the belief in the ameliorative impact of social 
housing on public health did not survive unscathed. After the mid 1960s, there was 
an explosion of published research on the connection between housing and tenant 
health, many of these studies focusing particularly on social housing. The broad 
mood during the period pointed to growing circumspection among academics of the 
power of social housing tenancy to improve health. The most charitable 
interpretation of the published research of the period could be construed as such: 
while academics acknowledged social housing’s superiority in the provision of 
modern conveniences, they were convinced that social housing probably only had a 
palliative impact on tenant health.  A review of the general discussion during this 
period on the power of social housing architecture, and the purported public health 
dividends from living in social housing, is necessary to understand the specific impact 
of social housing on tenant health in Glasgow and Baltimore during these years. 
 
The Decline of Architectural Determinism: 
 
 The more localized research on the public health impact of social housing in 
Glasgow and Baltimore was shaped by a broader, more philosophical debate. The 
issue that galvanized such strong opinions in housers at the time was whether 
architectural form could change human behaviour. While the earliest proponents of 
social housing were staunch enthusiasts of this concept, after the mid 1960s 
architects, planners, and municipal officials had become disillusioned with the 
concept of ‘architectural determinism’. This term referred to the concept that 
building design could alter the human condition (e.g. rehoused slum dwellers would 
act like model tenants). This was a marked change in temperament, even amongst 
erstwhile supporters of the principle of architectural determinism. Planners and 
architects, who were once viewed as philanthropic visionaries, were now viewed as 
myopic and arrogant; more and more their high-rise developments were viewed as 
emblems of the grandiose machinations of elite intellectuals, rather than charitable 
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icons of subsidized housing for society’s downtrodden.610 Despite the published 
research on the public health benefits of rehousing (nuanced though their 
conclusions were) dating from the 1930s, housing and health authorities had 
become sceptical of the extent of the benefits of rehousing. In 1972 (ten years after 
Wilner’s study and one year after Jephcott’s study), Yale epidemiologist Stanislav 
Kasl, conducted a review of 178 studies that looked at the connection between 
housing and health. This review was included in HUD’s tome of housing opinion 
Housing in the Seventies, which aimed to delineate federal housing policy of the 
period and provide a forum for contemporary academic viewpoints on housing. In 
his review of other academic studies, Kasl commented: 
 
The link between the parameters of housing and indices of physical health has not been well 
supported by the reviewed evidence, at least not in any direct sense …The association 
between housing and mental health (excluding housing satisfaction) is supported only by the 
weakest, most ambiguous studies … the best designed studies do not demonstrate any 
mental health benefits, and it now appears that some of our most cherished hopes- such as 
raising educational and occupational aspirations by moving people out of slums- never will 
be realized.611 
 
Thus, while early enthusiasm for social housing among academics was unbridled, by 
the early 1970s public health professionals were coming to appreciate that the 
problems of poverty might not be solved through slum clearance and rehousing 
alone. As noted in the previous chapter, the detrimental effects of slum clearance 
and the limitations of social housing had been raised before the 1970s; in the 1950s 
and 1960s, the ‘Baltimore Plan’ selected pilot areas of some of the city’s worst slums 
and enforced housing code violations relentlessly, hoping to coerce slumlords to 
maintain their dwellings. Beginning in 1974, the Glasgow East Area Renewal (GEAR) 
programme sought to refurbish existing housing stock in an eastern area of Glasgow 
under a broader urban renewal effort. The city’s privately organized Community 
Based Housing Associations (CBHAs) were even more successful in providing an 
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alternative option to social housing for working class Glaswegians. Both of these 
programmes were reactions to the growing awareness of the deleterious effects of 
‘slash-and-burn’ slum clearance.612 After all, if slum housing was just a symptom of 
poverty, then rehousing slum dwellers into social housing could only aim to alleviate 
a symptom of poverty temporarily. Housing academics, like public health 
professionals, began to understand the limits of rehousing. The sociologist Edwin 
Mills echoed this sentiment in his commentary on the determinist position: 
 
Some writers attribute many social evils to underinvestment in housing. For example, it is 
often claimed that underinvestment in slum housing breeds crime, alienation, drug abuse, 
and other ills. Undoubtedly, the important causes of these problems are poverty, racial 
conflict, etc…613 
 
By the early 1970s, then, many American housing academics viewed the connection 
between housing and health as tenuous at best. In their opinion, rehousing slum 
tenants likely would not better their condition, and it certainly would not produce 
any long term health benefits. Yet it was not that the idea that there were 
underlying social causes that explained health and quality of life differences among 
socio-economically disadvantaged groups that was the new revelation. Rather, the 
important concession of housing academics during the period was that rehousing 
slum dwellers into social housing might not always produce better health 
outcomes.614 Even the broad popularity of the Wilner study, which reported slight 
but observable benefits to rehousing, failed to convince housing academics of social 
housing’s potency. Economist Richard Muth, in review of the study, wrote that ‘in 
matters relating to health and personal adjustment, however, differences [between 
slum dwellers and the rehoused group] were small and did not systematically favour 
public housing tenants.’ After this somewhat conciliatory statement, Muth escalated 
his commentary and wondered if ‘current disenchantment with federal housing 
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programs reflects partly, at least, that better housing does not magically transform 
the lives of slum dwellers.’615 Given the notorious riots and social deprivation of the 
United States’ most infamous housing projects (Cabrini-Green in Chicago, Pruitt-Igoe 
in St. Louis, Marcy Projects in Brooklyn, etc.) during the 1970s, Muth’s declaration 
seems legitimate. Furthermore, given the tenacity of the criticism of the determinist 
position in Housing in the Seventies, it seems fair to assert that by the early 1970s 
academics had become sceptical that the original objective of social housing, i.e. to 
improve the health of slum dwellers, was achievable through rehousing. The tacit 
implication of this assertion was that investing in social housing was at best an 
inefficient solution for housing and health problems and at worst, a wasteful 
expenditure of money and planning effort.   
 
There were of course lingering supporters of the determinist position, and by 
extension, residual advocates for social housing. Although there were public health 
success stories to bolster this position, retaining a pro social housing stance in the 
1970s was not without its difficulties. In the wake of the 1967 urban riots, the 
findings of the Kerner Commission, and the general deterioration of housing projects 
in American cities, the Nixon administration placed a moratorium on new social 
housing construction in 1973. Newly ousted HUD secretary George Romney privately 
opposed the moratorium, but was compelled to endorse it, stating that American 
social housing had become ‘a statutory and administrative monstrosity that could 
not possibly yield effective results even with the wisest and most professional 
management system’.616  Romney’s successor, James T. Lynn, was happy to defend 
the moratorium, even though several court cases struck down the moratorium and 
Congress asked for further proof that social housing was ineffective. Furthermore, a 
Democratically controlled Congress funded a critical review of Housing in the 
Seventies reported that though the official by-line of the HUD report was that social 
housing expansion should be discontinued, the hard data present in the report 
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showed that ‘public housing tenants on average occupy significantly better housing 
than they would in the absence of the program.’617 Perhaps because of further 
research and analysis (or perhaps because of the Watergate scandal), the 
moratorium on new social housing was lifted in 1974. This repeal was a victory, but 
only a small one. Defenders of social housing felt the tide of public and professional 
opinion was against them. In his historical report on the rise and fall of support for 
social housing, Nathaniel Keith argued in Politics and the Housing Crisis since 1930 
that since 1930 opponents of social housing had no hard proof that the housing form 
was ineffective, but rather their fierce opposition was based in their conviction of 
the ‘undeserving poor,’ and that furthermore that ‘the alignment of political forces, 
not the availability of material and financial resources…has primarily determined the 
rate of progress over the past 40 years, or lack of progress, in housing in the United 
States.’618 The idea that the opponents of social housing were stronger than 
advocates of social housing resonated with many academics. Political scientist 
Leonard Freedman argued that the opponents of social housing were monied 
interests, such as real estate boards, home construction companies, and mortgage 
lenders. Freedman claimed that not only did these interests find allies in Congress, 
they spread spurious rumours to tarnish the reputation of social housing among the 
general public, e.g. that social housing was a New Deal conspiracy to catalyze racial 
integration.619 Drawing on this idea of oppositional forces, Lawrence Friedman 
emphasized the contrapositive point – that the social housing provided in the United 
States failed to meet the explicit promise of the 1949 Housing Act (to provide a 
‘decent home’ for every American) simply because the beneficiaries of social housing 
were politically impotent.620 The early enthusiasm for and success of social housing 
in the 1940s, Friedman explained, was a unique product of the Great Depression: 
though the American middle class had lost their economic power, they had not lost 
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their political power.621 Thus, while the majority of American academics had decided 
(with federal endorsement) that social housing was a doomed experiment, there 
remained a strong contingent of pro-social housing academics in the late 1960s and 
1970s. 
 
Though the pendulum had begun to swing inexorably towards housing 
restoration and away from the expansion of social housing, those who advocated for 
social housing defended the housing form as a necessary tool for equal 
enfranchisement. While it was difficult to argue that there were not better housing 
options for (White) slum dwellers in the suburbs, access to fair housing proved 
exceedingly difficult for poor, urban Blacks. Even by the 1970s, the United States 
remained hyper-segregated by race and income, and poor Blacks were compelled to 
live in inadequate slum housing.  According to pro-housing academics, however, the 
proper utilization of social housing could improve their welfare. Research had 
previously shown (Wilner) that rehousing slum dwellers improved tenant health, and 
while many academics disputed the intensity of the improvements, there was little 
evidence yet to suggest that social housing worsened tenant health. To bolster their 
advocacy, pro-housing academics pointed to the public health research of the period 
as evidence of social housing’s effectiveness. The only complication was that, much 
like housing academics, public health academics were also debating the impact of 
social housing.  
 
Changing Epidemiological Viewpoints: 
 
Most of the public health research on housing published in the 1960s and 
1970s focused on the impact of housing form on community health and broader 
social indicators. This approach to public health research was not without precedent. 
While the architectural determinist position had waxed and waned in popularity 
among housing academics for decades, by the early 1970s some public health 
professionals had grown sceptical of the determinist position as well. This sentiment 
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contrasted sharply to the mood of the early 1960s; indeed a number of public health 
studies pointed to a positive health impact of rehousing.622 Furthermore, Daniel 
Wilner’s monumental longitudinal study of rehoused Baltimorean slum dwellers 
remained especially relevant in the housing and health debate. This study remained 
the ‘holy grail’ of housing and health studies; so much so that most essays critical of 
rehousing efforts felt compelled to address the Wilner study specifically. The 
Jephcott study, published in 1971, would occupy a similar place in Scottish public 
health literature. Much like Wilner, Pearl Jephcott discovered that rehousing slum 
dwellers into high-rise social housing in Glasgow generally resulted in happier 
tenants, though there were some less salubrious aspects of high-rise living. Homes in 
High Flats (utilizing data from 1966-1969) noted that while most Glaswegian families 
reported overall satisfaction with their flats, there were physical and social aspects 
of high-rise social housing that were deleterious to health and perceived quality of 
life. This was particularly true of certain tenant subgroups, namely the elderly and 
families with children. Although Jephcott’s study was published in 1971, American 
researcher Oscar Newman achieved more fame with his research on the pitfalls of 
high-rise living in the 1970s. In 1972, Oscar Newman reported in his seminal work 
Defensible Space that high-rise tower blocks were fertile environments for crime and 
anti-social behaviour to a greater degree than low-rise developments. Newman 
published his research on high-rise social housing in New York at a time when the 
city was near bankruptcy, providing fodder for social housing critics who thought 
rehousing slum dwellers into contrived concentrations of poverty would only 
exacerbate social deprivation. In his research, Newman explained that the solution 
to the problems of high-rise living were to correct environmental problems as 
immediately as they occur, anticipating Wilson and Kelling’s ‘broken windows 
theory’ published ten years later.623 Newman’s criticism of high-rise living, then, was 
far more severe than Jephcott’s, who endorsed Glasgow’s high-rise social housing 
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estates for the majority of tenants while warning of the detrimental impact of high-
rise life on certain tenant subgroups. While there were growing concerns about the 
public health impact of social housing, broadly, public health academics were keen 
to argue in favour of the merits of social housing.  
 
In addition to public health research that focused on broader metrics, 
researchers published a large number of reports on the impact of social housing on 
epidemiological data. Concerning infectious disease, tuberculosis reduction in 
relation to urban housing garnered considerable research attention in both Glasgow 
and Baltimore. In Baltimore, Matthew Tayback, the city’s Deputy Commissioner of 
Health and a contributor to the Wilner study, sought to reduce tuberculosis through 
ambulatory care services directed at the city’s poorly housed. Tayback, along with 
noted tuberculosis researcher Alan Moodie found that although social housing did 
not halt the spread of tuberculosis, the environment better facilitated public health 
outreach programmes. Similarly, the anti-tuberculosis radiography screening 
programmes in Glasgow enjoyed their best results in social housing developments 
throughout the city, particularly in the peripheral schemes. This did not mean 
Glasgow’s peripheral schemes did not escape public health criticism; Maclure and 
Stewart’s longitudinal research found that children raised in the city’s peripheral 
schemes were far more likely to be admitted into hospital with an infectious 
condition.624 Regardless, while many studies argued that systemic poverty could not 
be cured through rehousing families; mostly social housing detractors acknowledged 
at the very least that social housing alleviated many health problems for poor 
families. In the years leading up to 1980, while public opinion and housing 
academics’ opinion of social housing would wane generally, public health academics 
in the late 1960s and 1970s tended to err on defence of rehousing slum dwellers. 
According to most public health researchers, social housing seemed to impact health 
positively, if only moderately. While the public health research on social housing 
could not stem the movement against housing restoration and urban renewal 
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programmes, it did much to invigorate discourse on the urban health, and stands as 
a retort to claims that social housing caused more harm than good. 
 
The Jephcott Study and Glasgow’s High-Rise Tower Blocks: 
 
 When Pearl Jephcott left the London School of Economics for the University 
of Glasgow in 1965, she was already an accomplished social researcher. After 
graduating with a university degree in social work she spent the 1940s organizing 
girls clubs and women’s’ organizations and produced scholarly work independently. 
She then moved to the University of Nottingham as a researcher and then to LSE 
under noted academic Richard Titmuss, where she produced research on juvenile 
delinquency and racial tensions in London. Although Jephcott left the LSE, by the 
time she arrived in Glasgow she had already published five books, followed by a sixth 
at Glasgow in 1967.625 Beginning in 1968, however, Jephcott embarked on her most 
ambitious study yet: to determine the quality of life of tenants in Glasgow’s high-rise 
social housing developments. Her study Homes in High Flats (1971), written with the 
help of fellow lecturer Hilary Robinson, is of such importance as it was produced at a 
critical juncture in the trajectory of Glaswegian social housing. Research for the study 
was conducted during the 1960s, just as social housing schemes began to be 
dominated by higher-risk groups: the elderly, single mother families, and the poor 
and disadvantaged. While Jephcott had much to report on the physical aspects of 
high-rise social housing, such as unchecked vandalism and broken lifts, she also 
emphasized that tenant demographics explained much of the successes and failures 
of Glaswegian developments. This did not make her a stalwart opponent of the 
architectural determinist position, however. Jephcott felt that some tenant 
subgroups could handle the deficiencies of social housing life, e.g. the lack of 
community facilities, and still benefit from social housing’s more salubrious qualities, 
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e.g. spacious flats, spectacular views, and suburban locations. Put simply, Jephcott 
found that the social housing model could produce successful and sustainable 
communities – as long as housing professionals achieved the right balance of 
tenants. As Jephcott discovered, however, the goal of social housing sustainability 
might have already passed by the early 1970s, as the more advantaged tenant 
subgroups had already left social housing for greener pastures and the more 
susceptible tenant subgroups came to dominate Glasgow’s estates. 
 
British sociologist Pearl Jephcott, Reproduced from the Encyclopaedia of Informal Education 
[www.infed.org] 
 
 The parameters of Jephcott’s study were simple enough to compress into a 
single study but expansive enough to cover several different indicators in several 
housing estates. The study focused solely on social housing estates dominated by 
‘multi-storey’ buildings, which Jephcott defined as buildings with at least 6 floors and 
at least one lift. Most of the estates selected included some low-rise development 
(mostly maisonettes), but none of the estates were composed primarily of low-rises. 
The study did not include a comparative control investigation of low-rise social 
housing flats because there were no developments composed primarily of low-rise 
flats of a similar population size; when the study began in 1965 nearly all new 
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construction in Glasgow was over six storeys.626 Selected maisonettes and low-rise 
flats were built in some estates mostly out of a token tribute to housing variety, but 
the trend in social housing construction was clear – ‘up’.627 Ultimately, five estates 
(Wyndford, Royston, Albion, Castlemilk, and Red Road) were selected, with a 5% 
population sample of the estates taken for study responses. While some of these 
estates were brand new, the precipitous growth of high-rise flats had begun in the 
previous decade. In 1957, just over a fifth of social housing units were in blocks of 
five stories or higher; by 1959 a fifth of units were in blocks of ten stories or 
higher.628 This trend continued despite early indications that flats in multi-storey 
buildings were not only more expensive to construct, but more costly to maintain 
than traditional maisonettes or terraced houses.629 Thus it was a topical choice for 
Jephcott to focus exclusively on high-rise social housing. Stylistically, Jephcott chose 
to focus more on issues related to the ‘quality of life’ aspects of living in high-rises 
rather than issues related to physicality or more abstract socio-cultural implications. 
In Jephcott’s words, the terms of the study were: 
 
Fairly open except that the work was to concentrate on social issues, ignoring as far as 
proved workable those aspects of housing connected with densities, costs, architectural 
design, and aesthetics… this study would concern itself more with practical matters relating 
to the day-to-day life of the multi-storey population than with the longer distance social 
implications.630  
 
Jephcott’s aim, then, was to produce a tenant focused study, rather than policy 
implications focused study. More explicitly, she enumerated the following questions 
for the study to attempt to answer: 
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A) The kind of environment, in terms of facilities and services, that high flats need. 
B) The suitability of different types of households for life in a multi-storey. 
C) The problems relating to children. 
D) Any trained staff that high flats as an unfamiliar type of housing may require. 
E) The special functions and problems of tenants associations. 
 
In addition to these preconceived lines of inquiry, the two junior research staff hired 
by the study went to live in four of the five estates for over six weeks.631 Jephcott’s 
study, then, approached a humanistic question (i.e. Do people benefit from tenancy 
in high-rise social housing?) with social scientific precision. Although Jephcott herself 
noted the study was ‘not an exercise in academic sociology’ due to the 
inconsistencies in methodology and practice, the project was still ambitious and of 
earnest intention. The responses to the study’s investigation varied on age, gender, 
family size, and the quality of tenants’ former home before rehousing. One 
quotation, however, that Jephcott selected to introduce her chapter on tenant views 
of their new flats, points to the broad consensus of those surveyed: ‘I love my 
home.’632 
 
 Jephcott felt that to highlight the structural and amenity improvements of 
high-rise flats over the traditional tenements whence most tenant families came was 
not unfair. The flats in the five estates were all well appointed even by middle class 
Scottish standards in the mid-1960s, with private toilets and bathrooms, large area 
windows, and electric heaters; all new luxuries for working class families. On this 
point she wrote that ‘[The flats’] brightness, airiness and modernity were a fantastic 
contrast to the gaunt and gloomy places so many had lived in previously. To have a 
bathroom outweighed even the dream kitchen or the under-floor heating.’633 This 
description of new tenants’ early euphoria is in line with Jephcott’s pronouncement 
that on the whole, tenants in the mid to late 1960s felt that social housing flats were 
an improvement over slum housing. Furthermore, although twenty-first century 
urban planners extol dense centre city development and neighbourhoods with 
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‘walkability’, study participants welcomed the better air quality and light exposure of 
the flats’ more suburban locations. Jephcott, however, was less convinced of the 
benefits of the peripheral locations of the estates studied; although those surveyed 
reported that they felt healthier for breathing in the ‘country’ air and having their 
children play in the sunlight, Jephcott remained sceptical. Commenting on these 
beliefs, Jephcott wrote:  
 
That health should benefit from the cleaner atmosphere [is of] considerable uncertainty as 
to how far the air really is purer. Evidence about the possible effects of height above ground 
in relation to air pollution from smoke, sulphur dioxide, etc. suggests that in periods of high 
wind almost any variation is possible.634 
 
Jephcott did note that a government study published ten years prior did seem to 
corroborate these anecdotal views, noting that according to one study air pollutant 
levels decreased with each increased storey.635 Regardless of academic opinion, 
however, new tenants to high-rises relished their new accommodation. The fresh 
ergonomic design and convenient features of social housing induced awe in new 
tenants, and likely lessened the pain of losing one’s community ties. Of course, as 
has already been discussed, these flats eventually devolved into disrepair and 
dysfunction; some estate blocks (Hutchesontown –D) only lasted about ten years 
before demolition.636 Early indications of this deterioration were, of course, 
perceived by social scientists, and this was the animating force behind Jephcott’s 
study.637 Her research efforts showed that even during the research period tenants 
were concerned by certain aspects of high-rise social housing life. 
 
 Nearly all study participants, including families with young children, 
responded positively about the amenities provided or the ‘mod cons’ (modern 
conveniences) in their new flats. There is not much to write about this general 
                                                 
634 Ibid. 
635 Warren Spring Laboratory, The Investigation of Atmospheric Pollution, 1958-1966 (London: HMSO, 
1967), pp. 51-52. 
636 Michael Middleton, Cities in Transition: The Regeneration of Britain’s Inner Cities (London: Michael 
Joseph, 1991), pp. 101-108. 
637 M Zald and R Ash, ‘Social Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay and Change’ Social Forces, Vol. 
44, No. 3: 327-341; W Hole and J Attenburrow, Houses and People (London: HMSO, 1966). 
 294 
satisfaction only that tenants tended to appreciate the spaciousness of their new 
flats and the provision of modern appliances. In contrast, there was near universal 
condemnation of the isolation of the estates and their lack of community facilities. 
Jephcott reported that study participants were particularly distraught by the lack of 
reliable transportation options, so much so that this single issue often determined 
whether a tenant found their new flat satisfactory or not.638 Bus lines were 
established to service the estates, but the bus lines did not increase in frequency to 
match the growing populations of the estates. There were similar complaints about 
the provision of shopping facilities. While all social housing estates were meant to 
have necessary shops on site, in general the shopping facilities were not built until all 
the towers of an estate had been completed. Jephcott noted that two of the estates 
studied (which were comprised of 700 and 500 flats respectively) lacked shops for 
over five years and that there were no signs of any planned openings.639 Similarly, 
tenants (especially families with young children) complained of the conspicuous 
absence of social areas which had been touted as one of the advantages of social 
housing life. Many estates offered no playgrounds for young children, no sports 
facilities for adolescents, and no community reception rooms for social clubs for 
adults. The external corridors of the high-rises, which Hutchesontown architect Basil 
Spence had hoped would become ‘gardens in the sky’, were a poor substitute for the 
lively streets of Glasgow’s central neighbourhoods, where gossip spread quickly and 
local matrons kept eyes on local children collectively. While research on balcony 
corridors in Swedish high-rises showed that tenants found some positive aspects to 
this design (absence of cooking smells, access to fresh air, more room for outside 
temporary storage), the drawbacks to this design feature (amplified noise, lack of 
privacy) led the research authors to condemn the practice, even though most 
tenants surveyed in the Swedish study approved of the balconies.640 That Scottish 
tenants took such umbrage at the discrepancies in communal space showed, 
according to Jephcott, that ‘they recognised one of the justifications of urban life, 
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viz. that it meets a deep-seated human need for gregariousness.’641 While sociability 
was important to tenant health, however, the more immediate factor was access to 
medical facilities. Yet with the exception of the Albion estate in Ibrox, there were no 
general practitioner surgeries or dental clinics within a half-mile of the estates.642 
 
 
A list of selected facilities and their proximity to three estates. The Albion estate, located in centre-city 
neighbourhood Ibrox, is noticeably closer to several amenities. Homes in High Flats (Appendix D), p. 
157. 
 
Despite the real and significant deficiencies of high-rise social housing life, Jephcott 
found that study participants tended to under-report problems with the estates, 
rather than embellish their criticism. This is similar to responses to the Anderson 
study. For instance, very few tenants complained of disrepair, vandalism, or even 
graffiti, despite the evidence of these problems being readily apparent to casual 
observers.  Evidence of physical deterioration of the estates included: ‘breaking 
railings down (for weapons?), tearing out telephone equipment, wrenching the 
handles off fire safety doors, breaking into the meters of drying cupboards and even 
smashing the lights on the estate’s Christmas tree.’643 Thus, while tenants had 
reservations about reporting issues that affected quality of life, the defects of high-
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rise life were obvious to Jephcott and her study team. Ultimately, however, Jephcott 
had to accept that the majority of tenants approved of their new residences and 
reported being happy and healthy. Her investigation of high-rise social housing did 
reveal that it was unsuitable for certain tenant subgroups, however, and her findings 
on these groups form the crux of the study.  
 
 
Design aspects and demographics of the estates studied. Homes in High Flats, p. 29. 
 
 Proponents of high-rise living surmised that older tenants would fit perfectly 
into these communities. After all, the flats were nominally ergonomic, and 
conveniences such as central heating were supposed to be of especial benefit to 
weaker and frailer tenants. Older persons, dubbed ‘pensioners’ in the study, were 
very much represented in the estates’ population; in July 1968 11% of the population 
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were aged over 65 (the same percentage as Glasgow’s general population), and 14% 
of the flats occupied were occupied solely by pensioners. Even more tellingly than 
these percentages, Jephcott admitted that 94% of surveyed older tenants reported 
‘overall satisfaction’ with their high-rise flats.644 What Jephcott came to find, 
however, was that older tenants raised several individual concerns about their ability 
to conduct normal lives in high-rise buildings. These concerns, and observations 
made by the study team, led to the conclusion that high-rise buildings were 
unsuitable for older tenants, and potentially deleterious to their health. Many of 
these obstacles that older tenants faced were not obstacles for the general tenant 
population, and thus often unexpected. Perhaps the most surprising obstacle among 
elderly tenants was a fear of using the lift, as many new tenants had never used a lift 
before. This tepid attitude to altered surroundings resulted in isolated tenants – one 
elderly woman had rarely left her flat in the past two years because of this 
trepidation. Yet a solitary life had its difficulties as well. Older tenants struggled with 
high electricity bills (whereas previously most tenants had used coal for heating and 
cooking), high gas bills, and other associated expenses that came with living in a 
modern flat. Furthermore, older tenants were unable to enjoy some of these 
modern conveniences and design aspects of high-rise social housing flats. High 
windows, located sometimes five feet off the floor (presumably to make room for 
furniture), resulted in immobile elderly tenants unable to enjoy the spectacular 
views of their homes. Scenic views were arguably one of the few aspects of high-rise 
living of which tenants universally approved. The scenic views of the high-rise estates 
(if even viewable at all), did not counteract the isolation that older tenants 
experienced, particularly if the tenants were single. Indeed, much of the features of 
high-rise living, while nominally meant to improve quality of life, contributed to 
these feelings of isolation. In Jephcott’s words ‘Good physical provision is no 
guarantee against the loneliness that may lead to an existence that is “dead, 
dumpish, and sour.”’645 In order to counter the loneliness that dominated older 
tenant life, Jephcott argued that high-rise estates employ certain tenants to check-in 
on older tenants and keep them company. While some tenants were already 
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engaged in this activity, Jephcott speculated that if the position were a paid one, 
estate tenants could be cultivated into amateur social workers. In her mind, this 
would undoubtedly be an asset to high-rise social housing life. Such a repertoire of 
estate-based social workers would invariably have also helped another subgroup of 
tenants that Jephcott felt was unsuited for high-rise life: families with children. The 
tenants themselves reported the universal sentiment that the high-rise flats were 
‘nae use for the bairns’.646 
 
 
An older tenant of the Wyndford estate who cannot peer out of her window due to mobility issues. 
Homes in High Flats, p. 105. 
 
The idea that the contrived environment of high-rise tower blocks were 
unsuitable for, or at the very least, undesirable for children preceded Jephcott’s 
study. Several academics had noted that the provision for adequate play facilities 
was slim-to-none at many planned high-rise estates, and that this would likely be 
detrimental to the mental health of tenant children.647 Familiar with the existing 
literature, Jephcott herself wondered what the autobiographies of children who 
were raised in high-rise flats would contain, concluding that they would likely not 
contain positive reflections. While it was true that Jephcott found some positive 
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aspects in high-rise estates for children (much as she offered concessions on life for 
older tenants), her broader contention was that high-rise life did not provide a 
suitable environment for raising children. Most importantly, there was a temporal 
aspect to this unsuitability. While the constraints placed on older tenants could be 
rectified, allowing life to resume improved, the damage inflicted on children’s health 
could be irreparable. The lack of adequate facilities for children coupled with 
children’s inherent delicate health needs led Jephcott to conclude that families with 
children were particularly ill-accommodated in high-rise social housing.  
 
 
The age distribution of Glasgow’s population and the estate population. Jephcott, Homes in 
High Flats, p. 46. 
 
Much as with elderly tenants, it was not so much the physical aspects of the 
high-rise buildings but the impact of estate design on social interaction that led 
Jephcott and her research staff to view high-rises as unsuitable for children. The 
primary concern was that as flats were located so far away (read: high) from the 
estate grounds, tenant children of all ages found it difficult to spend time in 
communal areas. In particular, whereas the lower-rise tenements of Glasgow were 
located on busy city streets that acted as social arteries for tenants of all ages, the 
estate grounds were neither convenient nor entertaining. Similarly, this distance 
between the home and the communal had the potential to exacerbate social 
tension: while tenement children could escape bullies by running quickly up the 
nearest close under the watchful eye of a matron, high-rise children had no such 
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recourse. In a more illustrative description of this phenomenon, Jephcott described 
the plight of such children ‘He runs into shelter from a squall, to fetch a toy, to go to 
the toilet, to wheedle 2p when he hears the chimes of the ice cream van – all of 
which means that he is fairly often in touch with his grown-ups.’648 But the benefit of 
proximate adults was not just in their tacit protection; research published on family 
dynamics in social housing estates argued that children learned adult behaviours by 
osmosis. Furthermore, as the estates had little in the provision of activity facilities 
for children, idleness bred misbehaviour. Just as in Baltimore’s housing projects, 
children ‘rode’ the lifts, played with rubbish, and broke estate property. While this 
behaviour was similar to juvenile delinquency in American projects, it was in stark 
contrast to the social housing high-rise estates of other European countries: 
 
The continental countries seem to have mastered [recreational areas for children]. 
Stockholm, for example, has hundreds of sandpits, mostly quite small but dotted all over the 
city. Its parks department require in the direct vicinity of the entrance to the dwelling 13 
square metres of free area for play for every municipal flat containing children.649 
 
None of the estates selected had provided any facilities anything like those provided 
by Stockholm. This deficiency resulted in heavily home-based children. The study 
research staff that encountered children of all ages in the estates found them 
unusually quiet and reserved, and unwilling to interrupt adult conversation. Jephcott 
found that the unusual degree of isolation experienced by tenant children would 
likely result in adult difficulties, mainly with casual social interaction.  As children 
were restricted in their casual contact with other community children, Jephcott 
theorized that high-rise children might grow up to be socially anxious. While it was 
true that adult tenants valued the privacy afforded by their flats (though 
paradoxically, were also discouraged by the difficulty in making new friends), 
Jephcott felt that ‘living nose to tail with so many potential acquaintances perhaps 
makes anyone who does not easily make social contacts feel that there is something 
odd about him or, more likely, herself.’650  Jephcott, then, was positioning herself as 
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a pessimistic architectural determinist: the high-rise tower block seemed to dictate 
tenant behaviour, but not for their benefit.  Given her reservations on the liveability 
of social housing, it is not surprising that Jephcott had so many recommendations for 
Glasgow’s housing authorities on how to better manage the tenant experience.  
 
 Jephcott was not an unrealistic idealist. She was aware that both 
Westminster and the Corporation had spent very much money on constructing the 
city’s high-rise tower blocks, and they were going to be lived in for quite some time. 
By May, 1969, not long after when most of the data for the study was collected, 
nearly 50,000 Glaswegians lived in high-rises. They lived in 15,500 flats in 163 blocks, 
at densities often as high as 150 persons per acre.651 Regardless, Jephcott surmised 
that many of these tower blocks would last 60 years (in many cases, this was an 
overestimate), and thus it was appropriate to offer suggestions to the Corporation 
on how to improve high-rise life. Most of her recommendations attempt to assuage 
the difficulties of living at elevated heights. She was especially concerned with the 
adequate provision of lifts; Jephcott urged that lifts be ‘suited to the size and 
demographic character of the block’ and that ‘detailed records should be kept at 
every block of the times and length of breakdown and normal length of waiting time’ 
to ensure that stereotypes about unreliable lifts did not pervade high-rise 
communities.652 On this note of tenant inclusion, Jephcott also urged the 
encouragement of voluntary tenant associations (much like those that were 
prominent in Baltimore’s housing projects), and argued that they be given powers 
over aesthetic and facilities issues.653 In terms of recommendations on tenant 
selection, Jephcott reiterated her position that families with small children should 
not be allocated flats in high-rise tower blocks, even though this family type often 
needed rehousing the most. Similarly, Jephcott urged the dispersal of older tenants 
so as to prevent the formation of what are now termed naturally-aging 
communities.654 Yet while Jephcott understood the importance of improving the 
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liveability of existing high-rises, her investigations had only bolstered her hypothesis: 
that the tower block was an inefficient and ultimately detrimental housing form. Her 
summation of the high-rise: 
 
Dismissing for the moment the social implications of high flats, there is no clear case on 
other grounds in favour of them as a form of local authority housing. On the contrary, there 
are solid arguments against them, particularly because of their excessive cost. As regards 
social issues, they display few features which might outweigh their disadvantages in other 
fields and distinct from one that is more or less all right… Thus the conclusion cannot be 
avoided that local authorities should discontinue this form of housing except for a limited 
range of carefully selected tenants or in cases of extreme pressure. 
 
Almost without exception, Jephcott was opposed to high-rise social housing, despite 
mostly positive tenant responses. Like many critics, Jephcott echoed the sentiment 
that the key to successful social housing communities that facilitated healthy living 
was lower rise developments located centrally in the city. While Jephcott may have 
illustrated the ways in which high-rise housing was unsuitable for many types of 
tenants, it was not always the case that lower rise social housing developments 
escaped the same social and public health problems. Indeed, Baltimorean tenant 
agitators noted the city’s housing project’s own problems with high-rise housing 
projects throughout the 1960s and 1970s, despite the city’s overall preference for 
low-rise developments. One provocateur in particular, Shirley Wise, dedicated her 
career to improving the quality-of-life of the city’s high-rise tower block population. 
A review of Wise’s testimonies on the perils of high-rise life should illuminate the 
similar problems that social housing developments in both Glasgow and Baltimore 
experienced during their years of maturation.  
 
The Decline of the High-Rise Housing Projects of Baltimore: 
 
 Just as Pearl Jephcott had discovered in her investigations in Glasgow, 
tenants in high-rise tower blocks in Baltimore experienced many unexpected 
difficulties in their newfound homes. While the HABC built mostly lower-rise social 
housing projects in the 1940s and 1950s, like other American cities the city’s housing 
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authority experimented with high-rises in the 1960s and 1970s. As many historians 
have commented, these high-rise tower blocks began to look like municipal 
prisons.655 Yet the tenants of these developments were not totally without recourse; 
Baltimorean social housing tenants seemed to be more frank in venting their 
frustrations than their Glaswegian counterparts. It was these social housing tenant 
agitators that brought national attention to Baltimoreans difficulties with the high-
rise experience, and their voicing of concerns helped shape municipal (and indeed 
national) housing policy. Lillian Jones, a resident of Lakeview Towers, in 1970 
became the first tenant to sit on the Housing Authority Commission (HAC) and later 
became the first chairperson of the Residency Advisory Board (RAB). Jones was a 
kind of tenant representative, charged generally with interacting with municipal 
housing managers.656 The woman who succeeded Jones after her untimely death 
less than a year after her appointment, Shirley Wise, was perhaps the most notable 
tenant agitator to draw attention to the difficulties of social housing life in Baltimore. 
A former slum dweller, Wise moved into Lafayette Courts with her disabled mother 
in 1954, the year of racial integration in the city’s social housing. She later became 
active in Baltimore municipal housing politics and highlighted the many pit-falls of 
social housing life for the general public. Her commentary, while generally 
supportive of social housing programmes in the United States, offered an honest and 
insider perspective on the difficulties faced by housing project tenants over the 
twentieth century. Indeed, in a congressional testimony in 1981, Wise recounted the 
various social transformations that had occurred throughout her lifetime in 
Baltimore’s housing projects: 
 
My first impression of as a resident of Poe Home was to finally have a home that was safe, 
sound, and sanitary.  Because of my family’s composition, we were soon transferred to a 
new development that was opening, a family-type high rise… a great many transformations 
took place, not only for me but also significant to the entire project community. In the early 
years… we included families that sociologists would call stable, in addition to families headed 
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by single female parents. I sincerely do not think that the housing project of those days could 
have foreseen the problems that were to become a reality in the 1960s and 1970s in high-
rise housing.657 
 
Her introduction to social housing, then, while idyllic, turned sour as the 
demographics of Baltimore’s housing projects changed. This of course did not mean 
that Wise or her mother were complacent about the changes in social housing 
policy. While tenant councils had existed in Baltimore since the mid 1960s, they 
remained under management control until the early 1970s. It was at this point that 
Wise joined the tenant council to focus on improving tenant / housing authority 
relations. In October, 1970, she was elected to the RAB – the organization first 
headed by Lillian Jones and designed by tenants to voice popular grievances.658 With 
the ascension of Wise to the leadership, the RAB changed direction dramatically. 
From the outset, Wise disrupted the traditional order of tenant/municipal relations; 
while there had been tenant participation in social housing before, seldom had 
tenants had such a voracious leader.659 Even Wise herself maintained that tenant-
inspired change required considerable gumption, before her time as tenant leader 
Wise would ‘Let somebody else take care of that. I was one of those people. Like I 
say, social commitments, that’s me. Anything that was really rocking the boat, I 
wasn’t into it until I found out I had the legal right to do that.’660 With the benefit of 
this fiery attitude, Wise helped transform RAB and individual housing projects’ 
tenant councils into effective organizations. Despite her efforts, Wise contended that 
‘there are no easy solutions or “quick fixes”. Public housing, the sheltering of the 
poor, disabled, the old, will always be grinding work’. For Wise, this sentiment was 
especially germane to her criticism of what she considered was Baltimorean social 
housing’s greatest flaw: the high-rise tower block. While most of the city’s social 
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housing was low-rise, Wise (herself a resident of high-rise Lafayette Courts) believed 
that much of the social deprivation of the city’s projects was due to the inherent 
mistake of housing vulnerable families in high-rise social housing developments.  
 
 Wise did not disguise her contempt for the high-rise tower block in the 
slightest. In her opinion ‘housing families in high-rise projects was a disastrous 
course that we in public housing hope will never be repeated’.661 It was not so much 
that high-rises were categorically uninhabitable; many wealthy Americans chose to 
live in luxury high-rise buildings. The difference was that the vulnerable and low-
income families placed in Baltimore’s high-rise housing projects did not have the 
same advantages as wealthy tenants nor even the ability to enrich their lives outside 
of their homes. While wealthy tenants of luxury buildings could afford health club 
memberships, spas, and restaurant meals, social housing families were more-or-less 
trapped by their surroundings. For Wise, the high-rise lifestyle only compounded the 
difficulties faced by low-income tenants, and argued that ‘When those apartments 
are stacked on top of each other in towers 10 or 20 stories high, the rudimentary, 
daily tasks of living become more difficult, stressful, and dangerous, if not 
impossible.’662 Fortunately, according to Wise, the solutions to the problems posed 
by high-rise living were relatively easy to enact. Firstly, Wise felt that despite the 
waxing popularity of higher density urban development (as of 1981), the HABC 
needed to halt construction of new high-rise housing projects. This advice turned out 
to be especially prescient, as no new high-rise projects were built in Baltimore after 
1981 and during the early 1990s all of Baltimore’s existing high-rise housing projects 
for family occupation were either demolished or repurposed for elderly 
occupation.663 Secondly, Wise argued that the problems of social deprivation could 
be mitigated through the omnipresence of social services, echoing Oscar Newman’s 
arguments in Defensible Space. Indeed, Wise herself noted that the presence of 
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social services for children, the disabled, and the elderly contributed towards the 
‘stability and relative success’ of the city’s housing projects.664 Yet Wise believed that 
the most important step towards improving high-rise life in housing projects was for 
tenants to take control of their own housing projects by setting strict social 
standards and by becoming intolerant of poor social behaviour. For Wise, this was 
only possible through tenant organization: 
 
[To] get depraved pushers off our stairways and our corners, and we cannot let our 
daughters have multiple teenage pregnancies. We have to raise our sons to protect us and 
honor us so that we do not become victims. We have to fight waste and vandalism. We have 
to fight the plantation-boss mentality in management. There is only one way to do these 
things, to make housing projects become communities, and that is to build popular 
representative and effective tenant organizations.665 
 
Luckily for Baltimorean social housing tenants, the RAB continued to advocate for 
the improvement of environmental conditions in the city’s housing projects and 
sought to include tenants in decision processes. Yet while many of these suggestions 
seem easier said than done, Wise dedicated her life to advocating for social housing 
improvement. Wise spent the entirety of her adult life in Baltimore social housing 
projects, including 25 years in high-rise Lafayette Courts, and eventually rose to 
become the Eastern Vice-Chairperson of the National Tenants Organization. Her 
intention was to improve living conditions for the tens of thousands of Baltimorean 
families who lived in the city’s housing projects. Interestingly, she was a fierce critic 
of the Section-8 housing voucher programme, though the impetus for the creation of 
the Section-8 vouchers was partially to rehouse families trapped in high-rise tower 
blocks into private housing or ‘scattered site’ housing projects.666 But in many ways, 
Wise was very successful in drawing attention to the inefficiency of high-rise social 
housing developments. There was scant development of high-rise housing projects 
in any American city during the 1980s; any high-rise projects built were exclusively 
for elderly occupation. Indeed, the eleven towers that composed Lafayette Courts, 
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were either demolished or converted into elderly housing in 1995.667 By the mid 
1990s, Henry Cisneros, HUD director during the Clinton administration, stunned even 
his most conservative critics by calling for all American high-rise social housing 
projects to be demolished in an official HUD report.668 Through her work with the 
RAB and HAC, then, Shirley Wise not only helped to improve living conditions for 
thousands of high-rise social housing dwellers, but also managed to convince varying 
levels of housing authorities of the inefficiency of high-rise tower blocks as social 
housing developments. Although not a public health professional, Wise’s efforts to 
combat the anti-social behaviour present in the city’s tower blocks point to the 
difficulties in maintaining a healthy, happy housing environment for the city’s most 
deprived residents. This difficulty included preventing the spread of tuberculosis 
infection in social housing. Both Glasgow and Baltimore continued to experience 
difficulties with controlling tuberculosis in their municipalities; even in Glasgow after 
the success of the Mass Miniature Radiography (MMR) campaign the city hosted a 
larger than expected tubercular population. In both cities, the aspect of social 
housing tenancy played a large role in the evaluation of tubercular patient recovery 
time. A review of the strategies utilized in combating tuberculosis in both cities and 
the role of social housing tenancy on tuberculosis recovery is useful in understanding 
the impact of social housing on tenant health in the 1960s and 1970s. 
 
Tuberculosis and Housing in Baltimore: 
 
 Tuberculosis had long been known as a ‘social disease’, and the relationship 
between the spread of the disease and poor housing had been documented by 
earlier public health professionals. Even Huntington Williams, the city’s health 
commissioner for over three decades until 1962, was convinced that the Black 
population’s higher incidence could be attributed almost fully to slum conditions and 
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overcrowding.669 During the post-War period in the United States, the relationship 
between poor housing and tuberculosis became even more apparent. For while 
effective tuberculosis drugs had been developed (including thioacetazone, 
capreomycin, and clofazimine, which were all introduced during the 1960s), 
tuberculosis incidence was growing in Baltimore. Despite increased funding from the 
USPHS, Baltimore witnessed almost a ten percent jump in positive tubercular 
specimens from 1964 to 1965.670 Furthermore, the death rate for tuberculosis cases 
in the city rose from 10.4 per 100,000 persons to 11.5 in the same period, with 
Blacks dying at a higher rate than Whites.671 City public health professionals could no 
longer pretend that tuberculosis was a nineteenth-century disease; it was very much 
a real problem and a conspicuous reminder of Baltimore’s declining fortunes. 
Matthew Tayback, then deputy commissioner of health under Commissioner Robert 
Farber, offered a stern admission in the annual health report for 1965:  
 
During the year it became increasingly clear that social and economic reforms in the lives of 
the many indigent and medically indigent families in the City was the urgent need to bring 
meaningful improvements in such problem areas as tuberculosis control, venereal disease 
control, high infant mortality levels, and inadequate care of the medically indigent, 
particularly of the elderly.672 
 
It seemed clear that Baltimorean health professionals were deeply concerned about 
the impact of tuberculosis on the city population, and were aware that control of the 
disease depended upon socio-economic conditions, i.e. poor housing. The situation 
was perceived as so dire that that same year the BCHD created the position of 
Administrative Health Officer for Tuberculosis Control to help quell the spread of 
tuberculosis cases. The person they chose to fill this role would spend the next 
decade working to lessen the extent of tuberculosis prevalence, and was uniquely 
qualified for the position. The BCHD chose Allan Moodie, a public health oriented 
                                                 
669 ‘Tuberculosis Data Put City among Worst; Death Rate Here Highest of Ten Largest U.S. 
Municipalities; Dr. Williams Lays Blame to Badly Housed Negro Population’ BS, November 1938, 
Vertical File, ‘Tuberculosis-Baltimore’, Enoch Pratt Free Library, Baltimore, MD. 
670 BCHD, Annual Report (Baltimore, MD: 1965), p.26. 
671 Ibid., p.12. 
672 Ibid., p. 19. 
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physician with the British Overseas Medical Service who had tackled the tuberculosis 
outbreak in Hong Kong, to come to Baltimore to devise a tuberculosis control 
programme and restructure treatment efforts. While not a housing professional, 
Moodie like Tayback and Farber recognized the social determinants of tuberculosis 
were just as important for control as actual drug therapy; patients could not be 
expected to recuperate fully if they inhabited slums or exhibited itinerant 
behaviours. Moodie would spend the next several years working to develop the 
United States’ most aggressive tuberculosis control and prevention programme, 
based mostly on out-patient ambulatory treatment. Coincidentally, Moodie was a 
native Glaswegian and a graduate of the University of Glasgow medical school.673 
Although he spent the mid fifties to the early sixties combating tuberculosis in Hong 
Kong, and not in his native city, Moodie was certainly aware of Glasgow’s 
ambulatory chest X-ray programme in the late 1950s.674 This doubtless informed his 
understanding of tuberculosis treatment, and surely Moodie sought to imitate the 
success of his home city’s efforts in his new home in Baltimore. With both inspiration 
and experience, Moodie set upon establishing the growing efforts of ambulatory, 
home-based tuberculosis care in Baltimore.  
 
 The reason the BCHD choose Moodie for the position was that they believe 
he was particularly qualified considering a perceived similarity between the cities of 
Hong Kong and Baltimore, and their respective tubercular patients. While the 
comparison might seem odd to a contemporary audience, in the 1960s both cities 
were viewed through the European-centric mindset as exotic, non-white localities 
that exhibited non-standard patient behaviour. Both cities had a ‘tropical’ climate 
and were dominated by racial groups that were perceived to have a natural 
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Fifties: A Democratic Health Service in Action’, Scottish Health History: International Contexts, 
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susceptibility to tuberculosis.675 Furthermore, neither Hong Kong nor Baltimore had 
enough hospital space to treat the thousands of tuberculosis cases, and in any case 
according to Tayback, Farber, and others the social and economic determinants of 
tuberculosis were far more important for treatment than the mere provision of 
drugs and hospital space. When Moodie was in Hong Kong, only 800 hospital bed 
spaces were made available to tuberculosis patients (in a city of three million people, 
more than three times as populous as Baltimore at the time), and even then the 
spaces were made available only for difficult or recurring cases. Hong Kong’s first 
tuberculosis clinic opened in 1947, and Moodie estimated that by 1950 there was 
only one hospital bed for every 25 to 30 tuberculosis cases.676 Furthermore, even 
though Moodie knew of Glasgow’s ambulatory radiography campaign in 1957, he 
was probably more influenced by the published results of fellow British Overseas 
Medical Service physicians, most notably tuberculosis research conducted by the 
Madras Chemotherapy Centre and the East Africa Tuberculosis Investigation 
Centre.677 While the Madras study (funded by both British and Indian centres along 
with the WHO) did not find much disparity in results between tubercular patients 
treated in hospital and those treated at home (indeed, patients treated in a TB 
sanatorium produced slightly better results), out-patient treatment was nearly as 
effective at a significant cost reduction.678 Similarly, research conducted in East 
Africa suggested found that home-based oral drug regimens had a curative rate of 
80% - again indicating a better cost/result ratio.679 Thus, out of both necessity and an 
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acute understanding of the nature of tuberculosis, Moodie cultivated a highly 
patient-centred domiciliary approach to treatment. Moodie developed a nine month 
programme of ambulatory treatment for tubercular patients, involving a 24 week 
monitoring period of almost daily supervised medication administration at Hong 
Kong’s TB clinic, followed by a 12 week unsupervised (but documented) period of 
home treatment. The programme was a resounding success, though Moodie 
attributed the success to hired public health aides. The aides were mostly young 
university educated men, without any explicit medical training, and who were 
responsible primarily for tracking the patients’ whereabouts and ensuring drug 
therapy adherence. Later, in his published research on his work on Baltimore, 
Moodie attributed the success to the same strategy – employing local public health 
aides (though a great many in Baltimore were women and often only high school 
graduates) to monitor the progress of indigent tubercular patients. What Moodie 
discovered in Baltimore, however, was that the city’s social housing developments 
provided not only useful respite for poor slum dwellers, but facilitated better health 
monitoring of tubercular patients and potentially provided a more conducive 
environment for recuperation. 
 
 In line with the BCHD, Moodie recognized the direct impact slum housing had 
on tuberculosis. In an article Moodie characterized tuberculosis as ‘a disease of the 
very poor, the slum dweller, the migrant worker, the alcoholic’ and reiterated that 
the difficulty in tuberculosis treatment was not the efficacy of prevailing drugs but 
managing patient behaviour.680 Although Moodie spent much of his career in Hong 
Kong, his description of the disease in an American context had been preceded by 
other public health professionals; Jones Jr. et al longitudinal study of tubercular 
homeless men concluded that a ‘high rate of incidence of tuberculosis occurs in a 
transient, very mobile population group’ and that in general they lived ‘under 
conditions that are likely to foster infection of others in the same group.’681 The trick 
to helping tuberculosis patients, then, was to ensure that patients followed 
                                                 
680 Ibid., p. 384. 
681 Herbert Jones Jr. et al, ‘Incidence of Tuberculosis Among Homeless Men, Journal of the American 
Medical Association, Vol. 155, (31/07/1954): 1222-1223. 
 312 
treatment. Explaining his public health philosophy to the Baltimore Sun, Moodie 
assured middle class Baltimoreans that ‘TB is an eminently curable disease. If you 
can get the drugs into the patient, you can cure the disease. The problem with many 
alcoholics, loners, and the uneducated is in finding the patient.’682 Luckily for 
Moodie, he did not have look for prospective patients himself – he had the backing 
of the BCHD, funding from the USPHS, and the authority to hire public health 
workers to monitor high-risk tubercular persons. While Moodie and his staff were 
compelled to provide care for destitute patients, they came to find that certain 
patients were easier to care for than others. Not surprisingly, Moodie and his staff 
came to find that Baltimore’s social housing developments served a dual purpose: as 
social housing projects offered a higher concentration of tubercular patients than 
average city neighbourhoods, they were an environment for public health workers to 
find tubercular patients. Furthermore, the projects were an environment better 
suited for monitoring said patients, and were thus more conducive for recuperation. 
In the five years leading up to 1970, Moodie would endeavour to expand the role of 
public health aides in Baltimore to cultivate a programme of domiciliary tuberculosis 
care. The results of this programme should be examined to understand the impact of 
social housing on tuberculosis recuperation. 
 
                                                 
682 Frank Bogardus, ‘Recalcitrant TB Patients Traced’, Baltimore Sun, 09/12/1965. 
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Glaswegian Physician Allan S. Moodie, Director of the Bureau of Communicable Diseases of the 
Baltimore City Health Department, Circa 1970, Photo Courtesy: Baltimore Sun. 
 
In 1963, the USPHS published a report entitled ‘The Future of Tuberculosis Control’, 
wherein the Surgeon General’s task force on tuberculosis found that federal money 
was needed to better combat tuberculosis. Specifically, one of the report’s explicit 
recommendations in halting the spread of the disease was that: 
 
 Recruitment and training of able persons for assignment to the States to work in 
tuberculosis control. Such a cadre of trained personnel should reach a total of 100 within 3 
years. In the control of this long-term disease, in which many people must receive periodic 
service in some cases for a lifetime, useful and dynamic records are a necessity. The task 
force is of the opinion that a central service using automatic data processing techniques 
would be invaluable in tuberculosis control, both to local areas and to the national effort, 
and it recommends that the Public Health Service continue to work towards establishing 
such a service.683 
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For Moodie, the recruitment of public health aides was imperative to the success of 
any tuberculosis control programme as he considered the disease a chronic 
condition; even with adequate treatment the healing process could take months. 
Furthermore, the report noted that ‘new findings are … essential to rapid progress 
and believes continuation of Public Health Service tuberculosis studies and the 
addition of studies of the epidemiology of tuberculosis in cities in the United 
States’.684 Moodie’s work in Baltimore (and the money to fund his efforts), stemmed 
from this report and the sincerity of the USPHS’s tuberculosis efforts. In 1964, a year 
after this report, Baltimore City received these extra funds, and the effect was 
noticeable immediately. Moodie established a paramedical group separate from the 
general staff of the city’s five chest clinics, known as the ‘investigative staff’. The 
staff officers would be under the authority of the tuberculosis control programme 
but supervised daily by their respective individual chest clinics.685 The tuberculosis 
staff was divided into three components: nurses, who were to provide medical 
supervision and administer treatment; clerks, who were to record results and 
statistical information, and the investigative staff, who were primarily field agents 
designed to ensure patients followed their treatment.686 While the field agents might 
have seemed the least crucial to the success of the programme, the exact opposite 
was true; public health aides were needed to keep track of tuberculosis patients 
precisely because they were so hard to find. While two university educated men 
were hired immediately, to deal with more irascible male patients, most of the 
public health aides were inner city women without degrees. They were viewed as 
having intuitive knowledge of their communities, and were considered beneficial for 
the programme’s image.687 Although some of the first hired aides were sent off to 
field work, later the aides received 8 weeks of training in public health and social 
work through Baltimore city hospitals. Women who received this training became 
fully capable of general social work, and the programme was seen as a skill training 
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scheme. Considering the limited budget of the tuberculosis programme, their 
contribution was essential.   
 
 
A public health aide interviews a TB patient’s close contact, Moodie and Rogers, ‘Baltimore Uses Inner 
City Aides’, p. 956. 
As the investigative staff grew, and the staff members gained experience, their 
responsibilities increased. Moodie found that health aides who made between 1.3 
and 1.5 home visits to tubercular patients seemed to induce patient compliance and 
clinic attendance, and that within two weeks more than 75 % of delinquent patients 
would be back on track. Most significantly, just as studies in British colonial cities had 
found, the cost/result ratio favoured public health aides over nurses. Put more 
simply, Moodie reported that ‘visit for visit, the health aide has proved to be at least 
as efficient in this kind of work as the nurse, and at half the price.’688 The graph 
below illustrates just how much responsibility the newly trained public health aides 
took on from traditional nursing staff as the years progressed and they gained 
competence: 
                                                 
688 Ibid., p. 960. 
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Moodie and Rogers, ‘Baltimore Uses Inner City Aides’, p. 958. 
 
By the end of 1969, public health aides were conducting nearly two-thirds of all field 
visits to tuberculosis patients. The success of Moodie’s program in Baltimore was 
undeniable. While 40% of tubercular patients released from hospital in 1965 were 
listed as unlocatable, by 1969 only 5% of tubercular patients were considered 
unlocatable. Furthermore, evidence suggested that the general population trusted 
the public health aides more than the nurses associated with the tuberculosis 
programme. Between December 1965 and September 1968, the percentage rate of 
identified patients attending chest clinics for drug therapy, X-rays, and checkups, fell 
from 83.8% to 59%. During this period, nurses were responsible for inducing patients 
to attend chest clinics; once this responsibility shifted to public health aides in 
September 1968, regular attendance shot up to 89% within six months.689 This data 
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signified that not only were the public health aides cheaper managers of tubercular 
patients, but also more efficacious managers. Moodie’s method of employing health 
aides into the field to administer care for domiciled patients, then, seemed to be 
effective. Yet his early research did not specifically compare the results of hospital 
based tuberculosis treatment and domiciliary care, as studies in Madras and Nairobi 
had. In order to identify slum housing as being unconducive to recuperation, along 
with facilitating infectious disease spread, Moodie would have to focus his research 
efforts on the impact of housing on tuberculosis patients. Although Moodie did not 
ever implicate social housing specifically in his research, his later research pointed to 
slum housing conditions and concomitant overcrowding as a primary determinant of 
differences in recuperation speeds. His research on the detrimental effects 
tubercular patients experienced while living in inner city slum housing provided a 
public health counterargument to critics of architectural determinism, that the built 
environment very well could alter human condition.  
 
 Moodie was not the first public health professional in Baltimore to warn of 
the connection between slum housing and tuberculosis. Since the publication of 
Wilner’s research in the early 1960s, public health professionals and biostatisticians 
had viewed social housing populations and slum housing populations as an 
interesting pair of test and control groups.690 Even before Wilner, tuberculosis 
treatment centred on social housing; the BCHD in cooperation with the Maryland 
Tuberculosis Association (a non-governmental organization) conducted their first X-
ray screening at the Cherry Hill Homes in Southwest Baltimore in 1946.691 In 
Glasgow, 37 mobile radiography units operating out of vans visited social housing 
schemes throughout the city in a five week blitz in 1957 to screen for tuberculosis, 
offering lottery prizes to compel attendance.692 Furthermore, two years after 
Moodie’s arrival in Baltimore, commissioner of health Robert Farber noted on 
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Baltimore Health News television syndicate that poor housing along with diet was 
the most immediate preventable catalyst for tuberculosis spread: 
 
It’s also a matter of nutrition and housing. It’s in the low economic areas that people are 
crowded together… people living as many as five or six in one bedroom; their diet is not 
adequate, therefore their resistance to tuberculosis is lowered. I’ve said earlier that the 
Negroes, for instance, have a high TB death and case rate compared to the Whites. Well, this 
does not mean that the Negro is more susceptible to tuberculosis. It just simply means that 
the Negro is living under poorer conditions than Whites and therefore is more at risk to 
tuberculosis.693 
 
Farber’s statement sheds light on Moodie’s approach to tuberculosis control in a 
number of ways. Blacks were always disproportionately likely to be tubercular in 
Baltimore, and by the late 1960s constituted the majority of tuberculosis cases in the 
city when they had not (quite) become the majority population. Of course, Blacks 
were also always more disproportionately likely to inhabit over-crowded, slum 
housing, thus exacerbating (and potentially incubating) any tuberculosis cases. 
However, by this point in time Blacks were also the clear majority of social housing 
tenants, and while the perceived quality-of-life of housing project tenants had come 
under question during this time, few would argue that life in Baltimore’s social 
housing projects was as injurious to health as occupying a flop house or sleeping 
rough. While Blacks were more likely to suffer from tuberculosis, social housing at 
least provided respite from over-crowding, the housing determinant of health that 
the city’s commissioner of health viewed as most aggravating tuberculosis 
recuperation. Not surprisingly, Moodie found crowding in Baltimore’s slums as an 
important indicator of the success of his out-patient tuberculosis treatment.    
 
 Whether or not a patient resided in social housing impacted the success of 
tuberculosis treatment in two ways. Firstly, if a tuberculosis patient was a social 
housing tenant, the patient was much more likely to have adequate private space, 
and probably their own bedroom. This was not merely a minor comfort. Through his 
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research, Moodie found a direct correlation with higher transmission of tuberculosis 
in crowded, slum dwellings. In 1974, Moodie published a longitudinal study of the 
contagiousness of tuberculosis patients recuperating in inner city slum dwellings, 
comparing tuberculosis infectivity before and after the initiation of drug therapy. 
Moodie initially sought to track the tuberculosis status of 156 household contacts of 
home-bound tuberculosis patients, i.e. persons who shared a residence with said 
patients.694 In order to assess the study contacts’ infectivity, Moodie subjected 
contacts to tuberculin testing, testing contacts as soon as the index patient was 
identified as tubercular, then at intervals of 2,4,6,20, and 52 weeks.695 Of the 70 
patients that remained tracked in the study (81 tested originally as non-tubercular, 
11 contacts disappeared, likely due to slum families’ proclivity for itinerancy), sixteen 
persons, or 23% of all contacts, developed tuberculosis before the index patient 
started drug therapy.696 The table below illustrates the number of contacts who 
became reactors and their time of conversion: 
 
 
‘Table 3: Number of Initially Tuberculin-Nonreactive Contacts who Converted to Tuberculin Reactors’, 
American Review of Respiratory Disease, (1974), Vol. 110, p. 811. 
 
While Moodie did find that once a patient had started therapy the patient became 
dramatically less contagious (thus nullifying the injurious impact of contact proximity 
to patients), the study pointed to a clear message about the connection between 
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housing and health. Even with the pharmaceutical advancements of the twentieth 
century, overcrowded poor housing facilitated the spread of disease: if patients did 
not follow their drug therapy fastidiously (which was more common than not 
without public health aide supervision), then patients living in crowded slum housing 
were more likely to infect their close contacts than adequately housed patients. 
Furthermore, while the study did not include a control social housing group, the 
study amounted to a tacit endorsement of the public health benefits of social 
housing. Not only were social housing units more spacious than slum dwellings, but 
as public health aides could locate social housing tubercular patients with greater 
ease (due to their decreased likelihood for itinerancy), their drug therapy was more 
efficacious. True, slum dwelling patients who followed their drug regimens 
religiously arrested their contagiousness, but as this behaviour was so difficult to 
enforce, living in overcrowded slum housing could be viewed as risky behaviour, or 
at least a significantly deleterious determinant to health.  In condemnation of slum 
conditions, Moodie concluded in his longitudinal study that: 
 
The evidence that untreated tuberculosis patients are highly infectious in the inner city home 
is strong, because approximately 20 per cent of 70 initially nonreactive household contacts 
were infected during the 1 or 2 months before treatment of patient was begun. The absence 
of late conversions in contacts of patients treated at home is consistent with a rapid loss of 
infectivity after initiation of chemotherapy.697 
 
 Following Moodie’s research, and thanks to his expansion of the role of 
public health aides, tuberculosis incidence rate continued to decline in Baltimore 
throughout the 1970s. The city even managed to record the sharpest decline in 
tuberculosis rates, and deaths from the disease dropped precipitously. This did not 
mean Moodie’s efforts and the continued expansion of social housing quelled 
tuberculosis in the city entirely. Indeed, despite progress in the intervening years, 
Baltimore had the one of the highest tuberculosis incidence rate of American cities 
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as late as 1980, second only to San Francisco.698 What the decline did signify, 
however, was a rebuttal of social housing critics: nineteenth-century diseases still 
existed in American cities, and these diseases flourished in slum housing. Baltimore’s 
social housing projects may have not been luxurious, but they did seem to stem the 
spread of infectious disease, specifically tuberculosis, better than overcrowded slum 
housing. With Moodie’s research on the negative impact of slum housing on health, 
medical academics and public health professionals now had ammunition against 
social housing detractors. Yet while Moodie’s Baltimorean experiment drew heavily 
on Glasgow’s prior tuberculosis control programmes, his research outcomes did not 
match the results of transatlantic research. For in Glasgow, public health research 
seemed to suggest that social housing residents were more susceptible, not less, to 
tuberculosis and other infections. While these studies confirmed much of the 
suspicions of social housing critics of the era, they were none-the-less provocative: 
Wilner and Jephcott had both argued that while social housing developments were 
not perfect, they were an improvement on slum life. A review of the public health 
literature on the impact of Glaswegian social housing on tuberculosis and other 
health metrics should help explain the deterioration of public and academic opinion 
of social housing in Scotland in the years leading up to 1980. 
 
 
Tuberculosis and Housing in Glasgow: 
 
 In the late 1960s and 1970s, public health professionals in Glasgow came to 
many of the same realizations as had their transatlantic counterparts. The 
importance of the research produced during the period, however, was far less 
dramatic than in Baltimore. For by this point, the impact of tuberculosis on 
Glasgow’s population had diminished significantly. Although tuberculosis was once a 
serious scourge in Glasgow, health professionals had tackled successfully the disease 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Specifically, the 1957 mass X-Ray campaign in 
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Glasgow, which sought to screen ordinary Glaswegians for the disease in their homes 
and workplaces, mitigated the impact of tuberculosis near the general population. 
While there were 8,135 reported cases of pulmonary tuberculosis in Scotland in 
1950, by 1975 there were only 1,200 reported cases.699 Yet despite this significant 
decline, tuberculosis among at-risk groups remained a vexing problem for health 
professionals. Specifically, the indigent and itinerant, who opted for temporary 
housing (hostels, night shelters, and Scotland’s infamous ‘model lodging-houses’) 
were especially unable to recuperate from tuberculosis.700 While the lifestyle choices 
of these groups certainly did not contribute to good health, their housing did not 
exactly facilitate a healthy lifestyle. Additionally, as the city’s demographics changed, 
new health problems arose. While Glasgow had long been a mono-racial city, by the 
1970s immigrant groups, most notably South Asians, had established communities in 
the city. For a variety of reasons, health professionals noticed early on that these 
communities were more susceptible to certain diseases, including rickets and 
tuberculosis.701 Thus, while tuberculosis was no longer a massive problem for 
ordinary Glaswegians by the 1960s and 1970s, it remained a problem among certain 
subgroups. Whether these subgroups were itinerant, indigent, immigrants, or White 
Glaswegians unlucky enough still to reside in slums, the two factors that united these 
groups was susceptibility to tuberculosis and poor housing. While public and housing 
professional opinion of social housing had already begun to wane by the late 1960s, 
public health professionals found that slums and temporary housing contributed to 
poor health, and that social housing retained the potential to offer its tenants respite 
from infectious disease and substandard environmental conditions.   
 
 Although this chapter focuses on the public health trends in the years leading 
up to 1980, the mass radiography campaign conducted over a five week period 
between March and April of 1957 is too large to ignore. The success of the campaign 
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was all the more astounding considering the prevalence of tuberculosis in the city. In 
1957 the city’s tuberculosis incidence rate was Western Europe’s highest at 160 per 
100,000 people, and concomitantly, the city’s death rate was the highest at 25 per 
100,000 people.702 Ten years after the end of WWII, this was considered a medical 
embarrassment, and prompted Secretary of State for Scotland James Stuart in 1956 
to announce a two year radiography campaign to eradicate tuberculosis starting next 
year.703 Stuart and the Corporation managed to secure every single ambulatory 
MMR vans from throughout Britain (37 in total), hoping that each van could screen 
approximately 2,000 people a week for tuberculosis.704Although Stuart and his 
successor John MacLay recognized the need for a wide and intense campaign 
tuberculosis, neither of them could have predicted the programme’s success. In the 
duration of the programme, 714,915 persons were screened for tuberculosis, or 76% 
of Glasgow’s total population. The programme found 2,755 active cases of 
tuberculosis and a further 5,379 cases of potentially active tubercular status.705 The 
table below illustrates just how prevalent tuberculosis was in the city relative to the 
mass radiography campaigns in comparable cities: 
 
Four Community M.M.R. Surveys, ‘Review of Mass Radiography Services: A Report by the Joint 
Tuberculosis Council’, Tubercle (1964), Vol. 45: 263. 
 
The campaign’s success was attributed to three factors: the ambulatory nature of 
the screening, community mobilization, and heavy advertising. In terms of 
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advertising, the municipal authorities saturated Glasgow with notifications. The 
MOH for Glasgow sent a letter to every household asking for persons over 14 to 
attend, lottery prizes were offered to encourage attendance (including a new car and 
colour television sets), and posters were placed in thousands of pubs, shops, and 
post offices. Overall, out of a budget of £114,269, the DHS spent £17,000 on 




An illuminated ambulatory X-Ray tram-car positioned as an advertisement, operated by Glasgow 
Corporation, circa 1957, photo courtesy: Wellcome Library. 
 
 While the campaign was a broad effort, health professionals noted its 
particular impact in attracting certain groups for screening. Most notably, older men 
participated enthusiastically in the programme, despite their usual intransigence to 
comply with public health campaigns. Consider the photograph presented below – 
on the last day of the radiography campaign, George’s Square was filled with 
working class middle aged and older men, queuing for X-Ray screening. Even though 
nearly a quarter of Glaswegians did not participate in the campaign, evidence 
suggests they were not necessarily riskier patients from a public health perspective; 
6756 contacts X-Rayed after the campaign produced only 17 positive tuberculosis 
cases, an incidence rate less than the initially five week campaign (0.25% vs. 
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0.38%).707 Yet while the radiography campaign was undoubtedly a marked success, it 
did not totally eradicate tuberculosis. Indeed, while thousands of people were 
notified of their tuberculosis status, and the number of tuberculosis cases declined 
precipitously after the campaign, the prevalence of tuberculosis in certain subgroups 
of people (i.e. those who lived in poor housing) remained stubbornly intact. In order 
to nullify tuberculosis as a threat in these populations, a more targeted approach to 
tuberculosis detection and treatment was necessary. This would involve greater 




Queuing for X-Ray screening on final day of programme, George’s Square, Glasgow, photo courtesy: 
Mitchell Library, ref.  930.99.142 
 
 As established above detecting tuberculosis in patients was only the 
beginning of treatment; once solitary public health professionals had to cultivate a 
plan towards wellness. A clean home environment for recuperation was seen as 
essential, and social housing seemed to provide this. Since the beginning of 
Glasgow’s rehousing efforts, the city had sought to pay particular attention to 
tubercular families. As slums were considered injurious to tuberculosis recuperation 
(as studies in Baltimore by Wells-Riley and Moodie would confirm), a certain amount 
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of social housing constructed was allocated to families with tubercular members.708 
Although there were concerns that concentrating tuberculosis families in social 
housing schemes could exacerbate the problem in certain communities, reports 
from the MOH for Glasgow confirmed that public health professionals recognized 
the benefit of a clean, spacious, amenable flat for tuberculosis recuperation. Indeed, 
tuberculosis status was an important component of rehousing efforts in the 1940s 
and 1950s, and allowed families who inhabited relatively stable housing to receive 
social housing offers quicker than other applicants.709 Perhaps because of these 
tuberculosis rehousing efforts (or perhaps in spite of them), the radiography 
campaign focused heavily on social housing tenants, and visited each of the city’s 
peripheral housing schemes. The image below points to the momentousness of the 
vans’ arrival in these areas: 
 
 
‘Queue at 11 P.M. at Mobile Unit in Drumchapel’, photo courtesy: Mitchell Library 
 
Yet by 1963 the number of families being rehoused due to tuberculosis status had 
dropped to double digits. Ironically, it was likely that the dramatic success of the 
                                                 
708 Anne Davis, ‘A Historical Perspective on Tuberculosis and its Control’, Tuberculosis: A 
Comprehensive International Approach (New York: Marcel Dekker, 2000), p. 12; R Riley and W Wells 
et al, ‘Air Hygiene in Tuberculosis: Quantitative Studies of Infectivity and Control in a Pilot Ward’, 
American Review of Tuberculosis, Vol. 75 (1957): 420-430; Moodie and Rogers, ‘Baltimore Uses Inner 
City Aides’. 
709  ‘Housing’, HC Debate 30/11/1948, Vol. 458, cc 1797-1798; ‘Housing’, HC Debate, 13/03/1950, Vol. 
473, cc 804-808. 
 327 
radiography campaign contributed to the decline in importance of tuberculosis 
status as a factor in rehousing.710 The chart below illustrates the decline of the 
annual numbers of families rehoused under this scheme in the years leading up to 
1971:  
 
Table 6: Glasgow Tubercular Families Rehoused, 1934-1971 
Year: Number of Families 
Recommended to be 
Rehoused: 
Number of Families 
Actually Rehoused: 
1934-1935 3,764 1,484 
1946-1955 5,459 4,372 
1956-1960 1,822 1,822 
1961 189 180 
1962 113 119 
1963 65 78 
1964 63 69 
1965 44 32 
1966 53 34 
1967 30 42 
1968 36 25 
1969 27 14 
1970 26 17 
1971 18 8 
Data from: Medical Officer of Health for Glasgow, Annual Report 1964, p. 287; Medical Officer of 
Health for Glasgow, Annual Report 1971, p. 229. 
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The decline in rehousing tubercular families did not reflect a shortage of social 
housing, but rather a significant decrease in the prevalence of tuberculosis. The 
number of tuberculosis cases in Glasgow’s general population had fallen from over 
1,500 in 1958 (a year after the radiography campaign) to less than 500 cases in 
1971.711 This explains how, by 1971, only a single digit number of families qualified 
for social housing due to their tuberculosis status; tuberculosis was not viewed as 
affecting the general population and therefore did not require special attention. 
Furthermore, the tuberculosis cases that did surface tended to be detections of 
patients with healed tuberculosis foci in their lungs. These cases mostly required 
little or no intervention. Put simply, by the 1970s medical professionals did not view 
tuberculosis as a serious problem in Glasgow. 
 
Yet despite cavalier attitudes about the success of the radiography campaign 
in Glasgow, and the real decline in incidence, tuberculosis had not been totally 
eradicated in the city by the 1970s. Indeed, tuberculosis incidence in Scotland was 
the highest in Western Europe, and West of Scotland medical professionals offered a 
stern warning about complacency: 
 
While the decline of pulmonary tuberculosis is both welcome and gratifying, there is, 
nevertheless, a danger that it may be regarded in the same light as diphtheria; that is to say, 
as a disease whose occurrence is both rare and unexpected. This is not the case in Scotland 
and is certainly not so as far as Lanarkshire is concerned. Here tuberculosis still exists, must 
never be taken for granted, and must constantly be considered as a community hazard.712 
 
The problem of tuberculosis in Glasgow had dissipated, not disappeared. 
Furthermore, some communities in the city were especially impacted by the disease. 
There were particular subgroups of people who were still highly susceptible to 
tuberculosis, most notably the elderly, mental institution patients, prisoners, and the 
indigent and itinerant. Of these groups, the latter’s susceptibility to tuberculosis was 
most conditioned by their housing. While the lifestyles of what were then known as 
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‘vagrants’ (i.e. engagement in risky behaviour) most certainly contributed to 
increased likelihood of tuberculosis contraction, their proclivity to reside in 
substandard housing only exacerbated the severity of the disease and furthered the 
spread to other patients. Indeed, Edinburgh MP Robin Cook contended that: 
 
This group of people contains a high incidence of social and medical problems. Study after 
study has shown that this group contains a higher incidence of alcoholism, drug abuse, 
personality disorders, epilepsy and tuberculosis than any comparable social group. 
Notoriously Camberwell (a district in South London) hostel contains more mentally ill people 
than do most state mental hospitals.713 
 
Yet while the plight of the indigent had long been known to public health 
professionals, in the late 1950s and early 1960s public health professionals were 
more concerned with combating the tuberculosis epidemic on mass (re: general 
population) scale. This attitude, however, would have to evolve as public health 
professionals grappled with the fact that tuberculosis was becoming a less common 
disease. Indeed, at a conference on tuberculosis eradication in New Zealand, a 
physician argued that ‘the large-scale expensive surveys as conducted in Edinburgh 
and Glasgow… are no longer justified in view of the decreasing incidence of the 
disease’.714 Clearly, tuberculosis treatment in the late 1960s and 1970s would be 
more focused on specific groups who, despite the successes of mass radiography, 
remained vulnerable. As investigations would show, the most vulnerable population 
group for tuberculosis contraction were the indigent. These persons tended to 
congregate in temporary housing- model lodging-houses, night shelters, and hostels. 
Public health research into the health of the indigent would find that their 
substandard housing was a significant contributor to their proclivity towards 
tuberculosis contraction and slow recuperation paces, and that social housing 
accommodation would have better protected this population from exposure to 
tuberculosis and better enabled the healing process.  
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 The early focus on the general population did not mean that medical 
professionals were unaware that tuberculosis impacted some population groups 
more severely than others. Indeed, several medical and public professionals 
investigated the problem of tuberculosis in ‘vagrant’ populations before the 1970s. 
In the 1950s, the MOH for Glasgow Stuart Laidlaw (1946-1955) was interested in the 
impact of indigent housing on health, in particular tuberculosis. In one of his studies, 
Laidlaw found that tuberculosis was the fourth most common cause of death of 
tenants of Glasgow’s infamous ‘model lodging-houses’. Furthermore, once tenants 
were diagnosed with tuberculosis, their average length of survival afterwards was 
three years. On those who were diagnosed, Laidlaw wrote that ‘Neither of these had 
previously sought medical advice, and it was not until they were unable to rise from 
their bunks that their superintendent became aware that they were ill’.715 Laidlaw 
thus concluded that because occupants of model lodging-houses were at best 
disregarded and at worst viewed with disdain, their housing choice contributed to a 
delayed diagnosis. Considering this lack of concern for tenants, it is surprising that 
tubercular patients survived for as long as they did. The lifestyle choices of 
occupants did not contribute to good health, to be fair, and their increased 
likelihood of late diagnosis and treatment was certainly due partially to their own 
intransigence. After 1957, J.E. Geddes invited over 860 tenants of Glasgow’s lodging-
houses for radiography screening. Only 193 (22%) could be encouraged to submit to 
an X-Ray; 67 of whom were referred to chest clinics. 56 occupants attended, and 22 
were found to have tuberculosis.716 This was a stark illustration of the increased 
cases of tuberculosis in lodging-houses; while the 1957 campaign produced a 
positive rate of nearly 4%, Geddes’ efforts produced an 11% positive rate of those 
screened. Furthermore, a higher concentration of tuberculosis cases in lodging-
houses seemed to have collateral damage beyond the other occupants; research in 
Belfast in the 1960s found that tuberculosis cases in areas in the immediate vicinity 
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of lodging-houses were higher than the city average prevalence.717 The problem of 
tuberculosis in ‘vagrant’ populations interested medical professionals so much that it 
provoked a report of the Joint Tuberculosis Council in 1965 on the prevalence of the 
disease in lodging houses. While the report focused on English cities outside London, 
they discovered an important aspect of treating tuberculosis in indigent populations. 
Standard chemotherapy produced little results due to resistant tuberculosis foci 
present in these populations – and patients could not recuperate fully in the 
crowded, insanitary conditions of the lodging-houses. The report recommended that 
occupants of these institutions be rehoused into more amenable accommodation, 
which could only mean social housing, given the report’s near blanket condemnation 
of temporary housing. Glasgow’s lodging-houses fared no better; ten years after the 
Joint Tuberculosis Council’s report, occupants were still at far greater risk for 
tuberculosis. A look at data published by the Greater Glasgow Health Board (GGHB) 
of active tuberculosis in Glasgow’s model lodging-houses in the 1970s illustrates the 
extent of the problem: 
 
Table 7: Tuberculosis in Glasgow Model Lodging-Houses, 1976-1980 
Year: Number of 
Screenings  
Number of Active 
TB Cases 
Percentage of TB 
Cases 
1976 787 6 7.62 
1977 792 14 17.68 
1978 1,298 27 20.80 
1979 2,434 33 13.56 
1980 1,855 18 9.70 
… … … … 
Yearly Avg.: 1433.2 19.6 13.87 
Data taken from Greater Glasgow Health Board, Annual Report: Mass Radiography Service, (1976), p. 
19; (1977), p. 15; (1978), p. 15; (1979), p. 12; (1980), p. 13. 
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Although the active tuberculosis cases declined after the spike in cases from 1977-
1978 by 1980, the table above illustrates just how precarious it was to live in 
indigent housing. Many argued that society’s indigent and itinerant persons 
(alcoholics, drug addicts, homeless, etc.) would live healthier lives in social housing; 
that lodging-houses and similar forms of accommodation only facilitated poor 
behaviour and could ‘adversely affect their return to society’.718 Yet much like social 
housing, indigent housing had its detractors and its supporters. Oldham MP Michael 
Meacher castigated the impact of slum clearance schemes on lodging-houses, 
maintaining that ‘the growing crisis among homeless single people is perhaps the 
most telling indictment of the indifference and unconcern bred by affluence in a 
market system’, and further added that by failing to find suitable housing for those 
displaced by closing lodging houses the State had ‘withdrawn from its social 
responsibilities.’719 In Scotland, Edinburgh MP Robin Cook, who by his own account 
had 800 constituents living in lodging-houses, found the incessant condemnation of 
lodging-houses and the like was counterproductive. In particular, Cook argued that it 
was unnecessarily punitive to arrest and detain lodging-house occupants with 
vagrancy; one his constituents had been arrested for vagrancy despite having 
resided in the same lodging-house for ten years.720 Similarly, and although there at 
least appeared to be a correlation between model-lodging houses and tuberculosis, 
Laidlaw viewed them as a social necessity. In his PhD thesis on model-lodging 
occupants in Glasgow, Laidlaw wrote that ‘it has been shown that in large centres of 
population the common lodging-house is a necessity. It is here that the flotsam and 
jetsam of society drift together.’721 Clearly, lodging-houses had a purpose – but 
public health professionals wondered if there were better methods of housing 
itinerant tubercular patients. 
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 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Glasgow physician K.R. Patel sought to 
determine the impact of indigent housing on the health of occupants through a 
prospective survey. Patel, who was a physician with the Department of Respiratory 
Medicine at the Western Infirmary, wondered if occupants of Glasgow’s model 
lodging-houses, hostels, and night shelters could be encouraged to submit to chest 
X-Rays or to comply with outpatient drug therapy. Earlier research in Glasgow and 
other British cities had shown that residents of these housing types were more likely 
to have tuberculosis, and Moodie’s research in Baltimore had shown that 
overcrowded housing conditions coupled with chemotherapy non-compliance 
resulted in less successful recuperation. RG Priest found that tenancy in Edinburgh 
lodging-houses contributed to alcoholism, which in turn exacerbated mental 
illness.722 Furthermore, Patel et al had also discovered that pulmonary tuberculosis 
incidence in Glasgow and neighbouring Lanarkshire was among the highest in Britain, 
and that environmental conditions including housing, contributed to this high 
incidence.723 There was little question, then, that Glasgow’s indigent population 
seemed to be particularly susceptible to tuberculosis contraction. Whether the 
inhabitants of indigent housing were likely to submit to treatment, however, was 
less predictable. Patel, who was familiar with the medical literature on the treatment 
of ‘vagrants’, was not optimistic. Commenting on the limitations of traditional 
treatment when applied to indigent populations, Patel wrote that ‘outpatient 
chemotherapy of vagrants… is generally unsuccessful as these people are unable to 
cope with appointment systems usually operated at hospital outpatient clinics and 
antipathy towards them from hospital staff and other patients.’724 Thus, much like 
Baltimore’s indigent and overcrowded tuberculosis patients, efficacious treatment 
seemed out of reach without significant intervention. While lodging-houses offered 
concentrations of tubercular cases, they did not yield exemplary patients. The data 
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produced in Patel’s early research confirmed the difficulty in treating the indigent. In 
the control portion of his experiment, the study population was mostly unresponsive 
to medical intervention. In six monthly radiography surveys of indigent housing 
between 1975 and 1977, the response rate for each survey never topped 15% of the 
study population.725 These housing forms not only did not provide an environment 
conducive to recovery, they frustratingly reinforced intransigent habits among 
occupants. Thus, Patel theorized that providing incentives could increase 
radiography and chemotherapy compliance. A more compliant indigent population 
would, hopefully, result in a reduction in mortality and arrest the spread of 
tuberculosis among this population.  
 
 Throughout the duration of the study (1978-1982), an ambulatory 
radiography van, little changed from the 1957 campaign, visited twenty two lodging-
houses. In total, the establishments provided beds for about 3,000 single men, many 
of whom were alcoholics, drug addicts, and/or homeless. Many of these hostels 
were already known to be in much worse condition than the low standards 
permitted; indeed the director of the city’s Environmental Health Department wrote 
the GGHB that ‘the new hostels are outwith the scope of the Legislation for Common 
Lodging Houses and are run by Housing Management Department’.726 Public health 
workers, many from Glasgow’s Environmental Health Department, visited the 
establishments in the autumn and the winter. The inducements were offered only 
during the winter visits. The inducements took the form of vouchers, which could be 
exchanged for either food or cigarettes. Originally, Patel had sought to offer 50 
pence as incentive.727 Patel later concluded that monetary incentives might be 
misappropriated, and switched to vouchers. Put simply, the vouchers worked: once 
the vouchers were introduced, occupant compliance in radiography examinations 
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increased. While the autumn sessions saw little change in radiography compliance 
compared with the 1975-1977 period, the winter sessions response rate increased 
47%.728 The graph below illustrates the change in compliance over the years after 
the introduction of incentives: 
 
 
K R Patel, ‘Pulmonary Tuberculosis in Residents of Lodging Houses, Night Shelters and Common 
Hostels in Glasgow: A 5 Year Prospective Study’, British Journal of Diseases of the Chest (1985), Vol. 
79: 62. 
 
The most striking aspect of the graph may not be the representation of active 
tuberculosis cases found, but rather just how many occupants opted for screening; 
the novelty of incentives produced a dramatic response from occupants. These 
incentives could not have come at a more opportune time, given the extent of 
tuberculosis in Glaswegian indigent housing. Patel compared the prevalence rate of 
tuberculosis of indigent housing occupants with other groups deemed susceptible to 
the disease. Occupants had between 45 and 160 times the prevalence rate of school 
teachers and industrial workers, who invariably lived in more permanent, suitable 
accommodation. Glasgow’s prisoners, who were subjected to overcrowded and 
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insanitary conditions, were 15 times less likely to suffer from tuberculosis.729 But 
perhaps most alarmingly, indigent housing occupants were six times as likely to have 
tuberculosis as persons referred by their physicians to chest clinics for radiography. 
This suggests that persons who lived in lodging-houses, shelters, or hostels were 
more apt to be tubercular than ordinary Glaswegians whose doctors felt they 
exhibited symptoms! The conspicuous prevalence of tuberculosis in the lodging-
house occupant population pointed not just to deficiencies in behaviour, but 
deficiencies in the housing form; earlier research in London had shown that even 
when lodging-house occupants followed chemotherapy prescriptions, they were far 
less likely to overcome infection than better housed patients.730 The table below 
highlights the dramatic difference in prevalence rate between lodging-house 






K R Patel, ‘Pulmonary Tuberculosis in Residents of Lodging Houses, Night Shelters and Common 
Hostels in Glasgow: A 5 Year Prospective Study’, British Journal of Diseases of the Chest (1985), Vol. 
79: 64. 
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There was never ever any contention that indigent Glaswegians, due in part to their 
risky behaviours, were more likely to contract tuberculosis. Whether or not 
occupants would take advantage of tuberculosis treatment initiatives did, however, 
spark inquiry. Furthermore, Patel’s research pointed to the conclusion that indigent 
housing had a negative impact on occupant health. This conclusion rebuts Laidlaw’s 
contention that model lodging-houses and similar dwellings were beneficial for 
occupants. The argument for lodging-houses, hostels, night shelters, and similar 
accommodation was simple: residing here is better than sleeping rough. Patel’s 
survey pointed to a contrary conclusion – that overall, lodging-houses and the like 
were detrimental to occupant health. True, indigent housing provided occupants 
with roofs over their heads. But not only did it not offer any solace from 
tuberculosis, it seemed to exacerbate conditions that led to tuberculosis contraction 
and cultivated habits that inhibited seeking treatment. The lodging-house 
environment, which instilled in its occupants a lodging-house mentality, did not 
seem to foster responsible health decisions. Only food voucher incentives compelled 
occupants to submit to radiography screenings. While the incentive programme was 
successful in compelling screening attendance (and indeed successful in reducing 
tuberculosis mortality rates in a high-risk group), the survey also highlighted a public 
health failure: a deficiency in housing society’s most vulnerable persons. Lodging-
houses, hostels, and night shelter were not adequate long term housing options; 
they weren’t even healthy short term housing options. There were reports that 
lodging-house occupants were deliberately becoming homeless in order to ‘jump 
queue’ on rehousing lists.731 If these housing forms were as injurious to health as to 
engender tuberculosis incidence rates 15 times that of Scottish prisoners, perhaps 
such seemingly reckless abandonment was less deleterious than one might imagine. 
Regardless, public health professionals were aware of the decrepit state of lodging-
housing – and sought to rectify the problem. Indeed, Patel’s study caught the 
attention of Gordon Brown, the assistant secretary of the Greater Glasgow Health 
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Board.732 In a letter to Patel, Brown wrote that the Working Party on Tuberculosis of 
the GGHB was impressed with his research but sought to encourage the regular 
screening of health workers who worked with tubercular lodging house 
occupants.733 Patel responded in a letter that his suggestions were quite prescient, 
and had already been adopted by the Scottish Home and Health Department.734 
Thus, Patel’s study helped further illuminate the connection between housing and 
health, and strengthened the public health case for social housing. Due to a general 
shortage of social housing units in Glasgow, there were persons who were compelled 
to live in crowded, insanitary, short-term housing units. As Patel’s study showed, 
simply living in a lodging-house had the potential to be injurious to occupant health. 
While it was true that the lodging-houses concentrated certain types of persons who 
were more likely to contract tuberculosis, and thus provided an environment to offer 
radiography screening, lodging-houses were not suitable for patient recuperation. 
Just as Moodie had shown before the Patel study, sanitary and secure 
accommodation was necessary for illness recovery. Mostly, Glasgow’s housing and 
medical professionals had heeded this notion; by 1980 there were more social 
housing units proportionally than any other first world city. Yet Patel had shown that 
even by 1980, some Glaswegians were still struggling to overcome tuberculosis 
insanitary environments. While tuberculosis continued to decline in incidence in 
later decades (although spikes in the 1980s were attributed to growing minority 





The political climate of the 1960s and 1970s preceded the academic and 
professional investigations into social housing’s viability as a healthy housing 
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alternative for Glasgow and Baltimore’s slum dwellers. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the political opinion of social housing as both an efficient and beneficial tool 
of housing largesse had begun to wane; housing rehabilitation programmes were 
favoured more than new social housing developments as the social problems 
associated with housing schemes and projects became more known. Housing 
authorities on both sides of the Atlantic were becoming increasingly suspicious of 
the transformative powers of social housing. The academic investigators of social 
housing during this period were driven by the same questions: did social housing, 
now a more mature housing form, provide any recognizable health benefits to 
tenants over that of slum housing? Both Glaswegian and Baltimorean investigators 
came to a similar conclusion: while social housing seemed to provide a reasonably 
healthy environment for slum dwelling families, high-rise tower blocks were an 
especially inappropriate choice for social housing communities. In Glasgow, Jephcott 
had shown that while many tenants expressed positive evaluations of their new 
homes, certain subgroups such as the elderly and families with small children 
reported difficulty in adjusting to their new high-rise family environments. Likewise, 
across the Atlantic, tenant activist and provocateur Shirley Wise testified before the 
United States Congress multiple times relaying her experiences with housing 
vulnerable families in high-rise tower blocks. In her opinion, while social housing was 
by definition a difficult venture, the use of high-rises only made the mission of 
protecting vulnerable families more difficult. Yet while high-rise tower blocks did not 
retain many advocates during the 1960s and 1970s, social housing’s impact on 
tuberculosis recovery time did feature in public health literature. Glasgow trained 
physician Allan Moodie advocated social housing for tubercular patients, as a steady 
residence shortened recovery times to full health. In Glasgow, Patel investigated the 
deleterious impact lodging-house tenancy had on tuberculosis contraction and 
identification. Although tuberculosis prevalence had been dramatically reduced by 
the late 1970s, the disease was still a scourge among certain subgroups of vulnerable 
persons in Glasgow – the very types of persons that would have benefited from 
social housing tenancy. Patel argued that adequate housing not only would have 
mitigated the intensity of tuberculosis infection in tenants, but like Moodie found 
that a steady residence was of great help to public health professionals in 
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administering radiography screening (in conjunction with other incentives). Thus, 
housing and health authorities in the 1960s and 1970s seemed to be much in 
agreement with their predecessors in the 1940s and 1950s: social housing provided 
an environment for low-income families to pursue healthy and happy lives, but these 
communities were not without their structural and social flaws. Similarly, and 
although architectural determinism waned in popularity during these years, housing 
professionals and public health professionals seemed convinced of the efficacy of 
social housing. While the strict condemnation of social housing altogether was a 
recurring theme during the 1980s, in the years leading up to 1980 social housing 
remained an endorsed tool in the provision of healthy alternatives to slum housing, 
despite its tarnished reputation.  
 
Chapter 8: Did Social Housing Achieve its Goal in Glasgow and Baltimore? 
 
 This dissertation has sought to evaluate the relationship between social 
housing and health in Glasgow and Baltimore during the 1930-1980 period. The 
thesis of this study has been that social housing tenancy had an impact on public 
health, and that specifically, those who moved from slum housing into social housing 
saw an improvement in their health. Yet while this thesis might not seem particularly 
audacious, the evidence presented in this study suggests that it may have been too 
ambitious. Through a review of the intellectual and political discussion surrounding 
the development of social housing in both cities, and a concomitant review of public 
health literature (particularly longitudinal studies) pertinent to the correlation 
between housing and health, the aim of this investigation was to show that there 
was tangible, concrete data to support the conclusion that social housing improved 
health outcomes and contributed to a better general public health. In simple terms, 
however, the evidence did not support this conclusion. While social housing in 
Glasgow and Baltimore managed to provide some respite from slum conditions, it 
did not dramatically improve either individual tenant health outcomes or greatly 
improve the general public health. At best, the implementation of social housing in 
both Glasgow and Baltimore can described as having small, positive effect on the 
public health. This is not to suggest that social housing was not a worth-while 
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endeavour; indeed social housing provided suitable accommodation for tens of 
thousands of families who were compelled to live in slum conditions. Rather, this 
dissertation must accept that the evidence examined cannot support the claim that 
social housing dramatically improved tenant health outcomes or provided an 
environment that allowed lower-income persons escape poor health.  
 
The idea that housing form could positively influence public health was from 
the outset a controversial contention. Commentators on both housing and health 
debated whether the slums were the product of poor tenant behaviour or an 
unfortunate symptom of working-class poverty. In the eighteenth century, 
commentators of public health issues were sceptical that slum housing conditions 
were a cause of slum tenants’ health woes, instead endorsing the idea that slum 
dwellers intrinsic poor behaviours led to the decrepit environmental conditions of 
the slums.735  In the nineteenth century, reformers like Charles Booth and Jacob Riis 
helped change the general public’s perceptions of slum dwellers, but still the 
concept of social housing eluded social reformers. By the early twentieth century, 
the architectural determinist position (i.e. that housing form could influence health 
and behaviour) influenced many housing and public health professionals; it is at this 
point that social housing first coalesced into a viable idea. The ‘housers’, as they 
were known, were successful on both sides of the Atlantic in pushing subsidized 
municipally owned and controlled housing for low-income persons. Yet by the 1980s, 
the once grand experiment had begun its inexorable decline. Very quickly, public, 
professional, and governmental enthusiasm for social housing declined. With the 
arrival of Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister in 1979 and Ronald Reagan as 
President in 1981, the writing was on the wall; both British and American voters had 
endorsed conservative governments that were sceptical of the positive impact of 
social housing. With the Thatcher government’s policy of ‘right-to-buy’ and the 
Reagan administration’s general slashing of social welfare funds, social housing had 
reached its nadir. Indeed, Reagan viewed social housing with such suspicion that he 
found it inherently unsustainable: 
                                                 
735 Heather Beatty, Nervous Disease in Late Eighteenth-Century Britain: The Reality of a Fashionable 
Disorder (London: Routledge, 2015).  
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People do not develop a sense of pride in their neighborhoods when the lawns are mowed for them 
by public housing employees; the garbage is taken out by a public housing employee; and everything 
else is done for them. Despite all the efforts and fine management of many local authorities, they 
cannot overcome the fundamental weakness of most public housing: namely it fails to give a man a 
chance to own his own home.736 
 
Yet while social housing in Britain and the United States never regained its 
once heralded stature, the housing form nevertheless had a profound impact on the 
urban fabric of British and American cities. Indeed, any historian of British or 
American urban history must have an understanding of the impact of social housing 
on the development of the city in each society.737 Yet the issue of whether social 
housing had a positive or negative impact on tenant health overall remains a 
contentious idea. Indeed, the more influential contemporary commentators on the 
environmental determinants of health, i.e. Dahlgren and Whitehead and Sir Douglas 
Black, have been divided on the issue. In the former’s now famous rainbow model of 
the external determinants of health, ‘living and working conditions’ is one of the 
most outer concentric layers of personal health – the implication being that while 
housing quality contributed to individual health it was by no measure the most 
important indicator of health. Regardless, they recognized that better quality 
housing conditions could have a profound influence on health, particularly among 
those who were already vulnerable.738 The Black Report, however, was far more 
critical of the role of social housing in improving tenant health. While Sir Black 
endorsed the further funding of social housing, he found through his research using 
data from the 1970s that inequalities in morbidity and mortality rates had increased 
in the lower class, and that those that inhabited social housing had suffered a decline 
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in their standard of health.739 Indeed, in his report Black had estimated that if the 
same mortality rates that applied to what he termed ‘Class I’ persons (the 
professional class) applied to ‘Class IV and V’ persons (lower skilled and unskilled 
workers and their families), who were more likely to live in social housing, there 
would have been 74,000 fewer deaths during the 1970-1972 period.740 Following this 
line of inquiry, the Acheson Report, which focused on the years following 1980 and 
was published in 1998, concurred with the findings of the Black Report and found 
that the primary determinants of health were external, socioeconomic factors and 
that current government efforts to combat public health problems (mainly 
healthcare services, but also the provision of social housing) were inadequate. Of the 
39 recommendations the Acheson Report made to improve the health of lower 
income persons, only three related to health services.741 
 
 Social housing, then, had certainly not proved itself a panacea to public 
health woes, even after forty years in Britain.742 Yet, while social housing schemes 
often seemed far from paradisiacal, they were designed to provide a healthy and 
affordable housing alternative to the slums for British and American working class 
families. The provision of accommodation that would facilitate a healthy life for 
former slum dwellers was, along with affordability, the prime motivation for the 
creation of social housing developments in both Glasgow and Baltimore. As this 
dissertation has shown, however, the vision of creating an oasis of healthy living for 
urban slum dwellers proved more difficult to achieve than at first conceived.  
 
As discussed in the first chapter, the cities of Glasgow and Baltimore both 
suffered from similar problems. Both cities were industrial port cities grappling with 
the prospect of economic decline. Both cities were hotbeds of civil unrest; in 
Glasgow, primarily labour unrest, in Baltimore, primarily racial unrest. Both cities had 
                                                 
739 Barritt, Humanity in Healthcare, p. 36; Mark Exworthy and Adam Oliver, ‘Evidence and Health 
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742 While the Black Report was published in 1980, the data collected focused on the early 1970s. 
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long struggled with problems with slum housing, albeit in different housing forms. 
Crucial to the narrative of this dissertation, both cities struggled with unhealthy 
populations relative to their more affluent neighbours. As discussed in the second 
chapter, the similarities between Glasgow and Baltimore prompted very similar 
political movements: ‘housers’ argued that state and municipal intervention into the 
housing market could provide a suitable housing alternative to slum dwellers. On 
both sides of the Atlantic, these housers were successful in their endeavour; by the 
end of the Second World War social housing developments had been established in 
both cities. While at first these new housing communities were heralded by both the 
general public and professionals as dramatic improvements over slum dwellings, 
unexpected problems disrupted the social harmony envisioned for these new 
neighbourhoods. In Glasgow, many of the new social housing schemes built 
consisted of high-rise flats – which as profiled by Pearl Jephcott were hardly urban 
paradises for most families. Additionally, much of Glasgow’s schemes were built on 
the periphery of the city, far away from the amenities and job opportunities of the 
city centre. Furthermore, neither planners nor willing tenants realized the 
devastating impact of breaking up old neighbourhoods and severing community 
connections between residents. In Baltimore, the social tumult caused by the Brown 
v. Board decision in 1954, which ended racial segregation in the city’s nascent 
housing projects, resulted in White flight and an ideological abandonment of the 
social housing ideal. Once social housing in Baltimore became associated popularly 
as ‘Black housing’, the housing projects lost appeal to both White and Black 
prospective tenants. Given the ‘challenge’ of housing low-income people adequately, 
to borrow housing activist Shirley Wise’s terminology, it is perhaps not surprising 
that social housing fell short of its lofty goals. It was not that tens of thousands of 
Glaswegian and Baltimorean families were better accommodated in slum housing. 
Indeed, few voices contested the structural superiority of social housing buildings or 
the relatively generous equipping of individual housing units over slum housing 
units. The critical position of this dissertation is not that social housing provided 
worse accommodation than the slums, or even that social housing policy was 
executed inefficiently. Rather, this dissertation mostly concurs with the findings of 
the Black Report, and argues that social housing in Glasgow and Baltimore did not 
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deliver what its proponents promised: an environment wherein working-class 
families could live free from the health and social consequences of poverty. At best, 
social housing in Glasgow and Baltimore provided working-class families with 
accommodation that slightly better facilitated the pursuit of a healthy life. 
Ultimately, social housing could not deliver on its promises because it promised too 
much; the problems of industrial decline, structural poverty, and institutionalized 
racism were societal problems too grand and complex to be alleviated by the 
provision of adequate housing. For the most part, there was little evidence that 
social housing exacerbated poor health (with the notable primary exception of 
M’wan), rather social housing cannot claim that it reduced the consequences of 
poverty greatly nor greatly improved health outcomes for slum-dwelling tenants. 
What social housing did achieve was the provision of spacious accommodation 
equipped with the appliances that pointed to an increasing standard of living in the 
post-war period. Significantly, social housing in Glasgow and Baltimore managed to 
provide this to families at affordable rental rates. Tenancy in social housing did not 
guarantee an escape from poverty, but it did provide a more decent living 
experience for those trapped in the cycle of poverty. My dissertation has sought to 
illuminate this aspect of the social housing experience in both cities, through an 
examination of a wide variety of primary and secondary sources that documented 
social housing in both cities.  
 
 In particular, the public health research published on the impact of social 
housing tenancy on health supports this conclusion. In Baltimore, Daniel Wilner’s 
comparative longitudinal analysis of rehoused slum dwellers and continued slum 
dwellers showed little improvement in the rehoused group, with the notable 
exception of rehoused children who did better in terms of school advancement. In 
Glasgow, Thomas Ferguson’s cross-sectional examinations of slum dwellers and 
recently rehoused families showed that generally, there were only small health 
benefits to rehousing, with the significant exception of improved infant mortality in 
the rehoused group. Indeed, aside from his conclusions on the impact of housing on 
infant mortality Ferguson’s research suggested that weekly income was a more 
accurate indicator of family health than housing tenancy. Thus, as the years 
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progressed, public health researchers only managed to reveal modest health 
benefits to rehousing. Social housing occupancy seemed to affect resident health in 
more unanticipated ways. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Glasgow trained 
physician Allan Moodie’s research found that Baltimorean tuberculosis patients 
recovered more quickly when they had secure tenancy, tacitly suggesting that 
tubercular social housing tenants would recover more quickly if only because of the 
security of tenancy associated with social housing meant that public health workers 
could locate and aid their patients with greater ease. Physician K R Patel concurred 
with Moodie’s tacit endorsement of social housing as tool of public health, but only 
because the occupants of Glasgow’s lodging-houses were so susceptible to the 
contraction of tuberculosis and suffered longer recuperation periods. Put simply, 
social housing developments seemed to provide a healthier alternative to the slums, 
but this was a low bar to beat. Even social oriented commentators grew less 
enthusiastic about social housing. Pearl Jephcott’s study on the impact of high-rise 
tower block life on more vulnerable tenants recorded general tenant satisfaction 
with their flats, but also pointed to unexpected difficulties for many tenants. 
According to Oakley, while Jephcott nominally approves of social housing tenancy as 
an overall improvement over slum conditions, when reading Homes in High Flats it is 
easy to detect a not-so-subtle judgement of Scotland’s high-rise social housing 
schemes as overall insufficient.743 In the words of architectural historian Jonathan 
Hughes: 
 
 ‘[Jephcott] put the whole official bureaucracy (including architects and planners) on trial, and found 
them to be wanting –creating buildings and environments out of tune with public need or sentiment – 
imposing their designs without proper consultation, and then failing to maintain them adequately’.744 
 
 Indeed, these feelings of malaise that Jephcott’s study participants reported may 
have informed Thatcher’s strong criticism of the benefits of social housing and her 
administration’s efforts to privatize council housing throughout Britain. Baltimore 
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tenant activist Shirley Wise, who had spent her early years in rural slum housing, 
found conditions little improved in the city’s housing projects. Wise thought high-rise 
projects were a particularly unsuitable housing form for more vulnerable tenants, 
such as the elderly and large families. Wise’s testimony before the federal 
government and city-wide activism led to the demolition or repurposing of literally 
every high-rise housing project in Baltimore by the early 1990s. Thus, while social 
housing sustained a quick and meteoritic rise in both Glasgow and Baltimore, it also 
suffered an equally quick decline in public and professional opinion.  
 
If social housing residency improved tenant health during the latter years of 
the second half of the twentieth century, by the 1980s Glaswegians and 
Baltimoreans were not impressed enough to sustain social housing to the level they 
once had. The massive social housing developments that municipal authorities in 
both cities once praised are now viewed as undesirable. Many of Baltimore’s largest 
social housing projects have been demolished. In Glasgow, and despite the fact that 
there are many, many more high-rise schemes than there ever were in Baltimore, 
the most notorious schemes have been demolished and other schemes are being 
redeveloped. In the twenty first century, social housing looks appreciably different in 
both Glasgow and Baltimore. In Scotland, new housing developments must allocate 
some percentage of the development to subsidized low-income housing.  In 
Maryland and throughout the United States, the growth of private housing vouchers 
since the 1980s through the expansion of Section 8 of the Wagner-Steagall Act has 
helped de-concentrate Black urban poverty. While social housing still does not 
provide the harmonious accommodation for working-class families as the first 
housers had promised, inroads have been made. Both Scottish and American social 
housing developments continue to provide respite from the larger socioeconomic 
forces that have oppressed working class persons in both Glasgow and Baltimore for 
decades and prevented families from achieving upward social and economic 
mobility. 
 
 Indeed, one of the most charitable explanations regarding the failure of social 
housing to greatly improve tenant health would be that in order to accomplish this 
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task, social housing tenancy in Glasgow and Baltimore would have to have helped 
elevate its tenants out of poverty. This, however, is a herculean task.  Social housing 
developments in both cities failed to provide this socioeconomic ladder to its tenants 
– but that can be attributed to the greater social and environmental determinants of 
health that have pressured lower income Scots and Americans for decades. Dahlgren 
and Whitehead’s famous rainbow model was not only illuminating because of its 
delineations of all the varied determinants of health, but also because it highlighted 
just how strongly health is determined by external factors.745  While the 
recommendations of the Black Report were reinforced by the analysis of the 
Acheson report nearly 20 years later, the Black Report was not uncritical of the 
potential health benefits of social housing. While Pearl Jephcott expressed 
reservations about the benefits of social housing but ultimately accepted that 
Glasgow’s schemes were more beneficial than unbeneficial, the Black Report argued 
that in some regards those who inhabited social housing were worse than low 
income persons in private accommodation. Subsequent research supported this 
claim. Blackman’s research into Belfast’s Divis Flats showed that 16% of tenant 
children were admitted into hospital (a much higher percentage than the 
surrounding area), Smith’s survey of three council estates in England showed that 
respiratory illnesses were more common, and Kogevinas discovered that not only 
were social housing tenants more likely to develop cancer – but were less likely to 
survive cancer than homeowners.746 Time and again, medical evidence disproved the 
notion that social housing was categorically healthier housing. While it is true that 
both the Black Report and the Acheson Report argued for an increase in the 
provision of social housing, their message was not only that more social housing 
units were needed, but that social housing developments needed to provide an 
environment that facilitated healthy living. Many social housing tenants in Glasgow 
and Baltimore were not fortunate enough to enjoy life in such communities. As many 
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Glaswegian tenants who voluntarily left social housing accommodation contended, 
starting the first community based housing associations (CBHAs) in the 1970s did not 
alleviate all of their problems. The City of Glasgow was often not a generous or 
compassionate landlord; tenement life was hard all around.747 
 
Regardless, the impact of social housing on the public health in Glasgow and 
Baltimore has been evident. It is true that social housing as both a political and 
public health experiment failed to meet its lofty expectations. Very high goals were 
set for social housing developments in both cities, however, and thus social housing 
should not be viewed as an absolute failure in either social or public health terms. In 
Glasgow, housing schemes were tasked with providing a new, stable housing 
environment for an impoverished and unhealthy population of working-class families 
during a period of dramatic deindustrialization and changing social expectations. In 
Baltimore, housing projects quickly assumed the task of providing stable 
communities for a population of Black families who were marginalized politically, 
socially, and economically. As of the early twenty first century, the ‘Glasgow Effect’, 
referenced in the first chapter continues to define the health of the city’s most 
economically marginalized and racial discrepancies in both health and wealth. 
Similar socioeconomic conditions continue to dampen the public health of Baltimore. 
Social housing, it must be conceded, was not an entirely successful experiment. Yet 
social housing was not a categorical failure either; in Glasgow the massive schemes 
removed hundreds of thousands of persons from the city’s infamous dilapidated 
slums and in Baltimore thousands of Black families were allocated well-equipped 
housing units that would normally have been prohibitively expensive or otherwise 
unobtainable. Furthermore, had social housing developments never been built in 
either Glasgow or Baltimore, the problems of overcrowding, poor public health, and 
class/racial division that plagued both cities throughout the twentieth century would 
almost certainly been more severe; it is doubtful that CBHAs alone could have 
improved the entirety of Glasgow’s slum housing and Black Baltimoreans would have 
to wait until after the 1980s before it was feasible to move en masse to suburban 
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Baltimore County. It is almost certainly true that the availability of social housing 
units in Glasgow and Baltimore not only improved the public health but assuaged 
social tension and civil unrest. As Glasgow’s industrial action in the 1980s and 
Baltimore’s racial riots in the 1960s and 1970s shows, both cities were susceptible to 
these disruptions. While the advent of social housing did not eliminate the social 
problems that beset these cities’ populations, they alleviated the detrimental effects 
of the social conditions of both cities.  It is true that the cities of Glasgow and 
Baltimore are still characterized as relatively unhealthy places. The advent of social 
housing in the twentieth century, however, mitigated the impact of both 
deindustrialization and environmental conditions deleterious to health for hundreds 
of thousands of working-class Glaswegians and Baltimoreans. On these grounds 
alone, the social housing experiment should be viewed as a moderate success.  
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